Files
kandev/apps/backend/internal/secrets/sqlite_store.go
T
João Salavisa 919a39e49a feat(auth): opt-in authentication & multi-user segregation (#1930)
* feat(auth): add auth core — identities, sessions, PATs, invites, mode state machine

Phase 1 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- internal/auth: argon2id password hashing (PHC), opaque session/PAT tokens
  (SHA-256 at rest), login rate limiter, auth-mode state machine
  (disabled/setup/enabled), setup-wizard promotion of the pre-auth
  default-user row into the admin account, invites, admin user management
  with last-admin guard.
- internal/auth/store: auth_identities (OIDC-ready), auth_sessions,
  auth_api_tokens, auth_invites tables (SQLite+Postgres dialects).
- internal/auth/authn: request-identity plumbing (gin + plain contexts),
  RequireAdmin middleware.
- users table: display_name/role/status columns via new MigrateLogger
  wiring; AccountRepository surface (consumer-scoped, keeps existing
  Repository fakes untouched).
- config: AuthConfig.Required/SessionTTLHours/CookieName
  (KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED), FeaturesConfig.Auth; profiles.yaml + runtime
  flag registry entry for KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): enforce opt-in auth over HTTP — middleware, auth API, boot payload

Phase 2 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- internal/auth/httpmw: global gin middleware after CORS. Disabled mode
  injects the synthetic single-user admin identity (behavior unchanged);
  enabled mode resolves session cookie then PAT bearer, with an explicit
  allowlist (health, SPA bootstrap reads, credential endpoints,
  self-authenticating webhooks), deferral for WS/proxy upgrades and
  office agent JWTs, and SPA shell availability for the login page.
- internal/auth/httpapi: full auth surface — setup wizard, login/logout,
  me, password change, sessions, PATs, invites (mint/preview/accept),
  auth settings (enable/disable), admin user management.
- Boot payload: initialState.auth block always present; unauthenticated
  visitors on auth-enabled instances get features+auth only (no data).
- External MCP: PAT required once auth is enabled (open while disabled).
- Admin guards on destructive system routes and runtime-flag overrides.
- Startup warning when bound non-loopback with auth disabled
  (ServerConfig.NonLoopbackBinds fail-closed nudge).
- Wiring: auth store in Repositories, auth service in Services,
  ClaimUnownedWorkspaces backfill on the task repository.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): per-user workspace scoping across HTTP services

Phase 3 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- Task service: workspaces, workflows, repositories, and tasks are scoped
  to the request identity (owner-only visibility; pre-auth unowned rows
  stay shared). Denials use *NotFound sentinels - no existence leak.
  Internal callers and the disabled-mode synthetic identity remain
  unscoped, preserving behavior exactly when auth is off.
- CreateWorkspace stamps the authenticated caller as owner.
- Session chokepoint: lifecycle Manager.GetOrEnsureExecution runs a
  settable session-access check covering shell/files/ports/vscode/LSP.
- Secrets: per-user user_id column, scoped CRUD/list, ClaimUnowned wired
  into the setup-wizard backfills.
- Boot payload inherits scoping automatically.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): scope WebSocket gateway to authenticated users

Phase 4 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- Connection auth: /ws, /terminal, /lsp, /vscode, /port-proxy routes are
  guarded when auth is enabled - session cookie (same-origin upgrade),
  resolved identity from the HTTP middleware, or ?token=<PAT> for
  headerless programmatic clients; JSON 401 before any upgrade.
- Client identity: every WS client carries its authn.Identity; dispatched
  RPC actions (workspace.list, task CRUD, ...) run under a context
  carrying it, so WS RPC gets the same per-user scoping as HTTP.
- Subscription checks: task/session subscribe+focus verify workspace
  visibility via the task service; user topic subscriptions are pinned to
  the client's own user.
- Broadcast routing: new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspace routes workspace-scoped
  events (task/workflow/repo/office/session-state) to the owner's clients
  only, with safe fallbacks (unowned/unresolvable -> broadcast) so events
  never vanish; instance-wide events (executors, environments, agent
  profiles, system jobs) stay global by design.
- Replaced the long-standing discarded-token TODO in HandleConnection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): add feature spec and backend architecture notes for opt-in auth

- docs/specs/auth/spec.md: product behavior (opt-in, setup wizard,
  per-user workspaces, sessions/PATs, invites, public surface, v1 limits)
- apps/backend/AGENTS.md: internal/auth package layout + scoping rules
  for new service entry points and WS broadcast call sites

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): public documentation for opt-in authentication

- New docs/public/authentication.md: enabling, users & invites, PATs,
  public endpoints, limitations, disabling
- run-as-a-service.md: network-security note now points at the real
  authentication boundary instead of reverse-proxy-only guidance
- meta.json: nav entry under Configure Kandev

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): ADR for opt-in authentication architecture

Records the load-bearing choices: mode state machine + synthetic identity
in disabled mode, opaque DB-backed credentials over JWTs, default-user
promotion at setup, service-layer scoping with no-admin-bypass, and the
explicit public allowlist.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(web): auth UI — login, setup wizard, invites, users & account settings

Adds the frontend half of opt-in authentication: a pre-auth gate in
main.tsx that renders the setup wizard or login/invite pages instead of
the app shell whenever the boot payload's auth block says so, a new
`auth` store slice + feature flag mirroring the backend's StatePayload,
credentialed fetch (`credentials: "include"`) with a 401 handler that
clears the session and redirects to /login, and a full auth-api.ts
client for the /api/v1/auth and /api/v1/users routes.

Settings additions: a System > Users page (list/create/disable/promote
users, invite-link dialog) and System > Authentication page (enable/
disable with confirm + env-locked banner), gated on the `auth` feature
flag and admin role. A new Account sidebar group (Profile & Password,
API Tokens) is shown to signed-in users once auth is enabled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(auth): E2E lifecycle suite + fix workspace event WS leak it caught

New dedicated Playwright auth project (backend restarts with
KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED=true, isolated from the tokenless default suite):
setup-mode boot gating, admin setup wizard, login/logout + bad
credentials, PATs, admin-surface authorization, anonymous WS rejection,
UI login flow, and the acceptance test - two-user segregation across
HTTP, boot payload, and WebSocket.

The segregation spec immediately caught a real leak: workspace.* event
payloads carry their ID as 'id' (the payload IS the workspace DTO), not
'workspace_id', so BroadcastToWorkspace fell back to broadcast-to-all
for workspace create/update/delete. Fixed with action-aware extraction
plus a unit regression test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): close cross-user access gaps found in security audit

Two independent security audits of the auth branch found several
authorization gaps where session/workspace-scoped surfaces were not wired
to the new per-user chokepoint. All fixed:

- IDOR on reverse-proxy/terminal routes (vscode, port-proxy, terminal):
  these resolve executions via GetExecutionBySessionID /
  GetOrEnsureExecutionForEnvironment / EnsurePassthroughExecution, which
  skipped the session-access check that only GetOrEnsureExecution ran. Added
  the check inside the env/passthrough resolvers (before the cache
  short-circuit) and an explicit CheckSessionAccess gate in the two bare-lookup
  proxy handlers. An authenticated non-owner can no longer reach another
  user's IDE, forwarded ports, or shell.
- Cross-user agent-conversation read: ListMessages / ListMessagesPaginated /
  SearchMessages now authorize the session.
- Cross-user repository-script read/inject: script CRUD now authorizes the
  parent repository's workspace.
- Office HTTP surface: a group middleware enforces workspace ownership on
  :wsId routes for real users (agent-JWT callers keep their claim scoping).
- Login rate-limit bypass: SetTrustedProxies(nil) so a spoofed
  X-Forwarded-For can't rotate the limiter key on a directly-reachable
  backend.
- Invite double-provisioning race: MarkInviteUsed is now the atomic
  serialization point (consumed before user creation).
- Setup wizard: serialized with a mutex so concurrent first-visitors can't
  corrupt the promoted admin profile.
- Log sanitizer: explicit kandev_pat_ redaction rule.

Regression tests added for message/script scoping and the
execution-access-before-cache invariant. Auth E2E (incl. two-user
segregation) still green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): scope repository active-session-count endpoint

GET /api/v1/repositories/:id/active-session-count went through
CountActiveSessionsByRepository, which was not identity-scoped - a
cross-user info leak of another owner's active session counts. Added the
same authorizeRepositoryID gate the script routes use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): add json tags to auth store models — omit digests, fix token UI

The auth store structs (APIToken, Invite, LoginIdentity, Session) had db:
tags but no json: tags, so the handlers that serialize them directly sent
Go-cased keys (CreatedAt, Name) AND leaked the SHA-256/password digests to
clients. Two consequences:
- The API-tokens UI showed 'Invalid Date' and an empty name (frontend reads
  created_at/name).
- token_sha256 / password_hash were serialized in list responses.

Added json tags with snake_case keys the frontend reads and json:"-" on
every credential digest. Regression test asserts digests never serialize and
the snake_case timestamp/name keys are present. Also adds the
auth-screenshots capture spec (artifacts gitignored).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(web): move auth enable into feature toggles; show current user in sidebar

Remove the standalone Authentication settings page and its dedicated
settings/get-auth-settings API surface now that enabling auth lives in the
Feature Toggles system, and drop env_required now that /auth/me no longer
returns it. Add a current-user chip with a logout action to the sidebar
footer, shown only in enabled auth mode.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(auth): make features.auth the single on/off control

Per review feedback: authentication configuration now lives entirely in
the existing Feature Toggles system rather than a separate Authentication
settings section.

- The auth mode is derived from the features.auth runtime flag
  (KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH): off -> disabled, on+no-admin -> setup,
  on+admin -> enabled. Removed the parallel auth.mode system setting,
  the SetEnabled service method, GET/PATCH /api/v1/auth/settings, the
  AuthConfig.Required field, KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED, and the auth service's
  Settings-store dependency and EnvRequired/env_required.
- The features.auth registry entry is re-described as the actual enable
  switch (high-risk, restart-required) and defaults off in every profile
  (dev was previously true — that only revealed UI before; now it would
  enforce, so it must be an explicit opt-in).
- Setup no longer persists a mode; completing the wizard creates the admin
  and the mode auto-derives to enabled.
- Startup 'exposed without auth' warning + all docs (public guide,
  run-as-a-service, spec, ADR, AGENTS.md) point at the feature toggle.
- E2E: auth specs use KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH; screenshot spec captures the
  Feature Toggles page instead of the removed Authentication page; the
  member-restriction assertion targets an admin invite route.
- Tests updated across service/httpmw/httpapi/profiles for the derived
  mode; full suite green (only pre-existing sandbox-FS failures remain).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): complete cross-user isolation — integrations, automation, plan/walkthrough, session reads

A follow-up isolation audit found that per-user scoping had been wired into
the task service, secrets, office, and the WS gateway — but several
workspace/task/session-scoped surfaces still resolved a caller-supplied ID
with no ownership gate. Closed all of them; cross-user access now returns
404 across the board.

- Integrations (jira/linear/sentry/slack/azure-devops/gitlab/github/
  workflow-sync): a global middleware authorizes the workspace_id (query, or
  gitlab's /workspaces/:id/ path) on those route groups. Previously a member
  who knew another user's workspace ID could read/overwrite their integration
  connection config and watches.
- Automation: workspace-authorizer seam gates get/list/create/update/delete/
  enable/disable, triggers, run history, and — critically — the webhook
  secret. Was fully cross-tenant over WS before.
- Task plans (PlanService) and walkthroughs (WalkthroughService): task-
  authorizer seam on every read/write. These bypassed the task service.
- Session reads that hit the repo directly — session turns, task context,
  git snapshots, file reviews — now call AuthorizeSession/TaskAccess.

Internal callers (pollers, schedulers, MCP) carry no identity and stay
unscoped; disabled mode is unaffected. Regression tests added
(plan/walkthrough scoping, automation authorizer matrix, integration path
extraction) and the two-user E2E now asserts integration routes are shielded.
Docs (spec, ADR, public guide) updated to state what is isolated and that
filesystem/agent-credential isolation remains an OS-level limitation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(web): current-user chip uses border hover, not accent fill

The sidebar current-user chip used hover:bg-accent (a purpleish fill).
Switch to the border-hover idiom used elsewhere (border border-transparent
-> hover:border-border) with the neutral hover:bg-muted/50 the adjacent
workspace picker uses, so the hover reads as a subtle outline instead of a
colored background. Screenshot spec now captures the chip hover state.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(web): right-align current-user chip in the sidebar footer

Push the user chip to the far right of the expanded footer (ml-auto) so it
sits opposite the left-aligned icon buttons; collapsed mode keeps the
centered vertical stack unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): reject synthetic identity on management routes and scope office run broadcasts

Address code-review findings on the opt-in authentication PR:

- P1: while auth is disabled the middleware injects a synthetic admin
  (RoleAdmin), and RequireAdmin alone let it through — so anyone hitting a
  not-yet-enabled instance could mint a PAT or plant an admin that survives
  enablement and hijacks first-run setup. Add authn.RequireRealIdentity and
  guard the credential/session/user-management routes with it (public
  bootstrap routes stay reachable). Responds 404 while disabled.
- P1: office run events carry task_id but no workspace_id, so they fell back
  to a global broadcast and leaked across users. Resolve the workspace from
  the task and route via the new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspaceOrDrop, which fails
  closed (drops rather than global-broadcasts) when the workspace is unknown
  and auth is enforced.
- nit: type createAuthSlice as a single-arg creator and call it with just set.

Also register the authentication docs page and its settings routes in
docs/public/coverage.json so the public-docs validator passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 00:10:22 +01:00

250 lines
7.0 KiB
Go

package secrets
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/jmoiron/sqlx"
"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/auth/authn"
"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/db"
"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/db/dialect"
)
type sqliteStore struct {
db *sqlx.DB // writer
ro *sqlx.DB // reader
crypto *MasterKeyProvider
ownsDB bool
}
var _ SecretStore = (*sqliteStore)(nil)
// Provide creates the SQLite secret store using separate writer and reader pools.
func Provide(writer, reader *sqlx.DB, crypto *MasterKeyProvider) (*sqliteStore, func() error, error) {
store := &sqliteStore{db: writer, ro: reader, crypto: crypto}
if err := store.initSchema(); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("secrets schema init: %w", err)
}
return store, store.Close, nil
}
func (s *sqliteStore) initSchema() error {
binaryType := dialect.BlobType(s.db.DriverName())
schema := fmt.Sprintf(`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS secrets (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
name TEXT NOT NULL,
user_id TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
encrypted_value %s NOT NULL,
nonce %s NOT NULL,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
updated_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
);
`, binaryType, binaryType)
if _, err := s.db.Exec(schema); err != nil {
return err
}
// Existing databases: CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS is a no-op, so the
// column must also be added via an idempotent migration (ADR 0027).
migrate := db.NewMigrateLogger(s.db, nil)
migrate.Apply("secrets.user_id", "ALTER TABLE secrets ADD COLUMN user_id TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''")
return nil
}
// scopeOwner returns the per-user scoping ID for a request context.
// Empty = unscoped (internal caller or auth disabled), matching the
// task-service scoping semantics. Rows with user_id=” (created pre-auth or
// by internal flows) stay visible to every caller until the setup wizard
// claims them for the admin.
func scopeOwner(ctx context.Context) string {
identity, ok := authn.IdentityFromContext(ctx)
if !ok || identity.Synthetic {
return ""
}
return identity.UserID
}
// ClaimUnowned assigns every unowned secret to ownerID. Called by the auth
// setup wizard; idempotent.
func (s *sqliteStore) ClaimUnowned(ctx context.Context, ownerID string) error {
_, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, s.db.Rebind(`
UPDATE secrets SET user_id = ? WHERE user_id = ''`), ownerID)
return err
}
func (s *sqliteStore) Close() error {
if !s.ownsDB {
return nil
}
return s.db.Close()
}
func (s *sqliteStore) Create(ctx context.Context, secret *SecretWithValue) error {
if secret.ID == "" {
secret.ID = uuid.New().String()
}
now := time.Now().UTC()
secret.CreatedAt = now
secret.UpdatedAt = now
ciphertext, nonce, err := Encrypt([]byte(secret.Value), s.crypto.Key())
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("encrypt secret: %w", err)
}
_, err = s.db.ExecContext(ctx, s.db.Rebind(`
INSERT INTO secrets (id, name, user_id, encrypted_value, nonce, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`),
secret.ID, secret.Name, scopeOwner(ctx), ciphertext, nonce, now, now,
)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("insert secret: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func (s *sqliteStore) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*Secret, error) {
var row secretRow
err := s.ro.GetContext(ctx, &row, s.ro.Rebind(`
SELECT id, name, created_at, updated_at
FROM secrets WHERE id = ? AND (user_id = '' OR ? = '' OR user_id = ?)`),
id, scopeOwner(ctx), scopeOwner(ctx))
if err != nil {
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrNotFound, id)
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("get secret: %w", err)
}
return row.toSecret(), nil
}
func (s *sqliteStore) Reveal(ctx context.Context, id string) (string, error) {
var ciphertext, nonce []byte
err := s.ro.QueryRowContext(ctx, s.ro.Rebind(`
SELECT encrypted_value, nonce FROM secrets
WHERE id = ? AND (user_id = '' OR ? = '' OR user_id = ?)`),
id, scopeOwner(ctx), scopeOwner(ctx)).
Scan(&ciphertext, &nonce)
if err != nil {
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrNotFound, id)
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("reveal secret: %w", err)
}
plaintext, err := Decrypt(ciphertext, nonce, s.crypto.Key())
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("decrypt secret: %w", err)
}
return string(plaintext), nil
}
func (s *sqliteStore) Update(ctx context.Context, id string, req *UpdateSecretRequest) error {
existing, err := s.Get(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
return err
}
now := time.Now().UTC()
if req.Name != nil {
existing.Name = *req.Name
}
if req.Value != nil {
ciphertext, nonce, err := Encrypt([]byte(*req.Value), s.crypto.Key())
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("encrypt secret: %w", err)
}
_, err = s.db.ExecContext(ctx, s.db.Rebind(`
UPDATE secrets SET name = ?, encrypted_value = ?, nonce = ?, updated_at = ?
WHERE id = ?`),
existing.Name, ciphertext, nonce, now, id,
)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("update secret: %w", err)
}
} else {
_, err = s.db.ExecContext(ctx, s.db.Rebind(`
UPDATE secrets SET name = ?, updated_at = ?
WHERE id = ?`),
existing.Name, now, id,
)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("update secret: %w", err)
}
}
return nil
}
func (s *sqliteStore) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
result, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, s.db.Rebind(`
DELETE FROM secrets WHERE id = ? AND (user_id = '' OR ? = '' OR user_id = ?)`),
id, scopeOwner(ctx), scopeOwner(ctx))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("delete secret: %w", err)
}
rows, _ := result.RowsAffected()
if rows == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrNotFound, id)
}
return nil
}
func (s *sqliteStore) List(ctx context.Context) ([]*SecretListItem, error) {
var rows []secretListRow
err := s.ro.SelectContext(ctx, &rows, s.ro.Rebind(`
SELECT id, name, 1 as has_value, created_at, updated_at
FROM secrets WHERE (user_id = '' OR ? = '' OR user_id = ?)
ORDER BY created_at DESC`),
scopeOwner(ctx), scopeOwner(ctx))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("list secrets: %w", err)
}
return toSecretListItems(rows), nil
}
// secretRow is the DB scan target for secret metadata queries.
type secretRow struct {
ID string `db:"id"`
Name string `db:"name"`
CreatedAt time.Time `db:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt time.Time `db:"updated_at"`
}
func (r *secretRow) toSecret() *Secret {
return &Secret{
ID: r.ID,
Name: r.Name,
CreatedAt: r.CreatedAt,
UpdatedAt: r.UpdatedAt,
}
}
// secretListRow is the DB scan target for list queries.
type secretListRow struct {
ID string `db:"id"`
Name string `db:"name"`
HasValue bool `db:"has_value"`
CreatedAt time.Time `db:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt time.Time `db:"updated_at"`
}
func toSecretListItems(rows []secretListRow) []*SecretListItem {
items := make([]*SecretListItem, len(rows))
for i, r := range rows {
items[i] = &SecretListItem{
ID: r.ID,
Name: r.Name,
HasValue: r.HasValue,
CreatedAt: r.CreatedAt,
UpdatedAt: r.UpdatedAt,
}
}
return items
}