c82668c789
Co-authored-by: Vojtěch Biberle <vojtech.biberle@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: nova28 <17953305+nova28@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Carlos Florencio <carlosmflorencio@gmail.com>
177 lines
6.3 KiB
Go
177 lines
6.3 KiB
Go
package securityutil
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"unicode/utf8"
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)
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func TestProjectPermissionActionAllowlistAndRedaction(t *testing.T) {
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const secret = "sk-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456"
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projection := ProjectPermissionAction("command", "Run command", map[string]any{
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"description": "Use token=" + secret,
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"raw_input": map[string]any{
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"command": "curl --api-key=" + secret + " https://example.com",
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"cwd": "/workspace/project",
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"env": map[string]any{"API_KEY": secret},
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"headers": map[string]any{"Authorization": "Bearer " + secret},
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},
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})
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encoded, err := json.Marshal(projection)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if strings.Contains(string(encoded), secret) {
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t.Fatalf("projection leaked a secret: %s", encoded)
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}
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if strings.Contains(string(encoded), "API_KEY") || strings.Contains(string(encoded), "headers") {
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t.Fatalf("projection leaked a hidden field: %s", encoded)
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}
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if projection.CWD != "/workspace/project" || !projection.Redacted {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected projection: %+v", projection)
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}
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}
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func TestSanitizePermissionTextTruncatesAtUTF8Boundary(t *testing.T) {
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value := strings.Repeat("a", maxPermissionPresentationBytes-1) + "€tail"
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sanitized, changed := SanitizePermissionText(value)
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if !changed {
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t.Fatal("expected oversized presentation to be truncated")
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}
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if !utf8.ValidString(sanitized) {
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t.Fatalf("truncated presentation is not valid UTF-8: %q", sanitized[len(sanitized)-4:])
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}
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if sanitized != strings.Repeat("a", maxPermissionPresentationBytes-1) {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected UTF-8 truncation length/content: %d bytes", len(sanitized))
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}
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}
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func TestProjectPermissionActionRedactsSchemelessURLCredentials(t *testing.T) {
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projection := ProjectPermissionAction("network", "Connect", map[string]any{
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"destination": "user:pass@example.com/private/path",
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})
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if projection.Destination != "example.com/private/path" || !projection.Redacted {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected schemeless credential projection: %+v", projection)
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}
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}
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func TestProjectPermissionActionStripsSchemelessURLQueryAndFragment(t *testing.T) {
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const canary = "s3cr3t-query-canary"
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projection := ProjectPermissionAction("network", "Connect", map[string]any{
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"destination": "example.com/private/path?X-Amz-Signature=" + canary + "#fragment",
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})
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encoded, err := json.Marshal(projection)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if strings.Contains(string(encoded), canary) {
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t.Fatalf("projection leaked schemeless URL query credentials: %s", encoded)
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}
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if projection.Destination != "example.com/private/path" || !projection.Redacted {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected schemeless URL projection: %+v", projection)
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}
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}
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func TestProjectPermissionActionMapsRealACPToolKinds(t *testing.T) {
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// These are the raw acp.ToolKind wire values agentctl forwards unchanged
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// as ActionType (see forwardPermissionRequest in
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// internal/agentctl/server/acp/client.go) — not the internal display
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// names ("command", "file_write", ...) this package also accepts.
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cases := []struct {
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acpKind string
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wantType string
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detailKey string
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wantDetail string
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}{
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{acpKind: "execute", wantType: "command", detailKey: "command", wantDetail: "ls -la"},
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{acpKind: "edit", wantType: "file_write", detailKey: "path", wantDetail: "/workspace/file.go"},
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{acpKind: "read", wantType: "file_read", detailKey: "path", wantDetail: "/workspace/file.go"},
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{acpKind: "fetch", wantType: "network", detailKey: "destination", wantDetail: "example.com"},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.acpKind, func(t *testing.T) {
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projection := ProjectPermissionAction(tc.acpKind, "Approve action", map[string]any{
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tc.detailKey: tc.wantDetail,
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})
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if projection.Type != tc.wantType {
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t.Fatalf("acp kind %q: got Type %q, want %q", tc.acpKind, projection.Type, tc.wantType)
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}
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encoded, err := json.Marshal(projection)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(string(encoded), tc.wantDetail) {
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t.Fatalf("acp kind %q: projection dropped its display detail: %s", tc.acpKind, encoded)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestProjectPermissionActionFailsClosedOnMalformedAbsoluteURL(t *testing.T) {
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const canary = "s3cr3t-canary-pass"
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// A space in the host is rejected by net/url.Parse ("invalid character
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// in host name"), so stripURLCredentials cannot confirm it stripped the
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// embedded userinfo. Before the fail-open fix, this returned the raw
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// value — including the credential — unchanged.
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projection := ProjectPermissionAction("network", "Connect", map[string]any{
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"destination": "https://user:" + canary + "@ex ample.com/",
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})
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encoded, err := json.Marshal(projection)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if strings.Contains(string(encoded), canary) {
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t.Fatalf("projection leaked credential from an unparseable absolute URL: %s", encoded)
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}
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if projection.Destination != "" || !projection.Redacted {
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t.Fatalf("unparseable absolute URL should fail closed: %+v", projection)
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}
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}
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func TestProjectPermissionActionFailsClosedOnSchemelessCredentialWithNoHost(t *testing.T) {
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const canary = "s3cr3t-canary-pass"
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// Looks credential-shaped (userinfo containing ':' before '@') but there
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// is nothing after '@' for net/url to resolve as a host. Before the
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// fail-open fix, this returned the raw value — including the credential
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// — unchanged.
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projection := ProjectPermissionAction("network", "Connect", map[string]any{
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"destination": "user:" + canary + "@",
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})
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encoded, err := json.Marshal(projection)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if strings.Contains(string(encoded), canary) {
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t.Fatalf("projection leaked credential from a hostless schemeless value: %s", encoded)
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}
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if projection.Destination != "" || !projection.Redacted {
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t.Fatalf("hostless schemeless credential shape should fail closed: %+v", projection)
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}
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}
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func TestProjectPermissionActionDropsMCPArguments(t *testing.T) {
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projection := ProjectPermissionAction("mcp_tool", "Call tool", map[string]any{
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"server": "github",
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"tool": "create_issue",
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"arguments": map[string]any{"token": "hidden"},
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})
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if projection.Server != "github" || projection.Tool != "create_issue" {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected MCP identity: %+v", projection)
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}
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encoded, err := json.Marshal(projection)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if strings.Contains(string(encoded), "arguments") || strings.Contains(string(encoded), "hidden") {
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t.Fatalf("projection leaked MCP arguments: %s", encoded)
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}
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}
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