Files
kandev/apps/web/e2e/tests/auth/auth-lifecycle.spec.ts
T
João Salavisa 919a39e49a feat(auth): opt-in authentication & multi-user segregation (#1930)
* feat(auth): add auth core — identities, sessions, PATs, invites, mode state machine

Phase 1 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- internal/auth: argon2id password hashing (PHC), opaque session/PAT tokens
  (SHA-256 at rest), login rate limiter, auth-mode state machine
  (disabled/setup/enabled), setup-wizard promotion of the pre-auth
  default-user row into the admin account, invites, admin user management
  with last-admin guard.
- internal/auth/store: auth_identities (OIDC-ready), auth_sessions,
  auth_api_tokens, auth_invites tables (SQLite+Postgres dialects).
- internal/auth/authn: request-identity plumbing (gin + plain contexts),
  RequireAdmin middleware.
- users table: display_name/role/status columns via new MigrateLogger
  wiring; AccountRepository surface (consumer-scoped, keeps existing
  Repository fakes untouched).
- config: AuthConfig.Required/SessionTTLHours/CookieName
  (KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED), FeaturesConfig.Auth; profiles.yaml + runtime
  flag registry entry for KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): enforce opt-in auth over HTTP — middleware, auth API, boot payload

Phase 2 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- internal/auth/httpmw: global gin middleware after CORS. Disabled mode
  injects the synthetic single-user admin identity (behavior unchanged);
  enabled mode resolves session cookie then PAT bearer, with an explicit
  allowlist (health, SPA bootstrap reads, credential endpoints,
  self-authenticating webhooks), deferral for WS/proxy upgrades and
  office agent JWTs, and SPA shell availability for the login page.
- internal/auth/httpapi: full auth surface — setup wizard, login/logout,
  me, password change, sessions, PATs, invites (mint/preview/accept),
  auth settings (enable/disable), admin user management.
- Boot payload: initialState.auth block always present; unauthenticated
  visitors on auth-enabled instances get features+auth only (no data).
- External MCP: PAT required once auth is enabled (open while disabled).
- Admin guards on destructive system routes and runtime-flag overrides.
- Startup warning when bound non-loopback with auth disabled
  (ServerConfig.NonLoopbackBinds fail-closed nudge).
- Wiring: auth store in Repositories, auth service in Services,
  ClaimUnownedWorkspaces backfill on the task repository.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): per-user workspace scoping across HTTP services

Phase 3 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- Task service: workspaces, workflows, repositories, and tasks are scoped
  to the request identity (owner-only visibility; pre-auth unowned rows
  stay shared). Denials use *NotFound sentinels - no existence leak.
  Internal callers and the disabled-mode synthetic identity remain
  unscoped, preserving behavior exactly when auth is off.
- CreateWorkspace stamps the authenticated caller as owner.
- Session chokepoint: lifecycle Manager.GetOrEnsureExecution runs a
  settable session-access check covering shell/files/ports/vscode/LSP.
- Secrets: per-user user_id column, scoped CRUD/list, ClaimUnowned wired
  into the setup-wizard backfills.
- Boot payload inherits scoping automatically.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): scope WebSocket gateway to authenticated users

Phase 4 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- Connection auth: /ws, /terminal, /lsp, /vscode, /port-proxy routes are
  guarded when auth is enabled - session cookie (same-origin upgrade),
  resolved identity from the HTTP middleware, or ?token=<PAT> for
  headerless programmatic clients; JSON 401 before any upgrade.
- Client identity: every WS client carries its authn.Identity; dispatched
  RPC actions (workspace.list, task CRUD, ...) run under a context
  carrying it, so WS RPC gets the same per-user scoping as HTTP.
- Subscription checks: task/session subscribe+focus verify workspace
  visibility via the task service; user topic subscriptions are pinned to
  the client's own user.
- Broadcast routing: new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspace routes workspace-scoped
  events (task/workflow/repo/office/session-state) to the owner's clients
  only, with safe fallbacks (unowned/unresolvable -> broadcast) so events
  never vanish; instance-wide events (executors, environments, agent
  profiles, system jobs) stay global by design.
- Replaced the long-standing discarded-token TODO in HandleConnection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): add feature spec and backend architecture notes for opt-in auth

- docs/specs/auth/spec.md: product behavior (opt-in, setup wizard,
  per-user workspaces, sessions/PATs, invites, public surface, v1 limits)
- apps/backend/AGENTS.md: internal/auth package layout + scoping rules
  for new service entry points and WS broadcast call sites

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): public documentation for opt-in authentication

- New docs/public/authentication.md: enabling, users & invites, PATs,
  public endpoints, limitations, disabling
- run-as-a-service.md: network-security note now points at the real
  authentication boundary instead of reverse-proxy-only guidance
- meta.json: nav entry under Configure Kandev

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): ADR for opt-in authentication architecture

Records the load-bearing choices: mode state machine + synthetic identity
in disabled mode, opaque DB-backed credentials over JWTs, default-user
promotion at setup, service-layer scoping with no-admin-bypass, and the
explicit public allowlist.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(web): auth UI — login, setup wizard, invites, users & account settings

Adds the frontend half of opt-in authentication: a pre-auth gate in
main.tsx that renders the setup wizard or login/invite pages instead of
the app shell whenever the boot payload's auth block says so, a new
`auth` store slice + feature flag mirroring the backend's StatePayload,
credentialed fetch (`credentials: "include"`) with a 401 handler that
clears the session and redirects to /login, and a full auth-api.ts
client for the /api/v1/auth and /api/v1/users routes.

Settings additions: a System > Users page (list/create/disable/promote
users, invite-link dialog) and System > Authentication page (enable/
disable with confirm + env-locked banner), gated on the `auth` feature
flag and admin role. A new Account sidebar group (Profile & Password,
API Tokens) is shown to signed-in users once auth is enabled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(auth): E2E lifecycle suite + fix workspace event WS leak it caught

New dedicated Playwright auth project (backend restarts with
KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED=true, isolated from the tokenless default suite):
setup-mode boot gating, admin setup wizard, login/logout + bad
credentials, PATs, admin-surface authorization, anonymous WS rejection,
UI login flow, and the acceptance test - two-user segregation across
HTTP, boot payload, and WebSocket.

The segregation spec immediately caught a real leak: workspace.* event
payloads carry their ID as 'id' (the payload IS the workspace DTO), not
'workspace_id', so BroadcastToWorkspace fell back to broadcast-to-all
for workspace create/update/delete. Fixed with action-aware extraction
plus a unit regression test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): close cross-user access gaps found in security audit

Two independent security audits of the auth branch found several
authorization gaps where session/workspace-scoped surfaces were not wired
to the new per-user chokepoint. All fixed:

- IDOR on reverse-proxy/terminal routes (vscode, port-proxy, terminal):
  these resolve executions via GetExecutionBySessionID /
  GetOrEnsureExecutionForEnvironment / EnsurePassthroughExecution, which
  skipped the session-access check that only GetOrEnsureExecution ran. Added
  the check inside the env/passthrough resolvers (before the cache
  short-circuit) and an explicit CheckSessionAccess gate in the two bare-lookup
  proxy handlers. An authenticated non-owner can no longer reach another
  user's IDE, forwarded ports, or shell.
- Cross-user agent-conversation read: ListMessages / ListMessagesPaginated /
  SearchMessages now authorize the session.
- Cross-user repository-script read/inject: script CRUD now authorizes the
  parent repository's workspace.
- Office HTTP surface: a group middleware enforces workspace ownership on
  :wsId routes for real users (agent-JWT callers keep their claim scoping).
- Login rate-limit bypass: SetTrustedProxies(nil) so a spoofed
  X-Forwarded-For can't rotate the limiter key on a directly-reachable
  backend.
- Invite double-provisioning race: MarkInviteUsed is now the atomic
  serialization point (consumed before user creation).
- Setup wizard: serialized with a mutex so concurrent first-visitors can't
  corrupt the promoted admin profile.
- Log sanitizer: explicit kandev_pat_ redaction rule.

Regression tests added for message/script scoping and the
execution-access-before-cache invariant. Auth E2E (incl. two-user
segregation) still green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): scope repository active-session-count endpoint

GET /api/v1/repositories/:id/active-session-count went through
CountActiveSessionsByRepository, which was not identity-scoped - a
cross-user info leak of another owner's active session counts. Added the
same authorizeRepositoryID gate the script routes use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): add json tags to auth store models — omit digests, fix token UI

The auth store structs (APIToken, Invite, LoginIdentity, Session) had db:
tags but no json: tags, so the handlers that serialize them directly sent
Go-cased keys (CreatedAt, Name) AND leaked the SHA-256/password digests to
clients. Two consequences:
- The API-tokens UI showed 'Invalid Date' and an empty name (frontend reads
  created_at/name).
- token_sha256 / password_hash were serialized in list responses.

Added json tags with snake_case keys the frontend reads and json:"-" on
every credential digest. Regression test asserts digests never serialize and
the snake_case timestamp/name keys are present. Also adds the
auth-screenshots capture spec (artifacts gitignored).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(web): move auth enable into feature toggles; show current user in sidebar

Remove the standalone Authentication settings page and its dedicated
settings/get-auth-settings API surface now that enabling auth lives in the
Feature Toggles system, and drop env_required now that /auth/me no longer
returns it. Add a current-user chip with a logout action to the sidebar
footer, shown only in enabled auth mode.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(auth): make features.auth the single on/off control

Per review feedback: authentication configuration now lives entirely in
the existing Feature Toggles system rather than a separate Authentication
settings section.

- The auth mode is derived from the features.auth runtime flag
  (KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH): off -> disabled, on+no-admin -> setup,
  on+admin -> enabled. Removed the parallel auth.mode system setting,
  the SetEnabled service method, GET/PATCH /api/v1/auth/settings, the
  AuthConfig.Required field, KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED, and the auth service's
  Settings-store dependency and EnvRequired/env_required.
- The features.auth registry entry is re-described as the actual enable
  switch (high-risk, restart-required) and defaults off in every profile
  (dev was previously true — that only revealed UI before; now it would
  enforce, so it must be an explicit opt-in).
- Setup no longer persists a mode; completing the wizard creates the admin
  and the mode auto-derives to enabled.
- Startup 'exposed without auth' warning + all docs (public guide,
  run-as-a-service, spec, ADR, AGENTS.md) point at the feature toggle.
- E2E: auth specs use KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH; screenshot spec captures the
  Feature Toggles page instead of the removed Authentication page; the
  member-restriction assertion targets an admin invite route.
- Tests updated across service/httpmw/httpapi/profiles for the derived
  mode; full suite green (only pre-existing sandbox-FS failures remain).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): complete cross-user isolation — integrations, automation, plan/walkthrough, session reads

A follow-up isolation audit found that per-user scoping had been wired into
the task service, secrets, office, and the WS gateway — but several
workspace/task/session-scoped surfaces still resolved a caller-supplied ID
with no ownership gate. Closed all of them; cross-user access now returns
404 across the board.

- Integrations (jira/linear/sentry/slack/azure-devops/gitlab/github/
  workflow-sync): a global middleware authorizes the workspace_id (query, or
  gitlab's /workspaces/:id/ path) on those route groups. Previously a member
  who knew another user's workspace ID could read/overwrite their integration
  connection config and watches.
- Automation: workspace-authorizer seam gates get/list/create/update/delete/
  enable/disable, triggers, run history, and — critically — the webhook
  secret. Was fully cross-tenant over WS before.
- Task plans (PlanService) and walkthroughs (WalkthroughService): task-
  authorizer seam on every read/write. These bypassed the task service.
- Session reads that hit the repo directly — session turns, task context,
  git snapshots, file reviews — now call AuthorizeSession/TaskAccess.

Internal callers (pollers, schedulers, MCP) carry no identity and stay
unscoped; disabled mode is unaffected. Regression tests added
(plan/walkthrough scoping, automation authorizer matrix, integration path
extraction) and the two-user E2E now asserts integration routes are shielded.
Docs (spec, ADR, public guide) updated to state what is isolated and that
filesystem/agent-credential isolation remains an OS-level limitation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(web): current-user chip uses border hover, not accent fill

The sidebar current-user chip used hover:bg-accent (a purpleish fill).
Switch to the border-hover idiom used elsewhere (border border-transparent
-> hover:border-border) with the neutral hover:bg-muted/50 the adjacent
workspace picker uses, so the hover reads as a subtle outline instead of a
colored background. Screenshot spec now captures the chip hover state.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(web): right-align current-user chip in the sidebar footer

Push the user chip to the far right of the expanded footer (ml-auto) so it
sits opposite the left-aligned icon buttons; collapsed mode keeps the
centered vertical stack unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): reject synthetic identity on management routes and scope office run broadcasts

Address code-review findings on the opt-in authentication PR:

- P1: while auth is disabled the middleware injects a synthetic admin
  (RoleAdmin), and RequireAdmin alone let it through — so anyone hitting a
  not-yet-enabled instance could mint a PAT or plant an admin that survives
  enablement and hijacks first-run setup. Add authn.RequireRealIdentity and
  guard the credential/session/user-management routes with it (public
  bootstrap routes stay reachable). Responds 404 while disabled.
- P1: office run events carry task_id but no workspace_id, so they fell back
  to a global broadcast and leaked across users. Resolve the workspace from
  the task and route via the new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspaceOrDrop, which fails
  closed (drops rather than global-broadcasts) when the workspace is unknown
  and auth is enforced.
- nit: type createAuthSlice as a single-arg creator and call it with just set.

Also register the authentication docs page and its settings routes in
docs/public/coverage.json so the public-docs validator passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 00:10:22 +01:00

270 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript

import { expect } from "@playwright/test";
import { backendFixture as test } from "../../fixtures/backend";
import {
acceptInvite,
createInviteToken,
fetchBootState,
login,
mintPAT,
setupAdmin,
} from "../../helpers/auth";
/**
* Opt-in authentication lifecycle. Runs in the dedicated `auth` Playwright
* project: the worker's backend is restarted with KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH=true,
* so it must never share a worker with the default suite (which assumes an
* open backend). Serial: later tests depend on the admin created in setup.
*
* Uses the raw backendFixture (not test-base) on purpose — test-base's
* auto-fixtures reset integration state through endpoints that require a
* session once auth is enabled.
*/
test.describe.serial("opt-in authentication", () => {
const ADMIN = { email: "admin@e2e.dev", password: "adminpass123", displayName: "Admin" };
const MEMBER = { email: "member@e2e.dev", password: "memberpass123", displayName: "Member" };
test.beforeAll(async ({ backend }) => {
await backend.restart({ KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH: "true" });
});
test.afterAll(async ({ backend }) => {
// Revert to the fixture's baseline env (auth off) for any later suites.
await backend.restart();
});
test("boots into setup mode with no data exposed", async ({ browser, backend }) => {
const context = await browser.newContext({ baseURL: backend.frontendUrl });
const boot = await fetchBootState(context, backend.baseUrl);
const auth = boot.initialState.auth as { mode: string; authenticated: boolean };
expect(auth.mode).toBe("setup");
expect(auth.authenticated).toBe(false);
// No data loaders may run for anonymous visitors.
expect(boot.initialState.workspaces).toBeUndefined();
// Protected APIs are closed; allowlisted ones stay open.
expect((await context.request.get(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/workspaces`)).status()).toBe(401);
expect((await context.request.get(`${backend.baseUrl}/health`)).ok()).toBeTruthy();
expect((await context.request.get(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/features`)).ok()).toBeTruthy();
await context.close();
});
test("setup wizard promotes the first admin and signs them in", async ({ browser, backend }) => {
const context = await browser.newContext({ baseURL: backend.frontendUrl });
await setupAdmin(context, backend.baseUrl, ADMIN);
// The session cookie from setup authenticates subsequent requests.
const me = await (await context.request.get(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/auth/me`)).json();
expect(me.mode).toBe("enabled");
expect(me.authenticated).toBe(true);
expect(me.user.email).toBe(ADMIN.email);
expect(me.user.role).toBe("admin");
expect((await context.request.get(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/workspaces`)).ok()).toBeTruthy();
// Setup is single-shot.
const again = await context.request.post(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/auth/setup`, {
data: { email: "second@e2e.dev", password: "password123" },
});
expect(again.status()).toBe(409);
await context.close();
});
test("login rejects bad credentials and issues working sessions", async ({
browser,
backend,
}) => {
const context = await browser.newContext({ baseURL: backend.frontendUrl });
const bad = await context.request.post(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/auth/login`, {
data: { email: ADMIN.email, password: "wrong-password!" },
});
expect(bad.status()).toBe(401);
const ghost = await context.request.post(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/auth/login`, {
data: { email: "ghost@e2e.dev", password: "whatever-pass" },
});
expect(ghost.status()).toBe(401);
await login(context, backend.baseUrl, ADMIN);
expect((await context.request.get(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/workspaces`)).ok()).toBeTruthy();
// Logout revokes the session.
await context.request.post(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/auth/logout`);
expect((await context.request.get(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/workspaces`)).status()).toBe(401);
await context.close();
});
test("two users are fully segregated over HTTP, boot payload, and WS", async ({
browser,
backend,
}) => {
test.setTimeout(90_000);
const adminContext = await browser.newContext({ baseURL: backend.frontendUrl });
await login(adminContext, backend.baseUrl, ADMIN);
// Admin creates a private workspace.
const created = await adminContext.request.post(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/workspaces`, {
data: { name: "Admin Secret Workspace" },
});
expect(created.ok(), await created.text()).toBeTruthy();
const workspace = (await created.json()) as { id: string };
// Member joins via invite.
const inviteToken = await createInviteToken(adminContext, backend.baseUrl, {
email: MEMBER.email,
role: "member",
});
const memberContext = await browser.newContext({ baseURL: backend.frontendUrl });
await acceptInvite(memberContext, backend.baseUrl, inviteToken, MEMBER);
// HTTP: the member cannot list or fetch the admin's workspace.
const memberList = (await (
await memberContext.request.get(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/workspaces`)
).json()) as { workspaces: Array<{ id: string }> };
expect(memberList.workspaces.map((w) => w.id)).not.toContain(workspace.id);
expect(
(
await memberContext.request.get(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/workspaces/${workspace.id}`)
).status(),
).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(404);
// Boot payload: member sees no admin data.
const memberBoot = await fetchBootState(memberContext, backend.baseUrl);
const memberWorkspaces = memberBoot.initialState.workspaces as
| { items: Array<{ id: string }> }
| undefined;
if (memberWorkspaces) {
expect(memberWorkspaces.items.map((w) => w.id)).not.toContain(workspace.id);
}
// Integration settings are also shielded: the member cannot read the
// admin's workspace-scoped integration config by supplying the ID.
for (const path of [
`/api/v1/jira/config?workspace_id=${workspace.id}`,
`/api/v1/github/status?workspace_id=${workspace.id}`,
`/api/v1/gitlab/status?workspace_id=${workspace.id}`,
`/api/v1/gitlab/workspaces/${workspace.id}/task-mrs`,
]) {
const res = await memberContext.request.get(`${backend.baseUrl}${path}`);
expect(res.status(), `integration route ${path} must be shielded`).toBe(404);
}
// Admin still sees it everywhere.
const adminList = (await (
await adminContext.request.get(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/workspaces`)
).json()) as { workspaces: Array<{ id: string }> };
expect(adminList.workspaces.map((w) => w.id)).toContain(workspace.id);
// WS: member's socket must stay silent for admin workspace events.
const memberPage = await memberContext.newPage();
await memberPage.goto("/login");
const wsUrl = backend.baseUrl.replace(/^http/, "ws") + "/ws";
await memberPage.evaluate((url) => {
const w = window as unknown as { __wsFrames: string[]; __ws?: WebSocket };
w.__wsFrames = [];
const socket = new WebSocket(url);
socket.onmessage = (event) => w.__wsFrames.push(String(event.data));
w.__ws = socket;
return new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
socket.onopen = () => resolve();
socket.onerror = () => reject(new Error("ws failed to open"));
});
}, wsUrl);
// Admin mutates their workspace — generates workspace.updated traffic.
const renamed = await adminContext.request.patch(
`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/workspaces/${workspace.id}`,
{ data: { name: "Admin Secret Workspace v2" } },
);
expect(renamed.ok()).toBeTruthy();
await memberPage.waitForTimeout(1500);
const frames = await memberPage.evaluate(
() => (window as unknown as { __wsFrames: string[] }).__wsFrames,
);
const leaked = frames.filter((frame) => frame.includes(workspace.id));
expect(leaked, `member WS received admin workspace traffic: ${leaked[0] ?? ""}`).toHaveLength(
0,
);
// Unauthenticated sockets are refused entirely.
const anonContext = await browser.newContext({ baseURL: backend.frontendUrl });
const anonPage = await anonContext.newPage();
await anonPage.goto("/login");
const anonRejected = await anonPage.evaluate((url) => {
return new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {
const socket = new WebSocket(url);
socket.onopen = () => resolve(false);
socket.onclose = () => resolve(true);
socket.onerror = () => resolve(true);
setTimeout(() => resolve(false), 3000);
});
}, wsUrl);
expect(anonRejected, "anonymous WS upgrade must be rejected").toBe(true);
await anonContext.close();
await memberContext.close();
await adminContext.close();
});
test("personal access tokens authenticate programmatic clients", async ({ browser, backend }) => {
const adminContext = await browser.newContext({ baseURL: backend.frontendUrl });
await login(adminContext, backend.baseUrl, ADMIN);
const pat = await mintPAT(adminContext, backend.baseUrl, "e2e-token");
const bare = await browser.newContext();
const withToken = await bare.request.get(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/workspaces`, {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${pat}` },
});
expect(withToken.ok()).toBeTruthy();
const forged = await bare.request.get(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/workspaces`, {
headers: { Authorization: "Bearer kandev_pat_deadbeef_forged" },
});
expect(forged.status()).toBe(401);
await bare.close();
await adminContext.close();
});
test("member cannot use admin surfaces", async ({ browser, backend }) => {
const memberContext = await browser.newContext({ baseURL: backend.frontendUrl });
await login(memberContext, backend.baseUrl, MEMBER);
expect((await memberContext.request.get(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/users`)).status()).toBe(403);
// Admin-only invite creation is also forbidden for members.
expect(
(
await memberContext.request.post(`${backend.baseUrl}/api/v1/auth/invites`, {
data: { role: "admin" },
})
).status(),
).toBe(403);
await memberContext.close();
});
test("login page renders for anonymous visitors", async ({ browser, backend }) => {
const context = await browser.newContext({ baseURL: backend.frontendUrl });
const page = await context.newPage();
await page.goto("/");
// The SPA must show the login surface instead of the app shell.
await expect(page.getByTestId("login-email")).toBeVisible({ timeout: 15_000 });
await expect(page.getByTestId("login-password")).toBeVisible();
// Sign in through the UI and land in the app.
await page.getByTestId("login-email").fill(ADMIN.email);
await page.getByTestId("login-password").fill(ADMIN.password);
await page.getByTestId("login-submit").click();
await page.waitForURL("**/");
await expect(page.getByTestId("login-email")).toHaveCount(0, { timeout: 15_000 });
await context.close();
});
});