919a39e49a
* feat(auth): add auth core — identities, sessions, PATs, invites, mode state machine Phase 1 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation: - internal/auth: argon2id password hashing (PHC), opaque session/PAT tokens (SHA-256 at rest), login rate limiter, auth-mode state machine (disabled/setup/enabled), setup-wizard promotion of the pre-auth default-user row into the admin account, invites, admin user management with last-admin guard. - internal/auth/store: auth_identities (OIDC-ready), auth_sessions, auth_api_tokens, auth_invites tables (SQLite+Postgres dialects). - internal/auth/authn: request-identity plumbing (gin + plain contexts), RequireAdmin middleware. - users table: display_name/role/status columns via new MigrateLogger wiring; AccountRepository surface (consumer-scoped, keeps existing Repository fakes untouched). - config: AuthConfig.Required/SessionTTLHours/CookieName (KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED), FeaturesConfig.Auth; profiles.yaml + runtime flag registry entry for KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): enforce opt-in auth over HTTP — middleware, auth API, boot payload Phase 2 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation: - internal/auth/httpmw: global gin middleware after CORS. Disabled mode injects the synthetic single-user admin identity (behavior unchanged); enabled mode resolves session cookie then PAT bearer, with an explicit allowlist (health, SPA bootstrap reads, credential endpoints, self-authenticating webhooks), deferral for WS/proxy upgrades and office agent JWTs, and SPA shell availability for the login page. - internal/auth/httpapi: full auth surface — setup wizard, login/logout, me, password change, sessions, PATs, invites (mint/preview/accept), auth settings (enable/disable), admin user management. - Boot payload: initialState.auth block always present; unauthenticated visitors on auth-enabled instances get features+auth only (no data). - External MCP: PAT required once auth is enabled (open while disabled). - Admin guards on destructive system routes and runtime-flag overrides. - Startup warning when bound non-loopback with auth disabled (ServerConfig.NonLoopbackBinds fail-closed nudge). - Wiring: auth store in Repositories, auth service in Services, ClaimUnownedWorkspaces backfill on the task repository. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): per-user workspace scoping across HTTP services Phase 3 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation: - Task service: workspaces, workflows, repositories, and tasks are scoped to the request identity (owner-only visibility; pre-auth unowned rows stay shared). Denials use *NotFound sentinels - no existence leak. Internal callers and the disabled-mode synthetic identity remain unscoped, preserving behavior exactly when auth is off. - CreateWorkspace stamps the authenticated caller as owner. - Session chokepoint: lifecycle Manager.GetOrEnsureExecution runs a settable session-access check covering shell/files/ports/vscode/LSP. - Secrets: per-user user_id column, scoped CRUD/list, ClaimUnowned wired into the setup-wizard backfills. - Boot payload inherits scoping automatically. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): scope WebSocket gateway to authenticated users Phase 4 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation: - Connection auth: /ws, /terminal, /lsp, /vscode, /port-proxy routes are guarded when auth is enabled - session cookie (same-origin upgrade), resolved identity from the HTTP middleware, or ?token=<PAT> for headerless programmatic clients; JSON 401 before any upgrade. - Client identity: every WS client carries its authn.Identity; dispatched RPC actions (workspace.list, task CRUD, ...) run under a context carrying it, so WS RPC gets the same per-user scoping as HTTP. - Subscription checks: task/session subscribe+focus verify workspace visibility via the task service; user topic subscriptions are pinned to the client's own user. - Broadcast routing: new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspace routes workspace-scoped events (task/workflow/repo/office/session-state) to the owner's clients only, with safe fallbacks (unowned/unresolvable -> broadcast) so events never vanish; instance-wide events (executors, environments, agent profiles, system jobs) stay global by design. - Replaced the long-standing discarded-token TODO in HandleConnection. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(auth): add feature spec and backend architecture notes for opt-in auth - docs/specs/auth/spec.md: product behavior (opt-in, setup wizard, per-user workspaces, sessions/PATs, invites, public surface, v1 limits) - apps/backend/AGENTS.md: internal/auth package layout + scoping rules for new service entry points and WS broadcast call sites Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(auth): public documentation for opt-in authentication - New docs/public/authentication.md: enabling, users & invites, PATs, public endpoints, limitations, disabling - run-as-a-service.md: network-security note now points at the real authentication boundary instead of reverse-proxy-only guidance - meta.json: nav entry under Configure Kandev Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(auth): ADR for opt-in authentication architecture Records the load-bearing choices: mode state machine + synthetic identity in disabled mode, opaque DB-backed credentials over JWTs, default-user promotion at setup, service-layer scoping with no-admin-bypass, and the explicit public allowlist. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(web): auth UI — login, setup wizard, invites, users & account settings Adds the frontend half of opt-in authentication: a pre-auth gate in main.tsx that renders the setup wizard or login/invite pages instead of the app shell whenever the boot payload's auth block says so, a new `auth` store slice + feature flag mirroring the backend's StatePayload, credentialed fetch (`credentials: "include"`) with a 401 handler that clears the session and redirects to /login, and a full auth-api.ts client for the /api/v1/auth and /api/v1/users routes. Settings additions: a System > Users page (list/create/disable/promote users, invite-link dialog) and System > Authentication page (enable/ disable with confirm + env-locked banner), gated on the `auth` feature flag and admin role. A new Account sidebar group (Profile & Password, API Tokens) is shown to signed-in users once auth is enabled. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(auth): E2E lifecycle suite + fix workspace event WS leak it caught New dedicated Playwright auth project (backend restarts with KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED=true, isolated from the tokenless default suite): setup-mode boot gating, admin setup wizard, login/logout + bad credentials, PATs, admin-surface authorization, anonymous WS rejection, UI login flow, and the acceptance test - two-user segregation across HTTP, boot payload, and WebSocket. The segregation spec immediately caught a real leak: workspace.* event payloads carry their ID as 'id' (the payload IS the workspace DTO), not 'workspace_id', so BroadcastToWorkspace fell back to broadcast-to-all for workspace create/update/delete. Fixed with action-aware extraction plus a unit regression test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): close cross-user access gaps found in security audit Two independent security audits of the auth branch found several authorization gaps where session/workspace-scoped surfaces were not wired to the new per-user chokepoint. All fixed: - IDOR on reverse-proxy/terminal routes (vscode, port-proxy, terminal): these resolve executions via GetExecutionBySessionID / GetOrEnsureExecutionForEnvironment / EnsurePassthroughExecution, which skipped the session-access check that only GetOrEnsureExecution ran. Added the check inside the env/passthrough resolvers (before the cache short-circuit) and an explicit CheckSessionAccess gate in the two bare-lookup proxy handlers. An authenticated non-owner can no longer reach another user's IDE, forwarded ports, or shell. - Cross-user agent-conversation read: ListMessages / ListMessagesPaginated / SearchMessages now authorize the session. - Cross-user repository-script read/inject: script CRUD now authorizes the parent repository's workspace. - Office HTTP surface: a group middleware enforces workspace ownership on :wsId routes for real users (agent-JWT callers keep their claim scoping). - Login rate-limit bypass: SetTrustedProxies(nil) so a spoofed X-Forwarded-For can't rotate the limiter key on a directly-reachable backend. - Invite double-provisioning race: MarkInviteUsed is now the atomic serialization point (consumed before user creation). - Setup wizard: serialized with a mutex so concurrent first-visitors can't corrupt the promoted admin profile. - Log sanitizer: explicit kandev_pat_ redaction rule. Regression tests added for message/script scoping and the execution-access-before-cache invariant. Auth E2E (incl. two-user segregation) still green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): scope repository active-session-count endpoint GET /api/v1/repositories/:id/active-session-count went through CountActiveSessionsByRepository, which was not identity-scoped - a cross-user info leak of another owner's active session counts. Added the same authorizeRepositoryID gate the script routes use. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): add json tags to auth store models — omit digests, fix token UI The auth store structs (APIToken, Invite, LoginIdentity, Session) had db: tags but no json: tags, so the handlers that serialize them directly sent Go-cased keys (CreatedAt, Name) AND leaked the SHA-256/password digests to clients. Two consequences: - The API-tokens UI showed 'Invalid Date' and an empty name (frontend reads created_at/name). - token_sha256 / password_hash were serialized in list responses. Added json tags with snake_case keys the frontend reads and json:"-" on every credential digest. Regression test asserts digests never serialize and the snake_case timestamp/name keys are present. Also adds the auth-screenshots capture spec (artifacts gitignored). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(web): move auth enable into feature toggles; show current user in sidebar Remove the standalone Authentication settings page and its dedicated settings/get-auth-settings API surface now that enabling auth lives in the Feature Toggles system, and drop env_required now that /auth/me no longer returns it. Add a current-user chip with a logout action to the sidebar footer, shown only in enabled auth mode. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(auth): make features.auth the single on/off control Per review feedback: authentication configuration now lives entirely in the existing Feature Toggles system rather than a separate Authentication settings section. - The auth mode is derived from the features.auth runtime flag (KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH): off -> disabled, on+no-admin -> setup, on+admin -> enabled. Removed the parallel auth.mode system setting, the SetEnabled service method, GET/PATCH /api/v1/auth/settings, the AuthConfig.Required field, KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED, and the auth service's Settings-store dependency and EnvRequired/env_required. - The features.auth registry entry is re-described as the actual enable switch (high-risk, restart-required) and defaults off in every profile (dev was previously true — that only revealed UI before; now it would enforce, so it must be an explicit opt-in). - Setup no longer persists a mode; completing the wizard creates the admin and the mode auto-derives to enabled. - Startup 'exposed without auth' warning + all docs (public guide, run-as-a-service, spec, ADR, AGENTS.md) point at the feature toggle. - E2E: auth specs use KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH; screenshot spec captures the Feature Toggles page instead of the removed Authentication page; the member-restriction assertion targets an admin invite route. - Tests updated across service/httpmw/httpapi/profiles for the derived mode; full suite green (only pre-existing sandbox-FS failures remain). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): complete cross-user isolation — integrations, automation, plan/walkthrough, session reads A follow-up isolation audit found that per-user scoping had been wired into the task service, secrets, office, and the WS gateway — but several workspace/task/session-scoped surfaces still resolved a caller-supplied ID with no ownership gate. Closed all of them; cross-user access now returns 404 across the board. - Integrations (jira/linear/sentry/slack/azure-devops/gitlab/github/ workflow-sync): a global middleware authorizes the workspace_id (query, or gitlab's /workspaces/:id/ path) on those route groups. Previously a member who knew another user's workspace ID could read/overwrite their integration connection config and watches. - Automation: workspace-authorizer seam gates get/list/create/update/delete/ enable/disable, triggers, run history, and — critically — the webhook secret. Was fully cross-tenant over WS before. - Task plans (PlanService) and walkthroughs (WalkthroughService): task- authorizer seam on every read/write. These bypassed the task service. - Session reads that hit the repo directly — session turns, task context, git snapshots, file reviews — now call AuthorizeSession/TaskAccess. Internal callers (pollers, schedulers, MCP) carry no identity and stay unscoped; disabled mode is unaffected. Regression tests added (plan/walkthrough scoping, automation authorizer matrix, integration path extraction) and the two-user E2E now asserts integration routes are shielded. Docs (spec, ADR, public guide) updated to state what is isolated and that filesystem/agent-credential isolation remains an OS-level limitation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(web): current-user chip uses border hover, not accent fill The sidebar current-user chip used hover:bg-accent (a purpleish fill). Switch to the border-hover idiom used elsewhere (border border-transparent -> hover:border-border) with the neutral hover:bg-muted/50 the adjacent workspace picker uses, so the hover reads as a subtle outline instead of a colored background. Screenshot spec now captures the chip hover state. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(web): right-align current-user chip in the sidebar footer Push the user chip to the far right of the expanded footer (ml-auto) so it sits opposite the left-aligned icon buttons; collapsed mode keeps the centered vertical stack unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): reject synthetic identity on management routes and scope office run broadcasts Address code-review findings on the opt-in authentication PR: - P1: while auth is disabled the middleware injects a synthetic admin (RoleAdmin), and RequireAdmin alone let it through — so anyone hitting a not-yet-enabled instance could mint a PAT or plant an admin that survives enablement and hijacks first-run setup. Add authn.RequireRealIdentity and guard the credential/session/user-management routes with it (public bootstrap routes stay reachable). Responds 404 while disabled. - P1: office run events carry task_id but no workspace_id, so they fell back to a global broadcast and leaked across users. Resolve the workspace from the task and route via the new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspaceOrDrop, which fails closed (drops rather than global-broadcasts) when the workspace is unknown and auth is enforced. - nit: type createAuthSlice as a single-arg creator and call it with just set. Also register the authentication docs page and its settings routes in docs/public/coverage.json so the public-docs validator passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
261 lines
7.6 KiB
TypeScript
261 lines
7.6 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from "vitest";
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vi.mock("@/lib/config", () => ({
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getBackendConfig: () => ({ apiBaseUrl: "http://api.test" }),
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}));
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import {
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fetchAuthState,
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setup,
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login,
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logout,
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changePassword,
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listSessions,
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revokeSession,
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listTokens,
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mintToken,
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revokeToken,
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listInvites,
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createInvite,
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previewInvite,
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acceptInvite,
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listUsers,
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createUser,
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updateUser,
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} from "./auth-api";
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const BASE = "http://api.test/api/v1/auth";
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const TEST_PASSWORD = "password123";
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const INVITEE_EMAIL = "invitee@x.com";
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type FetchInput = Parameters<typeof fetch>[0];
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type FetchInit = Parameters<typeof fetch>[1];
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const fetchSpy = vi.fn<(...args: [FetchInput, FetchInit?]) => Promise<Response>>();
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beforeEach(() => {
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fetchSpy.mockReset();
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vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchSpy);
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});
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afterEach(() => {
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vi.unstubAllGlobals();
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});
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function jsonResponse(body: unknown, init?: ResponseInit): Response {
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return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
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status: 200,
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headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
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...init,
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});
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}
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function noContentResponse(): Response {
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return new Response(null, { status: 204 });
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}
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function lastCall(): { url: string; init: FetchInit | undefined } {
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const call = fetchSpy.mock.calls.at(-1);
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if (!call) throw new Error("expected fetch to have been called");
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return { url: String(call[0]), init: call[1] };
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}
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function method(): string {
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return (lastCall().init?.method ?? "GET").toUpperCase();
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}
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function bodyJson(): unknown {
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const raw = lastCall().init?.body;
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return raw ? JSON.parse(String(raw)) : undefined;
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}
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describe("fetchAuthState", () => {
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it("GETs /me and returns the StatePayload shape", async () => {
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(jsonResponse({ mode: "enabled", authenticated: false }));
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const state = await fetchAuthState();
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expect(lastCall().url).toBe(`${BASE}/me`);
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expect(method()).toBe("GET");
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expect(state.mode).toBe("enabled");
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expect(state.authenticated).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe("setup", () => {
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it("POSTs credentials to /setup", async () => {
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(
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jsonResponse({
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user: { id: "u1", email: "a@b.com", display_name: "A", role: "admin", status: "active" },
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}),
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);
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const res = await setup({ email: "a@b.com", password: TEST_PASSWORD, display_name: "A" });
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expect(lastCall().url).toBe(`${BASE}/setup`);
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expect(method()).toBe("POST");
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expect(bodyJson()).toEqual({ email: "a@b.com", password: TEST_PASSWORD, display_name: "A" });
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expect(res.user.role).toBe("admin");
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});
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});
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describe("login", () => {
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it("POSTs credentials to /login", async () => {
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(
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jsonResponse({
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user: { id: "u1", email: "a@b.com", display_name: "A", role: "member", status: "active" },
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}),
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);
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await login({ email: "a@b.com", password: TEST_PASSWORD });
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expect(lastCall().url).toBe(`${BASE}/login`);
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expect(method()).toBe("POST");
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});
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});
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describe("logout", () => {
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it("POSTs to /logout and resolves on 204", async () => {
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(noContentResponse());
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await expect(logout()).resolves.toBeUndefined();
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expect(lastCall().url).toBe(`${BASE}/logout`);
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expect(method()).toBe("POST");
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});
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});
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describe("changePassword", () => {
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it("PATCHes /password", async () => {
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(noContentResponse());
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await changePassword({ current_password: "old12345", new_password: "new123456" });
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expect(lastCall().url).toBe(`${BASE}/password`);
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expect(method()).toBe("PATCH");
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});
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});
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describe("sessions", () => {
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it("lists and revokes sessions", async () => {
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(
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jsonResponse({
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sessions: [
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{
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id: "s1",
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created_at: "now",
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last_seen_at: "now",
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user_agent: "ua",
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ip: "1.2.3.4",
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current: true,
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},
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],
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}),
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);
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const res = await listSessions();
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expect(lastCall().url).toBe(`${BASE}/sessions`);
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expect(res.sessions).toHaveLength(1);
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(noContentResponse());
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await revokeSession("s1");
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expect(lastCall().url).toBe(`${BASE}/sessions/s1`);
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expect(method()).toBe("DELETE");
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});
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});
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describe("tokens", () => {
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it("mints, lists, and revokes tokens", async () => {
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(
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jsonResponse({
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token: "raw-token",
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record: { id: "t1", user_id: "u1", name: "ci", created_at: "now" },
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}),
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);
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const minted = await mintToken({ name: "ci", ttl_hours: 24 });
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expect(lastCall().url).toBe(`${BASE}/tokens`);
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expect(method()).toBe("POST");
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expect(minted.token).toBe("raw-token");
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(jsonResponse({ tokens: [minted.record] }));
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const listed = await listTokens();
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expect(listed.tokens).toHaveLength(1);
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(noContentResponse());
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await revokeToken("t1");
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expect(lastCall().url).toBe(`${BASE}/tokens/t1`);
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expect(method()).toBe("DELETE");
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});
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});
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describe("invites", () => {
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it("creates, lists, previews, and accepts invites", async () => {
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(
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jsonResponse({
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invite: { id: "i1", role: "member", created_by: "u1", expires_at: "later" },
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url: "/invite?token=raw",
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}),
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);
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const created = await createInvite({ role: "member", ttl_hours: 48 });
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expect(lastCall().url).toBe(`${BASE}/invites`);
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expect(created.url).toBe("/invite?token=raw");
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(jsonResponse({ invites: [created.invite] }));
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const listed = await listInvites();
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expect(listed.invites).toHaveLength(1);
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(
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jsonResponse({ email: INVITEE_EMAIL, role: "member", expires_at: "later" }),
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);
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const preview = await previewInvite("raw");
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expect(lastCall().url).toBe(`${BASE}/invites/preview?token=raw`);
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expect(preview.role).toBe("member");
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(
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jsonResponse({
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user: {
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id: "u2",
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email: INVITEE_EMAIL,
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display_name: "Invitee",
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role: "member",
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status: "active",
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},
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}),
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);
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const accepted = await acceptInvite({
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token: "raw",
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email: INVITEE_EMAIL,
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password: TEST_PASSWORD,
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display_name: "Invitee",
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});
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expect(lastCall().url).toBe(`${BASE}/invites/accept`);
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expect(accepted.user.email).toBe(INVITEE_EMAIL);
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});
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});
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describe("admin users", () => {
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it("lists, creates, and updates users", async () => {
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(
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jsonResponse({
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users: [{ id: "u1", email: "a@b.com", display_name: "A", role: "admin", status: "active" }],
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}),
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);
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const users = await listUsers();
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expect(lastCall().url).toBe("http://api.test/api/v1/users");
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expect(users.users).toHaveLength(1);
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(
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jsonResponse({
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user: { id: "u2", email: "c@d.com", display_name: "C", role: "member", status: "active" },
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}),
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);
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const created = await createUser({
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email: "c@d.com",
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password: TEST_PASSWORD,
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display_name: "C",
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role: "member",
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});
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expect(method()).toBe("POST");
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expect(created.user.email).toBe("c@d.com");
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fetchSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce(
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jsonResponse({
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user: { id: "u2", email: "c@d.com", display_name: "C", role: "admin", status: "active" },
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}),
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);
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const updated = await updateUser("u2", { role: "admin" });
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expect(lastCall().url).toBe("http://api.test/api/v1/users/u2");
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expect(method()).toBe("PATCH");
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expect(updated.user.role).toBe("admin");
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});
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|
});
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