919a39e49a
* feat(auth): add auth core — identities, sessions, PATs, invites, mode state machine Phase 1 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation: - internal/auth: argon2id password hashing (PHC), opaque session/PAT tokens (SHA-256 at rest), login rate limiter, auth-mode state machine (disabled/setup/enabled), setup-wizard promotion of the pre-auth default-user row into the admin account, invites, admin user management with last-admin guard. - internal/auth/store: auth_identities (OIDC-ready), auth_sessions, auth_api_tokens, auth_invites tables (SQLite+Postgres dialects). - internal/auth/authn: request-identity plumbing (gin + plain contexts), RequireAdmin middleware. - users table: display_name/role/status columns via new MigrateLogger wiring; AccountRepository surface (consumer-scoped, keeps existing Repository fakes untouched). - config: AuthConfig.Required/SessionTTLHours/CookieName (KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED), FeaturesConfig.Auth; profiles.yaml + runtime flag registry entry for KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): enforce opt-in auth over HTTP — middleware, auth API, boot payload Phase 2 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation: - internal/auth/httpmw: global gin middleware after CORS. Disabled mode injects the synthetic single-user admin identity (behavior unchanged); enabled mode resolves session cookie then PAT bearer, with an explicit allowlist (health, SPA bootstrap reads, credential endpoints, self-authenticating webhooks), deferral for WS/proxy upgrades and office agent JWTs, and SPA shell availability for the login page. - internal/auth/httpapi: full auth surface — setup wizard, login/logout, me, password change, sessions, PATs, invites (mint/preview/accept), auth settings (enable/disable), admin user management. - Boot payload: initialState.auth block always present; unauthenticated visitors on auth-enabled instances get features+auth only (no data). - External MCP: PAT required once auth is enabled (open while disabled). - Admin guards on destructive system routes and runtime-flag overrides. - Startup warning when bound non-loopback with auth disabled (ServerConfig.NonLoopbackBinds fail-closed nudge). - Wiring: auth store in Repositories, auth service in Services, ClaimUnownedWorkspaces backfill on the task repository. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): per-user workspace scoping across HTTP services Phase 3 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation: - Task service: workspaces, workflows, repositories, and tasks are scoped to the request identity (owner-only visibility; pre-auth unowned rows stay shared). Denials use *NotFound sentinels - no existence leak. Internal callers and the disabled-mode synthetic identity remain unscoped, preserving behavior exactly when auth is off. - CreateWorkspace stamps the authenticated caller as owner. - Session chokepoint: lifecycle Manager.GetOrEnsureExecution runs a settable session-access check covering shell/files/ports/vscode/LSP. - Secrets: per-user user_id column, scoped CRUD/list, ClaimUnowned wired into the setup-wizard backfills. - Boot payload inherits scoping automatically. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): scope WebSocket gateway to authenticated users Phase 4 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation: - Connection auth: /ws, /terminal, /lsp, /vscode, /port-proxy routes are guarded when auth is enabled - session cookie (same-origin upgrade), resolved identity from the HTTP middleware, or ?token=<PAT> for headerless programmatic clients; JSON 401 before any upgrade. - Client identity: every WS client carries its authn.Identity; dispatched RPC actions (workspace.list, task CRUD, ...) run under a context carrying it, so WS RPC gets the same per-user scoping as HTTP. - Subscription checks: task/session subscribe+focus verify workspace visibility via the task service; user topic subscriptions are pinned to the client's own user. - Broadcast routing: new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspace routes workspace-scoped events (task/workflow/repo/office/session-state) to the owner's clients only, with safe fallbacks (unowned/unresolvable -> broadcast) so events never vanish; instance-wide events (executors, environments, agent profiles, system jobs) stay global by design. - Replaced the long-standing discarded-token TODO in HandleConnection. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(auth): add feature spec and backend architecture notes for opt-in auth - docs/specs/auth/spec.md: product behavior (opt-in, setup wizard, per-user workspaces, sessions/PATs, invites, public surface, v1 limits) - apps/backend/AGENTS.md: internal/auth package layout + scoping rules for new service entry points and WS broadcast call sites Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(auth): public documentation for opt-in authentication - New docs/public/authentication.md: enabling, users & invites, PATs, public endpoints, limitations, disabling - run-as-a-service.md: network-security note now points at the real authentication boundary instead of reverse-proxy-only guidance - meta.json: nav entry under Configure Kandev Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(auth): ADR for opt-in authentication architecture Records the load-bearing choices: mode state machine + synthetic identity in disabled mode, opaque DB-backed credentials over JWTs, default-user promotion at setup, service-layer scoping with no-admin-bypass, and the explicit public allowlist. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(web): auth UI — login, setup wizard, invites, users & account settings Adds the frontend half of opt-in authentication: a pre-auth gate in main.tsx that renders the setup wizard or login/invite pages instead of the app shell whenever the boot payload's auth block says so, a new `auth` store slice + feature flag mirroring the backend's StatePayload, credentialed fetch (`credentials: "include"`) with a 401 handler that clears the session and redirects to /login, and a full auth-api.ts client for the /api/v1/auth and /api/v1/users routes. Settings additions: a System > Users page (list/create/disable/promote users, invite-link dialog) and System > Authentication page (enable/ disable with confirm + env-locked banner), gated on the `auth` feature flag and admin role. A new Account sidebar group (Profile & Password, API Tokens) is shown to signed-in users once auth is enabled. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(auth): E2E lifecycle suite + fix workspace event WS leak it caught New dedicated Playwright auth project (backend restarts with KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED=true, isolated from the tokenless default suite): setup-mode boot gating, admin setup wizard, login/logout + bad credentials, PATs, admin-surface authorization, anonymous WS rejection, UI login flow, and the acceptance test - two-user segregation across HTTP, boot payload, and WebSocket. The segregation spec immediately caught a real leak: workspace.* event payloads carry their ID as 'id' (the payload IS the workspace DTO), not 'workspace_id', so BroadcastToWorkspace fell back to broadcast-to-all for workspace create/update/delete. Fixed with action-aware extraction plus a unit regression test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): close cross-user access gaps found in security audit Two independent security audits of the auth branch found several authorization gaps where session/workspace-scoped surfaces were not wired to the new per-user chokepoint. All fixed: - IDOR on reverse-proxy/terminal routes (vscode, port-proxy, terminal): these resolve executions via GetExecutionBySessionID / GetOrEnsureExecutionForEnvironment / EnsurePassthroughExecution, which skipped the session-access check that only GetOrEnsureExecution ran. Added the check inside the env/passthrough resolvers (before the cache short-circuit) and an explicit CheckSessionAccess gate in the two bare-lookup proxy handlers. An authenticated non-owner can no longer reach another user's IDE, forwarded ports, or shell. - Cross-user agent-conversation read: ListMessages / ListMessagesPaginated / SearchMessages now authorize the session. - Cross-user repository-script read/inject: script CRUD now authorizes the parent repository's workspace. - Office HTTP surface: a group middleware enforces workspace ownership on :wsId routes for real users (agent-JWT callers keep their claim scoping). - Login rate-limit bypass: SetTrustedProxies(nil) so a spoofed X-Forwarded-For can't rotate the limiter key on a directly-reachable backend. - Invite double-provisioning race: MarkInviteUsed is now the atomic serialization point (consumed before user creation). - Setup wizard: serialized with a mutex so concurrent first-visitors can't corrupt the promoted admin profile. - Log sanitizer: explicit kandev_pat_ redaction rule. Regression tests added for message/script scoping and the execution-access-before-cache invariant. Auth E2E (incl. two-user segregation) still green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): scope repository active-session-count endpoint GET /api/v1/repositories/:id/active-session-count went through CountActiveSessionsByRepository, which was not identity-scoped - a cross-user info leak of another owner's active session counts. Added the same authorizeRepositoryID gate the script routes use. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): add json tags to auth store models — omit digests, fix token UI The auth store structs (APIToken, Invite, LoginIdentity, Session) had db: tags but no json: tags, so the handlers that serialize them directly sent Go-cased keys (CreatedAt, Name) AND leaked the SHA-256/password digests to clients. Two consequences: - The API-tokens UI showed 'Invalid Date' and an empty name (frontend reads created_at/name). - token_sha256 / password_hash were serialized in list responses. Added json tags with snake_case keys the frontend reads and json:"-" on every credential digest. Regression test asserts digests never serialize and the snake_case timestamp/name keys are present. Also adds the auth-screenshots capture spec (artifacts gitignored). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(web): move auth enable into feature toggles; show current user in sidebar Remove the standalone Authentication settings page and its dedicated settings/get-auth-settings API surface now that enabling auth lives in the Feature Toggles system, and drop env_required now that /auth/me no longer returns it. Add a current-user chip with a logout action to the sidebar footer, shown only in enabled auth mode. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(auth): make features.auth the single on/off control Per review feedback: authentication configuration now lives entirely in the existing Feature Toggles system rather than a separate Authentication settings section. - The auth mode is derived from the features.auth runtime flag (KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH): off -> disabled, on+no-admin -> setup, on+admin -> enabled. Removed the parallel auth.mode system setting, the SetEnabled service method, GET/PATCH /api/v1/auth/settings, the AuthConfig.Required field, KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED, and the auth service's Settings-store dependency and EnvRequired/env_required. - The features.auth registry entry is re-described as the actual enable switch (high-risk, restart-required) and defaults off in every profile (dev was previously true — that only revealed UI before; now it would enforce, so it must be an explicit opt-in). - Setup no longer persists a mode; completing the wizard creates the admin and the mode auto-derives to enabled. - Startup 'exposed without auth' warning + all docs (public guide, run-as-a-service, spec, ADR, AGENTS.md) point at the feature toggle. - E2E: auth specs use KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH; screenshot spec captures the Feature Toggles page instead of the removed Authentication page; the member-restriction assertion targets an admin invite route. - Tests updated across service/httpmw/httpapi/profiles for the derived mode; full suite green (only pre-existing sandbox-FS failures remain). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): complete cross-user isolation — integrations, automation, plan/walkthrough, session reads A follow-up isolation audit found that per-user scoping had been wired into the task service, secrets, office, and the WS gateway — but several workspace/task/session-scoped surfaces still resolved a caller-supplied ID with no ownership gate. Closed all of them; cross-user access now returns 404 across the board. - Integrations (jira/linear/sentry/slack/azure-devops/gitlab/github/ workflow-sync): a global middleware authorizes the workspace_id (query, or gitlab's /workspaces/:id/ path) on those route groups. Previously a member who knew another user's workspace ID could read/overwrite their integration connection config and watches. - Automation: workspace-authorizer seam gates get/list/create/update/delete/ enable/disable, triggers, run history, and — critically — the webhook secret. Was fully cross-tenant over WS before. - Task plans (PlanService) and walkthroughs (WalkthroughService): task- authorizer seam on every read/write. These bypassed the task service. - Session reads that hit the repo directly — session turns, task context, git snapshots, file reviews — now call AuthorizeSession/TaskAccess. Internal callers (pollers, schedulers, MCP) carry no identity and stay unscoped; disabled mode is unaffected. Regression tests added (plan/walkthrough scoping, automation authorizer matrix, integration path extraction) and the two-user E2E now asserts integration routes are shielded. Docs (spec, ADR, public guide) updated to state what is isolated and that filesystem/agent-credential isolation remains an OS-level limitation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(web): current-user chip uses border hover, not accent fill The sidebar current-user chip used hover:bg-accent (a purpleish fill). Switch to the border-hover idiom used elsewhere (border border-transparent -> hover:border-border) with the neutral hover:bg-muted/50 the adjacent workspace picker uses, so the hover reads as a subtle outline instead of a colored background. Screenshot spec now captures the chip hover state. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(web): right-align current-user chip in the sidebar footer Push the user chip to the far right of the expanded footer (ml-auto) so it sits opposite the left-aligned icon buttons; collapsed mode keeps the centered vertical stack unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): reject synthetic identity on management routes and scope office run broadcasts Address code-review findings on the opt-in authentication PR: - P1: while auth is disabled the middleware injects a synthetic admin (RoleAdmin), and RequireAdmin alone let it through — so anyone hitting a not-yet-enabled instance could mint a PAT or plant an admin that survives enablement and hijacks first-run setup. Add authn.RequireRealIdentity and guard the credential/session/user-management routes with it (public bootstrap routes stay reachable). Responds 404 while disabled. - P1: office run events carry task_id but no workspace_id, so they fell back to a global broadcast and leaked across users. Resolve the workspace from the task and route via the new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspaceOrDrop, which fails closed (drops rather than global-broadcasts) when the workspace is unknown and auth is enforced. - nit: type createAuthSlice as a single-arg creator and call it with just set. Also register the authentication docs page and its settings routes in docs/public/coverage.json so the public-docs validator passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
254 lines
8.1 KiB
Go
254 lines
8.1 KiB
Go
package websocket
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/auth/authn"
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"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/common/logger"
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ws "github.com/kandev/kandev/pkg/websocket"
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"go.uber.org/zap"
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)
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func newAccessTestHub(t *testing.T) *Hub {
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t.Helper()
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log, err := logger.NewFromZap(zap.NewNop())
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("logger: %v", err)
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}
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hub := NewHub(ws.NewDispatcher(), log)
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ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
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t.Cleanup(cancel)
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go hub.Run(ctx)
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return hub
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}
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func registerAccessClient(t *testing.T, hub *Hub, id string, identity authn.Identity) *Client {
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t.Helper()
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log, err := logger.NewFromZap(zap.NewNop())
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("logger: %v", err)
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}
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client := NewClient(id, identity, nil, hub, log)
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hub.Register(client)
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waitForClientCount(t, hub, id)
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return client
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}
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// waitForClientCount waits until the hub has processed the register message
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// for the given client (Register goes through the Run loop channel).
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func waitForClientCount(t *testing.T, hub *Hub, clientID string) {
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t.Helper()
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deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
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for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
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hub.mu.RLock()
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found := false
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for client := range hub.clients {
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if client.ID == clientID {
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found = true
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break
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}
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}
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hub.mu.RUnlock()
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if found {
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return
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}
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time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
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}
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t.Fatalf("client %s never registered", clientID)
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}
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func receivedActions(client *Client) []string {
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actions := []string{}
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for {
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select {
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case raw := <-client.send:
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var msg ws.Message
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &msg); err == nil {
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actions = append(actions, msg.Action)
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}
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default:
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return actions
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}
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}
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}
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func TestBroadcastToWorkspaceRoutesByOwner(t *testing.T) {
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hub := newAccessTestHub(t)
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hub.setAuthPolicy(AuthPolicy{
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WorkspaceOwner: func(_ context.Context, workspaceID string) (string, error) {
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switch workspaceID {
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case "ws-a":
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return "user-a", nil
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case "ws-unowned":
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return "", nil
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}
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return "", errors.New("unknown workspace")
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},
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})
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clientA := registerAccessClient(t, hub, "a", authn.Identity{UserID: "user-a", Role: authn.RoleMember})
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clientB := registerAccessClient(t, hub, "b", authn.Identity{UserID: "user-b", Role: authn.RoleMember})
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clientSynthetic := registerAccessClient(t, hub, "s", authn.Identity{UserID: "default-user", Role: authn.RoleAdmin, Synthetic: true})
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notify := func(action string) *ws.Message {
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msg, err := ws.NewNotification(action, map[string]interface{}{"workspace_id": "ws-a"})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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return msg
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}
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// Owned workspace: owner + synthetic receive, the other user does not.
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hub.BroadcastToWorkspace("ws-a", notify("task.created"))
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if got := receivedActions(clientA); len(got) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("owner received %v, want 1 message", got)
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}
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if got := receivedActions(clientB); len(got) != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("foreign user received %v, want none — WS LEAK", got)
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}
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if got := receivedActions(clientSynthetic); len(got) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("synthetic client received %v, want 1 message", got)
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}
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// Unowned workspace falls back to broadcast-to-all (async via Run loop).
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hub.BroadcastToWorkspace("ws-unowned", notify("task.updated"))
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waitForMessage(t, clientB)
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// Resolver errors also fall back to broadcast (never drop events).
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hub.BroadcastToWorkspace("ws-mystery", notify("task.updated"))
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waitForMessage(t, clientB)
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// Empty workspace ID = instance-wide event = everyone.
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hub.BroadcastToWorkspace("", notify("executor.created"))
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waitForMessage(t, clientA)
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}
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func waitForMessage(t *testing.T, client *Client) {
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t.Helper()
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select {
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case <-client.send:
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case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
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t.Fatalf("client %s did not receive expected broadcast", client.ID)
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}
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}
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func TestSubscriptionChecksDenyForeignTopics(t *testing.T) {
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hub := newAccessTestHub(t)
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denied := errors.New("denied")
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hub.setAuthPolicy(AuthPolicy{
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Subscriptions: SubscriptionAccessPolicy{
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Task: func(ctx context.Context, taskID string) error {
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identity, _ := authn.IdentityFromContext(ctx)
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if taskID == "task-b" && identity.UserID != "user-b" {
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return denied
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}
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return nil
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},
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Session: func(ctx context.Context, sessionID string) error {
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identity, _ := authn.IdentityFromContext(ctx)
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if sessionID == "sess-b" && identity.UserID != "user-b" {
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return denied
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}
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return nil
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},
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},
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})
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clientA := registerAccessClient(t, hub, "a", authn.Identity{UserID: "user-a", Role: authn.RoleMember})
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subscribe := func(action string, payload map[string]interface{}) *ws.Message {
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raw, _ := json.Marshal(payload)
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return &ws.Message{ID: "1", Type: ws.MessageTypeRequest, Action: action, Payload: raw}
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}
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clientA.handleSubscribe(subscribe(ws.ActionTaskSubscribe, map[string]interface{}{"task_id": "task-b"}))
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assertErrorResponse(t, clientA, "task subscribe")
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if len(hub.getSubscribersLocked(hub.taskSubscribers, "task-b")) != 0 {
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t.Fatal("denied task subscription must not register")
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}
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clientA.handleSessionSubscribe(subscribe(ws.ActionSessionSubscribe, map[string]interface{}{"session_id": "sess-b"}))
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assertErrorResponse(t, clientA, "session subscribe")
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if len(hub.getSubscribersLocked(hub.sessionSubscribers, "sess-b")) != 0 {
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t.Fatal("denied session subscription must not register")
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}
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// Own topics still work.
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clientA.handleSubscribe(subscribe(ws.ActionTaskSubscribe, map[string]interface{}{"task_id": "task-a"}))
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assertSuccessResponse(t, clientA, "own task subscribe")
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if len(hub.getSubscribersLocked(hub.taskSubscribers, "task-a")) != 1 {
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t.Fatal("allowed task subscription must register")
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}
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}
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func TestUserSubscribeScopedToOwnUser(t *testing.T) {
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hub := newAccessTestHub(t)
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client := registerAccessClient(t, hub, "a", authn.Identity{UserID: "user-a", Role: authn.RoleMember})
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raw, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]interface{}{"user_id": "user-b"})
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client.handleUserSubscribe(&ws.Message{ID: "1", Type: ws.MessageTypeRequest, Action: ws.ActionUserSubscribe, Payload: raw})
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assertErrorResponse(t, client, "foreign user subscribe")
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// Empty user_id defaults to the client's own user.
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raw, _ = json.Marshal(map[string]interface{}{})
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client.handleUserSubscribe(&ws.Message{ID: "2", Type: ws.MessageTypeRequest, Action: ws.ActionUserSubscribe, Payload: raw})
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assertSuccessResponse(t, client, "own user subscribe")
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if len(hub.getSubscribersLocked(hub.userSubscribers, "user-a")) != 1 {
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t.Fatal("own-user subscription must land on the client's user topic")
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}
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}
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func assertErrorResponse(t *testing.T, client *Client, label string) {
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t.Helper()
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select {
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case raw := <-client.send:
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var msg ws.Message
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &msg); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("%s: bad frame: %v", label, err)
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}
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if msg.Type != ws.MessageTypeError {
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t.Fatalf("%s: got %s frame, want error", label, msg.Type)
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}
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case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
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t.Fatalf("%s: no response frame", label)
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}
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}
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func assertSuccessResponse(t *testing.T, client *Client, label string) {
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t.Helper()
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select {
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case raw := <-client.send:
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var msg ws.Message
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &msg); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("%s: bad frame: %v", label, err)
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}
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if msg.Type == ws.MessageTypeError {
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t.Fatalf("%s: got error frame: %s", label, string(raw))
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}
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case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
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t.Fatalf("%s: no response frame", label)
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}
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}
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// Regression: workspace.* event payloads carry the workspace ID under "id"
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// (the payload IS the workspace DTO), not "workspace_id". The first
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// implementation missed this and broadcast admin workspace updates to every
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// user — caught by the auth E2E segregation spec.
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func TestExtractWorkspaceIDFieldShapes(t *testing.T) {
|
|
if got := extractWorkspaceID(map[string]interface{}{"workspace_id": "ws-1"}); got != "ws-1" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("workspace_id key: %q", got)
|
|
}
|
|
if got := extractWorkspaceID(map[string]interface{}{"id": "ws-1"}); got != "" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("bare id must NOT be treated as workspace context for generic events: %q", got)
|
|
}
|
|
if got := extractStringField(map[string]interface{}{"id": "ws-1"}, "id"); got != "ws-1" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("extractStringField: %q", got)
|
|
}
|
|
if got := extractWorkspaceID("not-a-map"); got != "" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("non-map payload: %q", got)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|