* feat(backend): per-launch authentication for agentctl
Add nonce-based handshake protocol to secure all agentctl HTTP/WS
endpoints. On launch, the parent (backend) passes a one-time bootstrap
nonce via AGENTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_NONCE env var. agentctl generates its own
auth token, enables Bearer auth immediately, and returns the token to
the parent via POST /auth/handshake (validated by nonce).
Standalone, Docker, and Sprites executors all use the same handshake
flow. Removes the old AGENTCTL_AUTH_TOKEN env var approach. For
Docker/Sprites, the retrieved token is persisted encrypted in
SecretStore (AES-256-GCM) for crash recovery.
Security properties:
- Auth enabled from boot (no unprotected window)
- Token never in env vars (only the burned nonce)
- Nonce is one-shot (replay impossible)
- Constant-time token comparison (timing-safe)
* fix: check fmt.Sscanf return value in integration test
* fix: address review feedback - constant-time nonce comparison, safe ID truncation
* fix(backend): exempt MCP routes from agentctl auth middleware
The agent subprocess connects to agentctl's MCP endpoints (/sse, /message,
/mcp) to use kandev tools (create_task, ask_user_question, etc.). These
endpoints run on the same HTTP server as the authenticated API, but the
agent process doesn't possess the auth token — it was only exchanged
between the backend and agentctl during the handshake.
Exempt /sse, /message, and /mcp from the Bearer auth middleware since the
agent process runs in the same trust boundary as agentctl.
* refactor(backend): remove query param token fallback and document SetAuthToken constraint
Remove the ?token= query parameter fallback from extractBearerToken —
tokens in URLs leak via access logs, referer headers, and browser history.
All WS callers already use Authorization headers via wsAuthHeaders().
Document SetAuthToken's concurrency constraint: it must not be called
concurrently with HTTP requests on the same client.
* fix(backend): enforce mutex in ControlClient/Launcher auth, fix Start() lock scope
- Add sync.Mutex to ControlClient; protect SetAuthToken and AuthToken() reads
- Guard Launcher.AuthToken() with l.mu (written under lock in Start, read unprotected)
- Extract buildAndStartProcess and performHandshake from Start() (was 106 lines, over 80-line limit)
- Release l.mu before blocking health/handshake calls so monitorExit() can close
l.exited — previously the fast-fail path in waitForHealthy was unreachable
- Update stale executor_backend.go comment (standalone no longer uses env var auth)
Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: strip origin/ prefix from base branch for rebase/merge operations
The frontend was passing 'origin/main' as the base branch, but the backend
expects just the branch name (e.g., 'main') and constructs 'origin/' itself.
This caused git fetch to fail with:
fatal: couldn't find remote ref origin/main
Because the command became 'git fetch origin origin/main' instead of
'git fetch origin main'.
* fix: increase prompt timeout to 60min, add error feedback, rename acp to agent API
- Add PromptTimeout constant (60 minutes) in common/constants/timeouts.go
- Update agentctl client and server to use the constant
- Add error message creation when prompt fails (timeout, agent not running, etc)
- Rename /acp/* endpoints to /agent/* (protocol-agnostic naming)
- Rename acp.go files to agent.go in both client and server
- Rename handler functions from handleACP* to handleAgent*
Carlos Florêncio