113 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
113 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: "01-same-origin-embedding"
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title: "Support same-origin canvas embedding"
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status: done
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wave: 1
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depends_on: []
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plan: "plan.md"
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requirements:
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- REQ-PLUGINS-ISOLATED-WEB-APPS-007
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acceptance_criteria:
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- AC-PLUGINS-ISOLATED-WEB-APPS-007.1
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- AC-PLUGINS-ISOLATED-WEB-APPS-007.7
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- AC-PLUGINS-ISOLATED-WEB-APPS-007.8
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- AC-PLUGINS-ISOLATED-WEB-APPS-007.10
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system_design:
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- ../../specs/plugins/system-design/isolated-web-app-contributions.md
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---
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# Task 01: Support same-origin canvas embedding
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## Summary
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Add the host-owned `'self'` source to runtime framing policy. This fixes custom
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DNS, IP, and port access without maintaining a hostname list or weakening the
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opaque sandbox.
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## In scope
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- Add the keyword in `BuildContentSecurityPolicy`, outside exact-origin parsing.
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- Preserve configured launcher/Tauri origins, current network policy, and
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relative runtime paths. No request-header-derived ancestor values.
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- Real-browser regression through two HTTPS aliases and a foreign parent.
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- Document same-origin hosting in public canvas/security guidance.
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## Out of scope
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New DNS/configuration keys, cross-origin deployment setup, initial grants,
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startup acknowledgement, dialog changes, or desktop packaging mutations.
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## Acceptance
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1. `TestBuildContentSecurityPolicyIncludesSelf` fails on the old policy, then
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passes with existing sandbox, normalization, and token tests preserved.
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2. Real entry content executes through each custom same-origin HTTPS host;
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unrelated and nested foreign ancestors stay blocked, including spoofed
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forwarded-header requests. Localhost and Tauri origins remain supported.
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3. The fix does not add wildcard ancestors, reflect inbound headers, or modify
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`allow-same-origin`, network grants, or stored release artifacts.
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## Verification
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From the repository root, after the plan's one-time dependency install:
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```bash
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(cd apps/backend && go test ./internal/plugins/webapp/...)
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(cd apps/web && pnpm e2e:run --project chromium tests/canvas/canvas-host-origins.spec.ts -- --retries=0)
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node --test scripts/validate-public-docs.test.mjs
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node scripts/validate-public-docs.mjs
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git diff --check
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```
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Create the policy unit RED first. The browser regression must assert content
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execution, not the outer host's existing Ready label. Close test proxies,
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contexts, and certificate directories in failure cleanup. No production DNS,
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live runtime, or public task interaction is permitted.
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## Files likely touched
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- `apps/backend/internal/plugins/webapp/policy.go`, `policy_test.go`, `runtime_test.go`
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- `apps/backend/internal/plugins/webapp/runtime.go`, `apps/backend/internal/plugins/provider.go` only if needed to preserve explicit origins
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- New `apps/web/e2e/tests/canvas/canvas-host-origins.spec.ts`
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- New `apps/web/e2e/tests/canvas/canvas-origin-fixture.ts`
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- `docs/public/canvases.md`, `docs/public/security.md`
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## Dependencies
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None. Start with the current spec and repository head; no other open PR is a prerequisite.
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## Risks
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An E2E proxy that rewrites CSP can make the test pass without proving the fix.
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An HTTPS-only trust bypass in test code must remain confined to disposable
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browser contexts. Cross-alias embedding is not same-origin embedding.
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## Parallelism
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`sequential`
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## Inputs
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- Plugin design: Browser host and Browser security boundary.
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- Existing runtime/security tests and `FrameAncestorsForConfig`.
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- TLS fixture mechanics in `apps/web/e2e/helpers/plugin-git-credentials.ts`.
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- [Plan evidence and E2E matrix](plan.md).
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## Results
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Implemented and verified on 2026-09-10.
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- `BuildContentSecurityPolicy` now adds `frame-ancestors 'self'` while
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retaining exact localhost and Tauri exceptions.
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- Added a disposable HTTPS browser fixture with two same-origin aliases,
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direct and nested foreign ancestors, and a spoofed forwarded-host header.
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- Same-origin entry content executes through both aliases. Direct and nested
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foreign framing stays blocked.
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- Updated public canvas and security guidance. No production DNS setting or
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request-header trust was added.
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- `(cd apps/backend && go test ./internal/plugins/webapp/...)`: passed, 30 tests.
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- `(cd apps/web && pnpm e2e:run --project chromium tests/canvas/canvas-host-origins.spec.ts -- --retries=0)`: passed, 1 test.
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- `node --test scripts/validate-public-docs.test.mjs`: passed, 62 tests.
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- `node scripts/validate-public-docs.mjs`: passed, 46 published docs pages.
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- `git diff --check`: passed.
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