c3d235b83b
* fix(auth): scope session-keyed reads and mutations to the workspace owner Session-keyed service entry points did not apply per-user scoping, so knowing another user's session or task ID was enough to reach it: - GetTaskSession, ListTaskSessions, GetPrimarySession returned rows for any ID. These feed GET /task-sessions/:id and GET /tasks/:id/sessions, whose DTO carries session Metadata, the host worktree path, the branch, and container/executor IDs. - DismissLastAgentError mutated any session. - ApproveSession approved a workflow review step on any session, which advances the task's workflow — the highest-impact of the set. Authorize via authorizeTaskID off the row already read, rather than AuthorizeSessionAccess, which would re-read the session on what is a hot path. Internal identity-less callers (pollers, event bus, office schedulers, office agent JWTs) and the synthetic identity used while auth is disabled stay unscoped, and unowned pre-auth rows stay visible. Batch helpers that take ID lists are deliberately left alone: their callers derive IDs from an already-authorized task list, so per-ID checks would add N queries to list views for no gain. Recorded in AGENTS.md. Also route httpApproveSession through handleNotFound so a denial answers 404 like every other session route instead of a 500 that would confirm the session exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): scope the session-keyed paths that bypass the task service An adversarial sweep of the previous commit found session-keyed surfaces reachable with a caller-supplied ID and no ownership check. They bypass the task service, so scoping its methods did not cover them: - POST /task-sessions/:id/{set-mode,set-model,set-config-option, authenticate} and .../processes/:processId/stop resolve their execution with a bare in-memory lookup, which skips the GetOrEnsure* chokepoint where the lifecycle per-user check runs. A non-owner could switch another user's model or mode, re-authenticate their agent, or kill their process. Guarded by a shared denySessionAccess helper. - The orchestrator reads sessions through its own repo handle, so GetTaskSessionStatus and CheckSessionPR inherited nothing from the task service. CheckSessionPR also installs a PR watch as a side effect. Added a SetSessionAccessChecker hook mirroring the lifecycle manager's, wired to taskSvc.AuthorizeSessionAccess. The check runs before CheckSessionPR's unconfigured-GitHub early return so it applies regardless of setup, and denials reuse the "session not found" shape so they cannot be told apart from a missing session. - GetMessage had no scoping while ListMessages beside it did, so a caller holding another user's (session_id, message_id) pair could read their shell output. This does NOT close the whole surface. A second sweep found the orchestrator's session-mutating WS actions (session.stop/delete/rename/ set_primary/set_plan_mode/reset_context/recover/launch/ensure, agent.cancel, permission.respond) and agent.stdin / agent.resize also unscoped — agent.stdin writes arbitrary input into another user's agent process. Those touch live session lifecycle and need their own change; recorded in AGENTS.md so the gap is not mistaken for covered. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): scope every session-keyed WS action, plus a gateway backstop Completes the sweep. Dispatched WS actions were left to authorize themselves at the service layer, and a dozen never did — a caller with a guessed session ID could stop, delete, rename, relaunch or reset another user's live agent session, cancel their in-flight turn, answer their permission prompts, or write arbitrary bytes into their agent process. Two layers, deliberately both: 1. Gateway backstop. Client.authorizeAction checks any dispatched payload carrying task_id or session_id against the client's identity before dispatch. Per-method opt-in across ~74 actions in four packages had been missed repeatedly; this makes a newly added action scoped by default. Verified safe to apply generically: session_id means a task session everywhere, and user-shell/terminal actions key off task_id / task_environment_id, so nothing is misread. 2. Explicit guards, for defense in depth and for non-WS callers: - orchestrator: StopSession, DeleteSession, SetPrimarySession, RenameSession, ResetAgentContext, CancelAgent, RespondToPermission, SetSessionPlanModeByID, RecoverSession, LaunchSession, EnsureSession, CancelTransientRetry. Added SetTaskAccessChecker for the task-keyed ones. LaunchSession guards every intent at the single funnel; SessionID is empty on create, so the task check carries that case. - agent.stdin / agent.resize now call lifecycleMgr.CheckSessionAccess, the helper already documented for bare-lookup handlers. Guards go first in each method, before any repo/executor use. TestSessionKeyedEntryPointsGuardBeforeDependencies runs all twelve with nil dependencies and fails on a panic if one is placed too late. Denials are indistinguishable from a missing resource: WS returns not-found, CancelTransientRetry reports "nothing cancelled", and GetTaskSessionStatus reuses its "session not found" shape. Unwired checkers stay permissive throughout, so identity-less internal callers (schedulers, event bus, workflow engine) and pre-auth single-user instances are unaffected — pinned per entry point. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): scope environment-keyed user-shell actions Third sweep finding, in surface the previous commit's own comment claimed was covered. The user-shell actions key off task_environment_id and treat task_id as optional, so a task_id-only backstop missed them: user_shell.stop with an empty task_id and a foreign task_environment_id fell through to the legacy runner path and tore down another user's terminal PTY. That path never reaches GetOrEnsureExecutionForEnvironment, where the environment check normally runs, so neither layer caught it. - Gateway backstop now also reads task_environment_id, gated by a new AuthPolicy.ActionEnvironment hook wired to taskSvc.AuthorizeEnvironmentAccess. This covers all three environment-keyed actions generically, not just the reported one. - wsUserShellStop guards explicitly via a new lifecycleMgr.CheckEnvironmentAccess, mirroring CheckSessionAccess, so the fallback is safe independent of the gateway. Corrected the comment that wrongly asserted task_environment_id was already covered, and recorded in AGENTS.md both the exact field names the backstop reads and why a permissive type on one of them would silently opt out. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): authorize both IDs on task+session entry points Review finding (P1). Entry points taking both a task and a session ID only checked the session, so a caller could satisfy that check with one of their own sessions while pointing taskID at another user's task: - CheckSessionPR then used the unchecked taskID for GetTaskPR, resolveTaskRepo, resolvePrimaryTaskRepositoryID and EnsurePRWatch — cross-workspace PR disclosure plus a PR-watch write. - CancelTransientRetry handed it to handleRecoverableFailure, which writes against that task. Both now use a new authorizeTaskSessionPair, which authorizes each ID and additionally requires the pair to be consistent, so the two arguments cannot describe different tasks. GetTaskSessionStatus already validated the pair after loading the session and is unchanged. The consistency half is skipped when the session cannot be loaded: both IDs are authorized by then, so a mismatch is a caller bug rather than a cross-user leak, and failing there would change behavior for identity-less internal callers. Recorded the rule in AGENTS.md — a two-ID entry point must never use authorizeSession alone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): scope AttachWorkspaceSources Found while rebasing onto main. POST /tasks/:id/workspace-sources and the add_workspace_sources_kandev MCP tool landed on main during this PR's review with no ownership check, so a caller could attach repositories and folders to another user's task and have them materialized into that task's workspace. Same class as the rest of this PR, so fixed here rather than left for a follow-up. The WS dispatch backstop added earlier already covered the browser path (the payload carries task_id); this closes the HTTP route and the MCP tool, which do not go through it. ErrTaskNotFound already maps to 404 in workspaceSourceHTTPStatus, so the denial surfaces correctly without touching the handler. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): map denied shell-output reads to 404 Review finding. GetMessage became per-user scoped earlier in this PR, so a denial now arrives as ErrTaskNotFound. httpGetShellOutput only mapped sql.ErrNoRows to 404, sending everything else to the 500 branch — so a foreign message answered 500 while a missing one answered 404, which is an existence signal and inconsistent with the 404-everywhere rule the other session routes follow. Kept the sql.ErrNoRows branch explicit rather than replacing it outright: isNotFound classifies typed sentinels and the "not found" substring, and "sql: no rows in result set" matches neither, so routing that case through handleNotFound alone regressed the missing-message response to 500 (caught by TestHTTPShellOutputSnapshot). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(auth): make the shell-output scoping test actually exercise the guard Both reviewers caught that TestHTTPGetShellOutputDeniesForeignMessageWith404 was vacuous. httpGetShellOutput has a second 404 gate after the service call — `if !ok || message.TaskSessionID != c.Param("id")` — and ExtractShellExecOutput returns ok=false for nil metadata. The fixture had none, so the route answered 404 through that gate whether or not scoping denied the read. Confirmed by mutation rather than inspection: with the authorization removed from GetMessage the test still passed. With valid shell-output metadata in the fixture it returns 200 and the victim's stdout, so the test fails as intended; restoring the guard makes it pass again. Also mutation-tested the sibling denial tests, since this is a defect class rather than a one-off: - TestHTTPGetTaskSessionDeniesForeignSessionWith404 — sound, returns 200 with the session DTO when the guard is removed. - TestProcessRoutesDenyForeignSession — catches removal, though via the documented nil-lifecycleMgr panic rather than a status assertion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(auth): add an in-test witness to the shell-output scoping test Review suggestion. The fixture fix made the test exercise the guard, but nothing in the test proved the 404 came from authorization rather than the route's post-service `!ok` gate — which is exactly how it went vacuous in the first place. The evidence lived in a commit message describing a manual mutation run, not in the test. Now asserts both directions, matching the approve-route test: the non-owner gets 404, and the owner does NOT. If the assertion ever stops proving authorization, the owner case fails and says so. Re-verified by mutation: removing the guard from GetMessage fails the test with 200 and the victim's stdout; restoring it passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
358 lines
13 KiB
Go
358 lines
13 KiB
Go
package orchestrator
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"go.uber.org/zap"
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"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/orchestrator/executor"
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"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/task/models"
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wfmodels "github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/workflow/models"
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v1 "github.com/kandev/kandev/pkg/api/v1"
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)
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// SessionIntent represents the type of session operation requested.
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type SessionIntent string
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const (
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IntentPrepare SessionIntent = "prepare" // Create session, optionally launch workspace, NO agent
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IntentStart SessionIntent = "start" // Create session + launch agent (new session)
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IntentStartCreated SessionIntent = "start_created" // Start agent on existing CREATED session
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IntentResume SessionIntent = "resume" // Restart stopped session with resume token
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IntentWorkflowStep SessionIntent = "workflow_step" // Start session with workflow step prompt config
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IntentRestoreWorkspace SessionIntent = "restore_workspace" // Restore workspace access for terminal-state session
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)
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// LaunchSessionRequest is the unified request for session.launch.
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type LaunchSessionRequest struct {
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TaskID string `json:"task_id"`
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Intent SessionIntent `json:"intent,omitempty"`
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SessionID string `json:"session_id,omitempty"`
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AgentProfileID string `json:"agent_profile_id,omitempty"`
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ExecutorID string `json:"executor_id,omitempty"`
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ExecutorProfileID string `json:"executor_profile_id,omitempty"`
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Prompt string `json:"prompt,omitempty"`
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PlanMode bool `json:"plan_mode,omitempty"`
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WorkflowStepID string `json:"workflow_step_id,omitempty"`
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Priority string `json:"priority,omitempty"`
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LaunchWorkspace bool `json:"launch_workspace,omitempty"`
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SkipMessageRecord bool `json:"skip_message_record,omitempty"`
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AutoStart bool `json:"auto_start,omitempty"`
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// DeferredStart marks a prepare whose caller will follow up with an explicit
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// IntentStartCreated that carries the prompt (the two-phase create flow:
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// cheap sync prepare + async start). It suppresses the passthrough
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// launchPrepare→launchStart upgrade so the eager launch doesn't spawn a
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// promptless PTY and pre-empt the prompt-bearing start. It is an internal
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// server-side coordination flag set by the deferred-start handlers, so it is
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// kept off the wire protocol (`json:"-"`) — a client must not be able to
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// suppress the upgrade and strand a passthrough session without a PTY.
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DeferredStart bool `json:"-"`
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Attachments []v1.MessageAttachment `json:"attachments,omitempty"`
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}
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// LaunchSessionResponse is the unified response for session.launch.
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type LaunchSessionResponse struct {
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Success bool `json:"success"`
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TaskID string `json:"task_id"`
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SessionID string `json:"session_id,omitempty"`
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AgentExecutionID string `json:"agent_execution_id,omitempty"`
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State string `json:"state"`
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WorktreePath *string `json:"worktree_path,omitempty"`
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WorktreeBranch *string `json:"worktree_branch,omitempty"`
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}
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// ResolveIntent infers the session intent from request fields when Intent is empty.
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func ResolveIntent(req *LaunchSessionRequest) SessionIntent {
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if req.Intent != "" {
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return req.Intent
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}
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if req.SessionID != "" && req.WorkflowStepID != "" {
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return IntentWorkflowStep
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}
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if req.SessionID != "" && req.Prompt == "" && req.AgentProfileID == "" {
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return IntentResume
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}
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if req.SessionID != "" {
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return IntentStartCreated
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}
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if req.LaunchWorkspace && req.Prompt == "" {
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return IntentPrepare
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}
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return IntentStart
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}
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// LaunchSession is the unified entry point for all session operations.
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func (s *Service) LaunchSession(ctx context.Context, req *LaunchSessionRequest) (*LaunchSessionResponse, error) {
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// Every intent funnels through here. SessionID is empty when creating, so
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// that case is carried by the task check alone.
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if err := s.authorizeTask(ctx, req.TaskID); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if err := s.authorizeSession(ctx, req.SessionID); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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intent := ResolveIntent(req)
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req.Prompt = strings.TrimSpace(req.Prompt)
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switch intent {
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case IntentPrepare:
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return s.launchPrepare(ctx, req)
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case IntentStart:
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return s.launchStart(ctx, req)
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case IntentStartCreated:
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return s.launchStartCreated(ctx, req)
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case IntentResume:
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return s.launchResume(ctx, req)
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case IntentWorkflowStep:
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return s.launchWorkflowStep(ctx, req)
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case IntentRestoreWorkspace:
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return s.launchRestoreWorkspace(ctx, req)
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default:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown intent: %s", intent)
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}
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}
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// launchPrepare creates a session entry without launching the agent.
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// Passthrough profiles can't be "prepared" without a running PTY — the terminal
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// has nothing to attach to until the agent process exists. Upgrade those calls
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// to a full start so the PTY is ready by the time the user sees the terminal.
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//
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// AutoStart=true means we arrived here from launchStart's blocked-auto-start
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// downgrade path; skipping the upgrade in that case avoids a launchStart ↔
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// launchPrepare bounce.
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//
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// DeferredStart=true means a prompt-bearing IntentStartCreated will follow this
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// prepare (the two-phase create flow); skipping the upgrade there leaves the
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// session CREATED so that follow-up start launches the passthrough agent WITH
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// the prompt — eagerly launching here would spawn a promptless PTY and the
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// later start would be rejected against the now-running session.
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func (s *Service) launchPrepare(ctx context.Context, req *LaunchSessionRequest) (*LaunchSessionResponse, error) {
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if s.shouldUpgradePassthroughPrepare(ctx, req) {
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return s.launchStart(ctx, req)
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}
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sessionID, err := s.PrepareTaskSession(
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ctx, req.TaskID, req.AgentProfileID, req.ExecutorID,
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req.ExecutorProfileID, req.WorkflowStepID, req.LaunchWorkspace,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return &LaunchSessionResponse{
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Success: true,
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TaskID: req.TaskID,
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SessionID: sessionID,
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State: string(models.TaskSessionStateCreated),
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}, nil
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}
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// shouldUpgradePassthroughPrepare reports whether a prepare request for a
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// passthrough profile should be eagerly upgraded to a full launch so a PTY
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// exists for the terminal to attach to. It is the single decision point for the
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// upgrade documented on launchPrepare: only genuine prepare-only callers (no
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// imminent prompt-bearing start) get the eager launch. See launchPrepare for
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// why AutoStart and DeferredStart each suppress it.
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func (s *Service) shouldUpgradePassthroughPrepare(ctx context.Context, req *LaunchSessionRequest) bool {
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return !req.AutoStart && !req.DeferredStart && s.isPassthroughProfile(ctx, req.AgentProfileID)
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}
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func (s *Service) isPassthroughProfile(ctx context.Context, profileID string) bool {
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if profileID == "" || s.agentManager == nil {
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return false
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}
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info, err := s.agentManager.ResolveAgentProfile(ctx, profileID)
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if err != nil || info == nil {
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return false
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}
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return info.CLIPassthrough
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}
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// launchStart creates a new session and launches the agent.
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// If the request is an auto-start and the task's current workflow step does not
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// have auto_start_agent, the request is downgraded to a prepare (workspace-only,
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// no agent) to prevent unwanted auto-starts from the frontend's useAutoStartSession hook.
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func (s *Service) launchStart(ctx context.Context, req *LaunchSessionRequest) (*LaunchSessionResponse, error) {
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if req.AutoStart && s.shouldBlockAutoStart(ctx, req) {
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req.LaunchWorkspace = true
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return s.launchPrepare(ctx, req)
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}
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execution, err := s.StartTask(
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ctx, req.TaskID, req.AgentProfileID, req.ExecutorID,
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req.ExecutorProfileID, req.Priority, req.Prompt,
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req.WorkflowStepID, req.PlanMode, req.AutoStart, req.Attachments,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return executionToLaunchResponse(req.TaskID, execution), nil
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}
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// shouldBlockAutoStart checks whether the task's workflow step allows auto-starting
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// the agent. Returns true when the step exists but does not have auto_start_agent
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// in its on_enter events. Tasks without a workflow step are never blocked.
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func (s *Service) shouldBlockAutoStart(ctx context.Context, req *LaunchSessionRequest) bool {
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if s.workflowStepGetter == nil {
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return false
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}
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task, err := s.repo.GetTask(ctx, req.TaskID)
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if err != nil || task.WorkflowStepID == "" {
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return false
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}
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step, err := s.workflowStepGetter.GetStep(ctx, task.WorkflowStepID)
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if err != nil || step == nil {
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return false
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}
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if step.HasOnEnterAction(wfmodels.OnEnterAutoStartAgent) {
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return false
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}
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s.logger.Info("auto-start downgraded to prepare: step lacks auto_start_agent",
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zap.String("task_id", req.TaskID),
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zap.String("workflow_step_id", task.WorkflowStepID),
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zap.String("step_name", step.Name))
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return true
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}
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// launchStartCreated starts agent execution on an existing CREATED session.
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func (s *Service) launchStartCreated(ctx context.Context, req *LaunchSessionRequest) (*LaunchSessionResponse, error) {
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execution, err := s.StartCreatedSession(
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ctx, req.TaskID, req.SessionID, req.AgentProfileID,
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req.Prompt, req.SkipMessageRecord, req.PlanMode, req.AutoStart, req.Attachments, nil,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return executionToLaunchResponse(req.TaskID, execution), nil
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}
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// launchResume resumes a stopped session.
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func (s *Service) launchResume(ctx context.Context, req *LaunchSessionRequest) (*LaunchSessionResponse, error) {
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execution, err := s.ResumeTaskSession(ctx, req.TaskID, req.SessionID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return executionToLaunchResponse(req.TaskID, execution), nil
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}
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// launchWorkflowStep starts a session with workflow step prompt configuration.
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func (s *Service) launchWorkflowStep(ctx context.Context, req *LaunchSessionRequest) (*LaunchSessionResponse, error) {
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err := s.StartSessionForWorkflowStep(ctx, req.TaskID, req.SessionID, req.WorkflowStepID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return &LaunchSessionResponse{
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Success: true,
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TaskID: req.TaskID,
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SessionID: req.SessionID,
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State: string(v1.TaskSessionStateRunning),
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}, nil
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}
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// launchRestoreWorkspace restores workspace access for a terminal-state session (COMPLETED, FAILED, CANCELLED).
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// It creates a lightweight agentctl execution so the frontend can browse files, open terminals, and view git status.
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func (s *Service) launchRestoreWorkspace(ctx context.Context, req *LaunchSessionRequest) (*LaunchSessionResponse, error) {
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if req.SessionID == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("session_id is required for workspace restore")
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}
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session, err := s.repo.GetTaskSession(ctx, req.SessionID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("session not found: %w", err)
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}
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if session.TaskID != req.TaskID {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("session does not belong to task")
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}
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if err := s.agentManager.EnsureWorkspaceExecutionForSession(ctx, req.TaskID, req.SessionID); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to restore workspace: %w", err)
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}
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resp := &LaunchSessionResponse{
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Success: true,
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TaskID: req.TaskID,
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SessionID: req.SessionID,
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State: string(session.State),
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}
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if len(session.Worktrees) > 0 {
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wt := session.Worktrees[0]
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if wt.WorktreePath != "" {
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resp.WorktreePath = &wt.WorktreePath
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}
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if wt.WorktreeBranch != "" {
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resp.WorktreeBranch = &wt.WorktreeBranch
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}
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}
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return resp, nil
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}
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// RecoverSession handles user-initiated recovery after an agent CLI failure.
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// action is "resume" (retry with existing ACP session) or "fresh_start" (clear token, start fresh).
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func (s *Service) RecoverSession(ctx context.Context, taskID, sessionID, action string) (*LaunchSessionResponse, error) {
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// Guard before the switch: "fresh_start" clears the resume token, so an
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// unauthorized call would mutate the session even if the launch failed.
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if err := s.authorizeSession(ctx, sessionID); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if err := s.authorizeTask(ctx, taskID); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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switch action {
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case "fresh_start":
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s.clearResumeToken(ctx, sessionID)
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case "resume":
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|
// no-op — relaunch with existing resume token
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid recovery action: %s", action)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
resp, err := s.LaunchSession(ctx, &LaunchSessionRequest{
|
|
TaskID: taskID,
|
|
SessionID: sessionID,
|
|
Intent: IntentResume,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, normalizeRecoverSessionError(err)
|
|
}
|
|
return resp, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func normalizeRecoverSessionError(err error) error {
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
if isMissingProfileResumeError(err) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("the agent profile used by this session was deleted; start a new session and choose an available agent profile: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func isMissingProfileResumeError(err error) bool {
|
|
msg := strings.ToLower(err.Error())
|
|
return strings.Contains(msg, "failed to resolve agent profile") ||
|
|
strings.Contains(msg, "agent profile not found")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// executionToLaunchResponse converts a TaskExecution to a LaunchSessionResponse.
|
|
func executionToLaunchResponse(taskID string, exec *executor.TaskExecution) *LaunchSessionResponse {
|
|
resp := &LaunchSessionResponse{
|
|
Success: true,
|
|
TaskID: taskID,
|
|
SessionID: exec.SessionID,
|
|
AgentExecutionID: exec.AgentExecutionID,
|
|
State: string(exec.SessionState),
|
|
}
|
|
if exec.WorktreePath != "" {
|
|
resp.WorktreePath = &exec.WorktreePath
|
|
}
|
|
if exec.WorktreeBranch != "" {
|
|
resp.WorktreeBranch = &exec.WorktreeBranch
|
|
}
|
|
return resp
|
|
}
|