João Salavisa
e145d48f22
* feat: add plugin system with grpc runtime and native ui plugins - go plugin backends ship as release tarballs (per-platform binaries, checksums) that kandev installs from url/upload or filesystem sideload+sync, then spawns and supervises via hashicorp/go-plugin (unix socket / loopback tcp+automtls) - strict typed grpc contract (kandev.plugin.v1): DeliverEvent/InvokeTool/HandleWebhook plus a capability-gated host service (state, secrets, emit); author sdk in pkg/pluginsdk; packaging cli in cmd/plugin-pack - native frontend bundles: window.registerKandevPlugin + registry/host loader with dynamic routes, nav items, slots and ws handlers; plugins settings page with install dialog, sync button and enable/disable/uninstall - gated behind the plugins feature flag (prod off, dev/e2e on); covered by unit and integration tests plus playwright e2e against a real packaged fixture plugin Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(plugins): hydrate base app context on plugin routes Plugin-owned SPA routes classify as RouteUnknown, so the boot payload shipped only feature flags — no workspaces, workflows, or kanban context. Native plugin UI (e.g. host.ui.TaskCreateDialog) then had an empty store. Hydrate the same base context as the Home route for unknown SPA routes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(plugins): expose TaskCreateDialog on host.ui Lets a native plugin open kandev's real create-task modal (prefilled via initialValues) instead of POSTing directly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(plugins): harden filesystem/URL sinks against CodeQL findings Add sink-level guards on the plugin trust boundary: securejoin containment on archive extraction (zip-slip), plugin-id validation before every fs_store path, http/https scheme validation on install-from-URL, and non-interpolated ws-handler error logging. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(plugins): address review findings (races, resource caps, lifecycle) - serialize per-plugin startup to close a TOCTOU double-spawn race, and let a plugin restart after exhausting attempts - bound plugin startup with an explicit 30s timeout - reject backslash paths and cap decompressed bytes by actual size in pkgtar; only mark a package Signed when a verifier actually ran and passed - delete plugin_state on uninstall; validate webhook keys against the manifest and cap webhook body size; restart an active plugin when a new version installs Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(plugins): sanitize plugin-id path sinks for CodeQL Pin the plugin id to a single path segment with filepath.Base at recordPath/ configPath and pkgtar.Remove — a barrier the taint analysis recognizes. Behaviour-identical for valid ids (already validated by safePluginID); clears the go/path-injection alerts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(plugins): inline plugin-id validation at path sinks for CodeQL filepath.Base does not strip '..', so it is not a path-injection barrier. Call the recognized safePluginID / id-pattern guard inline in Delete/GetConfig/ SetConfig and pkgtar.Remove — the same barrier that already cleared the Get sink. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(plugins): address code-review findings (backend) - add capability-gating tests for the Host RPC service (was untested) - close a stop-during-start orphan race so Disable/Uninstall can't leave a supervised subprocess behind - on failed upgrade, remove only the new version dir (not all versions + data); restart the prior version - validate manifest version and reject ids ending in .config (record-file alias) - make Deliverer.Refresh non-blocking and cancel in-flight delivery on worker stop - clamp out-of-range webhook status, skip-and-warn corrupt records in List, write records atomically, semver-aware sideload version pick Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(plugins): address code-review findings (frontend) - wrap plugin routes + settings routes in a shared PluginErrorBoundary so a throwing plugin page shows a fallback instead of white-screening the SPA - fix disable/re-enable in one session: keep the cached registration and re-run initialize instead of relying on a cached ES-module re-import - prefix root-relative bundle/style URLs with apiBaseUrl (split-origin/Tauri) - surface partial-install warnings via toast.warning instead of a bare success - dedupe/remove injected style links on unload; gate PluginNavItems on the flag Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(plugins): serialize per-plugin lifecycle + guard config writes - add a per-plugin keyed lock in Service so concurrent Enable/Disable/Install/ Uninstall/UpdateConfig for one id are serialized (no status-machine race) - take s.mu in SetConfig/GetConfig and write config atomically - bound each plugin initialize() with a timeout so one hung bundle can't stall the rest of the boot load Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(plugins): split service_test.go to satisfy file-length lint Move the install/URL test group into service_install_test.go; no logic change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: build and ship the e2e fixture plugin package to E2E shards The plugin E2E specs' global-setup requires apps/backend/.build/kandev-plugin-e2e-1.0.0.tar.gz. Build it in the E2E build job, upload it as an artifact, and download it in both the regular and container shard jobs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
65 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
65 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: task-02
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title: Filesystem registration store + credentials
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status: done
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wave: 1
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depends_on: [task-01]
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plan: docs/plans/plugins/plan.md
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---
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# Filesystem registration store + credentials
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## Title
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Persist plugin registrations to `~/.kandev/plugins/{id}.yml` with a bcrypt-hashed
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api_key and an encrypted (recoverable) webhook secret, plus operator config at
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`{id}.config.yml`.
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## Inputs
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- Spec `docs/specs/plugins/spec.md` → "Plugin registration (filesystem-backed)"
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and "Persistence guarantees".
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- **Credential storage refinement (resolves a spec inconsistency — capture in the
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task-15 spec update):**
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- `api_key`: kandev only ever *verifies* inbound requests → store as **bcrypt
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hash** only. Cleartext returned once at registration.
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- `webhook_secret`: kandev must *HMAC-sign* outbound event deliveries →
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bcrypt (one-way) is impossible. Store the secret in the **encrypted secrets
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store** (`internal/secrets` via `internal/integrations/secretadapter.Adapter`,
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which is reversible via `Reveal`). The `{id}.yml` keeps only a secret
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*reference id*, not the value. Cleartext returned once at registration.
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- Uses `Manifest` from task-01 (import `internal/plugins/manifest`).
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- bcrypt: `golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt`. Secret adapter interface: inject a small
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interface `SecretVault { Set(ctx,id,name,value) error; Reveal(ctx,id) (string,error); Delete(ctx,id) error }`
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so the store is testable with a fake (the real one is `secretadapter.Adapter`).
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## Acceptance
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1. `Record` struct = manifest + runtime fields (status, api_key_hash,
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webhook_secret_ref, registered_at, last_health_check).
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2. `store.Store` interface: `List`, `Get(id)`, `Save(*Record)`, `Delete(id)`,
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`GetConfig(id)`, `SetConfig(id, map)`.
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3. `NewFSStore(dir string, vault SecretVault)`; `Register(ctx, manifest) (*Record, Credentials, error)`
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generates random `api_key`+`webhook_secret` (crypto/rand), bcrypt-hashes the
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api_key, stores the webhook_secret in the vault under ref
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`plugin-webhook-secret:{id}`, writes `{id}.yml`, returns cleartext
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`Credentials{APIKey, WebhookSecret}` once.
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4. `VerifyAPIKey(id, key) (bool, error)` (bcrypt compare);
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`RevealWebhookSecret(ctx, id) (string, error)` (vault Reveal).
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5. Duplicate id on Register → typed `ErrAlreadyExists`. `Delete` also deletes the
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vault secret.
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## Files
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- `apps/backend/internal/plugins/store/store.go`
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- `apps/backend/internal/plugins/store/fs_store.go`
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- `apps/backend/internal/plugins/store/fs_store_test.go` (`t.TempDir()` + fake vault)
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## Verification
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- `go test ./internal/plugins/store/...` from `apps/backend`
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- `make -C apps/backend lint`
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## Output contract
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Report: file format, the api_key(bcrypt)/webhook_secret(encrypted-ref) split, the
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SecretVault interface shape (so task-05/06 can reveal the secret for signing).
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Do not edit `internal/plugins/manifest/` (import only). Stay within `internal/plugins/store/`.
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## Dependencies
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task-01 (imports manifest types).
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