Files
kandev/apps/backend/internal/user/models/models.go
T
João Salavisa 919a39e49a feat(auth): opt-in authentication & multi-user segregation (#1930)
* feat(auth): add auth core — identities, sessions, PATs, invites, mode state machine

Phase 1 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- internal/auth: argon2id password hashing (PHC), opaque session/PAT tokens
  (SHA-256 at rest), login rate limiter, auth-mode state machine
  (disabled/setup/enabled), setup-wizard promotion of the pre-auth
  default-user row into the admin account, invites, admin user management
  with last-admin guard.
- internal/auth/store: auth_identities (OIDC-ready), auth_sessions,
  auth_api_tokens, auth_invites tables (SQLite+Postgres dialects).
- internal/auth/authn: request-identity plumbing (gin + plain contexts),
  RequireAdmin middleware.
- users table: display_name/role/status columns via new MigrateLogger
  wiring; AccountRepository surface (consumer-scoped, keeps existing
  Repository fakes untouched).
- config: AuthConfig.Required/SessionTTLHours/CookieName
  (KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED), FeaturesConfig.Auth; profiles.yaml + runtime
  flag registry entry for KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): enforce opt-in auth over HTTP — middleware, auth API, boot payload

Phase 2 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- internal/auth/httpmw: global gin middleware after CORS. Disabled mode
  injects the synthetic single-user admin identity (behavior unchanged);
  enabled mode resolves session cookie then PAT bearer, with an explicit
  allowlist (health, SPA bootstrap reads, credential endpoints,
  self-authenticating webhooks), deferral for WS/proxy upgrades and
  office agent JWTs, and SPA shell availability for the login page.
- internal/auth/httpapi: full auth surface — setup wizard, login/logout,
  me, password change, sessions, PATs, invites (mint/preview/accept),
  auth settings (enable/disable), admin user management.
- Boot payload: initialState.auth block always present; unauthenticated
  visitors on auth-enabled instances get features+auth only (no data).
- External MCP: PAT required once auth is enabled (open while disabled).
- Admin guards on destructive system routes and runtime-flag overrides.
- Startup warning when bound non-loopback with auth disabled
  (ServerConfig.NonLoopbackBinds fail-closed nudge).
- Wiring: auth store in Repositories, auth service in Services,
  ClaimUnownedWorkspaces backfill on the task repository.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): per-user workspace scoping across HTTP services

Phase 3 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- Task service: workspaces, workflows, repositories, and tasks are scoped
  to the request identity (owner-only visibility; pre-auth unowned rows
  stay shared). Denials use *NotFound sentinels - no existence leak.
  Internal callers and the disabled-mode synthetic identity remain
  unscoped, preserving behavior exactly when auth is off.
- CreateWorkspace stamps the authenticated caller as owner.
- Session chokepoint: lifecycle Manager.GetOrEnsureExecution runs a
  settable session-access check covering shell/files/ports/vscode/LSP.
- Secrets: per-user user_id column, scoped CRUD/list, ClaimUnowned wired
  into the setup-wizard backfills.
- Boot payload inherits scoping automatically.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): scope WebSocket gateway to authenticated users

Phase 4 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- Connection auth: /ws, /terminal, /lsp, /vscode, /port-proxy routes are
  guarded when auth is enabled - session cookie (same-origin upgrade),
  resolved identity from the HTTP middleware, or ?token=<PAT> for
  headerless programmatic clients; JSON 401 before any upgrade.
- Client identity: every WS client carries its authn.Identity; dispatched
  RPC actions (workspace.list, task CRUD, ...) run under a context
  carrying it, so WS RPC gets the same per-user scoping as HTTP.
- Subscription checks: task/session subscribe+focus verify workspace
  visibility via the task service; user topic subscriptions are pinned to
  the client's own user.
- Broadcast routing: new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspace routes workspace-scoped
  events (task/workflow/repo/office/session-state) to the owner's clients
  only, with safe fallbacks (unowned/unresolvable -> broadcast) so events
  never vanish; instance-wide events (executors, environments, agent
  profiles, system jobs) stay global by design.
- Replaced the long-standing discarded-token TODO in HandleConnection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): add feature spec and backend architecture notes for opt-in auth

- docs/specs/auth/spec.md: product behavior (opt-in, setup wizard,
  per-user workspaces, sessions/PATs, invites, public surface, v1 limits)
- apps/backend/AGENTS.md: internal/auth package layout + scoping rules
  for new service entry points and WS broadcast call sites

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): public documentation for opt-in authentication

- New docs/public/authentication.md: enabling, users & invites, PATs,
  public endpoints, limitations, disabling
- run-as-a-service.md: network-security note now points at the real
  authentication boundary instead of reverse-proxy-only guidance
- meta.json: nav entry under Configure Kandev

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): ADR for opt-in authentication architecture

Records the load-bearing choices: mode state machine + synthetic identity
in disabled mode, opaque DB-backed credentials over JWTs, default-user
promotion at setup, service-layer scoping with no-admin-bypass, and the
explicit public allowlist.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(web): auth UI — login, setup wizard, invites, users & account settings

Adds the frontend half of opt-in authentication: a pre-auth gate in
main.tsx that renders the setup wizard or login/invite pages instead of
the app shell whenever the boot payload's auth block says so, a new
`auth` store slice + feature flag mirroring the backend's StatePayload,
credentialed fetch (`credentials: "include"`) with a 401 handler that
clears the session and redirects to /login, and a full auth-api.ts
client for the /api/v1/auth and /api/v1/users routes.

Settings additions: a System > Users page (list/create/disable/promote
users, invite-link dialog) and System > Authentication page (enable/
disable with confirm + env-locked banner), gated on the `auth` feature
flag and admin role. A new Account sidebar group (Profile & Password,
API Tokens) is shown to signed-in users once auth is enabled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(auth): E2E lifecycle suite + fix workspace event WS leak it caught

New dedicated Playwright auth project (backend restarts with
KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED=true, isolated from the tokenless default suite):
setup-mode boot gating, admin setup wizard, login/logout + bad
credentials, PATs, admin-surface authorization, anonymous WS rejection,
UI login flow, and the acceptance test - two-user segregation across
HTTP, boot payload, and WebSocket.

The segregation spec immediately caught a real leak: workspace.* event
payloads carry their ID as 'id' (the payload IS the workspace DTO), not
'workspace_id', so BroadcastToWorkspace fell back to broadcast-to-all
for workspace create/update/delete. Fixed with action-aware extraction
plus a unit regression test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): close cross-user access gaps found in security audit

Two independent security audits of the auth branch found several
authorization gaps where session/workspace-scoped surfaces were not wired
to the new per-user chokepoint. All fixed:

- IDOR on reverse-proxy/terminal routes (vscode, port-proxy, terminal):
  these resolve executions via GetExecutionBySessionID /
  GetOrEnsureExecutionForEnvironment / EnsurePassthroughExecution, which
  skipped the session-access check that only GetOrEnsureExecution ran. Added
  the check inside the env/passthrough resolvers (before the cache
  short-circuit) and an explicit CheckSessionAccess gate in the two bare-lookup
  proxy handlers. An authenticated non-owner can no longer reach another
  user's IDE, forwarded ports, or shell.
- Cross-user agent-conversation read: ListMessages / ListMessagesPaginated /
  SearchMessages now authorize the session.
- Cross-user repository-script read/inject: script CRUD now authorizes the
  parent repository's workspace.
- Office HTTP surface: a group middleware enforces workspace ownership on
  :wsId routes for real users (agent-JWT callers keep their claim scoping).
- Login rate-limit bypass: SetTrustedProxies(nil) so a spoofed
  X-Forwarded-For can't rotate the limiter key on a directly-reachable
  backend.
- Invite double-provisioning race: MarkInviteUsed is now the atomic
  serialization point (consumed before user creation).
- Setup wizard: serialized with a mutex so concurrent first-visitors can't
  corrupt the promoted admin profile.
- Log sanitizer: explicit kandev_pat_ redaction rule.

Regression tests added for message/script scoping and the
execution-access-before-cache invariant. Auth E2E (incl. two-user
segregation) still green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): scope repository active-session-count endpoint

GET /api/v1/repositories/:id/active-session-count went through
CountActiveSessionsByRepository, which was not identity-scoped - a
cross-user info leak of another owner's active session counts. Added the
same authorizeRepositoryID gate the script routes use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): add json tags to auth store models — omit digests, fix token UI

The auth store structs (APIToken, Invite, LoginIdentity, Session) had db:
tags but no json: tags, so the handlers that serialize them directly sent
Go-cased keys (CreatedAt, Name) AND leaked the SHA-256/password digests to
clients. Two consequences:
- The API-tokens UI showed 'Invalid Date' and an empty name (frontend reads
  created_at/name).
- token_sha256 / password_hash were serialized in list responses.

Added json tags with snake_case keys the frontend reads and json:"-" on
every credential digest. Regression test asserts digests never serialize and
the snake_case timestamp/name keys are present. Also adds the
auth-screenshots capture spec (artifacts gitignored).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(web): move auth enable into feature toggles; show current user in sidebar

Remove the standalone Authentication settings page and its dedicated
settings/get-auth-settings API surface now that enabling auth lives in the
Feature Toggles system, and drop env_required now that /auth/me no longer
returns it. Add a current-user chip with a logout action to the sidebar
footer, shown only in enabled auth mode.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(auth): make features.auth the single on/off control

Per review feedback: authentication configuration now lives entirely in
the existing Feature Toggles system rather than a separate Authentication
settings section.

- The auth mode is derived from the features.auth runtime flag
  (KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH): off -> disabled, on+no-admin -> setup,
  on+admin -> enabled. Removed the parallel auth.mode system setting,
  the SetEnabled service method, GET/PATCH /api/v1/auth/settings, the
  AuthConfig.Required field, KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED, and the auth service's
  Settings-store dependency and EnvRequired/env_required.
- The features.auth registry entry is re-described as the actual enable
  switch (high-risk, restart-required) and defaults off in every profile
  (dev was previously true — that only revealed UI before; now it would
  enforce, so it must be an explicit opt-in).
- Setup no longer persists a mode; completing the wizard creates the admin
  and the mode auto-derives to enabled.
- Startup 'exposed without auth' warning + all docs (public guide,
  run-as-a-service, spec, ADR, AGENTS.md) point at the feature toggle.
- E2E: auth specs use KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH; screenshot spec captures the
  Feature Toggles page instead of the removed Authentication page; the
  member-restriction assertion targets an admin invite route.
- Tests updated across service/httpmw/httpapi/profiles for the derived
  mode; full suite green (only pre-existing sandbox-FS failures remain).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): complete cross-user isolation — integrations, automation, plan/walkthrough, session reads

A follow-up isolation audit found that per-user scoping had been wired into
the task service, secrets, office, and the WS gateway — but several
workspace/task/session-scoped surfaces still resolved a caller-supplied ID
with no ownership gate. Closed all of them; cross-user access now returns
404 across the board.

- Integrations (jira/linear/sentry/slack/azure-devops/gitlab/github/
  workflow-sync): a global middleware authorizes the workspace_id (query, or
  gitlab's /workspaces/:id/ path) on those route groups. Previously a member
  who knew another user's workspace ID could read/overwrite their integration
  connection config and watches.
- Automation: workspace-authorizer seam gates get/list/create/update/delete/
  enable/disable, triggers, run history, and — critically — the webhook
  secret. Was fully cross-tenant over WS before.
- Task plans (PlanService) and walkthroughs (WalkthroughService): task-
  authorizer seam on every read/write. These bypassed the task service.
- Session reads that hit the repo directly — session turns, task context,
  git snapshots, file reviews — now call AuthorizeSession/TaskAccess.

Internal callers (pollers, schedulers, MCP) carry no identity and stay
unscoped; disabled mode is unaffected. Regression tests added
(plan/walkthrough scoping, automation authorizer matrix, integration path
extraction) and the two-user E2E now asserts integration routes are shielded.
Docs (spec, ADR, public guide) updated to state what is isolated and that
filesystem/agent-credential isolation remains an OS-level limitation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(web): current-user chip uses border hover, not accent fill

The sidebar current-user chip used hover:bg-accent (a purpleish fill).
Switch to the border-hover idiom used elsewhere (border border-transparent
-> hover:border-border) with the neutral hover:bg-muted/50 the adjacent
workspace picker uses, so the hover reads as a subtle outline instead of a
colored background. Screenshot spec now captures the chip hover state.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(web): right-align current-user chip in the sidebar footer

Push the user chip to the far right of the expanded footer (ml-auto) so it
sits opposite the left-aligned icon buttons; collapsed mode keeps the
centered vertical stack unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): reject synthetic identity on management routes and scope office run broadcasts

Address code-review findings on the opt-in authentication PR:

- P1: while auth is disabled the middleware injects a synthetic admin
  (RoleAdmin), and RequireAdmin alone let it through — so anyone hitting a
  not-yet-enabled instance could mint a PAT or plant an admin that survives
  enablement and hijacks first-run setup. Add authn.RequireRealIdentity and
  guard the credential/session/user-management routes with it (public
  bootstrap routes stay reachable). Responds 404 while disabled.
- P1: office run events carry task_id but no workspace_id, so they fell back
  to a global broadcast and leaked across users. Resolve the workspace from
  the task and route via the new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspaceOrDrop, which fails
  closed (drops rather than global-broadcasts) when the workspace is unknown
  and auth is enforced.
- nit: type createAuthSlice as a single-arg creator and call it with just set.

Also register the authentication docs page and its settings routes in
docs/public/coverage.json so the public-docs validator passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 00:10:22 +01:00

178 lines
8.7 KiB
Go

package models
import (
"encoding/json"
"time"
)
const (
MCPTaskAgentProfileDefaultCurrentTask = "current_task"
MCPTaskAgentProfileDefaultWorkspaceDefault = "workspace_default"
)
func NormalizeMCPTaskAgentProfileDefault(value string) string {
if value == MCPTaskAgentProfileDefaultWorkspaceDefault {
return value
}
return MCPTaskAgentProfileDefaultCurrentTask
}
const (
// RoleAdmin unlocks user management and system settings mutation when
// authentication is enabled. It does NOT grant visibility into other
// users' workspaces (hard privacy isolation).
RoleAdmin = "admin"
// RoleMember is a regular authenticated user.
RoleMember = "member"
// StatusActive marks a user that may log in.
StatusActive = "active"
// StatusDisabled marks a user whose access is revoked; all sessions and
// API tokens are invalidated when this status is set.
StatusDisabled = "disabled"
)
type User struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Email string `json:"email"`
DisplayName string `json:"display_name"`
Role string `json:"role"`
Status string `json:"status"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
}
type UserSettings struct {
UserID string `json:"user_id"`
WorkspaceID string `json:"workspace_id"`
KanbanViewMode string `json:"kanban_view_mode"`
WorkflowFilterID string `json:"workflow_filter_id"`
RepositoryIDs []string `json:"repository_ids"`
TasksListSort string `json:"tasks_list_sort"`
TasksListGroup string `json:"tasks_list_group"`
InitialSetupComplete bool `json:"initial_setup_complete"`
PreferredShell string `json:"preferred_shell"`
DefaultEditorID string `json:"default_editor_id"`
EnablePreviewOnClick bool `json:"enable_preview_on_click"`
ChatSubmitKey string `json:"chat_submit_key"` // "enter" | "cmd_enter"
ReviewAutoMarkOnScroll bool `json:"review_auto_mark_on_scroll"`
ConfirmTaskArchive bool `json:"confirm_task_archive"`
MCPTaskAgentProfileDefault string `json:"mcp_task_agent_profile_default"`
ShowReleaseNotification bool `json:"show_release_notification"`
ReleaseNotesLastSeenVersion string `json:"release_notes_last_seen_version"`
LspAutoStartLanguages []string `json:"lsp_auto_start_languages"`
LspAutoInstallLanguages []string `json:"lsp_auto_install_languages"`
LspServerConfigs map[string]map[string]interface{} `json:"lsp_server_configs"`
SavedLayouts []SavedLayout `json:"saved_layouts"`
SidebarViews []SidebarView `json:"sidebar_views"`
SidebarActiveViewID string `json:"sidebar_active_view_id"`
SidebarDraft *SidebarViewDraft `json:"sidebar_draft"`
SidebarTaskPrefs SidebarTaskPrefs `json:"sidebar_task_prefs"`
TaskCreateLastUsed TaskCreateLastUsed `json:"task_create_last_used"`
JiraSavedViews json.RawMessage `json:"jira_saved_views"`
JiraTaskPresets json.RawMessage `json:"jira_task_presets"`
GitHubSavedPresets json.RawMessage `json:"github_saved_presets"`
GitHubDefaultQueryPresets json.RawMessage `json:"github_default_query_presets"`
GitLabSavedPresets json.RawMessage `json:"gitlab_saved_presets"`
DefaultUtilityAgentID string `json:"default_utility_agent_id"` // Default inference agent for utility agents
DefaultUtilityModel string `json:"default_utility_model"` // Default model for utility agents
KeyboardShortcuts map[string]interface{} `json:"keyboard_shortcuts"` // User-configured keyboard shortcut overrides
TerminalLinkBehavior string `json:"terminal_link_behavior"` // "new_tab" | "browser_panel"
TerminalFontFamily string `json:"terminal_font_family"`
TerminalFontSize int `json:"terminal_font_size"`
ChangesPanelLayout string `json:"changes_panel_layout"` // "flat" | "tree"
SystemMetricsDisplay SystemMetricsDisplaySettings `json:"system_metrics_display"`
AppStatusBarOrder AppStatusBarOrder `json:"app_status_bar_order"`
VoiceMode VoiceModeSettings `json:"voice_mode"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
}
type SystemMetricsDisplaySettings struct {
ShowInTopbar bool `json:"show_in_topbar"`
Simplified bool `json:"simplified"`
}
type AppStatusBarOrder struct {
LeftItemIDs []string `json:"left_item_ids"`
RightItemIDs []string `json:"right_item_ids"`
}
// VoiceModeSettings is the per-user configuration surface for the chat
// voice-input feature. Stored as a nested JSON object inside the `users.settings`
// blob — adding fields here does not require a schema migration.
type VoiceModeSettings struct {
// Enabled gates the whole feature. When false, the mic button is hidden
// entirely and no voice-related hooks run on the chat input. Defaults to
// true for new users; pre-existing user rows that have no `enabled` field
// in their stored JSON are also treated as enabled (see store layer).
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
// Engine is the user's preferred transcription engine.
// "auto" | "webSpeech" | "whisperWeb" | "whisperServer". Default "auto".
Engine string `json:"engine"`
// Language is the BCP-47 tag or "auto" to use the browser's language.
// Examples: "en-US", "pt-PT", "ja-JP". Default "auto".
Language string `json:"language"`
// Mode controls how the mic button is activated: "toggle" (click to start/stop)
// or "hold" (push-to-talk). Default "toggle".
Mode string `json:"mode"`
// AutoSend submits the chat message immediately after the transcript is inserted.
AutoSend bool `json:"auto_send"`
// WhisperWebModel selects the in-browser Whisper model when engine = whisperWeb.
// "tiny" | "base" | "small". Default "base".
WhisperWebModel string `json:"whisper_web_model"`
}
// SavedLayout represents a user-saved dockview layout configuration.
type SavedLayout struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
IsDefault bool `json:"is_default"`
Layout json.RawMessage `json:"layout"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
}
// SidebarView represents a user-saved sidebar filter/sort/group preset.
// The payload is stored and returned as-is; the server does not interpret
// clause values beyond passing them through.
type SidebarView struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Filters []SidebarViewClause `json:"filters"`
Sort SidebarViewSort `json:"sort"`
Group string `json:"group"`
CollapsedGroups []string `json:"collapsed_groups"`
}
type SidebarViewClause struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Dimension string `json:"dimension"`
Op string `json:"op"`
Value json.RawMessage `json:"value"`
}
type SidebarViewSort struct {
Key string `json:"key"`
Direction string `json:"direction"`
}
type SidebarViewDraft struct {
BaseViewID string `json:"base_view_id"`
Filters []SidebarViewClause `json:"filters"`
Sort SidebarViewSort `json:"sort"`
Group string `json:"group"`
}
type SidebarTaskPrefs struct {
PinnedTaskIDs []string `json:"pinned_task_ids"`
OrderedTaskIDs []string `json:"ordered_task_ids"`
SubtaskOrderByParentID map[string][]string `json:"subtask_order_by_parent_id"`
}
type TaskCreateLastUsed struct {
RepositoryID string `json:"repository_id"`
Branch string `json:"branch"`
AgentProfileID string `json:"agent_profile_id"`
ExecutorProfileID string `json:"executor_profile_id"`
}