2e022c2498
The previous commit (18b2a5c) replaced our `curl | tar` install with orhun/git-cliff-action@v4 under the banner "supply chain". On reflection that swap doesn't actually improve anything: - @v4 is a moving tag, not a digest pin — same trust as a tagged curl URL. - Both depend on trusting the same maintainer (orhun). - The action adds a third-party step we don't audit. The legitimate concern from the review was "no integrity verification on the downloaded tarball." Address that directly: pin the asset version, embed its published sha512, and abort if the download doesn't match. The hash for v2.6.1's x86_64-linux-gnu tarball came from https://github.com/orhun/git-cliff/releases/download/v2.6.1/<asset>.sha512. This restores the original setup with a real integrity check and one fewer external dependency.