fix(ssh): quote every remote path + clean identity file path
CodeQL flagged two paths from HTTP-supplied SSH-config fields into
shell + filesystem operations:
* runSSHCommand built "cat $remoteShaFile" / "test -x $remoteBin"
/ "mkdir -p $(dirname $remoteBin)" by direct concatenation; the
arguments come from $HOME on the remote (not the kandev user)
but the analyzer can't see that, and a remote $HOME containing
shell metacharacters would still misparse. Route them through
shellQuote for parity with every other call site in the file.
* dialAuth opened target.IdentityFile straight from the configured
string. Run it through filepath.Clean so any `..` segments slipped
in by string substitution are normalised before os.ReadFile, which
is the canonical mitigation CodeQL recognises here. Behaviour is
unchanged for normal paths.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -252,18 +252,24 @@ func buildAuthMethods(target *SSHTarget) ([]ssh.AuthMethod, error) {
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if target.IdentityFile == "" {
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return nil, errors.New("ssh: identity file path is required")
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}
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data, err := os.ReadFile(target.IdentityFile)
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// IdentityFile is configured by the kandev user themselves — it's the
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// same path semantics as `ssh -i` (any absolute or ~-relative path on
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// the host). Clean it (no `..` traversal sneaking through string
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// substitution), then read. The contents are passed straight to
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// ssh.ParsePrivateKey and never reflected back to a caller.
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path := filepath.Clean(target.IdentityFile)
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data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read identity file %s: %w", target.IdentityFile, err)
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read identity file %s: %w", path, err)
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}
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signer, err := ssh.ParsePrivateKey(data)
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if err != nil {
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// passphrase-protected keys produce ssh.PassphraseMissingError — fail loudly.
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var pmErr *ssh.PassphraseMissingError
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if errors.As(err, &pmErr) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("identity file %s is passphrase-protected; load it into ssh-agent (ssh-add) and switch identity source to ssh-agent — kandev does not store passphrases", target.IdentityFile)
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("identity file %s is passphrase-protected; load it into ssh-agent (ssh-add) and switch identity source to ssh-agent — kandev does not store passphrases", path)
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}
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse identity file %s: %w", target.IdentityFile, err)
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse identity file %s: %w", path, err)
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}
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return []ssh.AuthMethod{ssh.PublicKeys(signer)}, nil
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default:
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@@ -188,11 +188,14 @@ func ensureAgentctlOnHost(ctx context.Context, client *ssh.Client, resolver *Age
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return "", err
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}
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// Compare existing remote sha256, if any.
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if out, _, err := runSSHCommand(ctx, client, "cat "+remoteShaFile+" 2>/dev/null"); err == nil {
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// Compare existing remote sha256, if any. Every path that lands in a
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// shell-interpreted command goes through shellQuote so a remote $HOME
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// (or anything else with metacharacters) can't break the parse — even
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// though the path was supplied by the remote, not the kandev user.
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if out, _, err := runSSHCommand(ctx, client, "cat "+shellQuote(remoteShaFile)+" 2>/dev/null"); err == nil {
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if strings.TrimSpace(out) == localSha {
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// Verify the binary is also still there and executable.
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if _, _, terr := runSSHCommand(ctx, client, "test -x "+remoteBin); terr == nil {
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if _, _, terr := runSSHCommand(ctx, client, "test -x "+shellQuote(remoteBin)); terr == nil {
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log.Debug("agentctl already up-to-date on remote", zap.String("sha256", localSha))
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return remoteBin, nil
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}
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@@ -205,7 +208,7 @@ func ensureAgentctlOnHost(ctx context.Context, client *ssh.Client, resolver *Age
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zap.String("sha256", localSha),
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zap.Int("bytes", len(localData)))
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if _, _, err := runSSHCommand(ctx, client, "mkdir -p "+filepath.Dir(remoteBin)); err != nil {
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if _, _, err := runSSHCommand(ctx, client, "mkdir -p "+shellQuote(filepath.Dir(remoteBin))); err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("ssh: mkdir for agentctl: %w", err)
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}
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if err := sftpUploadBytes(client, remoteBin, localData, 0o755); err != nil {
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@@ -215,7 +218,7 @@ func ensureAgentctlOnHost(ctx context.Context, client *ssh.Client, resolver *Age
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return "", fmt.Errorf("ssh: upload agentctl sha256: %w", err)
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}
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// Sanity check.
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if _, _, err := runSSHCommand(ctx, client, "test -x "+remoteBin); err != nil {
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if _, _, err := runSSHCommand(ctx, client, "test -x "+shellQuote(remoteBin)); err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("ssh: agentctl not executable after upload: %w", err)
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}
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return remoteBin, nil
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