dccff23cc0
* feat(backend): per-launch authentication for agentctl Add nonce-based handshake protocol to secure all agentctl HTTP/WS endpoints. On launch, the parent (backend) passes a one-time bootstrap nonce via AGENTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_NONCE env var. agentctl generates its own auth token, enables Bearer auth immediately, and returns the token to the parent via POST /auth/handshake (validated by nonce). Standalone, Docker, and Sprites executors all use the same handshake flow. Removes the old AGENTCTL_AUTH_TOKEN env var approach. For Docker/Sprites, the retrieved token is persisted encrypted in SecretStore (AES-256-GCM) for crash recovery. Security properties: - Auth enabled from boot (no unprotected window) - Token never in env vars (only the burned nonce) - Nonce is one-shot (replay impossible) - Constant-time token comparison (timing-safe) * fix: check fmt.Sscanf return value in integration test * fix: address review feedback - constant-time nonce comparison, safe ID truncation * fix(backend): exempt MCP routes from agentctl auth middleware The agent subprocess connects to agentctl's MCP endpoints (/sse, /message, /mcp) to use kandev tools (create_task, ask_user_question, etc.). These endpoints run on the same HTTP server as the authenticated API, but the agent process doesn't possess the auth token — it was only exchanged between the backend and agentctl during the handshake. Exempt /sse, /message, and /mcp from the Bearer auth middleware since the agent process runs in the same trust boundary as agentctl. * refactor(backend): remove query param token fallback and document SetAuthToken constraint Remove the ?token= query parameter fallback from extractBearerToken — tokens in URLs leak via access logs, referer headers, and browser history. All WS callers already use Authorization headers via wsAuthHeaders(). Document SetAuthToken's concurrency constraint: it must not be called concurrently with HTTP requests on the same client. * fix(backend): enforce mutex in ControlClient/Launcher auth, fix Start() lock scope - Add sync.Mutex to ControlClient; protect SetAuthToken and AuthToken() reads - Guard Launcher.AuthToken() with l.mu (written under lock in Start, read unprotected) - Extract buildAndStartProcess and performHandshake from Start() (was 106 lines, over 80-line limit) - Release l.mu before blocking health/handshake calls so monitorExit() can close l.exited — previously the fast-fail path in waitForHealthy was unreachable - Update stale executor_backend.go comment (standalone no longer uses env var auth) Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev> Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com>
137 lines
4.0 KiB
Go
137 lines
4.0 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/json"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/agentctl/server/config"
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"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/common/logger"
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)
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func setupHandshakeServer(cfg *config.Config) *ControlServer {
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log, _ := logger.NewLogger(logger.LoggingConfig{Level: "error", Format: "json"})
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return NewControlServer(cfg, nil, log)
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}
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func TestHandshake_ValidNonce(t *testing.T) {
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cfg := &config.Config{
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AuthToken: "self-generated-token",
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BootstrapNonce: "test-nonce-123",
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}
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cs := setupHandshakeServer(cfg)
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body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"nonce": "test-nonce-123"})
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/auth/handshake", bytes.NewReader(body))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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cs.router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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var resp map[string]string
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if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("failed to decode response: %v", err)
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}
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if resp["token"] != "self-generated-token" {
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t.Fatalf("expected self-generated-token, got %q", resp["token"])
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}
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}
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func TestHandshake_NonceBurnedAfterUse(t *testing.T) {
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cfg := &config.Config{
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AuthToken: "token-abc",
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BootstrapNonce: "one-time-nonce",
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}
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cs := setupHandshakeServer(cfg)
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// First handshake succeeds
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body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"nonce": "one-time-nonce"})
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/auth/handshake", bytes.NewReader(body))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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cs.router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("first handshake: expected 200, got %d", w.Code)
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}
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// Second handshake with same nonce fails (burned)
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w2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
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req2 := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/auth/handshake", bytes.NewReader(body))
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req2.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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cs.router.ServeHTTP(w2, req2)
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if w2.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
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t.Fatalf("second handshake: expected 403, got %d", w2.Code)
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}
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}
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func TestHandshake_WrongNonce(t *testing.T) {
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cfg := &config.Config{
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AuthToken: "token-abc",
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BootstrapNonce: "correct-nonce",
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}
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cs := setupHandshakeServer(cfg)
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body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"nonce": "wrong-nonce"})
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/auth/handshake", bytes.NewReader(body))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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cs.router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
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t.Fatalf("expected 403, got %d", w.Code)
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}
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}
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func TestHandshake_MissingNonce(t *testing.T) {
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cfg := &config.Config{
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AuthToken: "token-abc",
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BootstrapNonce: "some-nonce",
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}
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cs := setupHandshakeServer(cfg)
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body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{})
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/auth/handshake", bytes.NewReader(body))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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cs.router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
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t.Fatalf("expected 400, got %d", w.Code)
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}
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}
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func TestHandshake_ExemptFromAuth(t *testing.T) {
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// When auth is enabled, /auth/handshake should still be accessible without a token
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cfg := &config.Config{
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AuthToken: "self-generated-token",
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BootstrapNonce: "test-nonce",
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}
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cs := setupHandshakeServer(cfg)
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// First verify that a protected endpoint requires auth
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w1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
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req1 := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/instances", nil)
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cs.router.ServeHTTP(w1, req1)
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if w1.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("expected 401 for protected endpoint, got %d", w1.Code)
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}
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// But handshake should work without auth
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body, _ := json.Marshal(gin.H{"nonce": "test-nonce"})
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w2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
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req2 := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/auth/handshake", bytes.NewReader(body))
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req2.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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cs.router.ServeHTTP(w2, req2)
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if w2.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("expected 200 for handshake (exempt), got %d: %s", w2.Code, w2.Body.String())
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}
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}
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