13 KiB
0043 — Plugins read/write kandev data via capability-gated Host gRPC RPCs
- Status: accepted
- Date: 2026-07-17
- Area: backend, protocol
- Related: docs/specs/plugins/requirements/plugins.md ("Host data API"), docs/plans/plugins/GRPC-CONTRACT.md, docs/plans/plugins/host-data-api/plan.md
Context
The plugin system (spec docs/specs/plugins/requirements/plugins.md) gives plugins a
capability-gated Host gRPC service — GetState/SetState/DeleteState/
ListState/RevealSecret/EmitEvent — but no sanctioned way to read or write
kandev's own domain data (tasks, sessions, workspaces, workflows, agent
profiles, repositories, comments). The manifest already reserves
capabilities.api_read / capabilities.api_write (string lists) for this, and
manifest.CanRead(resource) / CanWrite(resource) already exist, but no Host
RPC consumes them.
A real plugin exposed the gap. kandev-plugin-agent-stats
(/home/jcfs/.kandev/tasks/tokens-per-task-loc_9tk/kandev-plugin-agent-stats/)
needs per-session lines-of-code plus each session's agent/model/acp_session_id
to attribute externally-measured token usage (from tokscale, keyed by
acp_session_id) to agents. With no data API, it opens the kandev SQLite file
directly, read-only (~/.kandev/data/kandev.db) and runs SQL against
task_sessions, task_session_commits, task_session_git_snapshots, and
executors_running.
Direct DB access is only possible because the backend spawns plugin subprocesses unsandboxed on the same host, and the plugin can guess the default DB path. It is wrong on every axis:
- Schema coupling. The plugin's SQL hard-codes column names, the
agent_profile_snapshotJSON shape, and thetask_session_git_snapshots.filesJSON shape. Any internal schema change silently breaks it. - No events on write. kandev's convention (
apps/backend/CLAUDE.md: "any code path that mutates a task row must publishtask.*events") cannot hold for a plugin writing SQL — it would bypass the event bus and break WS-driven UI. - Breaks on Postgres. kandev supports a Postgres backend; a plugin that opens a SQLite file has no data there at all.
- No auth or scoping. The plugin reads every row in the database regardless of what it declared or should see.
We want a "carrot" that makes the sanctioned path strictly better than touching the file, so we can then pursue the "stick" (env-scrubbing, not shipping the DB path into the subprocess, sandboxing) without stranding a legitimate use case.
Decision
Extend the existing kandev.plugin.v1 Host service with typed data RPCs.
Plugins read (phase 1) and later write (phase 2) kandev data over the same
capability-gated Host gRPC channel they already use for state and secrets. They
never open the database file and never receive internal domain structs over the
wire.
Concretely:
-
New RPCs on the Host surface. Add read RPCs now —
ListTasks,GetTask,ListWorkspaces,ListWorkflows,ListWorkflowSteps,ListAgentProfiles,ListRepositories,ListSessions,ListSessionCodeStats— and defer write RPCs (CreateTask,UpdateTask,CreateComment) to phase 2. The frozen draft lives atdocs/plans/plugins/HOST-DATA-API.proto; it is folded intoapps/backend/proto/kandev/plugin/v1/plugin.proto. (Whether these land on the existingservice Hostor a siblingservice HostDataserved on the same broker connection is an implementation detail settled in the plan; the wire package and capability model are identical either way.) -
Capability gating per resource. Each read RPC requires
api_read:<resource>in the plugin's manifest; each write RPC requiresapi_write:<resource>(e.g.api_read:tasks,api_read:sessions,api_write:tasks,api_write:comments). Enforcement reuses the existing per-plugin binding andmanifest.CanRead/CanWrite; an undeclared capability returns gRPCPermissionDeniedwithcapability 'api_read:tasks' not declared— identical to today's state/secrets gating. The gate lives at the RPC handler (or the existing unary interceptor), not in the plugin. -
Reads go through the service layer; writes go through service methods that publish events. Read handlers call the relevant service (
taskSvc, workflow service, analytics/session aggregation), never a repository directly, so future access rules and derived fields stay in one place. Write handlers callService.CreateTask/UpdateTask/ comment-create methods that publishtask.*events — neverrepository.TaskRepository. Publishing events is the whole reason plugins must not write the DB. -
Hand-mapped, versioned DTOs — never internal structs. The proto messages are a stable public contract. The backend maps internal models → these DTOs with explicit code; that mapping is the decoupling. We do not marshal domain structs through
structpb, do not generate DTOs from models, and do not expose raw table rows.SessionCodeStatsis a deliberately computed shape (committed insertions/deletions + peak pending-diff additions/deletions), never the rawtask_session_commits/task_session_git_snapshotsrows whose JSON schema churns. -
Conventions across the contract.
- Pagination: opaque cursor (
Page{limit, cursor}→PageInfo{next_cursor, has_more}), so the server can change ordering or store without breaking plugins. - Timestamps: RFC3339 strings, matching the
Eventenvelope and the JSON API — one time representation across the whole plugin contract. - Nullables: proto
optionalso absent (NULL) is distinguishable from empty. - Write provenance: the server stamps
source = "plugin:<id>"on created rows/comments; a plugin cannot set it. - API v1 compatibility: DTO fields are additive-only. The read-side
Task.labelsfield shipped in v0.93.0 and remains at field 23 as deprecated source/wire compatibility. New provider integrations keep their annotations in plugin-owned task state and UI slot data; task label writes are not part of the plugin write contract.
- Pagination: opaque cursor (
Open decisions (recorded, with recommendation)
-
(a) Workspace scoping. Plugins are instance-global today (installed by the operator, no per-user access). Reads could either require a
workspace_id/ become workspace-scoped, or stay global with a filter hook. Recommendation for v1: global-with-hook — reads return across all workspaces the instance holds, filters (workspace_ids,task_ids) narrow results, and a single server-side scoping hook is left in place so a future per-plugin or per-user workspace restriction can be enforced without a contract change. Matches the existing "plugins are global to the instance" permission model in the spec. -
(b) SessionCodeStats freshness. Computed on demand per request in v1 (one aggregation query per
ListSessionCodeStatscall, filtered and paginated), not precomputed or cached. The agent-stats plugin already caches its own report for 60s, so per-request compute is acceptable; a materialized/precomputed path is future work if the query proves hot.
Consequences
- Plugins get a first-class, stable data path; the agent-stats plugin is
rewritten to use it (
host.Sessions().List(...)+host.Sessions().CodeStats(...)) and stops opening the DB file — the proof the carrot is sufficient. - The proto is a public contract: DTO fields are additive-only thereafter; removing or renaming a field is a breaking change requiring a new api_version.
- Deprecated fields remain generated in API v1. In particular,
Task.labelsstays readable for clients compiled against v0.93.0 even though new plugins should not use it for provider-specific annotations. - A new read-only per-session LOC aggregation must be added at the service/
repository layer.
internal/analytics/repository/sqlite/stats.goaggregates git stats at workspace and per-repository granularity only; nothing computes per-session committed LOC + peak pending-diff, and the peak-pending snapshot aggregation (MAXover per-snapshotSUMofjson_each(files).additions) does not exist in-tree. This is the one net-new query the decision requires. - Enables the security "stick": once the sanctioned path exists, we can scrub
KANDEV_*env from the plugin subprocess, stop making the DB path derivable, and pursue sandboxing without breaking a real plugin. Tracked as the isolation follow-ups referenced from the plugin-system buildout. - Write RPCs inherit kandev's event-publishing invariant for free by routing
through service methods; no plugin can mutate a task without
task.*firing.
Update — 2026-07-26: writes implemented
The phase-2 write RPCs are now wired, following this ADR's decision points 3–5 verbatim. Concretely:
CreateTask/UpdateTask(capabilityapi_write:tasks) route throughinternal/task/service.Service.CreateTask/UpdateTask— the same event-publishing methods the REST/MCP API uses — via a backendapp adapter (pluginsTaskWriterAdapter) that translates the SDK's plugins-local input structs intoservice.CreateTaskRequest/UpdateTaskRequest(the service types can't be referenced frominternal/pluginswithout the import cycle this ADR'sSetDataSourcesnote already calls out).CreateTaskresolves placement defaults (single workspace; that workspace's first workflow; ambiguous →InvalidArgument) and honors an optionalstart_agentthat best-effort launches an agent through the orchestrator (a launch failure never fails the create, matching REST/MCP's async auto-start).UpdateTaskexposes a conservative field mask —title/description/state/priority, each optional — deliberately smaller than the full REST update surface.workflow_step_idremains present for wire compatibility but is rejected by Update; plugins must useMoveTaskfor workflow transitions.SendMessage(capabilityapi_write:messages) replaced the originally plannedCreateComment: an officeTaskCommentis an office/dashboard construct, not a way to message the agent working a task. SendMessage delivers a prompt to a task session through the orchestrator's real delivery path — the same onemessage_taskuses — via a backendapp adapter (pluginsTaskMessengerAdapter) that resolves the target session (explicit id, verified to belong to the task, or the task's primary session), records a user message stampedsource = "plugin:<id>", and dispatches by session state: a running session queues the prompt; an idle/completed one is prompted (resuming the agent process if it has gone); a never-started one is launched with the prompt as its first turn. A failed dispatch deletes the recorded message so no orphan prompt is left. The adapter and the orchestrator task-starter are reached via a lateSetWriteDepshook read live at call time, because the orchestrator is constructed after boot-active plugins spawn — the same live-read pattern the utility agent (ADR 0048) uses.- Provenance. The server stamps
source = "plugin:<id>"— task metadatasourcefor created tasks (the Task model has no source column), and the recorded user message's metadata for SendMessage. A plugin cannot set it. - Gating is per-method on the shared accessors:
Tasks()gates List/Get onapi_read:tasksand Create/Update onapi_write:tasks;Messages()gates List onapi_read:messagesand Send onapi_write:messages— each pair independent, so a plugin may hold one without the other. Undeclared → gRPCPermissionDenied, identical to reads.
This closes the "writes deferred to phase 2" language in the Decision above. The comment-create RPC named there was dropped in favor of SendMessage. Broadening the write surface (delete/archive tasks, sessions/workspaces, a wider update mask, delivery-mode/interrupt on SendMessage) remains future work.
Alternatives considered
- Raw DB access (status quo). What the agent-stats plugin does today. Rejected: schema coupling, no write events, breaks on Postgres, no auth/scoping, and only possible because the subprocess is unsandboxed. This is the failure the ADR exists to close.
- REST passthrough with the plugin's own HTTP client. Let plugins call
kandev's HTTP API. Rejected: reintroduces credential/auth machinery the gRPC
contract deliberately removed (
GRPC-CONTRACT.md§1), couples plugins to the backend's network topology and base URL, and duplicates the transport the Host channel already provides securely (spawn relationship + AutoMTLS). - Expose internal structs via
structpb. Marshal domain models as generic structs over the existing Struct-typed fields. Rejected: recreates the exact schema coupling of raw DB access, just one layer up — plugins would depend on internal field names and shapes with no stable contract boundary.