fix(gateway): authorize credential-less port-proxy subresources after document auth (#2682)

Co-authored-by: Carlos Florencio <carlosmflorencio@gmail.com>

apps/backend/AGENTS.md

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 Scoped guidance for `apps/backend/`. Repo-wide rules (commit format, code-quality limits, etc.) live in the root `AGENTS.md`. For plugin work, start at the [canonical plugin authoring guide](../../docs/public/plugins-authoring.md), follow choose recipe → edit `manifest.yaml` → implement → validate → package → smoke test, and treat `pkg/pluginsdk`, `proto/kandev/plugin/v1/plugin.proto`, `internal/plugins/manifest`, and `internal/plugins/pkgtar` as authoritative; the fixture is test support, and plugins must not access databases or `internal/...` packages.
 
 ## Package Structure
-
 ```text
 apps/backend/
 ├── cmd/
@@ -180,6 +179,7 @@ Standalone agentctl is launched in its own process group so terminal Ctrl+C is h
 - **Dispatched WS actions have a gateway backstop.** `Client.authorizeAction` (`internal/gateway/websocket/dispatch_scope.go`) checks any payload carrying `task_id` or `session_id` against the client's identity *before* dispatch, so a newly added action is scoped by default rather than only when its author remembers. Handler-level scoping is still required (defense in depth, and it covers non-WS callers) — do not delete a service-layer check because the backstop exists. The backstop reads `task_id`, `session_id` and `task_environment_id`, plus `id` on **top-level `task.<verb>` actions only** (`task.state`, `task.move`, `task.get`, … — `task.` and exactly one more segment). Keep using those names for task-scoped actions, because an action that invents a new name for the same kind of resource silently opts out. (`user_shell.stop` was exactly that: it keys off `task_environment_id` with `task_id` optional, so a `task_id`-only backstop missed it. `task.state` and `task.move` were the second instance: they name the task `id`, so the backstop parsed no refs and let one user mutate any other user's task — hence the `id` rule.) Deeper `task.*` namespaces are deliberately excluded: in `task.plan.revision.get` and `task.review.finding.update` the `id` names a revision or a finding, so those actions must carry `task_id` when they are task-scoped. Also avoid permissive types (`any`, `json.RawMessage`) for those fields: a payload that fails to unmarshal into the ref struct is treated as naming nothing.
 - **WS**: clients carry their identity; dispatched actions and subscriptions are scoped; workspace-carrying events route via `Hub.BroadcastToWorkspace`. A new `hub.Broadcast` (global) call site needs a `//ws:global` justification comment.
 - **Task overview vs. session detail:** Keep cross-task state in the bounded, persisted `TaskStatusSummary` projection and `task.status_summary.updated`; keep unbounded transcript and execution data session-scoped. The [bounded task-status spec](../../docs/specs/platform/bounded-task-status-delivery.md) and [accepted ADR](../../docs/decisions/2026-08-01-separate-task-summary-session-stream-traffic.md) define the shared contract.
+- **Port-proxy subtree capability:** with auth enforced, `/port-proxy/:sessionId/:port/*` needs a credential on *every* request, but browser subresource fetches cannot always carry one (the `<link rel="manifest">` fetch never sends cookies; sandboxed iframes and `?token=`-opened previews drop them elsewhere). `PortProxyHandler` mints a short-lived (15 min, sliding), path-scoped, HMAC-signed capability after the document authenticates and propagates it as a cookie scoped to the proxy subtree plus a `kandev_cap` query parameter appended to rewritten asset URLs. `requireConnectionAuth` (`internal/gateway/websocket/access.go`) accepts either form only for the exact session:port it was minted for and restores the issuing identity, so `CheckSessionAccess` still gates on the real owner. Synthetic identities (auth disabled) skip minting — proxied bodies stay byte-identical to the pre-auth behavior.
 - **Self-authenticating webhooks** (automation, office channels, plugin webhooks) and `/health`, `/api/v1/features`, `/api/v1/app-state` stay public — the allowlist lives in `auth/httpmw/middleware.go` with a pinning test.
 
 ## Execution Flow

apps/backend/internal/backendapp/auth.go

@@ -81,6 +81,13 @@ func gatewayAuthPolicy(authSvc *auth.Service, taskSvc *taskservice.Service, task
 	return gateways.AuthPolicy{
 		Enforced:     func() bool { return authSvc.Mode() != auth.ModeDisabled },
 		ResolveToken: authSvc.ResolveBearer,
+		// A restored subtree-capability identity must pass the same live
+		// account gate as cookie/PAT auth: IdentityForUser fails when the
+		// account is missing or no longer active.
+		ActiveUser: func(ctx context.Context, userID string) bool {
+			_, ok := authSvc.IdentityForUser(ctx, userID)
+			return ok
+		},
 		Subscriptions: gateways.SubscriptionAccessPolicy{
 			Task:    taskSvc.AuthorizeTaskAccess,
 			Session: taskSvc.AuthorizeSessionAccess,

apps/backend/internal/gateway/websocket/access.go

@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ type AuthPolicy struct {
 	// ResolveToken authenticates a ?token=<PAT> query credential for
 	// programmatic WS clients that cannot send cookies or headers.
 	ResolveToken func(ctx context.Context, token string) (authn.Identity, bool)
+	// ActiveUser reports whether a user account is still active. It is
+	// consulted after capability authentication: the subtree capability
+	// restores the signed identity without a live credential, so without this
+	// check a user disabled mid-preview would keep the sliding-mint capability
+	// alive indefinitely. Nil skips the check (zero-policy compatibility).
+	ActiveUser func(ctx context.Context, userID string) bool
 	// Subscriptions gates task/session topic subscriptions.
 	Subscriptions SubscriptionAccessPolicy
 	// WorkspaceOwner powers BroadcastToWorkspace owner routing.
@@ -55,7 +61,12 @@ func (g *Gateway) SetAuthPolicy(policy AuthPolicy) {
 // requireConnectionAuth guards WS upgrades and proxy routes. The global HTTP
 // auth middleware has already resolved cookie/bearer credentials into the gin
 // context; this closes the gap for unauthenticated attempts (JSON 401 before
-// any upgrade) and accepts ?token=<PAT> for headerless clients.
+// any upgrade) and accepts ?token=<PAT> for headerless clients. Port-proxy
+// requests additionally accept the short-lived subtree capability minted after
+// the preview document authenticated (see PortProxyHandler): carried as a
+// path-scoped cookie for ordinary subresource fetches, or as a query parameter
+// appended to rewritten asset URLs for fetches that never send cookies (the
+// browser's <link rel="manifest"> fetch, sandboxed iframes).
 func (g *Gateway) requireConnectionAuth() gin.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(c *gin.Context) {
 		policy := g.authPolicy
@@ -67,9 +78,27 @@ func (g *Gateway) requireConnectionAuth() gin.HandlerFunc {
 			c.Next()
 			return
 		}
+		if g.resolvePortProxyCapability(c) {
+			// A preview reloaded with ?token=<PAT> after the capability cookie
+			// was installed authenticates via the capability, but the PAT is
+			// still a gateway credential: it must be stripped from the
+			// forwarded query (never reach agentctl or the app), while a
+			// cookie-authenticated app's own token parameter is preserved.
+			if token := c.Query("token"); token != "" && policy.ResolveToken != nil {
+				if _, ok := policy.ResolveToken(c.Request.Context(), token); ok {
+					c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(context.WithValue(c.Request.Context(), proxyTokenConsumedKey{}, true))
+				}
+			}
+			c.Next()
+			return
+		}
 		if token := c.Query("token"); token != "" && policy.ResolveToken != nil {
 			if identity, ok := policy.ResolveToken(c.Request.Context(), token); ok {
 				authn.SetOnGin(c, identity)
+				// Remember that the gateway consumed ?token= so the port proxy
+				// can strip it from the forwarded query; a cookie-authenticated
+				// app's own token parameter must be preserved.
+				c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(context.WithValue(c.Request.Context(), proxyTokenConsumedKey{}, true))
 				c.Next()
 				return
 			}
@@ -78,6 +107,54 @@ func (g *Gateway) requireConnectionAuth() gin.HandlerFunc {
 	}
 }
 
+// resolvePortProxyCapability authenticates a /port-proxy/ request via the
+// short-lived subtree capability minted after the preview document
+// authenticated. It accepts the query-parameter form (appended to rewritten
+// asset URLs for fetches that never send cookies, like the browser's manifest
+// fetch) and the path-scoped cookie form (ordinary subresource fetches). The
+// credential only validates against the exact session:port subtree it was
+// minted for; on success the issuing identity is restored so downstream
+// session-ownership checks still run as the real user.
+func (g *Gateway) resolvePortProxyCapability(c *gin.Context) bool {
+	sessionID, port, ok := portProxyTarget(c)
+	if !ok || g.PortProxyHandler == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	// Accept ANY value of the capability parameter that validates: a
+	// credential-less request may carry multiple kandev_cap values (the app's
+	// own or an encoded duplicate), and the first one must not be able to
+	// shadow a valid one. A restored identity whose account is no longer
+	// active is rejected (same active-user gate the cookie/PAT paths run).
+	active := func(identity authn.Identity) bool {
+		if g.authPolicy.ActiveUser == nil {
+			return true
+		}
+		return g.authPolicy.ActiveUser(c.Request.Context(), identity.UserID)
+	}
+	if values := c.Request.URL.Query()[proxyCapabilityQueryParam]; len(values) > 0 {
+		for _, raw := range values {
+			if identity, valid := g.PortProxyHandler.validateCapability(raw, sessionID, port); valid && active(identity) {
+				authn.SetOnGin(c, identity)
+				return true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	// Accept ANY capability cookie that validates: duplicate kandev_port_proxy
+	// cookies (a stale or app-created value on a more-specific path is sent
+	// before the gateway's subtree cookie) must not let the first one shadow a
+	// valid value, matching the duplicate-safe query-parameter handling.
+	for _, cookie := range c.Request.Cookies() {
+		if cookie.Name != proxyCapabilityCookieName || cookie.Value == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if identity, valid := g.PortProxyHandler.validateCapability(cookie.Value, sessionID, port); valid && active(identity) {
+			authn.SetOnGin(c, identity)
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // clientMayReceive reports whether a client may receive workspace-scoped
 // traffic for the given owner. Synthetic identities (auth disabled) see
 // everything; unowned workspaces ("" owner) are visible to all.

apps/backend/internal/gateway/websocket/access_test.go

@@ -210,6 +210,229 @@ func assertAuthRequiredBody(t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestRequireConnectionAuthAcceptsPortProxyCapability covers the subtree
+// capability credential minted after the preview document authenticates: it is
+// accepted as a query parameter (appended to rewritten asset URLs, used by
+// credential-less fetches like the manifest) and as a path-scoped cookie
+// (cookie-sending subresource fetches), and only for the exact session:port
+// subtree it was minted for.
+func TestRequireConnectionAuthAcceptsPortProxyCapability(t *testing.T) {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	gateway := newGatewayForTest(t)
+	gateway.SetPortProxy(nil) // constructs the handler; capability logic needs no manager
+	gateway.SetAuthPolicy(AuthPolicy{
+		Enforced:     func() bool { return true },
+		ResolveToken: func(context.Context, string) (authn.Identity, bool) { return authn.Identity{}, false },
+	})
+	identity := authn.Identity{UserID: "owner-1", Role: authn.RoleAdmin}
+	capability := gateway.PortProxyHandler.issueCapability("sess-cap", 5173, identity)
+
+	type outcome struct {
+		status   int
+		identity authn.Identity
+		hasID    bool
+	}
+	run := func(path string, cookie *http.Cookie) outcome {
+		t.Helper()
+		router := gin.New()
+		var got outcome
+		router.Any("/port-proxy/:sessionId/:port/*path", gateway.requireConnectionAuth(), func(c *gin.Context) {
+			got.identity, got.hasID = authn.FromGin(c)
+			c.Status(http.StatusOK)
+		})
+		router.Any("/vscode/:sessionId/*path", gateway.requireConnectionAuth(), func(c *gin.Context) {
+			got.identity, got.hasID = authn.FromGin(c)
+			c.Status(http.StatusOK)
+		})
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, path, nil)
+		if cookie != nil {
+			req.AddCookie(cookie)
+		}
+		router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+		got.status = rec.Code
+		return got
+	}
+
+	// Query parameter form: accepted, identity restored.
+	if got := run("/port-proxy/sess-cap/5173/manifest.webmanifest?"+proxyCapabilityQueryParam+"="+capability, nil); got.status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("capability query status = %d, want %d", got.status, http.StatusOK)
+	} else if !got.hasID || got.identity.UserID != "owner-1" {
+		t.Fatalf("capability query identity = %+v (has=%v), want owner-1", got.identity, got.hasID)
+	}
+
+	// Cookie form: accepted.
+	cookie := &http.Cookie{Name: proxyCapabilityCookieName, Value: capability, Path: "/port-proxy/sess-cap/5173"}
+	if got := run("/port-proxy/sess-cap/5173/src/main.tsx", cookie); got.status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("capability cookie status = %d, want %d", got.status, http.StatusOK)
+	}
+
+	// The same capability on a different subtree is rejected.
+	if got := run("/port-proxy/other-session/5173/x?"+proxyCapabilityQueryParam+"="+capability, nil); got.status != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("capability on wrong session status = %d, want %d", got.status, http.StatusUnauthorized)
+	}
+	if got := run("/port-proxy/sess-cap/5174/x?"+proxyCapabilityQueryParam+"="+capability, nil); got.status != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("capability on wrong port status = %d, want %d", got.status, http.StatusUnauthorized)
+	}
+
+	// A capability on a non-port-proxy route is never consulted.
+	if got := run("/vscode/sess-cap/x?"+proxyCapabilityQueryParam+"="+capability, nil); got.status != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("capability on vscode route status = %d, want %d", got.status, http.StatusUnauthorized)
+	}
+
+	// No credential at all is still rejected.
+	if got := run("/port-proxy/sess-cap/5173/x", nil); got.status != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("no credential status = %d, want %d", got.status, http.StatusUnauthorized)
+	}
+}
+
+// A request may carry multiple kandev_cap values (the app's own or encoded
+// duplicates); a valid one must win even when an invalid value comes first.
+func TestRequireConnectionAuthAcceptsAnyValidCapabilityAmongDuplicates(t *testing.T) {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	gateway := newGatewayForTest(t)
+	gateway.SetPortProxy(nil)
+	gateway.SetAuthPolicy(AuthPolicy{
+		Enforced:     func() bool { return true },
+		ResolveToken: func(context.Context, string) (authn.Identity, bool) { return authn.Identity{}, false },
+	})
+	capability := gateway.PortProxyHandler.issueCapability("sess-cap", 5173,
+		authn.Identity{UserID: "owner-1", Role: authn.RoleAdmin})
+
+	router := gin.New()
+	var got struct {
+		identity authn.Identity
+		hasID    bool
+	}
+	router.Any("/port-proxy/:sessionId/:port/*path", gateway.requireConnectionAuth(), func(c *gin.Context) {
+		got.identity, got.hasID = authn.FromGin(c)
+		c.Status(http.StatusOK)
+	})
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet,
+		"/port-proxy/sess-cap/5173/x?"+proxyCapabilityQueryParam+"=garbage&"+proxyCapabilityQueryParam+"="+capability, nil)
+	router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d (valid duplicate must win)", rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
+	}
+	if !got.hasID || got.identity.UserID != "owner-1" {
+		t.Fatalf("identity = %+v (has=%v), want owner-1", got.identity, got.hasID)
+	}
+}
+
+// A restored capability identity must pass the same live-account gate as
+// cookie/PAT auth: a user disabled mid-preview cannot keep the sliding-mint
+// capability alive.
+func TestRequireConnectionAuthCapabilityRequiresActiveUser(t *testing.T) {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	gateway := newGatewayForTest(t)
+	gateway.SetPortProxy(nil)
+	identity := authn.Identity{UserID: "owner-1", Role: authn.RoleAdmin}
+	capability := gateway.PortProxyHandler.issueCapability("sess-cap", 5173, identity)
+
+	run := func(active func(context.Context, string) bool) int {
+		gateway.SetAuthPolicy(AuthPolicy{
+			Enforced:     func() bool { return true },
+			ResolveToken: func(context.Context, string) (authn.Identity, bool) { return authn.Identity{}, false },
+			ActiveUser:   active,
+		})
+		router := gin.New()
+		router.Any("/port-proxy/:sessionId/:port/*path", gateway.requireConnectionAuth(), func(c *gin.Context) {
+			c.Status(http.StatusOK)
+		})
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/port-proxy/sess-cap/5173/x?"+proxyCapabilityQueryParam+"="+capability, nil)
+		router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+		return rec.Code
+	}
+
+	if got := run(func(context.Context, string) bool { return true }); got != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("active user status = %d, want %d", got, http.StatusOK)
+	}
+	if got := run(func(context.Context, string) bool { return false }); got != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled user status = %d, want %d (capability must not outlive the account)", got, http.StatusUnauthorized)
+	}
+	// Nil ActiveUser preserves zero-policy behavior.
+	if got := run(nil); got != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("nil ActiveUser status = %d, want %d", got, http.StatusOK)
+	}
+}
+
+// Duplicate kandev_port_proxy cookies: a stale value sent first (more
+// specific path) must not shadow a valid subtree cookie — any cookie value
+// that validates authorizes the request.
+func TestRequireConnectionAuthAcceptsAnyValidCapabilityCookie(t *testing.T) {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	gateway := newGatewayForTest(t)
+	gateway.SetPortProxy(nil)
+	gateway.SetAuthPolicy(AuthPolicy{
+		Enforced:     func() bool { return true },
+		ResolveToken: func(context.Context, string) (authn.Identity, bool) { return authn.Identity{}, false },
+	})
+	capability := gateway.PortProxyHandler.issueCapability("sess-cap", 5173,
+		authn.Identity{UserID: "owner-1", Role: authn.RoleAdmin})
+
+	router := gin.New()
+	var got struct {
+		identity authn.Identity
+		hasID    bool
+	}
+	router.Any("/port-proxy/:sessionId/:port/*path", gateway.requireConnectionAuth(), func(c *gin.Context) {
+		got.identity, got.hasID = authn.FromGin(c)
+		c.Status(http.StatusOK)
+	})
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/port-proxy/sess-cap/5173/x", nil)
+	req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: proxyCapabilityCookieName, Value: "stale-not-valid", Path: "/port-proxy/sess-cap/5173"})
+	req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: proxyCapabilityCookieName, Value: capability, Path: "/port-proxy/sess-cap/5173"})
+	router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d (stale cookie must not shadow the valid one)", rec.Code, http.StatusOK)
+	}
+	if !got.hasID || got.identity.UserID != "owner-1" {
+		t.Fatalf("identity = %+v (has=%v), want owner-1", got.identity, got.hasID)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRequireConnectionAuthIgnoresCapabilityWhenHandlerUnwired pins that the
+// capability gate is inert when the port proxy is not wired (SetupRoutes
+// registers no port-proxy routes then, and requireConnectionAuth must not
+// reach into a nil handler).
+func TestRequireConnectionAuthIgnoresCapabilityWhenHandlerUnwired(t *testing.T) {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	gateway := NewGateway(newNopTestLogger(t))
+	gateway.SetAuthPolicy(AuthPolicy{
+		Enforced:     func() bool { return true },
+		ResolveToken: func(context.Context, string) (authn.Identity, bool) { return authn.Identity{}, false },
+	})
+
+	router := gin.New()
+	var called bool
+	router.GET("/ws", gateway.requireConnectionAuth(), func(c *gin.Context) {
+		called = true
+		c.Status(http.StatusOK)
+	})
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/ws?token=anything", nil)
+	req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: proxyCapabilityCookieName, Value: "whatever"})
+	router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusUnauthorized)
+	}
+	if called {
+		t.Fatal("downstream handler ran without a valid credential")
+	}
+}
+
+func newNopTestLogger(t *testing.T) *logger.Logger {
+	t.Helper()
+	log, err := logger.NewFromZap(zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("logger: %v", err)
+	}
+	return log
+}
+
 func newAccessTestHub(t *testing.T) *Hub {
 	t.Helper()
 	log, err := logger.NewFromZap(zap.NewNop())

apps/backend/internal/gateway/websocket/port_proxy.go

@@ -1,21 +1,95 @@
 package websocket
 
 import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httputil"
 	"net/url"
+	"path"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
+	"time"
 
 	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
 	"go.uber.org/zap"
 
 	"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/agent/runtime/lifecycle"
+	"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/auth/authn"
 	"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/common/logger"
 )
 
+// Port-proxy capability credential.
+//
+// With authentication enforced, every request to /port-proxy/:sessionId/:port/*
+// requires a credential (session cookie, PAT, or ?token=). The preview document
+// carries one, but the browser's subresource fetches do not always: <link
+// rel="manifest"> fetches are made with credentials omitted, so they never send
+// the session cookie, and headerless contexts (sandboxed iframes, ?token= URLs)
+// drop it from other requests too. A document that authenticated would 200
+// while every asset 401s — the preview appears broken.
+//
+// The handler therefore mints a short-lived, path-scoped capability after the
+// document authenticates and propagates it two ways: as a cookie scoped to the
+// proxy subtree (covers cookie-sending subresource fetches) and appended to the
+// rewritten asset URLs in proxied HTML/CSS (covers the credential-less manifest
+// fetch and cookie-less contexts). requireConnectionAuth accepts either form
+// for the matching /port-proxy/ subtree and reconstructs the identity, so
+// CheckSessionAccess still gates on the real owner.
+const (
+	// proxyCapabilityCookieName is the cookie carrying the subtree capability.
+	proxyCapabilityCookieName = "kandev_port_proxy"
+	// proxyCapabilityQueryParam is the query parameter appended to rewritten
+	// asset URLs by rewriteProxyResponse.
+	proxyCapabilityQueryParam = "kandev_cap"
+	// proxyCapabilityTTL is how long a minted capability stays valid. Sliding:
+	// every proxied response mints a fresh one. Previews opened with a durable
+	// session cookie re-authenticate indefinitely; a preview that relies
+	// solely on the capability (no cookie storage) is deliberately short-lived
+	// — after an idle proxyCapabilityTTL the capability expires and the
+	// subtree requires a fresh credential.
+	proxyCapabilityTTL = 15 * time.Minute
+)
+
+// proxyCapabilityContextKey carries the capability for the current request from
+// the handler into the cached proxy's ModifyResponse, which appends it to
+// rewritten asset URLs.
+type proxyCapabilityContextKey struct{}
+
+// proxyCSSBaseContextKey carries the PUBLIC directory (proxy prefix + app
+// path directory, trailing slash) that a standalone CSS response resolves
+// relative references against. The request path is rewritten to the
+// agentctl form before the proxy runs, so the public path must be captured
+// at the handler.
+type proxyCSSBaseContextKey struct{}
+
+// publicCSSBase returns the public directory (trailing slash) that a
+// standalone CSS file at the given public path resolves relative references
+// against: proxyPrefix + the directory of the app-relative path.
+func publicCSSBase(proxyPrefix, remaining string) string {
+	if remaining == "" {
+		return ""
+	}
+	dir := path.Dir(remaining)
+	if dir == "." || dir == "/" {
+		return proxyPrefix + "/"
+	}
+	return proxyPrefix + "/" + strings.TrimPrefix(dir, "/") + "/"
+}
+
+// proxyTokenConsumedKey marks that requireConnectionAuth authenticated this
+// request via ?token=<PAT>, so the port proxy strips the token from the
+// forwarded query. When absent, a ?token= parameter belongs to the app and is
+// forwarded untouched.
+type proxyTokenConsumedKey struct{}
+
 // portProxyEntry caches a reverse proxy and its target for a session:port pair.
 type portProxyEntry struct {
 	proxy  *httputil.ReverseProxy
@@ -28,16 +102,29 @@ type PortProxyHandler struct {
 	lifecycleMgr *lifecycle.Manager
 	logger       *logger.Logger
 
+	// capabilitySecret signs the subtree capability cookie/query credentials.
+	// Per-process random: capabilities are short-lived, so a backend restart
+	// simply invalidates them.
+	capabilitySecret [32]byte
+
 	mu      sync.Mutex
 	proxies map[string]*portProxyEntry // key: "sessionId:port"
 }
 
 // NewPortProxyHandler creates a new port proxy handler.
 func NewPortProxyHandler(lifecycleMgr *lifecycle.Manager, log *logger.Logger) *PortProxyHandler {
+	secret := [32]byte{}
+	if _, err := rand.Read(secret[:]); err != nil {
+		// crypto/rand never fails on supported platforms; a deterministic
+		// fallback would make capabilities forgeable, so fail loudly instead
+		// of serving an auth bypass.
+		panic(fmt.Sprintf("port proxy: generate capability secret: %v", err))
+	}
 	return &PortProxyHandler{
-		lifecycleMgr: lifecycleMgr,
-		logger:       log.WithFields(zap.String("component", "port-proxy")),
-		proxies:      make(map[string]*portProxyEntry),
+		lifecycleMgr:     lifecycleMgr,
+		logger:           log.WithFields(zap.String("component", "port-proxy")),
+		capabilitySecret: secret,
+		proxies:          make(map[string]*portProxyEntry),
 	}
 }
 
@@ -63,6 +150,22 @@ func (h *PortProxyHandler) HandlePortProxy(c *gin.Context) {
 		return
 	}
 
+	// After the request authenticated (session cookie, PAT, ?token=, or a
+	// previously issued subtree capability), mint a fresh short-lived
+	// capability for this session:port subtree. It authorizes the browser's
+	// subresource fetches — which cannot always carry the session credential —
+	// for the next proxyCapabilityTTL, sliding with every proxied response.
+	// Synthetic identities (auth disabled) skip it: with no auth anywhere the
+	// subtree needs no credential, and the proxied bodies stay byte-identical
+	// to the pre-auth behavior.
+	capability := ""
+	if identity, ok := authn.FromGin(c); ok && !identity.Synthetic {
+		capability = h.issueCapability(sessionID, port, identity)
+		h.setCapabilityCookie(c, sessionID, port, capability)
+		ctx := context.WithValue(c.Request.Context(), proxyCapabilityContextKey{}, capability)
+		c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(ctx)
+	}
+
 	proxy, err := h.resolveProxy(c, sessionID, port)
 	if err != nil {
 		return // error already written to response
@@ -76,9 +179,26 @@ func (h *PortProxyHandler) HandlePortProxy(c *gin.Context) {
 	if remaining == "" {
 		remaining = "/"
 	}
+
+	// The runtime shim is served by the gateway itself (same-origin, so an
+	// app Content-Security-Policy that allows 'self' scripts lets it load),
+	// not by the proxied app.
+	if remaining == "/"+runtimeShimPath {
+		h.serveRuntimeShim(c, prefix, capability)
+		return
+	}
+
 	c.Request.URL.Path = "/api/v1/port-proxy/" + portStr + remaining
 	c.Request.URL.RawPath = ""
 
+	// The request path is rewritten to the agentctl form above, so the
+	// public path is unrecoverable at ModifyResponse time. Stash the PUBLIC
+	// stylesheet directory for standalone CSS rewriting: relative CSS
+	// references resolve against the stylesheet file's public directory.
+	if dir := publicCSSBase(prefix, remaining); dir != "" {
+		c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(context.WithValue(c.Request.Context(), proxyCSSBaseContextKey{}, dir))
+	}
+
 	h.logger.Debug("port proxy forwarding",
 		zap.String("session_id", sessionID),
 		zap.Int("port", port),
@@ -151,6 +271,40 @@ func (h *PortProxyHandler) createProxy(cacheKey string, target *url.URL, authTok
 		r.SetURL(target)
 		r.Out.URL.Path = r.In.URL.Path
 		r.Out.URL.RawPath = ""
+		// Never forward the browser's Accept-Encoding: Go's Transport adds
+		// its own and transparently decompresses, so ModifyResponse (and the
+		// HTML/CSS rewriter) always sees identity bytes. Forwarding gzip/br
+		// would deliver compressed bytes to the rewriter, which then strips
+		// Content-Encoding while keeping the compressed body.
+		r.Out.Header.Del("Accept-Encoding")
+		// The subtree capability is consumed by requireConnectionAuth at the
+		// gateway; strip it (in any encoding) before forwarding so it never
+		// lands in agentctl or application logs, redirects, or analytics. Only
+		// the reserved pairs are removed — every other parameter keeps its
+		// original bytes and order. The ?token= PAT is stripped only when the
+		// gateway actually consumed it for authentication; a cookie-authenticated
+		// app's own token parameter passes through.
+		if consumed, _ := r.In.Context().Value(proxyTokenConsumedKey{}).(bool); consumed {
+			r.Out.URL.RawQuery = stripReservedProxyParams(r.Out.URL.RawQuery)
+		} else {
+			r.Out.URL.RawQuery = stripCapabilityParam(r.Out.URL.RawQuery)
+		}
+		// The browser may send a rewritten asset URL (which embeds the
+		// capability, possibly percent-encoded) as the Referer of a later
+		// request; sanitize every Referer. Capability-free Referers are left
+		// byte-identical; malformed ones are dropped rather than forwarded
+		// with their query intact.
+		if ref := r.Out.Header.Get("Referer"); ref != "" {
+			if parsed, err := url.Parse(ref); err == nil {
+				cleaned := stripReservedProxyParams(parsed.RawQuery)
+				if cleaned != parsed.RawQuery {
+					parsed.RawQuery = cleaned
+					r.Out.Header.Set("Referer", parsed.String())
+				}
+			} else {
+				r.Out.Header.Del("Referer")
+			}
+		}
 		// Inject agentctl auth token
 		if authToken != "" {
 			r.Out.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+authToken)
@@ -161,11 +315,35 @@ func (h *PortProxyHandler) createProxy(cacheKey string, target *url.URL, authTok
 	}
 
 	proxy.ModifyResponse = func(resp *http.Response) error {
+		filterReservedCookies(resp.Header)
+		capability, _ := resp.Request.Context().Value(proxyCapabilityContextKey{}).(string)
+		if capability != "" {
+			// Every response in an authenticated proxy subtree carries the
+			// per-user capability cookie, and rewritten bodies embed the
+			// capability: a shared intermediary must not retain or replay them
+			// for another user, and the browser must not leak the embedded
+			// capability to external origins through the Referer header. This
+			// applies to every response class (JS/JSON/redirects/upgrades
+			// included), not just the HTML/CSS bodies the rewriter touches.
+			resp.Header.Set("Cache-Control", "private, no-store")
+			resp.Header.Set("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
+		}
+		// Redirect Location headers are root-relative to the proxied app; the
+		// browser resolves them against the gateway origin, so they must be
+		// re-anchored on the proxy subtree (navigation: no capability).
+		if loc := resp.Header.Get("Location"); loc != "" {
+			resp.Header.Set("Location", rewriteURLReference(loc, proxyPrefix, ""))
+		}
 		if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusSwitchingProtocols {
 			resp.Header.Set("Connection", "Upgrade")
 			return nil
 		}
-		return rewriteProxyResponse(resp, proxyPrefix)
+		if resp.Request.Method == http.MethodHead {
+			// HEAD responses carry no body; rewriting would synthesize a
+			// misleading Content-Length for the would-be GET body.
+			return nil
+		}
+		return rewriteProxyResponse(resp, proxyPrefix, capability)
 	}
 
 	proxy.ErrorHandler = func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, err error) {
@@ -200,3 +378,218 @@ func (h *PortProxyHandler) InvalidateSession(sessionID string) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+// capabilityPayload is the signed, tamper-evident body of a subtree capability.
+// The identity travels inside the payload so requireConnectionAuth can restore
+// it and CheckSessionAccess still runs as the real owner.
+type capabilityPayload struct {
+	UserID    string `json:"u"`
+	Role      string `json:"r"`
+	SessionID string `json:"s"`
+	Port      int    `json:"p"`
+	ExpiresAt int64  `json:"e"` // unix seconds
+}
+
+// issueCapability mints a signed capability for the session:port subtree with
+// the default TTL.
+func (h *PortProxyHandler) issueCapability(sessionID string, port int, identity authn.Identity) string {
+	return h.issueCapabilityWithTTL(sessionID, port, identity, proxyCapabilityTTL)
+}
+
+// issueCapabilityWithTTL mints a signed capability with an explicit TTL (test
+// seam for expiry coverage).
+func (h *PortProxyHandler) issueCapabilityWithTTL(sessionID string, port int, identity authn.Identity, ttl time.Duration) string {
+	payload := capabilityPayload{
+		UserID:    identity.UserID,
+		Role:      string(identity.Role),
+		SessionID: sessionID,
+		Port:      port,
+		ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(ttl).Unix(),
+	}
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(payload)
+	if err != nil {
+		// The payload is a fixed shape; marshal cannot fail.
+		return ""
+	}
+	encoded := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(raw)
+	mac := h.signCapability(raw)
+	return encoded + "." + mac
+}
+
+// validateCapability verifies the signature, expiry, and session:port target of
+// a capability and returns the identity it was issued to.
+func (h *PortProxyHandler) validateCapability(raw, sessionID string, port int) (authn.Identity, bool) {
+	dot := strings.IndexByte(raw, '.')
+	if dot <= 0 || dot == len(raw)-1 {
+		return authn.Identity{}, false
+	}
+	encoded, mac := raw[:dot], raw[dot+1:]
+	payload, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(encoded)
+	if err != nil {
+		return authn.Identity{}, false
+	}
+	if !hmac.Equal([]byte(h.signCapability(payload)), []byte(mac)) {
+		return authn.Identity{}, false
+	}
+	var parsed capabilityPayload
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &parsed); err != nil {
+		return authn.Identity{}, false
+	}
+	if parsed.SessionID != sessionID || parsed.Port != port {
+		return authn.Identity{}, false
+	}
+	// Standard expiry semantics: the capability is valid strictly before
+	// ExpiresAt; at the exact boundary (now == ExpiresAt) it is expired.
+	if time.Now().Unix() >= parsed.ExpiresAt {
+		return authn.Identity{}, false
+	}
+	return authn.Identity{UserID: parsed.UserID, Role: authn.Role(parsed.Role)}, true
+}
+
+// signCapability computes the HMAC-SHA256 of the capability payload.
+func (h *PortProxyHandler) signCapability(payload []byte) string {
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, h.capabilitySecret[:])
+	_, _ = mac.Write(payload)
+	return hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
+}
+
+// cookieName extracts the cookie name from a Set-Cookie header value (the
+// token before the first '='), trimming leading/trailing whitespace. An
+// empty or malformed value yields "".
+func cookieName(setCookie string) string {
+	name, _, _ := strings.Cut(setCookie, "=")
+	return strings.TrimSpace(name)
+}
+
+// filterReservedCookies removes every upstream Set-Cookie whose name is the
+// reserved capability cookie: a proxied app must never control
+// kandev_port_proxy, since an app value with the same or a narrower Path
+// could override the gateway's capability and 401 the authenticated subtree.
+func filterReservedCookies(h http.Header) {
+	cookies := h["Set-Cookie"]
+	if len(cookies) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	kept := cookies[:0]
+	for _, c := range cookies {
+		if cookieName(c) == proxyCapabilityCookieName {
+			continue
+		}
+		kept = append(kept, c)
+	}
+	if len(kept) == 0 {
+		h.Del("Set-Cookie")
+		return
+	}
+	h["Set-Cookie"] = kept
+}
+
+// setCapabilityCookie sets the subtree-scoped capability cookie on the response
+// so the browser's cookie-sending subresource fetches stay authorized. The
+// cookie's Path is exactly the proxy subtree, so it is never presented to (or
+// accepted for) any other path.
+func (h *PortProxyHandler) setCapabilityCookie(c *gin.Context, sessionID string, port int, capability string) {
+	if capability == "" {
+		return
+	}
+	path := "/port-proxy/" + sessionID + "/" + strconv.Itoa(port)
+	c.SetSameSite(http.SameSiteLaxMode)
+	c.SetCookie(proxyCapabilityCookieName, capability, int(proxyCapabilityTTL.Seconds()), path, "", requestIsTLS(c), true)
+}
+
+// requestIsTLS reports whether the request arrived over TLS, directly or via a
+// reverse proxy setting X-Forwarded-Proto. Mirrors the auth cookie helper so
+// the Secure flag tracks the session cookie.
+func requestIsTLS(c *gin.Context) bool {
+	if c.Request.TLS != nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	return strings.EqualFold(c.GetHeader("X-Forwarded-Proto"), "https")
+}
+
+// proxyTokenQueryParam is the ?token=<PAT> query credential requireConnectionAuth
+// accepts on proxy routes. Like the capability, it is consumed at the gateway
+// and must never be forwarded to the proxied app.
+const proxyTokenQueryParam = "token"
+
+// stripCapabilityParam removes the capability query parameter from a raw query
+// string. See stripReservedProxyParams.
+func stripCapabilityParam(rawQuery string) string {
+	return stripQueryParam(rawQuery, proxyCapabilityQueryParam)
+}
+
+// stripQueryParam removes the named query parameter from a raw query string,
+// matching the decoded key so percent-encoded spellings are caught too.
+func stripQueryParam(rawQuery, name string) string {
+	if rawQuery == "" {
+		return rawQuery
+	}
+	parts := strings.Split(rawQuery, "&")
+	out := make([]string, 0, len(parts))
+	for _, part := range parts {
+		key, _, _ := strings.Cut(part, "=")
+		if decoded, err := url.QueryUnescape(key); err == nil {
+			key = decoded
+		}
+		if key != name {
+			out = append(out, part)
+		}
+	}
+	return strings.Join(out, "&")
+}
+
+// stripReservedProxyParams removes every reserved gateway credential pair
+// (kandev_cap, token) from a raw query string, matching the decoded key so
+// percent-encoded spellings (%6bandev_cap=) are caught too. Every other
+// parameter keeps its original bytes and order — nothing is re-encoded.
+// Returns the input unchanged when no reserved pair is present.
+//
+// The grammar is "&"-separated pairs, which is the only form the gateway ever
+// issues (the rewriter and runtime shim append with "?"/"&") and the only form
+// the gateway's own query parser accepts as a credential; semicolon- or
+// space-separated spellings cannot carry a gateway-issued capability, so they
+// are out of scope here.
+func stripReservedProxyParams(rawQuery string) string {
+	if rawQuery == "" {
+		return rawQuery
+	}
+	parts := strings.Split(rawQuery, "&")
+	out := make([]string, 0, len(parts))
+	for _, part := range parts {
+		key, _, _ := strings.Cut(part, "=")
+		if decoded, err := url.QueryUnescape(key); err == nil {
+			key = decoded
+		}
+		if key != proxyCapabilityQueryParam && key != proxyTokenQueryParam {
+			out = append(out, part)
+		}
+	}
+	return strings.Join(out, "&")
+}
+
+// portProxyTarget extracts the session:port subtree from a request handled by
+// the /port-proxy/:sessionId/:port(/...) routes.
+func portProxyTarget(c *gin.Context) (sessionID string, port int, ok bool) {
+	sessionID = c.Param("sessionId")
+	portStr := c.Param("port")
+	if sessionID == "" || portStr == "" {
+		return "", 0, false
+	}
+	port, err := strconv.Atoi(portStr)
+	if err != nil || port < 1024 || port > 65535 {
+		return "", 0, false
+	}
+	return sessionID, port, true
+}
+
+// serveRuntimeShim answers the reserved per-subtree runtime shim path with the
+// shim JavaScript, prefix and capability baked in. Served same-origin by the
+// gateway so an app Content-Security-Policy allowing 'self' scripts does not
+// block the proxy's runtime fixes; never cached (per-user body).
+func (h *PortProxyHandler) serveRuntimeShim(c *gin.Context, prefix, capability string) {
+	js := runtimeShim(prefix, capability)
+	c.Header("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8")
+	c.Header("Cache-Control", "private, no-store")
+	c.Header("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
+	c.Data(http.StatusOK, "application/javascript; charset=utf-8", []byte(js))
+}

apps/backend/internal/gateway/websocket/port_proxy_auth_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,680 @@
+package websocket
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"compress/gzip"
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/http/httputil"
+	"net/url"
+	"regexp"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+	"github.com/jmoiron/sqlx"
+	_ "github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3"
+	"go.uber.org/zap"
+
+	"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/auth"
+	"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/auth/authn"
+	authhttpmw "github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/auth/httpmw"
+	"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/auth/store"
+	"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/common/config"
+	"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/common/logger"
+	userstore "github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/user/store"
+)
+
+// newProxyAuthService builds an auth service with authentication enabled and an
+// admin user whose session-cookie token is returned. Mirrors the httpmw test
+// harness so the full production chain (httpmw.Middleware → requireConnectionAuth
+// → HandlePortProxy) is exercised against a real credential store.
+func newProxyAuthService(t *testing.T) (*auth.Service, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	conn, err := sqlx.Open("sqlite3", ":memory:")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open sqlite: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = conn.Close() })
+	users, cleanup, err := userstore.Provide(conn, conn)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("user store: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cleanup() })
+	authStore, err := store.New(conn, conn)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("auth store: %v", err)
+	}
+	cfg := &config.Config{}
+	cfg.Features.Auth = true
+	cfg.Auth.SessionTTLHours = 720
+	svc, err := auth.NewService(context.Background(), auth.Deps{
+		Cfg: cfg, Store: authStore, Users: users,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("auth service: %v", err)
+	}
+	_, token, err := svc.Setup(context.Background(), "admin@x.dev", "adminpass123", "Admin", "", "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("setup admin: %v", err)
+	}
+	return svc, token
+}
+
+// newAuthEnforcingFakeAgentctl stands in for the agentctl inside an executor: it
+// rejects requests without the injected Bearer token (like the real agentctl's
+// bearerTokenAuth) and forwards /api/v1/port-proxy/<port>/* to the fake app.
+// It records every forwarded request so tests can assert the gateway stripped
+// the capability from the query before it reaches the app.
+func newAuthEnforcingFakeAgentctl(t *testing.T, appURL, expectedToken string) (*httptest.Server, *fakeAgentctlRecordings) {
+	t.Helper()
+	target, err := url.Parse(appURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parse app URL: %v", err)
+	}
+	var mu sync.Mutex
+	var forwarded []string // "path?query" as received by the fake agentctl
+	var referers []string
+	record := func(rawQuery string, path, referer string) {
+		mu.Lock()
+		defer mu.Unlock()
+		if rawQuery != "" {
+			forwarded = append(forwarded, path+"?"+rawQuery)
+		} else {
+			forwarded = append(forwarded, path)
+		}
+		referers = append(referers, referer)
+	}
+	proxy := &httputil.ReverseProxy{}
+	proxy.Rewrite = func(r *httputil.ProxyRequest) {
+		record(r.Out.URL.RawQuery, r.Out.URL.Path, r.Out.Header.Get("Referer"))
+		r.SetURL(target)
+		// /api/v1/port-proxy/<port>/<path> → /<path>
+		rest, ok := strings.CutPrefix(r.Out.URL.Path, "/api/v1/port-proxy/")
+		if ok {
+			if _, path, found := strings.Cut(rest, "/"); found {
+				r.Out.URL.Path = "/" + path
+			} else {
+				r.Out.URL.Path = "/"
+			}
+		}
+		r.Out.URL.RawPath = ""
+	}
+
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if expectedToken != "" && r.Header.Get("Authorization") != "Bearer "+expectedToken {
+			w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
+			_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `{"error":"missing or invalid Authorization header"}`)
+			return
+		}
+		proxy.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+	}))
+	srv.Config.SetKeepAlivesEnabled(false)
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+	recordings := &fakeAgentctlRecordings{forwarded: &forwarded, referers: &referers, mu: &mu}
+	return srv, recordings
+}
+
+// fakeAgentctlRecordings captures what the fake agentctl received, with a
+// race-safe snapshot for assertions.
+type fakeAgentctlRecordings struct {
+	mu        *sync.Mutex
+	forwarded *[]string // "path?query" as received by the fake agentctl
+	referers  *[]string
+}
+
+func (r *fakeAgentctlRecordings) snapshot() (forwarded, referers []string) {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	forwarded = append([]string(nil), (*r.forwarded)...)
+	referers = append([]string(nil), (*r.referers)...)
+	return forwarded, referers
+}
+
+// newFakeProxyApp serves a Vite-style single page: an HTML document referencing
+// a manifest and a module script, plus the manifest itself. The HTML mirrors
+// the index.html shape that triggers the bug: the manifest <link> is fetched by
+// the browser with credentials omitted, so it never carries the session cookie.
+func newFakeProxyApp(t *testing.T) *httptest.Server {
+	t.Helper()
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	mux.HandleFunc("/manifest.webmanifest", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/manifest+json")
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `{"name":"proxied-app"}`)
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/src/main.tsx", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/javascript")
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `console.log("main");`)
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/redirect", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Location", "/landing")
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/landing", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `<!doctype html><html><head><title>landed</title></head><body>ok</body></html>`)
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `<!doctype html><html><head>`+
+			`<link rel="manifest" href="/manifest.webmanifest">`+
+			`<script type="module" src="/src/main.tsx"></script>`+
+			`</head><body>proxied app</body></html>`)
+	})
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
+	srv.Config.SetKeepAlivesEnabled(false)
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+	return srv
+}
+
+// proxyAuthGatewayResponse is one response from the gateway under test.
+type proxyAuthGatewayResponse struct {
+	status  int
+	body    string
+	headers http.Header
+}
+
+// proxyAuthGateway issues requests against the full production chain: CORS,
+// auth middleware, gateway routes (requireConnectionAuth + port proxy), a
+// token-enforcing fake agentctl, and the fake app.
+func proxyAuthGateway(t *testing.T, handler http.Handler) func(method, path string, headers map[string]string) proxyAuthGatewayResponse {
+	t.Helper()
+	srv := httptest.NewUnstartedServer(handler)
+	srv.Config.SetKeepAlivesEnabled(false)
+	srv.Start()
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+
+	transport := &http.Transport{DisableKeepAlives: true}
+	t.Cleanup(transport.CloseIdleConnections)
+	client := &http.Client{
+		Transport: transport,
+		CheckRedirect: func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
+			return http.ErrUseLastResponse
+		},
+	}
+
+	return func(method, path string, headers map[string]string) proxyAuthGatewayResponse {
+		t.Helper()
+		req, err := http.NewRequest(method, srv.URL+path, nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("build request %s: %v", path, err)
+		}
+		for k, v := range headers {
+			req.Header.Set(k, v)
+		}
+		resp, err := client.Do(req)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("request %s: %v", path, err)
+		}
+		defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+		body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("read body for %s: %v", path, err)
+		}
+		return proxyAuthGatewayResponse{status: resp.StatusCode, body: string(body), headers: resp.Header}
+	}
+}
+
+var manifestLinkPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`href="([^"]*manifest\.webmanifest[^"]*)"`)
+
+// TestPortProxyServesCredentiallessSubresourcesAfterDocumentAuth pins the
+// regression from the field report: with auth enforced, the preview document
+// loads (it carries the session cookie) but the browser's manifest fetch —
+// which never sends cookies — 401s on every subresource request. Once the
+// document authenticates, the proxy must mint a short-lived, path-scoped
+// capability and propagate it (cookie + rewritten asset URLs) so the whole
+// proxy subtree stays authorized without requiring per-request credentials.
+func TestPortProxyServesCredentiallessSubresourcesAfterDocumentAuth(t *testing.T) {
+	log, err := logger.NewFromZap(zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("logger: %v", err)
+	}
+	svc, sessionToken := newProxyAuthService(t)
+	app := newFakeProxyApp(t)
+	agentctl, recordings := newAuthEnforcingFakeAgentctl(t, app.URL, "agentctl-token")
+
+	manager := newProxyTestManager(t, log)
+	// Wire the production ownership boundary: the session-ownership check runs
+	// with whatever identity requireConnectionAuth restored (session cookie or
+	// capability), so a capability minted for user A must not unlock user B's
+	// session. Records the identities the check actually saw.
+	var checkerMu sync.Mutex
+	var seenOwners []string
+	manager.SetSessionAccessChecker(func(ctx context.Context, sessionID string) error {
+		identity, ok := authn.IdentityFromContext(ctx)
+		checkerMu.Lock()
+		defer checkerMu.Unlock()
+		if !ok {
+			seenOwners = append(seenOwners, "<none>")
+			return errors.New("no identity")
+		}
+		seenOwners = append(seenOwners, identity.UserID)
+		if identity.UserID != "default-user" {
+			return errors.New("foreign session")
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	addExecutionForURL(t, manager, "sess-auth", agentctl.URL, "agentctl-token", log)
+
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	router := gin.New()
+	router.Use(authhttpmw.Middleware(svc))
+	gateway := NewGateway(log)
+	gateway.SetAuthPolicy(AuthPolicy{
+		Enforced:     func() bool { return svc.Mode() != auth.ModeDisabled },
+		ResolveToken: svc.ResolveBearer,
+	})
+	gateway.SetPortProxy(manager)
+	gateway.SetupRoutes(router)
+
+	request := proxyAuthGateway(t, router)
+	cookieHeader := map[string]string{"Cookie": svc.CookieName() + "=" + sessionToken}
+
+	// 1. The document request authenticates with the session cookie.
+	doc := request(http.MethodGet, "/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173/", cookieHeader)
+	if doc.status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("document status = %d, want %d (body=%s)", doc.status, http.StatusOK, doc.body)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(doc.body, `/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173/manifest.webmanifest`) {
+		t.Fatalf("document HTML does not reference the proxied manifest:\n%s", doc.body)
+	}
+	capSetCookie := doc.headers.Values("Set-Cookie")
+	var capabilityCookie string
+	for _, sc := range capSetCookie {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(sc, proxyCapabilityCookieName+"=") {
+			capabilityCookie = sc
+		}
+	}
+	if capabilityCookie == "" {
+		t.Fatal("document response does not set the path-scoped capability cookie")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(capabilityCookie, "Path=/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173") {
+		t.Fatalf("capability cookie %q not scoped to the proxy subtree", capabilityCookie)
+	}
+	// Capability-bearing responses are uncacheable and referrer-safe.
+	if got := doc.headers.Get("Cache-Control"); got != "private, no-store" {
+		t.Fatalf("document Cache-Control = %q, want %q", got, "private, no-store")
+	}
+	if got := doc.headers.Get("Referrer-Policy"); got != "no-referrer" {
+		t.Fatalf("document Referrer-Policy = %q, want %q", got, "no-referrer")
+	}
+
+	// 2. The rewritten manifest link carries the capability query parameter, so
+	// the browser's credential-less manifest fetch authenticates without cookies.
+	match := manifestLinkPattern.FindStringSubmatch(doc.body)
+	if len(match) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("no manifest link in rewritten HTML:\n%s", doc.body)
+	}
+	manifestURL := match[1]
+	if !strings.Contains(manifestURL, proxyCapabilityQueryParam+"=") {
+		t.Fatalf("manifest link %q missing the capability query parameter", manifestURL)
+	}
+	manifestReq := request(http.MethodGet, manifestURL, nil) // no cookie, like Chrome's manifest fetch
+	if manifestReq.status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("manifest (capability query, no cookie) status = %d, want %d (body=%s)",
+			manifestReq.status, http.StatusOK, manifestReq.body)
+	}
+
+	// 3. The capability never reaches the proxied app: the gateway strips the
+	// reserved parameter from the forwarded query (any encoding) and from any
+	// Referer header that would embed a rewritten asset URL.
+	forwarded, _ := recordings.snapshot()
+	for _, seen := range forwarded {
+		if strings.Contains(seen, proxyCapabilityQueryParam) {
+			t.Fatalf("capability leaked to agentctl in forwarded request %q", seen)
+		}
+	}
+	// A later request whose Referer embeds a rewritten asset URL (which carries
+	// the capability) must be forwarded with the capability stripped. The
+	// request itself authenticates with the capability, like a browser
+	// subresource would.
+	_, capQuery, _ := strings.Cut(manifestURL, proxyCapabilityQueryParam+"=")
+	warmURL := "/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173/@react-refresh?" + proxyCapabilityQueryParam + "=" + capQuery
+	warm := request(http.MethodGet, warmURL,
+		map[string]string{"Referer": "http://gateway.test" + manifestURL})
+	if warm.status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("warm-up request status = %d, want %d", warm.status, http.StatusOK)
+	}
+	_, referers := recordings.snapshot()
+	if len(referers) > 0 {
+		last := referers[len(referers)-1]
+		if strings.Contains(last, proxyCapabilityQueryParam) {
+			t.Fatalf("capability leaked to agentctl in Referer %q", last)
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(last, "manifest.webmanifest") {
+			t.Fatalf("expected the manifest Referer to survive sanitization, got %q", last)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// A Referer whose capability key is percent-encoded must be sanitized too —
+	// the sanitizer cannot rely on the literal spelling.
+	encodedRef := "http://gateway.test/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173/x?%6bandev_cap=stale&a=1"
+	_ = request(http.MethodGet, "/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173/@vite/client?"+proxyCapabilityQueryParam+"="+capQuery,
+		map[string]string{"Referer": encodedRef})
+	_, referers = recordings.snapshot()
+	if len(referers) > 0 {
+		last := referers[len(referers)-1]
+		if strings.Contains(last, "kandev_cap") || strings.Contains(last, "%6bandev_cap") {
+			t.Fatalf("encoded capability leaked to agentctl in Referer %q", last)
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(last, "a=1") {
+			t.Fatalf("encoded-Referer sanitization dropped unrelated params, got %q", last)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// 3b. A reload carrying BOTH the capability and ?token=<PAT> authenticates
+	// via the capability, but the valid PAT is still a gateway credential and
+	// must be stripped from the forwarded query (never reach the app), while
+	// the capability itself is also stripped.
+	// A real gateway PAT (svc.ResolveBearer only accepts stored API tokens,
+	// not the Setup bootstrap token).
+	_, pat, patErr := svc.MintToken(context.Background(), userstore.DefaultUserID, "ci", 0)
+	if patErr != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("mint PAT: %v", patErr)
+	}
+	tokenReload := "/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173/@vite/client?" + proxyCapabilityQueryParam + "=" + capQuery + "&token=" + pat
+	tok := request(http.MethodGet, tokenReload, nil)
+	if tok.status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("capability+token reload status = %d, want %d", tok.status, http.StatusOK)
+	}
+	forwarded, _ = recordings.snapshot()
+	if len(forwarded) > 0 {
+		last := forwarded[len(forwarded)-1]
+		if strings.Contains(last, "token=") || strings.Contains(last, proxyCapabilityQueryParam) {
+			t.Fatalf("gateway PAT/capability leaked to agentctl in forwarded request %q", last)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// 3c. Duplicate kandev_port_proxy cookies (a stale value first, then the
+	// valid subtree cookie) must not let the stale one shadow the valid one:
+	// any cookie value that validates authorizes the request.
+	staleCap := "kandev_port_proxy=stale-not-valid; Path=/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173"
+	dup := request(http.MethodGet, "/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173/@vite/client?"+proxyCapabilityQueryParam+"="+capQuery,
+		map[string]string{"Cookie": staleCap + "; " + capabilityCookie})
+	if dup.status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("duplicate-cookie request status = %d, want %d (stale cookie must not shadow the valid one)", dup.status, http.StatusOK)
+	}
+
+	// 4. Ownership restoration: every proxied request ran the session-ownership
+	// check as the real owner (default-user), never as a synthetic or empty
+	// identity.
+	checkerMu.Lock()
+	owners := append([]string(nil), seenOwners...)
+	checkerMu.Unlock()
+	if len(owners) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("session-ownership checker never ran")
+	}
+	for _, owner := range owners {
+		if owner != "default-user" {
+			t.Fatalf("ownership check ran as %q, want default-user", owner)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// 5. A capability minted for another user is rejected at the ownership
+	// boundary: requireConnectionAuth restores the foreign identity and the
+	// checker denies it.
+	intruder := gateway.PortProxyHandler.issueCapability("sess-auth", 5173,
+		authn.Identity{UserID: "intruder", Role: authn.RoleAdmin})
+	denied := request(http.MethodGet,
+		"/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173/x?"+proxyCapabilityQueryParam+"="+intruder, nil)
+	if denied.status != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Fatalf("intruder capability status = %d, want %d (ownership denial)", denied.status, http.StatusNotFound)
+	}
+	checkerMu.Lock()
+	lastOwner := seenOwners[len(seenOwners)-1]
+	checkerMu.Unlock()
+	if lastOwner != "intruder" {
+		t.Fatalf("intruder request ran ownership check as %q, want intruder", lastOwner)
+	}
+
+	// 6. The same manifest without any credential still 401s — the capability
+	// is not a blanket bypass.
+	noCred := request(http.MethodGet, "/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173/manifest.webmanifest", nil)
+	if noCred.status != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("manifest (no credential) status = %d, want %d", noCred.status, http.StatusUnauthorized)
+	}
+
+	// 7. A module script carrying only the capability cookie (Path-scoped, no
+	// session cookie) also passes — covers cookie-sending subresource fetches
+	// in contexts that lack the session cookie.
+	capValue := capabilityCookie
+	if idx := strings.Index(capValue, ";"); idx >= 0 {
+		capValue = capValue[:idx]
+	}
+	_, capToken, _ := strings.Cut(capValue, "=")
+	script := request(http.MethodGet, "/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173/src/main.tsx",
+		map[string]string{"Cookie": proxyCapabilityCookieName + "=" + capToken})
+	if script.status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("module script (capability cookie, no session) status = %d, want %d (body=%s)",
+			script.status, http.StatusOK, script.body)
+	}
+
+	// 8. The runtime shim is served by the gateway at its reserved path, with
+	// the prefix and capability baked in, so an app CSP allowing 'self' scripts
+	// does not block the proxy's runtime fixes.
+	shim := request(http.MethodGet, "/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173/__kandev_runtime_shim.js", cookieHeader)
+	if shim.status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("runtime shim status = %d, want %d", shim.status, http.StatusOK)
+	}
+	if ct := shim.headers.Get("Content-Type"); !strings.Contains(ct, "application/javascript") {
+		t.Fatalf("runtime shim Content-Type = %q, want application/javascript", ct)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(shim.body, `var P="/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173";`) {
+		t.Fatalf("runtime shim missing the baked-in prefix:\n%.300s", shim.body)
+	}
+	if shim.headers.Get("Cache-Control") != "private, no-store" {
+		t.Fatalf("runtime shim Cache-Control = %q, want private, no-store", shim.headers.Get("Cache-Control"))
+	}
+	// The shim body is also the exact JS served for the injected <script src>.
+	if !strings.Contains(doc.body, "/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173/__kandev_runtime_shim.js") {
+		t.Fatalf("document does not inject the external runtime shim:\n%.500s", doc.body)
+	}
+
+	// 9. Redirect Location headers are re-anchored on the proxy subtree.
+	redir := request(http.MethodGet, "/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173/redirect", cookieHeader)
+	if redir.status != http.StatusFound {
+		t.Fatalf("redirect status = %d, want %d", redir.status, http.StatusFound)
+	}
+	if got := redir.headers.Get("Location"); got != "/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173/landing" {
+		t.Fatalf("redirect Location = %q, want the proxied landing path", got)
+	}
+
+	// 10. A cookie-authenticated request's own ?token= parameter is preserved
+	// for the app — only the gateway-consumed credential is stripped.
+	appToken := request(http.MethodGet,
+		"/port-proxy/sess-auth/5173/src/main.tsx?token=app-own-token&x=1", cookieHeader)
+	if appToken.status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("app-token request status = %d, want %d", appToken.status, http.StatusOK)
+	}
+	forwarded, _ = recordings.snapshot()
+	last := forwarded[len(forwarded)-1]
+	if !strings.Contains(last, "token=app-own-token") {
+		t.Fatalf("cookie-authenticated app token was stripped from forwarded request %q", last)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(last, "x=1") {
+		t.Fatalf("unrelated query param lost in forwarded request %q", last)
+	}
+}
+
+// A browser request carrying Accept-Encoding: gzip must not corrupt the
+// proxied HTML: the proxy drops the outbound header so Go's Transport
+// auto-decompresses, and the rewriter sees identity bytes. The response is
+// the REWRITTEN uncompressed HTML with no Content-Encoding.
+func TestPortProxyDecompressesAndRewritesCompressedHTML(t *testing.T) {
+	log, err := logger.NewFromZap(zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("logger: %v", err)
+	}
+	html := `<!doctype html><html><head><link rel="manifest" href="/m.webmanifest"></head><body>gzip</body></html>`
+	app := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
+		if strings.Contains(r.Header.Get("Accept-Encoding"), "gzip") {
+			w.Header().Set("Content-Encoding", "gzip")
+			var buf bytes.Buffer
+			gz := gzip.NewWriter(&buf)
+			_, _ = gz.Write([]byte(html))
+			_ = gz.Close()
+			w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(buf.Len()))
+			_, _ = w.Write(buf.Bytes())
+			return
+		}
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, html)
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(app.Close)
+
+	svc, sessionToken := newProxyAuthService(t)
+	agentctl, _ := newAuthEnforcingFakeAgentctl(t, app.URL, "agentctl-token")
+	manager := newProxyTestManager(t, log)
+	manager.SetSessionAccessChecker(func(ctx context.Context, sessionID string) error {
+		identity, ok := authn.IdentityFromContext(ctx)
+		if !ok || identity.UserID != "default-user" {
+			return errors.New("foreign session")
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	addExecutionForURL(t, manager, "sess-gz", agentctl.URL, "agentctl-token", log)
+
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	router := gin.New()
+	router.Use(authhttpmw.Middleware(svc))
+	gateway := NewGateway(log)
+	gateway.SetAuthPolicy(AuthPolicy{
+		Enforced:     func() bool { return svc.Mode() != auth.ModeDisabled },
+		ResolveToken: svc.ResolveBearer,
+	})
+	gateway.SetPortProxy(manager)
+	gateway.SetupRoutes(router)
+
+	request := proxyAuthGateway(t, router)
+	headers := map[string]string{
+		"Cookie":          svc.CookieName() + "=" + sessionToken,
+		"Accept-Encoding": "gzip",
+	}
+	doc := request(http.MethodGet, "/port-proxy/sess-gz/5173/", headers)
+	if doc.status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("document status = %d, want %d (body=%s)", doc.status, http.StatusOK, doc.body)
+	}
+	if got := doc.headers.Get("Content-Encoding"); got != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("Content-Encoding = %q, want none (body must be decompressed before rewriting)", got)
+	}
+	// The body must be the REWRITTEN uncompressed HTML, not gzip bytes.
+	if strings.Contains(doc.body, "\x1f\x8b") {
+		t.Fatalf("body still gzip-compressed after proxying:\n%q", doc.body[:min(len(doc.body), 40)])
+	}
+	mustContain(t, doc.body, `/port-proxy/sess-gz/5173/m.webmanifest?kandev_cap=`)
+	mustContain(t, doc.body, `<body>gzip</body>`)
+}
+
+// Nested standalone CSS served through the real proxy wiring resolves ../ and
+// relative references against the stylesheet's PUBLIC directory (stashed at
+// the handler before the path is rewritten to the agentctl form).
+func TestPortProxyRewritesNestedCSSWithPublicBase(t *testing.T) {
+	log, err := logger.NewFromZap(zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("logger: %v", err)
+	}
+	css := `body{background:url(../img.png)}a{background:url(rel.png)}`
+	app := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		switch r.URL.Path {
+		case "/css/main.css":
+			w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/css; charset=utf-8")
+			_, _ = io.WriteString(w, css)
+		default:
+			w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
+			_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `<!doctype html><html><body>app</body></html>`)
+		}
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(app.Close)
+
+	svc, sessionToken := newProxyAuthService(t)
+	agentctl, _ := newAuthEnforcingFakeAgentctl(t, app.URL, "agentctl-token")
+	manager := newProxyTestManager(t, log)
+	manager.SetSessionAccessChecker(func(ctx context.Context, sessionID string) error {
+		identity, ok := authn.IdentityFromContext(ctx)
+		if !ok || identity.UserID != "default-user" {
+			return errors.New("foreign session")
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	addExecutionForURL(t, manager, "sess-css", agentctl.URL, "agentctl-token", log)
+
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	router := gin.New()
+	router.Use(authhttpmw.Middleware(svc))
+	gateway := NewGateway(log)
+	gateway.SetAuthPolicy(AuthPolicy{
+		Enforced:     func() bool { return svc.Mode() != auth.ModeDisabled },
+		ResolveToken: svc.ResolveBearer,
+	})
+	gateway.SetPortProxy(manager)
+	gateway.SetupRoutes(router)
+
+	request := proxyAuthGateway(t, router)
+	headers := map[string]string{"Cookie": svc.CookieName() + "=" + sessionToken}
+	doc := request(http.MethodGet, "/port-proxy/sess-css/5173/css/main.css", headers)
+	if doc.status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("css status = %d, want %d (body=%s)", doc.status, http.StatusOK, doc.body)
+	}
+	// ../img.png resolves to the public P/img.png (in-subtree) and caps;
+	// rel.png resolves inside the css directory and caps.
+	mustContain(t, doc.body, `url(../img.png?kandev_cap=`)
+	mustContain(t, doc.body, `url(rel.png?kandev_cap=`)
+}
+
+// TestPortProxyCapabilityRoundTrip covers the signed capability itself:
+// valid capabilities validate, and tampering, expiry, or a mismatched
+// session:port target are all rejected.
+func TestPortProxyCapabilityRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	log, err := logger.NewFromZap(zap.NewNop())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("logger: %v", err)
+	}
+	handler := NewPortProxyHandler(newProxyTestManager(t, log), log)
+
+	identity := authn.Identity{UserID: "user-1", Role: authn.RoleAdmin}
+	cap := handler.issueCapability("sess-1", 5173, identity)
+
+	if got, ok := handler.validateCapability(cap, "sess-1", 5173); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("fresh capability did not validate")
+	} else if got.UserID != "user-1" {
+		t.Fatalf("validated identity UserID = %q, want %q", got.UserID, "user-1")
+	}
+
+	// Wrong session or port: rejected (the credential is subtree-scoped).
+	if _, ok := handler.validateCapability(cap, "sess-2", 5173); ok {
+		t.Fatal("capability validated for the wrong session")
+	}
+	if _, ok := handler.validateCapability(cap, "sess-1", 5174); ok {
+		t.Fatal("capability validated for the wrong port")
+	}
+
+	// Tampered payload: rejected.
+	tampered := cap[:len(cap)-2] + "00"
+	if _, ok := handler.validateCapability(tampered, "sess-1", 5173); ok {
+		t.Fatal("tampered capability validated")
+	}
+
+	// Expired: rejected.
+	old := handler.issueCapabilityWithTTL("sess-1", 5173, identity, -time.Minute)
+	if _, ok := handler.validateCapability(old, "sess-1", 5173); ok {
+		t.Fatal("expired capability validated")
+	}
+
+	// Exact boundary (now == ExpiresAt): expired per standard semantics.
+	atBoundary := handler.issueCapabilityWithTTL("sess-1", 5173, identity, 0)
+	if _, ok := handler.validateCapability(atBoundary, "sess-1", 5173); ok {
+		t.Fatal("capability at its expiry boundary validated")
+	}
+
+	// Garbage: rejected without panicking.
+	if _, ok := handler.validateCapability("not-a-capability", "sess-1", 5173); ok {
+		t.Fatal("garbage capability validated")
+	}
+}

apps/backend/internal/gateway/websocket/proxy_rewriter_css.go

@@ -0,0 +1,442 @@
+package websocket
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// This file holds the CSS URL rewriter. It lives apart from
+// proxy_rewriter.go so the latter stays under the revive file-length limit.
+
+// rewriteCSSURLsAt rewrites url(/...) and @import "/..." occurrences inside a
+// standalone CSS document, resolving relative references against the given
+// base directory (the stylesheet file's public directory).
+func rewriteCSSURLsAt(body []byte, prefix, capability, basePath string) []byte {
+	return []byte(rewriteCSSFragment(string(body), prefix, capability, basePath))
+}
+
+// cssScanner rewrites CSS URL references inside an arbitrary string (either
+// a full CSS file or the contents of an inline style attribute) with a small
+// tokenizer so only REAL url() tokens and @import strings are rewritten.
+// String literals and comments are copied untouched — a CSS string like
+// content:'url(/x)' is data, not a URL reference — and url(var(--x)) is left
+// alone because var() cannot be a URL token. Unquoted url() tokens run to
+// whitespace or ')', which keeps data: URLs intact (their ';' and ',' are
+// URL content, e.g. url()). Function names and
+// identifiers may use CSS escapes (\75rl( == url(), matching browser
+// preprocessing). Path-absolute references get the proxy prefix plus the
+// capability; relative references keep their resolution but still get the
+// capability appended so cookie-less CSS loads stay authorized. Scheme-bearing
+// (incl. data:), network-relative, and fragment-only references are left
+// untouched by rewriteURLReference.
+type cssScanner struct {
+	out        strings.Builder
+	css        string
+	prefix     string
+	capability string
+	basePath   string
+	i          int
+}
+
+func rewriteCSSFragment(css, prefix, capability, basePath string) string {
+	s := &cssScanner{css: css, prefix: prefix, capability: capability, basePath: basePath}
+	for s.i < len(css) {
+		if s.consumeComment() || s.consumeString() || s.consumeURL() || s.consumeImport() {
+			continue
+		}
+		s.out.WriteByte(s.css[s.i])
+		s.i++
+	}
+	return s.out.String()
+}
+
+// consumeComment copies a /* ... */ comment (or the remainder when
+// unterminated) and reports whether it consumed anything.
+func (s *cssScanner) consumeComment() bool {
+	css := s.css
+	if s.i+1 >= len(css) || css[s.i] != '/' || css[s.i+1] != '*' {
+		return false
+	}
+	if end := strings.Index(css[s.i+2:], "*/"); end >= 0 {
+		s.out.WriteString(css[s.i : s.i+2+end+2])
+		s.i += 2 + end + 2
+	} else {
+		s.out.WriteString(css[s.i:])
+		s.i = len(css)
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// consumeString copies a quoted CSS string (escape-aware) and reports whether
+// it consumed anything.
+func (s *cssScanner) consumeString() bool {
+	css := s.css
+	c := css[s.i]
+	if c != '\'' && c != '"' {
+		return false
+	}
+	j := s.i + 1
+	for j < len(css) {
+		if css[j] == '\\' && j+1 < len(css) {
+			j += 2
+			continue
+		}
+		if css[j] == c {
+			break
+		}
+		j++
+	}
+	if j >= len(css) {
+		s.out.WriteString(css[s.i:])
+		s.i = len(css)
+		return true
+	}
+	s.out.WriteString(css[s.i : j+1])
+	s.i = j + 1
+	return true
+}
+
+// consumeURL rewrites a url() function token (raw or escape-written function
+// name) and reports whether it consumed anything at s.i.
+func (s *cssScanner) consumeURL() bool {
+	css := s.css
+	c := css[s.i]
+	if c != 'u' && c != 'U' && c != '\\' {
+		return false
+	}
+	if s.i > 0 && isCSSIdentChar(css[s.i-1]) {
+		return false // noturl(/x) is not a url() token
+	}
+	open := cssFuncOpen(css, s.i, "url")
+	if open < 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	// The original function-name bytes are preserved in the output.
+	start := s.i
+	j := open + 1
+	for j < len(css) && isCSSSpace(css[j]) {
+		j++
+	}
+	spacing := css[open+1 : j]
+	if j < len(css) && (css[j] == '\'' || css[j] == '"') {
+		s.quotedURL(start, open, j, spacing)
+		return true
+	}
+	s.unquotedURL(start, open, j, spacing)
+	return true
+}
+
+// quotedURL rewrites url('...') with an escape-aware quoted token.
+func (s *cssScanner) quotedURL(start, open, j int, spacing string) {
+	css := s.css
+	q := css[j]
+	k := j + 1
+	for k < len(css) {
+		if css[k] == '\\' && k+1 < len(css) {
+			k += 2
+			continue
+		}
+		if css[k] == q {
+			break
+		}
+		k++
+	}
+	if k >= len(css) {
+		s.out.WriteString(css[start:])
+		s.i = len(css)
+		return
+	}
+	l := k + 1
+	for l < len(css) && isCSSSpace(css[l]) {
+		l++
+	}
+	if l < len(css) && css[l] == ')' {
+		s.out.WriteString(css[start:open+1] + spacing + string(q) + rewriteCSSURLToken(css[j+1:k], s.prefix, s.capability, s.basePath) + string(q) + css[k+1:l] + ")")
+		s.i = l + 1
+		return
+	}
+	s.out.WriteString(css[start : k+1])
+	s.i = k + 1
+}
+
+// unquotedURL rewrites url(token) with an unquoted token (runs to
+// whitespace or ')', but a whitespace after a hex escape is the escape's
+// terminator and part of the token; var() is not a URL token and is
+// preserved).
+func (s *cssScanner) unquotedURL(start, open, j int, spacing string) {
+	css := s.css
+	k := j
+	for k < len(css) && css[k] != ')' {
+		if css[k] == '\\' {
+			_, adv := cssEscapeDecode(css, k)
+			k += adv
+			continue
+		}
+		if isCSSSpace(css[k]) {
+			break
+		}
+		k++
+	}
+	l := k
+	for l < len(css) && isCSSSpace(css[l]) {
+		l++
+	}
+	if l < len(css) && css[l] == ')' {
+		tok := css[j:k]
+		decoded := cssDecodeToken(tok)
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(decoded), "var(") {
+			s.out.WriteString(css[start:open+1] + spacing + rewriteCSSURLToken(tok, s.prefix, s.capability, s.basePath) + css[k:l] + ")")
+			s.i = l + 1
+			return
+		}
+		s.out.WriteString(css[start : l+1])
+		s.i = l + 1
+		return
+	}
+	s.out.WriteString(css[start:k])
+	s.i = k
+}
+
+// consumeImport rewrites @import "…"; strings (comments are CSS whitespace
+// and are accepted between @import and the string) and reports whether it
+// consumed anything.
+func (s *cssScanner) consumeImport() bool {
+	css := s.css
+	if s.i+7 > len(css) || css[s.i] != '@' || !strings.EqualFold(css[s.i:s.i+7], "@import") {
+		return false
+	}
+	j := skipCSSSpaceAndComments(css, s.i+7)
+	if j < len(css) && (css[j] == '\'' || css[j] == '"') {
+		q := css[j]
+		k := j + 1
+		for k < len(css) {
+			if css[k] == '\\' && k+1 < len(css) {
+				k += 2
+				continue
+			}
+			if css[k] == q {
+				break
+			}
+			k++
+		}
+		if k >= len(css) {
+			s.out.WriteString(css[s.i:])
+			s.i = len(css)
+			return true
+		}
+		s.out.WriteString(css[s.i:j]) // "@import " + whitespace/comments
+		s.out.WriteString(string(q) + rewriteCSSURLToken(css[j+1:k], s.prefix, s.capability, s.basePath) + string(q))
+		s.i = k + 1
+		return true
+	}
+	// @import url(...) — the url() case rewrites it.
+	return false
+}
+
+// cssDecodeToken decodes every CSS escape in a url() token value: the
+// browser preprocesses escapes before resolving the URL, so classification
+// must see the decoded form (url(\2f asset.css) is url(/asset.css)).
+func cssDecodeToken(tok string) string {
+	var b strings.Builder
+	for i := 0; i < len(tok); {
+		if tok[i] == '\\' {
+			dec, adv := cssEscapeDecode(tok, i)
+			b.WriteString(dec)
+			i += adv
+			continue
+		}
+		b.WriteByte(tok[i])
+		i++
+	}
+	return b.String()
+}
+
+// cssEscapeToken re-escapes CSS-significant characters in a rewritten URL so
+// the emitted token survives CSS tokenization: whitespace, quotes, parens,
+// backslashes, and control characters become \XX hex escapes (the trailing
+// space is the optional hex-escape terminator and is consumed by the parser).
+// Plain proxy URLs need no escaping; this covers decoded-token rewrites whose
+// decoded value contained CSS-significant characters.
+func cssEscapeToken(tok string) string {
+	const hex = "0123456789ABCDEF"
+	var b strings.Builder
+	for i := 0; i < len(tok); i++ {
+		c := tok[i]
+		if c == '\\' || c == '\'' || c == '"' || c == '(' || c == ')' || isCSSSpace(c) || c < 0x20 || c == 0x7F {
+			b.WriteByte('\\')
+			b.WriteByte(hex[c>>4])
+			b.WriteByte(hex[c&0xF])
+			b.WriteByte(' ')
+			continue
+		}
+		b.WriteByte(c)
+	}
+	return b.String()
+}
+
+// rewriteCSSURLToken classifies a url() token value (with CSS escapes
+// decoded for classification) and returns the bytes to emit: the decoded
+// rewritten URL when the reference changed, or the ORIGINAL raw token bytes
+// when it did not (external/scheme/network-relative references keep their
+// spelling).
+func rewriteCSSURLToken(rawToken, prefix, capability, basePath string) string {
+	decoded := cssDecodeToken(rawToken)
+	rewritten := rewriteURLReferenceBase(decoded, prefix, capability, basePath)
+	if rewritten == decoded {
+		return rawToken
+	}
+	return cssEscapeToken(rewritten)
+}
+
+// isCSSSpace reports whether c is CSS whitespace (per the CSS syntax spec).
+func isCSSSpace(c byte) bool {
+	switch c {
+	case ' ', '\t', '\n', '\r', '\f':
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// isCSSIdentChar reports whether c can be part of a CSS identifier (per the
+// CSS syntax spec's ident-token: ASCII letters, digits, '-', '_', and
+// non-ASCII code points). Used to require a token boundary before `url(` so
+// `noturl(/x)` is not mistaken for a url() token.
+func isCSSIdentChar(c byte) bool {
+	return c >= 'a' && c <= 'z' || c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z' || c >= '0' && c <= '9' || c == '-' || c == '_' || c >= 0x80
+}
+
+// isCSSNameStart reports whether c can start a CSS identifier: ASCII letters,
+// '_', or a non-ASCII code point (digits and '-' are excluded per the CSS
+// syntax spec; escapes are handled separately by cssIdentAt).
+func isCSSNameStart(c byte) bool {
+	return c >= 'a' && c <= 'z' || c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z' || c == '_' || c >= 0x80
+}
+
+func isCSSHexDigit(c byte) bool {
+	return c >= '0' && c <= '9' || c >= 'a' && c <= 'f' || c >= 'A' && c <= 'F'
+}
+
+func cssHexVal(c byte) int {
+	switch {
+	case c >= '0' && c <= '9':
+		return int(c - '0')
+	case c >= 'a' && c <= 'f':
+		return int(c-'a') + 10
+	default:
+		return int(c-'A') + 10
+	}
+}
+
+// cssEscapeDecode decodes one CSS escape at css[i] (css[i] must be '\'):
+// a hex escape (\75, up to 6 hex digits, optional whitespace terminator)
+// yields its code point; an escaped non-newline character yields itself; an
+// escaped newline is removed (it is not a character). Returns the decoded
+// text and the number of bytes consumed.
+func cssEscapeDecode(css string, i int) (string, int) {
+	if i+1 >= len(css) {
+		return "", 1
+	}
+	switch c := css[i+1]; {
+	case isCSSHexDigit(c):
+		return cssHexEscape(css, i)
+	case c == '\n' || c == '\r' || c == '\f':
+		return "", 2
+	default:
+		return string(c), 2
+	}
+}
+
+// cssHexEscape decodes the \XXXXXX form: at most 6 hex digits with an
+// optional single whitespace terminator; invalid code points become U+FFFD.
+func cssHexEscape(css string, i int) (string, int) {
+	j := i + 1
+	v := 0
+	for j < len(css) && j-i < 7 && isCSSHexDigit(css[j]) {
+		v = v*16 + cssHexVal(css[j])
+		j++
+	}
+	if j < len(css) && isCSSSpace(css[j]) {
+		j++ // consume the optional whitespace terminator
+	}
+	if v == 0 || v > 0x10FFFF || v >= 0xD800 && v <= 0xDFFF {
+		return "\uFFFD", j - i
+	}
+	return string(rune(v)), j - i
+}
+
+// cssIdentAt decodes the identifier (raw or escape-containing) starting at
+// css[i], returning the decoded name, the byte length consumed, and whether
+// an identifier was actually found. \75rl( and u\72l( both decode to "url",
+// matching how the CSS tokenizer preprocesses escapes before recognizing
+// function names.
+func cssIdentAt(css string, i int) (string, int, bool) {
+	if i >= len(css) {
+		return "", 0, false
+	}
+	var b strings.Builder
+	j := i
+	first := true
+loop:
+	for j < len(css) {
+		c := css[j]
+		switch {
+		case c == '\\':
+			dec, adv := cssEscapeDecode(css, j)
+			if dec == "" {
+				break loop
+			}
+			if !first && !isCSSIdentChar(dec[0]) {
+				break loop
+			}
+			b.WriteString(dec)
+			j += adv
+		case first && isCSSNameStart(c):
+			b.WriteByte(c)
+			j++
+		case !first && isCSSIdentChar(c):
+			b.WriteByte(c)
+			j++
+		default:
+			break loop
+		}
+		first = false
+	}
+	if j == i {
+		return "", 0, false
+	}
+	return b.String(), j - i, true
+}
+
+// cssFuncOpen returns the index of the '(' that terminates a CSS function
+// token with the given decoded name starting at css[i] (which may use CSS
+// escapes, e.g. \75rl( decodes to "url"), or -1 when css[i] does not start
+// such a function. The caller is responsible for the identifier boundary
+// check on the raw previous byte.
+func cssFuncOpen(css string, i int, name string) int {
+	dec, adv, ok := cssIdentAt(css, i)
+	if !ok || !strings.EqualFold(dec, name) {
+		return -1
+	}
+	if i+adv < len(css) && css[i+adv] == '(' {
+		return i + adv
+	}
+	return -1
+}
+
+// skipCSSSpaceAndComments advances j past CSS whitespace and comments (both
+// are whitespace per the CSS syntax spec), returning the new position.
+func skipCSSSpaceAndComments(css string, j int) int {
+	for j < len(css) {
+		if isCSSSpace(css[j]) {
+			j++
+			continue
+		}
+		if css[j] == '/' && j+1 < len(css) && css[j+1] == '*' {
+			if end := strings.Index(css[j+2:], "*/"); end >= 0 {
+				j += 2 + end + 2
+				continue
+			}
+		}
+		break
+	}
+	return j
+}

apps/backend/internal/gateway/websocket/shim_probe_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+package websocket
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestDumpShimProbe writes the REAL runtime shim (with the probe export
+// injected) to /tmp/shim_probe.js so the node validator can exercise the
+// actual functions r/rn/sc/nz/norm/rwaStyle/srcsetParts/mref exactly as
+// shipped, including the observer-loop idempotency behavior.
+//
+// It is a diagnostic, not a behavioral test (Go cannot execute the shim's
+// JS), so it is skipped unless KANDEV_DUMP_SHIM=1 is set — normal test runs
+// never write the /tmp artifact. Invocation:
+//
+//	KANDEV_DUMP_SHIM=1 go test -run TestDumpShimProbe ./internal/gateway/websocket/
+//	node /tmp/shim_probe_validate.js
+func TestDumpShimProbe(t *testing.T) {
+	if os.Getenv("KANDEV_DUMP_SHIM") == "" {
+		t.Skip("diagnostic only: set KANDEV_DUMP_SHIM=1 to dump the shim for the node validator")
+	}
+	shim := runtimeShim(proxyPrefix, "cap.ABC-_123")
+	idx := strings.LastIndex(shim, "})();")
+	if idx < 0 {
+		t.Fatal("shim template does not end with the IIFE close")
+	}
+	probe := shim[:idx] + `window.__kandev__={r:r,rn:rn,sc:sc,nz:nz,norm:norm,rwaStyle:rwaStyle,srcsetParts:srcsetParts,mref:mref,rwa:rwa};` + shim[idx:]
+	if err := os.WriteFile("/tmp/shim_probe.js", []byte(probe), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write probe: %v", err)
+	}
+}

apps/web/hooks/use-preview-console-forwarder.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+import { describe, expect, it, vi, afterEach } from "vitest";
+import { renderHook, act } from "@testing-library/react";
+import type { RefObject } from "react";
+import { usePreviewConsoleForwarder } from "./use-preview-console-forwarder";
+
+const INSPECTOR_SOURCE = "kandev-inspector";
+
+// The console forwarder must only accept messages from the preview iframe
+// origin and contentWindow; wrong-origin or wrong-source messages are ignored.
+describe("usePreviewConsoleForwarder", () => {
+  afterEach(() => {
+    vi.restoreAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  const PREVIEW_ORIGIN = "http://api.example";
+
+  function makeIframeRef(
+    contentWindow: unknown,
+    src = `${window.location.origin}/port-proxy/session/3000/`,
+  ) {
+    return {
+      current: {
+        contentWindow,
+        src,
+        addEventListener: vi.fn(),
+        removeEventListener: vi.fn(),
+      },
+    } as unknown as RefObject<HTMLIFrameElement | null>;
+  }
+
+  function dispatchMessage(data: unknown, origin: string, source: unknown) {
+    window.dispatchEvent(
+      new MessageEvent("message", { data, origin, source: source as MessageEventSource }),
+    );
+  }
+
+  function consoleMessage(level: string, args: unknown[]) {
+    return { source: INSPECTOR_SOURCE, type: "console", payload: { level, args } };
+  }
+
+  it("forwards same-origin console messages from the preview iframe", () => {
+    const warn = vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
+    const contentWindow = { postMessage: vi.fn() };
+    renderHook(() => usePreviewConsoleForwarder(makeIframeRef(contentWindow)));
+
+    act(() => {
+      dispatchMessage(consoleMessage("warn", ["boom"]), window.location.origin, contentWindow);
+    });
+
+    expect(warn).toHaveBeenCalledWith("[preview]", "boom");
+  });
+
+  it("binds the console bridge and forwards messages from a separate preview origin", () => {
+    const warn = vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
+    const contentWindow = { postMessage: vi.fn() };
+    const iframeRef = makeIframeRef(contentWindow, `${PREVIEW_ORIGIN}/port-proxy/session/3000/`);
+    renderHook(() => usePreviewConsoleForwarder(iframeRef));
+
+    act(() => {
+      dispatchMessage(
+        { source: INSPECTOR_SOURCE, type: "console-ready", payload: {} },
+        PREVIEW_ORIGIN,
+        contentWindow,
+      );
+    });
+
+    expect(contentWindow.postMessage).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      { source: INSPECTOR_SOURCE, type: "console-bind", payload: {} },
+      PREVIEW_ORIGIN,
+    );
+
+    act(() => {
+      dispatchMessage(consoleMessage("warn", ["boom"]), PREVIEW_ORIGIN, contentWindow);
+    });
+
+    expect(warn).toHaveBeenCalledWith("[preview]", "boom");
+  });
+
+  it("ignores messages from a different origin", () => {
+    const warn = vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
+    const contentWindow = { postMessage: vi.fn() };
+    renderHook(() => usePreviewConsoleForwarder(makeIframeRef(contentWindow)));
+
+    act(() => {
+      dispatchMessage(consoleMessage("warn", ["boom"]), "https://evil.example", contentWindow);
+    });
+
+    expect(warn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("ignores messages from a different source window", () => {
+    const warn = vi.spyOn(console, "warn").mockImplementation(() => {});
+    const contentWindow = { postMessage: vi.fn() };
+    renderHook(() => usePreviewConsoleForwarder(makeIframeRef(contentWindow)));
+
+    act(() => {
+      dispatchMessage(consoleMessage("warn", ["boom"]), window.location.origin, { other: true });
+    });
+
+    expect(warn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("ignores non-console inspector messages", () => {
+    const log = vi.spyOn(console, "log").mockImplementation(() => {});
+    const contentWindow = { postMessage: vi.fn() };
+    renderHook(() => usePreviewConsoleForwarder(makeIframeRef(contentWindow)));
+
+    act(() => {
+      dispatchMessage(
+        { source: INSPECTOR_SOURCE, type: "other" },
+        window.location.origin,
+        contentWindow,
+      );
+    });
+
+    expect(log).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("ignores messages when the iframe source is not an HTTP origin", () => {
+    const log = vi.spyOn(console, "log").mockImplementation(() => {});
+    const contentWindow = { postMessage: vi.fn() };
+    renderHook(() => usePreviewConsoleForwarder(makeIframeRef(contentWindow, "about:blank")));
+
+    act(() => {
+      dispatchMessage(consoleMessage("log", ["x"]), PREVIEW_ORIGIN, contentWindow);
+    });
+
+    expect(log).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});

apps/web/hooks/use-preview-console-forwarder.ts

@@ -1,32 +1,67 @@
 "use client";
 
 import { useEffect } from "react";
-import { isInspectorMessage, isPreviewConsoleMessage } from "@/lib/preview-inspect-bridge";
+import {
+  isInspectorMessage,
+  isPreviewConsoleMessage,
+  isPreviewConsoleReadyMessage,
+  sendConsoleBind,
+} from "@/lib/preview-inspect-bridge";
 
 const PREFIX = "[preview]";
 
+function previewOrigin(iframe: HTMLIFrameElement): string | null {
+  try {
+    const origin = new URL(iframe.src || window.location.href, window.location.href);
+    if (origin.protocol !== "http:" && origin.protocol !== "https:") return null;
+    return origin.origin;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
 // Pipes iframe `console.log/warn/error/info/debug` calls — forwarded by the
 // runtime shim injected by the gateway port-proxy — into the parent window's
 // console with a `[preview]` prefix. Lets developers see iframe diagnostics
 // without manually switching DevTools' execution context to the iframe.
 //
 // The `iframeRef` argument is used to verify that incoming messages came from
-// the previewed iframe and not from another frame or extension; otherwise any
-// page with access to the parent window could spam the developer console with
-// fake `[preview]` lines.
+// the previewed iframe and not from another frame or extension. The origin is
+// pinned to the iframe's actual origin, derived from its src. This also lets
+// the console bridge bind its target origin when the UI and gateway use
+// different ports in dev mode.
 export function usePreviewConsoleForwarder(
   iframeRef: React.RefObject<HTMLIFrameElement | null>,
 ): void {
   useEffect(() => {
+    const bindCurrentConsole = () => {
+      const iframe = iframeRef.current;
+      const origin = iframe ? previewOrigin(iframe) : null;
+      if (iframe && origin) sendConsoleBind(iframe, origin);
+    };
+
     function handleMessage(event: MessageEvent) {
-      if (event.source !== iframeRef.current?.contentWindow) return;
+      const iframe = iframeRef.current;
+      if (!iframe || event.source !== iframe.contentWindow) return;
+      const origin = previewOrigin(iframe);
+      if (!origin || event.origin !== origin) return;
       if (!isInspectorMessage(event.data)) return;
+      if (isPreviewConsoleReadyMessage(event.data)) {
+        sendConsoleBind(iframe, event.origin);
+        return;
+      }
       if (!isPreviewConsoleMessage(event.data)) return;
       const { level, args } = event.data.payload;
       const fn = console[level] ?? console.log;
       fn.call(console, PREFIX, ...args);
     }
+    const iframe = iframeRef.current;
     window.addEventListener("message", handleMessage);
-    return () => window.removeEventListener("message", handleMessage);
+    iframe?.addEventListener?.("load", bindCurrentConsole);
+    bindCurrentConsole();
+    return () => {
+      window.removeEventListener("message", handleMessage);
+      iframe?.removeEventListener?.("load", bindCurrentConsole);
+    };
   }, [iframeRef]);
 }

apps/web/lib/preview-inspect-bridge.ts

@@ -69,6 +69,12 @@ interface InspectorReadyMessage {
   payload: Record<string, never>;
 }
 
+interface PreviewConsoleReadyMessage {
+  source: typeof INSPECTOR_SOURCE;
+  type: "console-ready";
+  payload: Record<string, never>;
+}
+
 export type PreviewConsoleLevel = "log" | "warn" | "error" | "info" | "debug";
 const PREVIEW_CONSOLE_LEVELS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
   "log",
@@ -88,6 +94,7 @@ export type InspectorMessage =
   | AnnotationAddedMessage
   | InspectExitedMessage
   | InspectorReadyMessage
+  | PreviewConsoleReadyMessage
   | PreviewConsoleMessage;
 
 // Narrows past the union — and validates that `level` is one we handle and
@@ -102,6 +109,12 @@ export function isPreviewConsoleMessage(msg: InspectorMessage): msg is PreviewCo
   );
 }
 
+export function isPreviewConsoleReadyMessage(
+  msg: InspectorMessage,
+): msg is PreviewConsoleReadyMessage {
+  return msg.type === "console-ready";
+}
+
 export function isInspectorMessage(data: unknown): data is InspectorMessage {
   if (typeof data !== "object" || data === null) return false;
   const d = data as { source?: unknown; type?: unknown; payload?: unknown };
@@ -146,6 +159,17 @@ export function sendRemoveMarker(iframe: HTMLIFrameElement, number: number): voi
   );
 }
 
+export function sendConsoleBind(iframe: HTMLIFrameElement, targetOrigin: string): void {
+  iframe.contentWindow?.postMessage(
+    {
+      source: INSPECTOR_SOURCE,
+      type: "console-bind",
+      payload: {},
+    },
+    targetOrigin,
+  );
+}
+
 function formatElement(el: CapturedElement): string {
   let idPart = "";
   if (el.id) idPart = `#${el.id}`;