92 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript
92 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript
import { test, expect } from "../../fixtures/docker-test-base";
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import { E2E_IMAGE_TAG } from "../../fixtures/docker-probe";
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import { dockerExec, dockerHasSubuidMapping, dockerSecurityOpt } from "../../helpers/docker";
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import { waitForLatestSessionDone } from "../../helpers/session";
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// Both probes run through `sh -c` on purpose. `docker exec <container> bwrap
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// ...` execs bwrap as the exec'd process itself, and writing
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// /proc/self/uid_map from that process is refused ("setting up uid map:
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// Permission denied") even when user namespaces are fully permitted. One shell
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// layer makes bwrap a forked child, which is how a real agent runtime spawns
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// it, and the probe then reflects the container's actual capability.
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const BWRAP_PROBE = "bwrap --unshare-user --dev-bind / / true";
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const UNSHARE_PROBE = "unshare --user true";
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test.describe("Docker executor user namespace sandbox", () => {
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test("enables bwrap user namespaces only for opted-in profiles", async ({
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apiClient,
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seedData,
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}) => {
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test.setTimeout(180_000);
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const { executors } = await apiClient.listExecutors();
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const executor = executors.find((item) => item.type === "local_docker");
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expect(executor?.id).toBeTruthy();
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const [enabledProfile, disabledProfile] = await Promise.all([
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apiClient.createExecutorProfile(executor!.id, {
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name: "User namespaces enabled",
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config: { image_tag: E2E_IMAGE_TAG, allow_user_namespaces: "true" },
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env_vars: seedData.gitConfigEnvVars,
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prepare_script: "",
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cleanup_script: "",
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}),
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apiClient.createExecutorProfile(executor!.id, {
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name: "User namespaces disabled",
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config: { image_tag: E2E_IMAGE_TAG },
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env_vars: seedData.gitConfigEnvVars,
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prepare_script: "",
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cleanup_script: "",
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}),
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]);
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try {
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const launch = async (title: string, profileID: string) => {
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const task = await apiClient.createTaskWithAgent(
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seedData.workspaceId,
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title,
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seedData.agentProfileId,
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{
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description: "/e2e:simple-message",
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workflow_id: seedData.workflowId,
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workflow_step_id: seedData.startStepId,
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repository_ids: [seedData.repositoryId],
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executor_profile_id: profileID,
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},
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);
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await waitForLatestSessionDone(apiClient, task.id, 1, `Waiting for ${title}`);
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const environment = await apiClient.getTaskEnvironment(task.id);
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expect(environment?.container_id).toBeTruthy();
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return environment!.container_id!;
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};
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const enabledContainer = await launch("Userns enabled", enabledProfile.id);
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const enabledSecurityOpt = dockerSecurityOpt(enabledContainer);
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expect(enabledSecurityOpt).toHaveLength(2);
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expect(enabledSecurityOpt).toContain("apparmor=unconfined");
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expect(enabledSecurityOpt![0]).toMatch(/^seccomp=\{/);
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const enabledUnshare = dockerExec(enabledContainer, "sh", "-c", UNSHARE_PROBE);
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expect(enabledUnshare.status, `${enabledUnshare.stdout}${enabledUnshare.stderr}`).toBe(0);
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// bwrap needs /etc/subuid + /etc/subgid entries (or newuidmap/newgidmap
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// setuid binaries), which are absent from most CI Docker hosts. When the
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// container lacks sub-id mapping support, skip the assertion rather than
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// failing — this matches the plan's "manual smoke" designation for bwrap.
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if (dockerHasSubuidMapping(enabledContainer)) {
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const enabledBwrap = dockerExec(enabledContainer, "sh", "-c", BWRAP_PROBE);
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expect(enabledBwrap.status, `${enabledBwrap.stdout}${enabledBwrap.stderr}`).toBe(0);
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}
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const disabledContainer = await launch("Userns disabled", disabledProfile.id);
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expect(dockerSecurityOpt(disabledContainer)).toBeNull();
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const disabledUnshare = dockerExec(disabledContainer, "sh", "-c", UNSHARE_PROBE);
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expect(disabledUnshare.status).not.toBe(0);
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expect(disabledUnshare.stderr).toContain("Operation not permitted");
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const disabledBwrap = dockerExec(disabledContainer, "sh", "-c", BWRAP_PROBE);
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expect(disabledBwrap.status).not.toBe(0);
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// Assert the reason, not just the failure: without this the probe also
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// "fails" when bwrap is missing or blocked for an unrelated reason.
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expect(disabledBwrap.stderr).toContain("No permissions to create new namespace");
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} finally {
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await Promise.all([
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apiClient.deleteExecutorProfile(enabledProfile.id).catch(() => {}),
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apiClient.deleteExecutorProfile(disabledProfile.id).catch(() => {}),
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]);
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}
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});
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});
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