Carlos Florêncio
65 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
65 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: task-02
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title: Filesystem registration store + credentials
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status: done
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wave: 1
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depends_on: [task-01]
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plan: docs/plans/plugins/plan.md
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---
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# Filesystem registration store + credentials
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## Title
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Persist plugin registrations to `~/.kandev/plugins/{id}.yml` with a bcrypt-hashed
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api_key and an encrypted (recoverable) webhook secret, plus operator config at
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`{id}.config.yml`.
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## Inputs
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- Spec `docs/specs/plugins/requirements/plugins.md` → "Plugin registration (filesystem-backed)"
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and "Persistence guarantees".
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- **Credential storage refinement (resolves a spec inconsistency — capture in the
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task-15 spec update):**
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- `api_key`: kandev only ever *verifies* inbound requests → store as **bcrypt
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hash** only. Cleartext returned once at registration.
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- `webhook_secret`: kandev must *HMAC-sign* outbound event deliveries →
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bcrypt (one-way) is impossible. Store the secret in the **encrypted secrets
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store** (`internal/secrets` via `internal/integrations/secretadapter.Adapter`,
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which is reversible via `Reveal`). The `{id}.yml` keeps only a secret
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*reference id*, not the value. Cleartext returned once at registration.
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- Uses `Manifest` from task-01 (import `internal/plugins/manifest`).
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- bcrypt: `golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt`. Secret adapter interface: inject a small
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interface `SecretVault { Set(ctx,id,name,value) error; Reveal(ctx,id) (string,error); Delete(ctx,id) error }`
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so the store is testable with a fake (the real one is `secretadapter.Adapter`).
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## Acceptance
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1. `Record` struct = manifest + runtime fields (status, api_key_hash,
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webhook_secret_ref, registered_at, last_health_check).
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2. `store.Store` interface: `List`, `Get(id)`, `Save(*Record)`, `Delete(id)`,
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`GetConfig(id)`, `SetConfig(id, map)`.
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3. `NewFSStore(dir string, vault SecretVault)`; `Register(ctx, manifest) (*Record, Credentials, error)`
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generates random `api_key`+`webhook_secret` (crypto/rand), bcrypt-hashes the
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api_key, stores the webhook_secret in the vault under ref
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`plugin-webhook-secret:{id}`, writes `{id}.yml`, returns cleartext
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`Credentials{APIKey, WebhookSecret}` once.
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4. `VerifyAPIKey(id, key) (bool, error)` (bcrypt compare);
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`RevealWebhookSecret(ctx, id) (string, error)` (vault Reveal).
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5. Duplicate id on Register → typed `ErrAlreadyExists`. `Delete` also deletes the
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vault secret.
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## Files
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- `apps/backend/internal/plugins/store/store.go`
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- `apps/backend/internal/plugins/store/fs_store.go`
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- `apps/backend/internal/plugins/store/fs_store_test.go` (`t.TempDir()` + fake vault)
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## Verification
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- `go test ./internal/plugins/store/...` from `apps/backend`
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- `make -C apps/backend lint`
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## Output contract
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Report: file format, the api_key(bcrypt)/webhook_secret(encrypted-ref) split, the
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SecretVault interface shape (so task-05/06 can reveal the secret for signing).
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Do not edit `internal/plugins/manifest/` (import only). Stay within `internal/plugins/store/`.
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## Dependencies
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task-01 (imports manifest types).
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