116f7557dd
* fix(auth): scope integration config/watch routes to workspace owner
The third-party integration route group is guarded by its own
query-only middleware (integrationWorkspaceScopeMiddleware), which
authorizes only the workspace_id query param and falls through when it
is absent. Two shapes bypassed it entirely under enforced auth:
- POST /{jira,linear,slack}/config/copy takes the copy TARGET from the
request body (targetWorkspaceId), which no layer checked. A caller
could copy their own connection settings + credential into another
user's workspace by naming its ID, after which that workspace's
identity-less poller would run against attacker-controlled config
(Jira/Linear issue watchers auto-creating tasks from attacker issues;
Slack bot token/webhook). CopyConfigToWorkspace now authorizes BOTH
source and target up front, before the pre-write UpdateAuthHealth
side effect. Mirrors github/copy.go.
- GET /{jira,linear}/watches/issue with workspace_id omitted returned
ListAllIssueWatches across every workspace (JQL/filters, repo, agent
and executor profile IDs, spawn prompt). It now filters to the
caller's workspaces; an identity-less internal caller still sees all,
preserving poller use.
- The config Get/Set/Delete entry points resolved an unowned global
"default" workspace when workspace_id was omitted; they now
resolve+authorize via resolveWorkspaceID.
Each service gains SetWorkspaceAuthorizer(taskSvc.AuthorizeWorkspaceAccess),
wired in backendapp; nil (unit tests, auth disabled) stays unscoped.
Denials surface repoerrors.ErrWorkspaceNotFound, mapped to 404 by the
handlers (no existence leak). Recorded the query-only-middleware rule in
integrations/AGENTS.md, including that Sentry and GitLab's
ListAllIssueWatches still need the same filter.
Regression tests added per package and mutation-verified: dropping only
the copy up-front guard fails on the victim health-flip witness;
dropping both guards fails on the config/secret witness.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): scope integration watch-write and data-plane paths too
Review of the prior commit (Codex + Claude, converging) found the same
body/query workspace-bypass class in surfaces the first pass missed:
- CreateIssueWatch / UpdateIssueWatch (Jira, Linear) never authorized the
workspace. CreateIssueWatch takes WorkspaceID from the request body, so
a caller could plant a persistent watch in another user's workspace that
repeatedly spawns tasks with that user's credentials and an
attacker-supplied filter/prompt. Now authorize req.WorkspaceID (create)
and the loaded row's workspace (update). The by-ID mutation/trigger/reset
handlers were already guarded by assertWatchInWorkspace + the
query-authorizing middleware; the service-layer guard adds defense in
depth and covers non-HTTP callers.
- TestConnectionForWorkspace (Jira, Linear, Slack) resolved the default
workspace with no auth, so an omitted workspace_id + attacker-supplied
siteUrl could exfiltrate that workspace's stored token. Now authorizes
after normalize and returns a hard error (404), not a swallowed
{OK:false}.
- Data-plane reads funnel through clientFor, which now resolves+authorizes
the workspace — scoping search/projects/statuses in one chokepoint.
- filterIssueWatchesByAccess treated ANY authorizer error as a denial,
silently dropping watches on a transient failure and returning a
truncated 200. It now drops only on ErrWorkspaceNotFound and propagates
everything else.
Denials map to 404 via the shared writeClientError / writeIssueWatchError
sinks and the two list/test handlers. Renamed the test helper
denyExcept -> denyOnly (it denies exactly the named workspaces). Added
per-package regression tests for create/update/list denial, authorizer
error propagation, connection-test denial, and data-plane denial;
mutation-verified the CreateIssueWatch guard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
77 lines
3.1 KiB
Go
77 lines
3.1 KiB
Go
package linear
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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)
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// ErrSameWorkspace is returned when a copy targets the same workspace it reads
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// from.
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var ErrSameWorkspace = errors.New("linear: source and target workspaces are the same")
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// ErrNothingToCopy is returned when the source workspace has no Linear config.
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var ErrNothingToCopy = errors.New("linear: source workspace has no configuration to copy")
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// CopyConfigToWorkspace copies the Linear provider config and credential (API
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// key) from sourceWorkspaceID to targetWorkspaceID. Watchers are intentionally
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// out of scope — only the connection settings and secret are duplicated.
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func (s *Service) CopyConfigToWorkspace(ctx context.Context, sourceWorkspaceID, targetWorkspaceID string) (*LinearConfig, error) {
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// Authorize BOTH workspaces up front. The integration middleware only
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// authorizes the source (workspace_id query param); the target arrives in the
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// request body and is otherwise unchecked, so a caller could copy their config
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// and credential into another user's workspace by naming its ID here. Guard
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// before the target health-row write below, not just before the config write.
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sourceWorkspaceID, err := s.resolveWorkspaceID(ctx, sourceWorkspaceID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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targetWorkspaceID, err = s.resolveWorkspaceID(ctx, targetWorkspaceID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if sourceWorkspaceID == targetWorkspaceID {
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return nil, ErrSameWorkspace
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}
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cfg, err := s.store.GetConfigForWorkspace(ctx, sourceWorkspaceID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("read source linear config: %w", err)
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}
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if cfg == nil {
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return nil, ErrNothingToCopy
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}
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secret, err := s.revealSecret(ctx, sourceWorkspaceID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("read source linear secret: %w", err)
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}
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// An empty Secret means "keep existing" in SetConfigForWorkspace, so copying
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// from a workspace without a stored API key would leave the target on its old
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// credential paired with the copied settings. Treat that as nothing to copy.
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if secret == "" {
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return nil, ErrNothingToCopy
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}
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req := &SetConfigRequest{
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AuthMethod: cfg.AuthMethod,
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DefaultTeamKey: cfg.DefaultTeamKey,
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Secret: secret,
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}
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// Mark the target unhealthy before the write so the UI doesn't briefly flash
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// a stale "connected" state (from a previously connected org) while the async
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// probe kicked off by SetConfigForWorkspace validates the copied credential.
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if err := s.store.UpdateAuthHealthForWorkspace(ctx, targetWorkspaceID, false, "", "", time.Now().UTC()); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("reset target linear health: %w", err)
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}
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cfgOut, err := s.SetConfigForWorkspace(ctx, targetWorkspaceID, req)
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if err != nil {
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// The write failed, so the target's config is unchanged but we already
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// flipped its health row. Re-probe asynchronously (best effort) so the row
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// reflects the target's real state again rather than a spurious
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// "unhealthy", without delaying the error response by the probe timeout.
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// Detach from the request context, which may already be cancelled.
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go s.RecordAuthHealthForWorkspace(context.Background(), targetWorkspaceID)
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return nil, err
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}
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return cfgOut, nil
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}
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