Files
kandev/apps/web/lib/state/default-state.ts
T
João Salavisa 919a39e49a feat(auth): opt-in authentication & multi-user segregation (#1930)
* feat(auth): add auth core — identities, sessions, PATs, invites, mode state machine

Phase 1 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- internal/auth: argon2id password hashing (PHC), opaque session/PAT tokens
  (SHA-256 at rest), login rate limiter, auth-mode state machine
  (disabled/setup/enabled), setup-wizard promotion of the pre-auth
  default-user row into the admin account, invites, admin user management
  with last-admin guard.
- internal/auth/store: auth_identities (OIDC-ready), auth_sessions,
  auth_api_tokens, auth_invites tables (SQLite+Postgres dialects).
- internal/auth/authn: request-identity plumbing (gin + plain contexts),
  RequireAdmin middleware.
- users table: display_name/role/status columns via new MigrateLogger
  wiring; AccountRepository surface (consumer-scoped, keeps existing
  Repository fakes untouched).
- config: AuthConfig.Required/SessionTTLHours/CookieName
  (KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED), FeaturesConfig.Auth; profiles.yaml + runtime
  flag registry entry for KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): enforce opt-in auth over HTTP — middleware, auth API, boot payload

Phase 2 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- internal/auth/httpmw: global gin middleware after CORS. Disabled mode
  injects the synthetic single-user admin identity (behavior unchanged);
  enabled mode resolves session cookie then PAT bearer, with an explicit
  allowlist (health, SPA bootstrap reads, credential endpoints,
  self-authenticating webhooks), deferral for WS/proxy upgrades and
  office agent JWTs, and SPA shell availability for the login page.
- internal/auth/httpapi: full auth surface — setup wizard, login/logout,
  me, password change, sessions, PATs, invites (mint/preview/accept),
  auth settings (enable/disable), admin user management.
- Boot payload: initialState.auth block always present; unauthenticated
  visitors on auth-enabled instances get features+auth only (no data).
- External MCP: PAT required once auth is enabled (open while disabled).
- Admin guards on destructive system routes and runtime-flag overrides.
- Startup warning when bound non-loopback with auth disabled
  (ServerConfig.NonLoopbackBinds fail-closed nudge).
- Wiring: auth store in Repositories, auth service in Services,
  ClaimUnownedWorkspaces backfill on the task repository.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): per-user workspace scoping across HTTP services

Phase 3 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- Task service: workspaces, workflows, repositories, and tasks are scoped
  to the request identity (owner-only visibility; pre-auth unowned rows
  stay shared). Denials use *NotFound sentinels - no existence leak.
  Internal callers and the disabled-mode synthetic identity remain
  unscoped, preserving behavior exactly when auth is off.
- CreateWorkspace stamps the authenticated caller as owner.
- Session chokepoint: lifecycle Manager.GetOrEnsureExecution runs a
  settable session-access check covering shell/files/ports/vscode/LSP.
- Secrets: per-user user_id column, scoped CRUD/list, ClaimUnowned wired
  into the setup-wizard backfills.
- Boot payload inherits scoping automatically.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): scope WebSocket gateway to authenticated users

Phase 4 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- Connection auth: /ws, /terminal, /lsp, /vscode, /port-proxy routes are
  guarded when auth is enabled - session cookie (same-origin upgrade),
  resolved identity from the HTTP middleware, or ?token=<PAT> for
  headerless programmatic clients; JSON 401 before any upgrade.
- Client identity: every WS client carries its authn.Identity; dispatched
  RPC actions (workspace.list, task CRUD, ...) run under a context
  carrying it, so WS RPC gets the same per-user scoping as HTTP.
- Subscription checks: task/session subscribe+focus verify workspace
  visibility via the task service; user topic subscriptions are pinned to
  the client's own user.
- Broadcast routing: new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspace routes workspace-scoped
  events (task/workflow/repo/office/session-state) to the owner's clients
  only, with safe fallbacks (unowned/unresolvable -> broadcast) so events
  never vanish; instance-wide events (executors, environments, agent
  profiles, system jobs) stay global by design.
- Replaced the long-standing discarded-token TODO in HandleConnection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): add feature spec and backend architecture notes for opt-in auth

- docs/specs/auth/spec.md: product behavior (opt-in, setup wizard,
  per-user workspaces, sessions/PATs, invites, public surface, v1 limits)
- apps/backend/AGENTS.md: internal/auth package layout + scoping rules
  for new service entry points and WS broadcast call sites

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): public documentation for opt-in authentication

- New docs/public/authentication.md: enabling, users & invites, PATs,
  public endpoints, limitations, disabling
- run-as-a-service.md: network-security note now points at the real
  authentication boundary instead of reverse-proxy-only guidance
- meta.json: nav entry under Configure Kandev

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): ADR for opt-in authentication architecture

Records the load-bearing choices: mode state machine + synthetic identity
in disabled mode, opaque DB-backed credentials over JWTs, default-user
promotion at setup, service-layer scoping with no-admin-bypass, and the
explicit public allowlist.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(web): auth UI — login, setup wizard, invites, users & account settings

Adds the frontend half of opt-in authentication: a pre-auth gate in
main.tsx that renders the setup wizard or login/invite pages instead of
the app shell whenever the boot payload's auth block says so, a new
`auth` store slice + feature flag mirroring the backend's StatePayload,
credentialed fetch (`credentials: "include"`) with a 401 handler that
clears the session and redirects to /login, and a full auth-api.ts
client for the /api/v1/auth and /api/v1/users routes.

Settings additions: a System > Users page (list/create/disable/promote
users, invite-link dialog) and System > Authentication page (enable/
disable with confirm + env-locked banner), gated on the `auth` feature
flag and admin role. A new Account sidebar group (Profile & Password,
API Tokens) is shown to signed-in users once auth is enabled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(auth): E2E lifecycle suite + fix workspace event WS leak it caught

New dedicated Playwright auth project (backend restarts with
KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED=true, isolated from the tokenless default suite):
setup-mode boot gating, admin setup wizard, login/logout + bad
credentials, PATs, admin-surface authorization, anonymous WS rejection,
UI login flow, and the acceptance test - two-user segregation across
HTTP, boot payload, and WebSocket.

The segregation spec immediately caught a real leak: workspace.* event
payloads carry their ID as 'id' (the payload IS the workspace DTO), not
'workspace_id', so BroadcastToWorkspace fell back to broadcast-to-all
for workspace create/update/delete. Fixed with action-aware extraction
plus a unit regression test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): close cross-user access gaps found in security audit

Two independent security audits of the auth branch found several
authorization gaps where session/workspace-scoped surfaces were not wired
to the new per-user chokepoint. All fixed:

- IDOR on reverse-proxy/terminal routes (vscode, port-proxy, terminal):
  these resolve executions via GetExecutionBySessionID /
  GetOrEnsureExecutionForEnvironment / EnsurePassthroughExecution, which
  skipped the session-access check that only GetOrEnsureExecution ran. Added
  the check inside the env/passthrough resolvers (before the cache
  short-circuit) and an explicit CheckSessionAccess gate in the two bare-lookup
  proxy handlers. An authenticated non-owner can no longer reach another
  user's IDE, forwarded ports, or shell.
- Cross-user agent-conversation read: ListMessages / ListMessagesPaginated /
  SearchMessages now authorize the session.
- Cross-user repository-script read/inject: script CRUD now authorizes the
  parent repository's workspace.
- Office HTTP surface: a group middleware enforces workspace ownership on
  :wsId routes for real users (agent-JWT callers keep their claim scoping).
- Login rate-limit bypass: SetTrustedProxies(nil) so a spoofed
  X-Forwarded-For can't rotate the limiter key on a directly-reachable
  backend.
- Invite double-provisioning race: MarkInviteUsed is now the atomic
  serialization point (consumed before user creation).
- Setup wizard: serialized with a mutex so concurrent first-visitors can't
  corrupt the promoted admin profile.
- Log sanitizer: explicit kandev_pat_ redaction rule.

Regression tests added for message/script scoping and the
execution-access-before-cache invariant. Auth E2E (incl. two-user
segregation) still green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): scope repository active-session-count endpoint

GET /api/v1/repositories/:id/active-session-count went through
CountActiveSessionsByRepository, which was not identity-scoped - a
cross-user info leak of another owner's active session counts. Added the
same authorizeRepositoryID gate the script routes use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): add json tags to auth store models — omit digests, fix token UI

The auth store structs (APIToken, Invite, LoginIdentity, Session) had db:
tags but no json: tags, so the handlers that serialize them directly sent
Go-cased keys (CreatedAt, Name) AND leaked the SHA-256/password digests to
clients. Two consequences:
- The API-tokens UI showed 'Invalid Date' and an empty name (frontend reads
  created_at/name).
- token_sha256 / password_hash were serialized in list responses.

Added json tags with snake_case keys the frontend reads and json:"-" on
every credential digest. Regression test asserts digests never serialize and
the snake_case timestamp/name keys are present. Also adds the
auth-screenshots capture spec (artifacts gitignored).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(web): move auth enable into feature toggles; show current user in sidebar

Remove the standalone Authentication settings page and its dedicated
settings/get-auth-settings API surface now that enabling auth lives in the
Feature Toggles system, and drop env_required now that /auth/me no longer
returns it. Add a current-user chip with a logout action to the sidebar
footer, shown only in enabled auth mode.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(auth): make features.auth the single on/off control

Per review feedback: authentication configuration now lives entirely in
the existing Feature Toggles system rather than a separate Authentication
settings section.

- The auth mode is derived from the features.auth runtime flag
  (KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH): off -> disabled, on+no-admin -> setup,
  on+admin -> enabled. Removed the parallel auth.mode system setting,
  the SetEnabled service method, GET/PATCH /api/v1/auth/settings, the
  AuthConfig.Required field, KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED, and the auth service's
  Settings-store dependency and EnvRequired/env_required.
- The features.auth registry entry is re-described as the actual enable
  switch (high-risk, restart-required) and defaults off in every profile
  (dev was previously true — that only revealed UI before; now it would
  enforce, so it must be an explicit opt-in).
- Setup no longer persists a mode; completing the wizard creates the admin
  and the mode auto-derives to enabled.
- Startup 'exposed without auth' warning + all docs (public guide,
  run-as-a-service, spec, ADR, AGENTS.md) point at the feature toggle.
- E2E: auth specs use KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH; screenshot spec captures the
  Feature Toggles page instead of the removed Authentication page; the
  member-restriction assertion targets an admin invite route.
- Tests updated across service/httpmw/httpapi/profiles for the derived
  mode; full suite green (only pre-existing sandbox-FS failures remain).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): complete cross-user isolation — integrations, automation, plan/walkthrough, session reads

A follow-up isolation audit found that per-user scoping had been wired into
the task service, secrets, office, and the WS gateway — but several
workspace/task/session-scoped surfaces still resolved a caller-supplied ID
with no ownership gate. Closed all of them; cross-user access now returns
404 across the board.

- Integrations (jira/linear/sentry/slack/azure-devops/gitlab/github/
  workflow-sync): a global middleware authorizes the workspace_id (query, or
  gitlab's /workspaces/:id/ path) on those route groups. Previously a member
  who knew another user's workspace ID could read/overwrite their integration
  connection config and watches.
- Automation: workspace-authorizer seam gates get/list/create/update/delete/
  enable/disable, triggers, run history, and — critically — the webhook
  secret. Was fully cross-tenant over WS before.
- Task plans (PlanService) and walkthroughs (WalkthroughService): task-
  authorizer seam on every read/write. These bypassed the task service.
- Session reads that hit the repo directly — session turns, task context,
  git snapshots, file reviews — now call AuthorizeSession/TaskAccess.

Internal callers (pollers, schedulers, MCP) carry no identity and stay
unscoped; disabled mode is unaffected. Regression tests added
(plan/walkthrough scoping, automation authorizer matrix, integration path
extraction) and the two-user E2E now asserts integration routes are shielded.
Docs (spec, ADR, public guide) updated to state what is isolated and that
filesystem/agent-credential isolation remains an OS-level limitation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(web): current-user chip uses border hover, not accent fill

The sidebar current-user chip used hover:bg-accent (a purpleish fill).
Switch to the border-hover idiom used elsewhere (border border-transparent
-> hover:border-border) with the neutral hover:bg-muted/50 the adjacent
workspace picker uses, so the hover reads as a subtle outline instead of a
colored background. Screenshot spec now captures the chip hover state.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(web): right-align current-user chip in the sidebar footer

Push the user chip to the far right of the expanded footer (ml-auto) so it
sits opposite the left-aligned icon buttons; collapsed mode keeps the
centered vertical stack unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): reject synthetic identity on management routes and scope office run broadcasts

Address code-review findings on the opt-in authentication PR:

- P1: while auth is disabled the middleware injects a synthetic admin
  (RoleAdmin), and RequireAdmin alone let it through — so anyone hitting a
  not-yet-enabled instance could mint a PAT or plant an admin that survives
  enablement and hijacks first-run setup. Add authn.RequireRealIdentity and
  guard the credential/session/user-management routes with it (public
  bootstrap routes stay reachable). Responds 404 while disabled.
- P1: office run events carry task_id but no workspace_id, so they fell back
  to a global broadcast and leaked across users. Resolve the workspace from
  the task and route via the new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspaceOrDrop, which fails
  closed (drops rather than global-broadcasts) when the workspace is unknown
  and auth is enforced.
- nit: type createAuthSlice as a single-arg creator and call it with just set.

Also register the authentication docs page and its settings routes in
docs/public/coverage.json so the public-docs validator passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 00:10:22 +01:00

332 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript

import {
defaultKanbanState,
defaultWorkspaceState,
defaultSettingsState,
defaultSessionState,
defaultSessionRuntimeState,
defaultUIState,
defaultGitHubState,
defaultGitLabState,
defaultAzureDevOpsState,
defaultJiraState,
defaultLinearState,
defaultOfficeState,
defaultFeaturesState,
defaultAuthState,
defaultAutomationsState,
defaultSystemState,
} from "./slices";
import { getStoredQuickChatNames } from "@/lib/local-storage";
import type { HydrationState } from "./store";
import { migrateView } from "./slices/ui/ui-slice";
export const defaultState = {
kanban: defaultKanbanState.kanban,
kanbanMulti: defaultKanbanState.kanbanMulti,
workflows: defaultKanbanState.workflows,
tasks: defaultKanbanState.tasks,
workspaces: defaultWorkspaceState.workspaces,
repositories: defaultWorkspaceState.repositories,
repositoryBranches: defaultWorkspaceState.repositoryBranches,
repositoryScripts: defaultWorkspaceState.repositoryScripts,
executors: defaultSettingsState.executors,
settingsAgents: defaultSettingsState.settingsAgents,
agentDiscovery: defaultSettingsState.agentDiscovery,
availableAgents: defaultSettingsState.availableAgents,
agentProfiles: defaultSettingsState.agentProfiles,
editors: defaultSettingsState.editors,
prompts: defaultSettingsState.prompts,
secrets: defaultSettingsState.secrets,
notificationProviders: defaultSettingsState.notificationProviders,
settingsData: defaultSettingsState.settingsData,
userSettings: defaultSettingsState.userSettings,
messages: defaultSessionState.messages,
turns: defaultSessionState.turns,
taskSessions: defaultSessionState.taskSessions,
taskSessionsByTask: defaultSessionState.taskSessionsByTask,
sessionAgentctl: defaultSessionState.sessionAgentctl,
worktrees: defaultSessionState.worktrees,
sessionWorktreesBySessionId: defaultSessionState.sessionWorktreesBySessionId,
pendingModel: defaultSessionState.pendingModel,
activeModel: defaultSessionState.activeModel,
taskPlans: defaultSessionState.taskPlans,
walkthroughs: defaultSessionState.walkthroughs,
queue: defaultSessionState.queue,
terminal: defaultSessionRuntimeState.terminal,
shell: defaultSessionRuntimeState.shell,
processes: defaultSessionRuntimeState.processes,
gitStatus: defaultSessionRuntimeState.gitStatus,
environmentIdBySessionId: defaultSessionRuntimeState.environmentIdBySessionId,
sessionCommits: defaultSessionRuntimeState.sessionCommits,
contextWindow: defaultSessionRuntimeState.contextWindow,
agents: defaultSessionRuntimeState.agents,
availableCommands: defaultSessionRuntimeState.availableCommands,
sessionMode: defaultSessionRuntimeState.sessionMode,
userShells: defaultSessionRuntimeState.userShells,
prepareProgress: defaultSessionRuntimeState.prepareProgress,
sessionTodos: defaultSessionRuntimeState.sessionTodos,
agentCapabilities: defaultSessionRuntimeState.agentCapabilities,
sessionModels: defaultSessionRuntimeState.sessionModels,
promptUsage: defaultSessionRuntimeState.promptUsage,
sessionPollMode: defaultSessionRuntimeState.sessionPollMode,
githubStatus: defaultGitHubState.githubStatus,
taskPRs: defaultGitHubState.taskPRs,
taskIssues: defaultGitHubState.taskIssues,
pendingPrUrlByTaskId: defaultGitHubState.pendingPrUrlByTaskId,
prWatches: defaultGitHubState.prWatches,
reviewWatches: defaultGitHubState.reviewWatches,
issueWatches: defaultGitHubState.issueWatches,
actionPresets: defaultGitHubState.actionPresets,
prFeedbackCache: defaultGitHubState.prFeedbackCache,
taskCIAutomation: defaultGitHubState.taskCIAutomation,
taskMRs: defaultGitLabState.taskMRs,
azureDevOpsTaskPullRequests: defaultAzureDevOpsState.azureDevOpsTaskPullRequests,
gitlabReviewWatches: defaultGitLabState.gitlabReviewWatches,
gitlabIssueWatches: defaultGitLabState.gitlabIssueWatches,
gitlabMRWatches: defaultGitLabState.gitlabMRWatches,
gitlabActionPresets: defaultGitLabState.gitlabActionPresets,
gitlabStats: defaultGitLabState.gitlabStats,
gitlabStatus: defaultGitLabState.gitlabStatus,
jiraIssueWatches: defaultJiraState.jiraIssueWatches,
linearIssueWatches: defaultLinearState.linearIssueWatches,
office: defaultOfficeState.office,
features: defaultFeaturesState.features,
auth: defaultAuthState.auth,
automations: defaultAutomationsState.automations,
automationRuns: defaultAutomationsState.automationRuns,
system: defaultSystemState.system,
previewPanel: defaultUIState.previewPanel,
rightPanel: defaultUIState.rightPanel,
diffs: defaultUIState.diffs,
connection: defaultUIState.connection,
mobileKanban: defaultUIState.mobileKanban,
mobileSession: defaultUIState.mobileSession,
chatInput: defaultUIState.chatInput,
reviewPRSelection: defaultUIState.reviewPRSelection,
documentPanel: defaultUIState.documentPanel,
systemHealth: defaultUIState.systemHealth,
quickChat: defaultUIState.quickChat,
sessionFailureNotification: defaultUIState.sessionFailureNotification,
bottomTerminal: defaultUIState.bottomTerminal,
sidebarViews: defaultUIState.sidebarViews,
collapsedSubtaskParents: defaultUIState.collapsedSubtaskParents,
kanbanPreviewedTaskId: defaultUIState.kanbanPreviewedTaskId,
sidebarTaskPrefs: defaultUIState.sidebarTaskPrefs,
};
export type DefaultState = typeof defaultState;
function mergeCodeHostFields(
d: DefaultState,
s: HydrationState,
): Pick<
DefaultState,
| "taskMRs"
| "gitlabReviewWatches"
| "gitlabIssueWatches"
| "gitlabMRWatches"
| "gitlabActionPresets"
| "gitlabStats"
| "gitlabStatus"
| "azureDevOpsTaskPullRequests"
> {
return {
taskMRs: { ...d.taskMRs, ...s.taskMRs },
gitlabReviewWatches: { ...d.gitlabReviewWatches, ...s.gitlabReviewWatches },
gitlabIssueWatches: { ...d.gitlabIssueWatches, ...s.gitlabIssueWatches },
gitlabMRWatches: { ...d.gitlabMRWatches, ...s.gitlabMRWatches },
gitlabActionPresets: { ...d.gitlabActionPresets, ...s.gitlabActionPresets },
gitlabStats: { ...d.gitlabStats, ...s.gitlabStats },
gitlabStatus: { ...d.gitlabStatus, ...s.gitlabStatus },
azureDevOpsTaskPullRequests: {
...d.azureDevOpsTaskPullRequests,
...s.azureDevOpsTaskPullRequests,
},
};
}
function mergeQuickChatState(initialState: HydrationState): DefaultState["quickChat"] {
const quickChat = { ...defaultState.quickChat, ...initialState.quickChat };
if (!initialState.quickChat?.sessions) return quickChat;
const storedNames = getStoredQuickChatNames();
return {
...quickChat,
sessions: initialState.quickChat.sessions.map((session) => {
const localName = storedNames[session.sessionId];
return {
...session,
kind: session.kind ?? "chat",
...(localName ? { name: localName } : {}),
};
}),
};
}
function mergeSidebarViewState(initialState: HydrationState): DefaultState["sidebarViews"] {
const sidebarViews = { ...defaultState.sidebarViews, ...initialState.sidebarViews };
const userSettings = initialState.userSettings;
const serverViews = userSettings?.sidebarViews?.map(migrateView) ?? [];
if (serverViews.length > 0) sidebarViews.views = serverViews;
const activeViewId = userSettings?.sidebarActiveViewId;
if (activeViewId && sidebarViews.views.some((view) => view.id === activeViewId)) {
sidebarViews.activeViewId = activeViewId;
} else if (!sidebarViews.views.some((view) => view.id === sidebarViews.activeViewId)) {
sidebarViews.activeViewId = sidebarViews.views[0].id;
}
if (userSettings?.sidebarDraft !== undefined) sidebarViews.draft = userSettings.sidebarDraft;
return sidebarViews;
}
function mergeSidebarTaskPrefsState(
initialState: HydrationState,
): DefaultState["sidebarTaskPrefs"] {
const sidebarTaskPrefs = {
...defaultState.sidebarTaskPrefs,
...initialState.sidebarTaskPrefs,
};
const serverPrefs = initialState.userSettings?.sidebarTaskPrefs;
if (!serverPrefs) return sidebarTaskPrefs;
return {
...sidebarTaskPrefs,
pinnedTaskIds: [...serverPrefs.pinnedTaskIds],
orderedTaskIds: [...serverPrefs.orderedTaskIds],
subtaskOrderByParentId: Object.fromEntries(
Object.entries(serverPrefs.subtaskOrderByParentId).map(([parentId, taskIds]) => [
parentId,
[...taskIds],
]),
),
};
}
function mergeReviewPRSelectionState(
initialState: HydrationState,
): DefaultState["reviewPRSelection"] {
return {
...defaultState.reviewPRSelection,
...initialState.reviewPRSelection,
selectedKeyByTaskId: {
...defaultState.reviewPRSelection.selectedKeyByTaskId,
...initialState.reviewPRSelection?.selectedKeyByTaskId,
},
};
}
function mergeSessionFailureNotification(initialState: HydrationState) {
return initialState.sessionFailureNotification ?? defaultState.sessionFailureNotification;
}
export function mergeInitialState(initialState?: HydrationState): DefaultState {
if (!initialState) return defaultState;
return {
...defaultState,
...initialState,
kanban: { ...defaultState.kanban, ...initialState.kanban },
kanbanMulti: { ...defaultState.kanbanMulti, ...initialState.kanbanMulti },
workflows: { ...defaultState.workflows, ...initialState.workflows },
tasks: { ...defaultState.tasks, ...initialState.tasks },
workspaces: { ...defaultState.workspaces, ...initialState.workspaces },
repositories: { ...defaultState.repositories, ...initialState.repositories },
repositoryBranches: { ...defaultState.repositoryBranches, ...initialState.repositoryBranches },
repositoryScripts: { ...defaultState.repositoryScripts, ...initialState.repositoryScripts },
executors: { ...defaultState.executors, ...initialState.executors },
settingsAgents: { ...defaultState.settingsAgents, ...initialState.settingsAgents },
agentDiscovery: { ...defaultState.agentDiscovery, ...initialState.agentDiscovery },
availableAgents: { ...defaultState.availableAgents, ...initialState.availableAgents },
agentProfiles: { ...defaultState.agentProfiles, ...initialState.agentProfiles },
editors: { ...defaultState.editors, ...initialState.editors },
prompts: { ...defaultState.prompts, ...initialState.prompts },
secrets: { ...defaultState.secrets, ...initialState.secrets },
notificationProviders: {
...defaultState.notificationProviders,
...initialState.notificationProviders,
},
settingsData: { ...defaultState.settingsData, ...initialState.settingsData },
userSettings: { ...defaultState.userSettings, ...initialState.userSettings },
messages: { ...defaultState.messages, ...initialState.messages },
turns: { ...defaultState.turns, ...initialState.turns },
taskSessions: { ...defaultState.taskSessions, ...initialState.taskSessions },
taskSessionsByTask: { ...defaultState.taskSessionsByTask, ...initialState.taskSessionsByTask },
sessionAgentctl: { ...defaultState.sessionAgentctl, ...initialState.sessionAgentctl },
worktrees: { ...defaultState.worktrees, ...initialState.worktrees },
sessionWorktreesBySessionId: {
...defaultState.sessionWorktreesBySessionId,
...initialState.sessionWorktreesBySessionId,
},
pendingModel: { ...defaultState.pendingModel, ...initialState.pendingModel },
activeModel: { ...defaultState.activeModel, ...initialState.activeModel },
taskPlans: { ...defaultState.taskPlans, ...initialState.taskPlans },
walkthroughs: { ...defaultState.walkthroughs, ...initialState.walkthroughs },
queue: { ...defaultState.queue, ...initialState.queue },
terminal: { ...defaultState.terminal, ...initialState.terminal },
shell: { ...defaultState.shell, ...initialState.shell },
processes: { ...defaultState.processes, ...initialState.processes },
gitStatus: { ...defaultState.gitStatus, ...initialState.gitStatus },
sessionCommits: { ...defaultState.sessionCommits, ...initialState.sessionCommits },
contextWindow: { ...defaultState.contextWindow, ...initialState.contextWindow },
agents: { ...defaultState.agents, ...initialState.agents },
sessionMode: { ...defaultState.sessionMode, ...initialState.sessionMode },
userShells: { ...defaultState.userShells, ...initialState.userShells },
prepareProgress: { ...defaultState.prepareProgress, ...initialState.prepareProgress },
sessionTodos: { ...defaultState.sessionTodos, ...initialState.sessionTodos },
agentCapabilities: { ...defaultState.agentCapabilities, ...initialState.agentCapabilities },
sessionModels: { ...defaultState.sessionModels, ...initialState.sessionModels },
promptUsage: { ...defaultState.promptUsage, ...initialState.promptUsage },
sessionPollMode: { ...defaultState.sessionPollMode, ...initialState.sessionPollMode },
githubStatus: { ...defaultState.githubStatus, ...initialState.githubStatus },
taskPRs: { ...defaultState.taskPRs, ...initialState.taskPRs },
taskIssues: { ...defaultState.taskIssues, ...initialState.taskIssues },
pendingPrUrlByTaskId: {
...defaultState.pendingPrUrlByTaskId,
...initialState.pendingPrUrlByTaskId,
},
prWatches: { ...defaultState.prWatches, ...initialState.prWatches },
reviewWatches: { ...defaultState.reviewWatches, ...initialState.reviewWatches },
issueWatches: { ...defaultState.issueWatches, ...initialState.issueWatches },
actionPresets: { ...defaultState.actionPresets, ...initialState.actionPresets },
prFeedbackCache: { ...defaultState.prFeedbackCache, ...initialState.prFeedbackCache },
taskCIAutomation: { ...defaultState.taskCIAutomation, ...initialState.taskCIAutomation },
...mergeCodeHostFields(defaultState, initialState),
jiraIssueWatches: { ...defaultState.jiraIssueWatches, ...initialState.jiraIssueWatches },
linearIssueWatches: {
...defaultState.linearIssueWatches,
...initialState.linearIssueWatches,
},
office: { ...defaultState.office, ...initialState.office },
features: { ...defaultState.features, ...initialState.features },
auth: { ...defaultState.auth, ...initialState.auth },
automations: { ...defaultState.automations, ...initialState.automations },
automationRuns: { ...defaultState.automationRuns, ...initialState.automationRuns },
system: { ...defaultState.system, ...initialState.system },
...mergeUIPanelState(initialState),
};
}
// Split out of mergeInitialState to stay under the per-function line limit —
// these fields are the UI/panel slice of the merge and have no cross-field
// dependencies on the rest of DefaultState.
function mergeUIPanelState(initialState: HydrationState) {
return {
previewPanel: { ...defaultState.previewPanel, ...initialState.previewPanel },
rightPanel: { ...defaultState.rightPanel, ...initialState.rightPanel },
diffs: { ...defaultState.diffs, ...initialState.diffs },
connection: { ...defaultState.connection, ...initialState.connection },
mobileKanban: { ...defaultState.mobileKanban, ...initialState.mobileKanban },
mobileSession: { ...defaultState.mobileSession, ...initialState.mobileSession },
chatInput: { ...defaultState.chatInput, ...initialState.chatInput },
reviewPRSelection: mergeReviewPRSelectionState(initialState),
documentPanel: { ...defaultState.documentPanel, ...initialState.documentPanel },
systemHealth: { ...defaultState.systemHealth, ...initialState.systemHealth },
quickChat: mergeQuickChatState(initialState),
sessionFailureNotification: mergeSessionFailureNotification(initialState),
bottomTerminal: { ...defaultState.bottomTerminal, ...initialState.bottomTerminal },
sidebarViews: mergeSidebarViewState(initialState),
sidebarTaskPrefs: mergeSidebarTaskPrefsState(initialState),
collapsedSubtaskParents:
initialState.collapsedSubtaskParents ?? defaultState.collapsedSubtaskParents,
};
}