919a39e49a
* feat(auth): add auth core — identities, sessions, PATs, invites, mode state machine Phase 1 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation: - internal/auth: argon2id password hashing (PHC), opaque session/PAT tokens (SHA-256 at rest), login rate limiter, auth-mode state machine (disabled/setup/enabled), setup-wizard promotion of the pre-auth default-user row into the admin account, invites, admin user management with last-admin guard. - internal/auth/store: auth_identities (OIDC-ready), auth_sessions, auth_api_tokens, auth_invites tables (SQLite+Postgres dialects). - internal/auth/authn: request-identity plumbing (gin + plain contexts), RequireAdmin middleware. - users table: display_name/role/status columns via new MigrateLogger wiring; AccountRepository surface (consumer-scoped, keeps existing Repository fakes untouched). - config: AuthConfig.Required/SessionTTLHours/CookieName (KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED), FeaturesConfig.Auth; profiles.yaml + runtime flag registry entry for KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): enforce opt-in auth over HTTP — middleware, auth API, boot payload Phase 2 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation: - internal/auth/httpmw: global gin middleware after CORS. Disabled mode injects the synthetic single-user admin identity (behavior unchanged); enabled mode resolves session cookie then PAT bearer, with an explicit allowlist (health, SPA bootstrap reads, credential endpoints, self-authenticating webhooks), deferral for WS/proxy upgrades and office agent JWTs, and SPA shell availability for the login page. - internal/auth/httpapi: full auth surface — setup wizard, login/logout, me, password change, sessions, PATs, invites (mint/preview/accept), auth settings (enable/disable), admin user management. - Boot payload: initialState.auth block always present; unauthenticated visitors on auth-enabled instances get features+auth only (no data). - External MCP: PAT required once auth is enabled (open while disabled). - Admin guards on destructive system routes and runtime-flag overrides. - Startup warning when bound non-loopback with auth disabled (ServerConfig.NonLoopbackBinds fail-closed nudge). - Wiring: auth store in Repositories, auth service in Services, ClaimUnownedWorkspaces backfill on the task repository. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): per-user workspace scoping across HTTP services Phase 3 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation: - Task service: workspaces, workflows, repositories, and tasks are scoped to the request identity (owner-only visibility; pre-auth unowned rows stay shared). Denials use *NotFound sentinels - no existence leak. Internal callers and the disabled-mode synthetic identity remain unscoped, preserving behavior exactly when auth is off. - CreateWorkspace stamps the authenticated caller as owner. - Session chokepoint: lifecycle Manager.GetOrEnsureExecution runs a settable session-access check covering shell/files/ports/vscode/LSP. - Secrets: per-user user_id column, scoped CRUD/list, ClaimUnowned wired into the setup-wizard backfills. - Boot payload inherits scoping automatically. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): scope WebSocket gateway to authenticated users Phase 4 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation: - Connection auth: /ws, /terminal, /lsp, /vscode, /port-proxy routes are guarded when auth is enabled - session cookie (same-origin upgrade), resolved identity from the HTTP middleware, or ?token=<PAT> for headerless programmatic clients; JSON 401 before any upgrade. - Client identity: every WS client carries its authn.Identity; dispatched RPC actions (workspace.list, task CRUD, ...) run under a context carrying it, so WS RPC gets the same per-user scoping as HTTP. - Subscription checks: task/session subscribe+focus verify workspace visibility via the task service; user topic subscriptions are pinned to the client's own user. - Broadcast routing: new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspace routes workspace-scoped events (task/workflow/repo/office/session-state) to the owner's clients only, with safe fallbacks (unowned/unresolvable -> broadcast) so events never vanish; instance-wide events (executors, environments, agent profiles, system jobs) stay global by design. - Replaced the long-standing discarded-token TODO in HandleConnection. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(auth): add feature spec and backend architecture notes for opt-in auth - docs/specs/auth/spec.md: product behavior (opt-in, setup wizard, per-user workspaces, sessions/PATs, invites, public surface, v1 limits) - apps/backend/AGENTS.md: internal/auth package layout + scoping rules for new service entry points and WS broadcast call sites Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(auth): public documentation for opt-in authentication - New docs/public/authentication.md: enabling, users & invites, PATs, public endpoints, limitations, disabling - run-as-a-service.md: network-security note now points at the real authentication boundary instead of reverse-proxy-only guidance - meta.json: nav entry under Configure Kandev Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(auth): ADR for opt-in authentication architecture Records the load-bearing choices: mode state machine + synthetic identity in disabled mode, opaque DB-backed credentials over JWTs, default-user promotion at setup, service-layer scoping with no-admin-bypass, and the explicit public allowlist. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(web): auth UI — login, setup wizard, invites, users & account settings Adds the frontend half of opt-in authentication: a pre-auth gate in main.tsx that renders the setup wizard or login/invite pages instead of the app shell whenever the boot payload's auth block says so, a new `auth` store slice + feature flag mirroring the backend's StatePayload, credentialed fetch (`credentials: "include"`) with a 401 handler that clears the session and redirects to /login, and a full auth-api.ts client for the /api/v1/auth and /api/v1/users routes. Settings additions: a System > Users page (list/create/disable/promote users, invite-link dialog) and System > Authentication page (enable/ disable with confirm + env-locked banner), gated on the `auth` feature flag and admin role. A new Account sidebar group (Profile & Password, API Tokens) is shown to signed-in users once auth is enabled. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(auth): E2E lifecycle suite + fix workspace event WS leak it caught New dedicated Playwright auth project (backend restarts with KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED=true, isolated from the tokenless default suite): setup-mode boot gating, admin setup wizard, login/logout + bad credentials, PATs, admin-surface authorization, anonymous WS rejection, UI login flow, and the acceptance test - two-user segregation across HTTP, boot payload, and WebSocket. The segregation spec immediately caught a real leak: workspace.* event payloads carry their ID as 'id' (the payload IS the workspace DTO), not 'workspace_id', so BroadcastToWorkspace fell back to broadcast-to-all for workspace create/update/delete. Fixed with action-aware extraction plus a unit regression test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): close cross-user access gaps found in security audit Two independent security audits of the auth branch found several authorization gaps where session/workspace-scoped surfaces were not wired to the new per-user chokepoint. All fixed: - IDOR on reverse-proxy/terminal routes (vscode, port-proxy, terminal): these resolve executions via GetExecutionBySessionID / GetOrEnsureExecutionForEnvironment / EnsurePassthroughExecution, which skipped the session-access check that only GetOrEnsureExecution ran. Added the check inside the env/passthrough resolvers (before the cache short-circuit) and an explicit CheckSessionAccess gate in the two bare-lookup proxy handlers. An authenticated non-owner can no longer reach another user's IDE, forwarded ports, or shell. - Cross-user agent-conversation read: ListMessages / ListMessagesPaginated / SearchMessages now authorize the session. - Cross-user repository-script read/inject: script CRUD now authorizes the parent repository's workspace. - Office HTTP surface: a group middleware enforces workspace ownership on :wsId routes for real users (agent-JWT callers keep their claim scoping). - Login rate-limit bypass: SetTrustedProxies(nil) so a spoofed X-Forwarded-For can't rotate the limiter key on a directly-reachable backend. - Invite double-provisioning race: MarkInviteUsed is now the atomic serialization point (consumed before user creation). - Setup wizard: serialized with a mutex so concurrent first-visitors can't corrupt the promoted admin profile. - Log sanitizer: explicit kandev_pat_ redaction rule. Regression tests added for message/script scoping and the execution-access-before-cache invariant. Auth E2E (incl. two-user segregation) still green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): scope repository active-session-count endpoint GET /api/v1/repositories/:id/active-session-count went through CountActiveSessionsByRepository, which was not identity-scoped - a cross-user info leak of another owner's active session counts. Added the same authorizeRepositoryID gate the script routes use. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): add json tags to auth store models — omit digests, fix token UI The auth store structs (APIToken, Invite, LoginIdentity, Session) had db: tags but no json: tags, so the handlers that serialize them directly sent Go-cased keys (CreatedAt, Name) AND leaked the SHA-256/password digests to clients. Two consequences: - The API-tokens UI showed 'Invalid Date' and an empty name (frontend reads created_at/name). - token_sha256 / password_hash were serialized in list responses. Added json tags with snake_case keys the frontend reads and json:"-" on every credential digest. Regression test asserts digests never serialize and the snake_case timestamp/name keys are present. Also adds the auth-screenshots capture spec (artifacts gitignored). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(web): move auth enable into feature toggles; show current user in sidebar Remove the standalone Authentication settings page and its dedicated settings/get-auth-settings API surface now that enabling auth lives in the Feature Toggles system, and drop env_required now that /auth/me no longer returns it. Add a current-user chip with a logout action to the sidebar footer, shown only in enabled auth mode. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(auth): make features.auth the single on/off control Per review feedback: authentication configuration now lives entirely in the existing Feature Toggles system rather than a separate Authentication settings section. - The auth mode is derived from the features.auth runtime flag (KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH): off -> disabled, on+no-admin -> setup, on+admin -> enabled. Removed the parallel auth.mode system setting, the SetEnabled service method, GET/PATCH /api/v1/auth/settings, the AuthConfig.Required field, KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED, and the auth service's Settings-store dependency and EnvRequired/env_required. - The features.auth registry entry is re-described as the actual enable switch (high-risk, restart-required) and defaults off in every profile (dev was previously true — that only revealed UI before; now it would enforce, so it must be an explicit opt-in). - Setup no longer persists a mode; completing the wizard creates the admin and the mode auto-derives to enabled. - Startup 'exposed without auth' warning + all docs (public guide, run-as-a-service, spec, ADR, AGENTS.md) point at the feature toggle. - E2E: auth specs use KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH; screenshot spec captures the Feature Toggles page instead of the removed Authentication page; the member-restriction assertion targets an admin invite route. - Tests updated across service/httpmw/httpapi/profiles for the derived mode; full suite green (only pre-existing sandbox-FS failures remain). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): complete cross-user isolation — integrations, automation, plan/walkthrough, session reads A follow-up isolation audit found that per-user scoping had been wired into the task service, secrets, office, and the WS gateway — but several workspace/task/session-scoped surfaces still resolved a caller-supplied ID with no ownership gate. Closed all of them; cross-user access now returns 404 across the board. - Integrations (jira/linear/sentry/slack/azure-devops/gitlab/github/ workflow-sync): a global middleware authorizes the workspace_id (query, or gitlab's /workspaces/:id/ path) on those route groups. Previously a member who knew another user's workspace ID could read/overwrite their integration connection config and watches. - Automation: workspace-authorizer seam gates get/list/create/update/delete/ enable/disable, triggers, run history, and — critically — the webhook secret. Was fully cross-tenant over WS before. - Task plans (PlanService) and walkthroughs (WalkthroughService): task- authorizer seam on every read/write. These bypassed the task service. - Session reads that hit the repo directly — session turns, task context, git snapshots, file reviews — now call AuthorizeSession/TaskAccess. Internal callers (pollers, schedulers, MCP) carry no identity and stay unscoped; disabled mode is unaffected. Regression tests added (plan/walkthrough scoping, automation authorizer matrix, integration path extraction) and the two-user E2E now asserts integration routes are shielded. Docs (spec, ADR, public guide) updated to state what is isolated and that filesystem/agent-credential isolation remains an OS-level limitation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(web): current-user chip uses border hover, not accent fill The sidebar current-user chip used hover:bg-accent (a purpleish fill). Switch to the border-hover idiom used elsewhere (border border-transparent -> hover:border-border) with the neutral hover:bg-muted/50 the adjacent workspace picker uses, so the hover reads as a subtle outline instead of a colored background. Screenshot spec now captures the chip hover state. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(web): right-align current-user chip in the sidebar footer Push the user chip to the far right of the expanded footer (ml-auto) so it sits opposite the left-aligned icon buttons; collapsed mode keeps the centered vertical stack unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): reject synthetic identity on management routes and scope office run broadcasts Address code-review findings on the opt-in authentication PR: - P1: while auth is disabled the middleware injects a synthetic admin (RoleAdmin), and RequireAdmin alone let it through — so anyone hitting a not-yet-enabled instance could mint a PAT or plant an admin that survives enablement and hijacks first-run setup. Add authn.RequireRealIdentity and guard the credential/session/user-management routes with it (public bootstrap routes stay reachable). Responds 404 while disabled. - P1: office run events carry task_id but no workspace_id, so they fell back to a global broadcast and leaked across users. Resolve the workspace from the task and route via the new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspaceOrDrop, which fails closed (drops rather than global-broadcasts) when the workspace is unknown and auth is enforced. - nit: type createAuthSlice as a single-arg creator and call it with just set. Also register the authentication docs page and its settings routes in docs/public/coverage.json so the public-docs validator passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
281 lines
8.7 KiB
Go
281 lines
8.7 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"testing"
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"github.com/jmoiron/sqlx"
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_ "github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3"
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"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/auth/store"
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"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/common/config"
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usermodels "github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/user/models"
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userstore "github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/user/store"
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)
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type serviceFixture struct {
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svc *Service
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users userstore.Repository
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backfills *[]string
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}
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func newServiceFixture(t *testing.T, authEnabled bool) *serviceFixture {
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t.Helper()
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conn, err := sqlx.Open("sqlite3", ":memory:")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("open sqlite: %v", err)
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() { _ = conn.Close() })
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users, cleanup, err := userstore.Provide(conn, conn)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("user store: %v", err)
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cleanup() })
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authStore, err := store.New(conn, conn)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("auth store: %v", err)
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}
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claimed := []string{}
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cfg := &config.Config{}
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cfg.Features.Auth = authEnabled
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cfg.Auth.SessionTTLHours = 720
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svc, err := NewService(context.Background(), Deps{
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Cfg: cfg,
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Store: authStore,
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Users: users,
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Backfills: []BackfillFunc{func(_ context.Context, ownerID string) error {
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claimed = append(claimed, ownerID)
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return nil
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}},
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("new service: %v", err)
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}
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return &serviceFixture{svc: svc, users: users, backfills: &claimed}
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}
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// enableAuth flips the features.auth flag on and recomputes the mode, the way
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// a restart with the runtime flag enabled would.
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func enableAuth(t *testing.T, f *serviceFixture) {
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t.Helper()
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f.svc.cfg.Features.Auth = true
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if err := f.svc.refreshMode(context.Background()); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("refresh mode: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestModeDisabledByDefault(t *testing.T) {
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f := newServiceFixture(t, false)
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if got := f.svc.Mode(); got != ModeDisabled {
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t.Fatalf("mode = %s, want disabled", got)
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}
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}
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func TestModeSetupWhenEnabledWithoutAdmin(t *testing.T) {
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f := newServiceFixture(t, true)
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if got := f.svc.Mode(); got != ModeSetup {
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t.Fatalf("mode = %s, want setup", got)
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}
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}
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func TestEnableThenSetupPromotesDefaultUser(t *testing.T) {
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f := newServiceFixture(t, false)
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ctx := context.Background()
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enableAuth(t, f)
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if f.svc.Mode() != ModeSetup {
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t.Fatalf("mode = %s, want setup", f.svc.Mode())
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}
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user, token, err := f.svc.Setup(ctx, "Admin@Example.com", "hunter2secure", "The Admin", "ua", "127.0.0.1")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
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}
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if user.ID != userstore.DefaultUserID {
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t.Fatalf("setup must promote the default-user row, got %s", user.ID)
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}
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if user.Email != "admin@example.com" || user.Role != usermodels.RoleAdmin {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected admin: %+v", user)
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}
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if len(*f.backfills) != 1 || (*f.backfills)[0] != userstore.DefaultUserID {
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t.Fatalf("backfills not invoked for admin: %v", *f.backfills)
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}
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if f.svc.Mode() != ModeEnabled {
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t.Fatalf("mode after setup = %s, want enabled", f.svc.Mode())
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}
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// The minted session authenticates.
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identity, ok := f.svc.ResolveSessionToken(ctx, token)
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if !ok || identity.UserID != userstore.DefaultUserID || !identity.IsAdmin() {
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t.Fatalf("session identity = %+v ok=%v", identity, ok)
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}
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// Setup is single-shot.
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if _, _, err := f.svc.Setup(ctx, "x@y.z", "password123", "", "", ""); !errors.Is(err, ErrSetupNotAvailable) {
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t.Fatalf("second setup: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func setupEnabled(t *testing.T, f *serviceFixture) {
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t.Helper()
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enableAuth(t, f)
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if _, _, err := f.svc.Setup(context.Background(), "admin@x.dev", "adminpass123", "Admin", "", ""); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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}
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func TestLoginFlow(t *testing.T) {
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f := newServiceFixture(t, false)
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ctx := context.Background()
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setupEnabled(t, f)
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if _, _, err := f.svc.Login(ctx, "admin@x.dev", "wrong-password", "", "1.2.3.4"); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidCredentials) {
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t.Fatalf("wrong password: %v", err)
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}
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if _, _, err := f.svc.Login(ctx, "ghost@x.dev", "whatever-pass", "", "1.2.3.4"); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidCredentials) {
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t.Fatalf("unknown email: %v", err)
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}
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user, token, err := f.svc.Login(ctx, "ADMIN@x.dev", "adminpass123", "ua", "1.2.3.4")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("login: %v", err)
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}
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if user.Email != "admin@x.dev" {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected user: %+v", user)
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}
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identity, ok := f.svc.ResolveSessionToken(ctx, token)
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if !ok || !identity.IsAdmin() {
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t.Fatalf("resolve: %+v ok=%v", identity, ok)
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}
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// Logout revokes.
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if err := f.svc.Logout(ctx, identity.SessionID, identity.UserID); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if _, ok := f.svc.ResolveSessionToken(ctx, token); ok {
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t.Fatal("session must be dead after logout")
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}
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}
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func TestLoginRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
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f := newServiceFixture(t, false)
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ctx := context.Background()
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setupEnabled(t, f)
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var lastErr error
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for i := 0; i < loginRateAttempts+1; i++ {
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_, _, lastErr = f.svc.Login(ctx, "admin@x.dev", "bad-password!", "", "9.9.9.9")
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}
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if !errors.Is(lastErr, ErrRateLimited) {
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t.Fatalf("expected rate limit, got %v", lastErr)
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}
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}
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func TestChangePasswordRevokesOtherSessions(t *testing.T) {
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f := newServiceFixture(t, false)
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ctx := context.Background()
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setupEnabled(t, f)
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_, tokenA, err := f.svc.Login(ctx, "admin@x.dev", "adminpass123", "", "")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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_, tokenB, err := f.svc.Login(ctx, "admin@x.dev", "adminpass123", "", "")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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identityA, _ := f.svc.ResolveSessionToken(ctx, tokenA)
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if err := f.svc.ChangePassword(ctx, identityA.UserID, identityA.SessionID, "adminpass123", "newpass12345"); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("change password: %v", err)
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}
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if _, ok := f.svc.ResolveSessionToken(ctx, tokenA); !ok {
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t.Fatal("current session must survive password change")
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}
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if _, ok := f.svc.ResolveSessionToken(ctx, tokenB); ok {
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t.Fatal("other sessions must be revoked")
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}
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if _, _, err := f.svc.Login(ctx, "admin@x.dev", "newpass12345", "", ""); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("login with new password: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestInviteFlow(t *testing.T) {
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f := newServiceFixture(t, false)
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ctx := context.Background()
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setupEnabled(t, f)
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_, token, err := f.svc.CreateInvite(ctx, userstore.DefaultUserID, "new@x.dev", "member", 0)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("create invite: %v", err)
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}
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// Wrong email is rejected when the invite pins one.
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if _, _, err := f.svc.AcceptInvite(ctx, token, "other@x.dev", "memberpass123", "", "", ""); !errors.Is(err, ErrInviteInvalid) {
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t.Fatalf("email mismatch: %v", err)
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}
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user, sessionToken, err := f.svc.AcceptInvite(ctx, token, "new@x.dev", "memberpass123", "New User", "", "")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("accept invite: %v", err)
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}
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if user.Role != usermodels.RoleMember {
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t.Fatalf("role = %s, want member", user.Role)
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}
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identity, ok := f.svc.ResolveSessionToken(ctx, sessionToken)
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if !ok || identity.IsAdmin() {
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t.Fatalf("member identity: %+v ok=%v", identity, ok)
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}
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// Single-use.
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if _, _, err := f.svc.AcceptInvite(ctx, token, "again@x.dev", "memberpass123", "", "", ""); !errors.Is(err, ErrInviteInvalid) {
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t.Fatalf("double accept: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestAdminUserManagement(t *testing.T) {
|
|
f := newServiceFixture(t, false)
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
setupEnabled(t, f)
|
|
|
|
member, err := f.svc.AdminCreateUser(ctx, "m@x.dev", "memberpass123", "M", "member")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create user: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := f.svc.AdminCreateUser(ctx, "m@x.dev", "memberpass123", "M2", "member"); !errors.Is(err, ErrEmailTaken) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("duplicate email: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
// Last-admin guard: sole admin cannot be demoted or disabled.
|
|
if _, err := f.svc.AdminSetRoleStatus(ctx, userstore.DefaultUserID, "member", ""); !errors.Is(err, ErrLastAdmin) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("demote last admin: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := f.svc.AdminSetRoleStatus(ctx, userstore.DefaultUserID, "", "disabled"); !errors.Is(err, ErrLastAdmin) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("disable last admin: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
// Disabling a member kills their credentials.
|
|
_, memberToken, err := f.svc.Login(ctx, "m@x.dev", "memberpass123", "", "")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
}
|
|
record, pat, err := f.svc.MintToken(ctx, member.ID, "ci", 0)
|
|
if err != nil || record.ID == "" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("mint token: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, ok := f.svc.ResolveBearer(ctx, pat); !ok {
|
|
t.Fatal("fresh PAT must authenticate")
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := f.svc.AdminSetRoleStatus(ctx, member.ID, "", "disabled"); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("disable member: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, ok := f.svc.ResolveSessionToken(ctx, memberToken); ok {
|
|
t.Fatal("disabled member session must fail")
|
|
}
|
|
if _, ok := f.svc.ResolveBearer(ctx, pat); ok {
|
|
t.Fatal("disabled member PAT must fail")
|
|
}
|
|
if _, _, err := f.svc.Login(ctx, "m@x.dev", "memberpass123", "", ""); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidCredentials) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("disabled member login: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestResolveBearerIgnoresNonPAT(t *testing.T) {
|
|
f := newServiceFixture(t, false)
|
|
if _, ok := f.svc.ResolveBearer(context.Background(), "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.agent.jwt"); ok {
|
|
t.Fatal("non-PAT bearer must not resolve")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|