Files
kandev/apps/backend/internal/agent/lifecycle/manager_auth_test.go
T
João Salavisa dccff23cc0 feat(backend): per-launch authentication for agentctl (#666)
* feat(backend): per-launch authentication for agentctl

Add nonce-based handshake protocol to secure all agentctl HTTP/WS
endpoints. On launch, the parent (backend) passes a one-time bootstrap
nonce via AGENTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_NONCE env var. agentctl generates its own
auth token, enables Bearer auth immediately, and returns the token to
the parent via POST /auth/handshake (validated by nonce).

Standalone, Docker, and Sprites executors all use the same handshake
flow. Removes the old AGENTCTL_AUTH_TOKEN env var approach. For
Docker/Sprites, the retrieved token is persisted encrypted in
SecretStore (AES-256-GCM) for crash recovery.

Security properties:
- Auth enabled from boot (no unprotected window)
- Token never in env vars (only the burned nonce)
- Nonce is one-shot (replay impossible)
- Constant-time token comparison (timing-safe)

* fix: check fmt.Sscanf return value in integration test

* fix: address review feedback - constant-time nonce comparison, safe ID truncation

* fix(backend): exempt MCP routes from agentctl auth middleware

The agent subprocess connects to agentctl's MCP endpoints (/sse, /message,
/mcp) to use kandev tools (create_task, ask_user_question, etc.). These
endpoints run on the same HTTP server as the authenticated API, but the
agent process doesn't possess the auth token — it was only exchanged
between the backend and agentctl during the handshake.

Exempt /sse, /message, and /mcp from the Bearer auth middleware since the
agent process runs in the same trust boundary as agentctl.

* refactor(backend): remove query param token fallback and document SetAuthToken constraint

Remove the ?token= query parameter fallback from extractBearerToken —
tokens in URLs leak via access logs, referer headers, and browser history.
All WS callers already use Authorization headers via wsAuthHeaders().

Document SetAuthToken's concurrency constraint: it must not be called
concurrently with HTTP requests on the same client.

* fix(backend): enforce mutex in ControlClient/Launcher auth, fix Start() lock scope

- Add sync.Mutex to ControlClient; protect SetAuthToken and AuthToken() reads
- Guard Launcher.AuthToken() with l.mu (written under lock in Start, read unprotected)
- Extract buildAndStartProcess and performHandshake from Start() (was 106 lines, over 80-line limit)
- Release l.mu before blocking health/handshake calls so monitorExit() can close
  l.exited — previously the fast-fail path in waitForHealthy was unreachable
- Update stale executor_backend.go comment (standalone no longer uses env var auth)

Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-21 14:00:49 +01:00

146 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

package lifecycle
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/common/logger"
"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/secrets"
)
// inMemorySecretStore implements secrets.SecretStore for testing.
type inMemorySecretStore struct {
store map[string]*secrets.SecretWithValue
err error
}
var _ secrets.SecretStore = (*inMemorySecretStore)(nil)
func newInMemorySecretStore() *inMemorySecretStore {
return &inMemorySecretStore{store: make(map[string]*secrets.SecretWithValue)}
}
func (s *inMemorySecretStore) Create(_ context.Context, secret *secrets.SecretWithValue) error {
if s.err != nil {
return s.err
}
if secret.ID == "" {
secret.ID = fmt.Sprintf("secret-%d", len(s.store)+1)
}
s.store[secret.ID] = secret
return nil
}
func (s *inMemorySecretStore) Get(_ context.Context, id string) (*secrets.Secret, error) {
if sw, ok := s.store[id]; ok {
return &sw.Secret, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("not found")
}
func (s *inMemorySecretStore) Reveal(_ context.Context, id string) (string, error) {
if sw, ok := s.store[id]; ok {
return sw.Value, nil
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("not found")
}
func (s *inMemorySecretStore) Update(_ context.Context, _ string, _ *secrets.UpdateSecretRequest) error {
return nil
}
func (s *inMemorySecretStore) Delete(_ context.Context, _ string) error { return nil }
func (s *inMemorySecretStore) List(_ context.Context) ([]*secrets.SecretListItem, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func (s *inMemorySecretStore) Close() error { return nil }
func TestPersistAuthToken(t *testing.T) {
log, _ := logger.NewLogger(logger.LoggingConfig{Level: "error", Format: "json"})
t.Run("stores token and sets metadata", func(t *testing.T) {
store := newInMemorySecretStore()
m := &Manager{logger: log, secretStore: store}
instance := &ExecutorInstance{
InstanceID: "exec-123456789012",
AuthToken: "handshake-token-abc",
}
execution := &AgentExecution{
Metadata: make(map[string]interface{}),
}
m.persistAuthToken(context.Background(), instance, execution)
// Verify secret was stored
if len(store.store) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 secret, got %d", len(store.store))
}
// Verify metadata has the secret ID
secretID, ok := execution.Metadata[MetadataKeyAuthTokenSecret].(string)
if !ok || secretID == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected secret ID in metadata, got %v", execution.Metadata[MetadataKeyAuthTokenSecret])
}
// Verify we can retrieve the token
revealed, err := store.Reveal(context.Background(), secretID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to reveal: %v", err)
}
if revealed != "handshake-token-abc" {
t.Fatalf("expected handshake-token-abc, got %q", revealed)
}
})
t.Run("no-op when auth token is empty", func(t *testing.T) {
store := newInMemorySecretStore()
m := &Manager{logger: log, secretStore: store}
instance := &ExecutorInstance{InstanceID: "exec-123456789012"}
execution := &AgentExecution{Metadata: make(map[string]interface{})}
m.persistAuthToken(context.Background(), instance, execution)
if len(store.store) != 0 {
t.Fatal("expected no secrets stored")
}
if _, ok := execution.Metadata[MetadataKeyAuthTokenSecret]; ok {
t.Fatal("expected no metadata key")
}
})
t.Run("no-op when secret store is nil", func(t *testing.T) {
m := &Manager{logger: log}
instance := &ExecutorInstance{
InstanceID: "exec-123456789012",
AuthToken: "some-token",
}
execution := &AgentExecution{Metadata: make(map[string]interface{})}
// Should not panic
m.persistAuthToken(context.Background(), instance, execution)
})
t.Run("handles nil metadata in execution", func(t *testing.T) {
store := newInMemorySecretStore()
m := &Manager{logger: log, secretStore: store}
instance := &ExecutorInstance{
InstanceID: "exec-123456789012",
AuthToken: "token-xyz",
}
execution := &AgentExecution{}
m.persistAuthToken(context.Background(), instance, execution)
if execution.Metadata == nil {
t.Fatal("expected metadata to be initialized")
}
if _, ok := execution.Metadata[MetadataKeyAuthTokenSecret]; !ok {
t.Fatal("expected secret ID in metadata")
}
})
}