Files
kandev/apps/backend/internal/gateway/websocket/access_test.go
T
João Salavisa 919a39e49a feat(auth): opt-in authentication & multi-user segregation (#1930)
* feat(auth): add auth core — identities, sessions, PATs, invites, mode state machine

Phase 1 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- internal/auth: argon2id password hashing (PHC), opaque session/PAT tokens
  (SHA-256 at rest), login rate limiter, auth-mode state machine
  (disabled/setup/enabled), setup-wizard promotion of the pre-auth
  default-user row into the admin account, invites, admin user management
  with last-admin guard.
- internal/auth/store: auth_identities (OIDC-ready), auth_sessions,
  auth_api_tokens, auth_invites tables (SQLite+Postgres dialects).
- internal/auth/authn: request-identity plumbing (gin + plain contexts),
  RequireAdmin middleware.
- users table: display_name/role/status columns via new MigrateLogger
  wiring; AccountRepository surface (consumer-scoped, keeps existing
  Repository fakes untouched).
- config: AuthConfig.Required/SessionTTLHours/CookieName
  (KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED), FeaturesConfig.Auth; profiles.yaml + runtime
  flag registry entry for KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): enforce opt-in auth over HTTP — middleware, auth API, boot payload

Phase 2 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- internal/auth/httpmw: global gin middleware after CORS. Disabled mode
  injects the synthetic single-user admin identity (behavior unchanged);
  enabled mode resolves session cookie then PAT bearer, with an explicit
  allowlist (health, SPA bootstrap reads, credential endpoints,
  self-authenticating webhooks), deferral for WS/proxy upgrades and
  office agent JWTs, and SPA shell availability for the login page.
- internal/auth/httpapi: full auth surface — setup wizard, login/logout,
  me, password change, sessions, PATs, invites (mint/preview/accept),
  auth settings (enable/disable), admin user management.
- Boot payload: initialState.auth block always present; unauthenticated
  visitors on auth-enabled instances get features+auth only (no data).
- External MCP: PAT required once auth is enabled (open while disabled).
- Admin guards on destructive system routes and runtime-flag overrides.
- Startup warning when bound non-loopback with auth disabled
  (ServerConfig.NonLoopbackBinds fail-closed nudge).
- Wiring: auth store in Repositories, auth service in Services,
  ClaimUnownedWorkspaces backfill on the task repository.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): per-user workspace scoping across HTTP services

Phase 3 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- Task service: workspaces, workflows, repositories, and tasks are scoped
  to the request identity (owner-only visibility; pre-auth unowned rows
  stay shared). Denials use *NotFound sentinels - no existence leak.
  Internal callers and the disabled-mode synthetic identity remain
  unscoped, preserving behavior exactly when auth is off.
- CreateWorkspace stamps the authenticated caller as owner.
- Session chokepoint: lifecycle Manager.GetOrEnsureExecution runs a
  settable session-access check covering shell/files/ports/vscode/LSP.
- Secrets: per-user user_id column, scoped CRUD/list, ClaimUnowned wired
  into the setup-wizard backfills.
- Boot payload inherits scoping automatically.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): scope WebSocket gateway to authenticated users

Phase 4 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- Connection auth: /ws, /terminal, /lsp, /vscode, /port-proxy routes are
  guarded when auth is enabled - session cookie (same-origin upgrade),
  resolved identity from the HTTP middleware, or ?token=<PAT> for
  headerless programmatic clients; JSON 401 before any upgrade.
- Client identity: every WS client carries its authn.Identity; dispatched
  RPC actions (workspace.list, task CRUD, ...) run under a context
  carrying it, so WS RPC gets the same per-user scoping as HTTP.
- Subscription checks: task/session subscribe+focus verify workspace
  visibility via the task service; user topic subscriptions are pinned to
  the client's own user.
- Broadcast routing: new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspace routes workspace-scoped
  events (task/workflow/repo/office/session-state) to the owner's clients
  only, with safe fallbacks (unowned/unresolvable -> broadcast) so events
  never vanish; instance-wide events (executors, environments, agent
  profiles, system jobs) stay global by design.
- Replaced the long-standing discarded-token TODO in HandleConnection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): add feature spec and backend architecture notes for opt-in auth

- docs/specs/auth/spec.md: product behavior (opt-in, setup wizard,
  per-user workspaces, sessions/PATs, invites, public surface, v1 limits)
- apps/backend/AGENTS.md: internal/auth package layout + scoping rules
  for new service entry points and WS broadcast call sites

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): public documentation for opt-in authentication

- New docs/public/authentication.md: enabling, users & invites, PATs,
  public endpoints, limitations, disabling
- run-as-a-service.md: network-security note now points at the real
  authentication boundary instead of reverse-proxy-only guidance
- meta.json: nav entry under Configure Kandev

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth): ADR for opt-in authentication architecture

Records the load-bearing choices: mode state machine + synthetic identity
in disabled mode, opaque DB-backed credentials over JWTs, default-user
promotion at setup, service-layer scoping with no-admin-bypass, and the
explicit public allowlist.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(web): auth UI — login, setup wizard, invites, users & account settings

Adds the frontend half of opt-in authentication: a pre-auth gate in
main.tsx that renders the setup wizard or login/invite pages instead of
the app shell whenever the boot payload's auth block says so, a new
`auth` store slice + feature flag mirroring the backend's StatePayload,
credentialed fetch (`credentials: "include"`) with a 401 handler that
clears the session and redirects to /login, and a full auth-api.ts
client for the /api/v1/auth and /api/v1/users routes.

Settings additions: a System > Users page (list/create/disable/promote
users, invite-link dialog) and System > Authentication page (enable/
disable with confirm + env-locked banner), gated on the `auth` feature
flag and admin role. A new Account sidebar group (Profile & Password,
API Tokens) is shown to signed-in users once auth is enabled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(auth): E2E lifecycle suite + fix workspace event WS leak it caught

New dedicated Playwright auth project (backend restarts with
KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED=true, isolated from the tokenless default suite):
setup-mode boot gating, admin setup wizard, login/logout + bad
credentials, PATs, admin-surface authorization, anonymous WS rejection,
UI login flow, and the acceptance test - two-user segregation across
HTTP, boot payload, and WebSocket.

The segregation spec immediately caught a real leak: workspace.* event
payloads carry their ID as 'id' (the payload IS the workspace DTO), not
'workspace_id', so BroadcastToWorkspace fell back to broadcast-to-all
for workspace create/update/delete. Fixed with action-aware extraction
plus a unit regression test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): close cross-user access gaps found in security audit

Two independent security audits of the auth branch found several
authorization gaps where session/workspace-scoped surfaces were not wired
to the new per-user chokepoint. All fixed:

- IDOR on reverse-proxy/terminal routes (vscode, port-proxy, terminal):
  these resolve executions via GetExecutionBySessionID /
  GetOrEnsureExecutionForEnvironment / EnsurePassthroughExecution, which
  skipped the session-access check that only GetOrEnsureExecution ran. Added
  the check inside the env/passthrough resolvers (before the cache
  short-circuit) and an explicit CheckSessionAccess gate in the two bare-lookup
  proxy handlers. An authenticated non-owner can no longer reach another
  user's IDE, forwarded ports, or shell.
- Cross-user agent-conversation read: ListMessages / ListMessagesPaginated /
  SearchMessages now authorize the session.
- Cross-user repository-script read/inject: script CRUD now authorizes the
  parent repository's workspace.
- Office HTTP surface: a group middleware enforces workspace ownership on
  :wsId routes for real users (agent-JWT callers keep their claim scoping).
- Login rate-limit bypass: SetTrustedProxies(nil) so a spoofed
  X-Forwarded-For can't rotate the limiter key on a directly-reachable
  backend.
- Invite double-provisioning race: MarkInviteUsed is now the atomic
  serialization point (consumed before user creation).
- Setup wizard: serialized with a mutex so concurrent first-visitors can't
  corrupt the promoted admin profile.
- Log sanitizer: explicit kandev_pat_ redaction rule.

Regression tests added for message/script scoping and the
execution-access-before-cache invariant. Auth E2E (incl. two-user
segregation) still green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): scope repository active-session-count endpoint

GET /api/v1/repositories/:id/active-session-count went through
CountActiveSessionsByRepository, which was not identity-scoped - a
cross-user info leak of another owner's active session counts. Added the
same authorizeRepositoryID gate the script routes use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): add json tags to auth store models — omit digests, fix token UI

The auth store structs (APIToken, Invite, LoginIdentity, Session) had db:
tags but no json: tags, so the handlers that serialize them directly sent
Go-cased keys (CreatedAt, Name) AND leaked the SHA-256/password digests to
clients. Two consequences:
- The API-tokens UI showed 'Invalid Date' and an empty name (frontend reads
  created_at/name).
- token_sha256 / password_hash were serialized in list responses.

Added json tags with snake_case keys the frontend reads and json:"-" on
every credential digest. Regression test asserts digests never serialize and
the snake_case timestamp/name keys are present. Also adds the
auth-screenshots capture spec (artifacts gitignored).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(web): move auth enable into feature toggles; show current user in sidebar

Remove the standalone Authentication settings page and its dedicated
settings/get-auth-settings API surface now that enabling auth lives in the
Feature Toggles system, and drop env_required now that /auth/me no longer
returns it. Add a current-user chip with a logout action to the sidebar
footer, shown only in enabled auth mode.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(auth): make features.auth the single on/off control

Per review feedback: authentication configuration now lives entirely in
the existing Feature Toggles system rather than a separate Authentication
settings section.

- The auth mode is derived from the features.auth runtime flag
  (KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH): off -> disabled, on+no-admin -> setup,
  on+admin -> enabled. Removed the parallel auth.mode system setting,
  the SetEnabled service method, GET/PATCH /api/v1/auth/settings, the
  AuthConfig.Required field, KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED, and the auth service's
  Settings-store dependency and EnvRequired/env_required.
- The features.auth registry entry is re-described as the actual enable
  switch (high-risk, restart-required) and defaults off in every profile
  (dev was previously true — that only revealed UI before; now it would
  enforce, so it must be an explicit opt-in).
- Setup no longer persists a mode; completing the wizard creates the admin
  and the mode auto-derives to enabled.
- Startup 'exposed without auth' warning + all docs (public guide,
  run-as-a-service, spec, ADR, AGENTS.md) point at the feature toggle.
- E2E: auth specs use KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH; screenshot spec captures the
  Feature Toggles page instead of the removed Authentication page; the
  member-restriction assertion targets an admin invite route.
- Tests updated across service/httpmw/httpapi/profiles for the derived
  mode; full suite green (only pre-existing sandbox-FS failures remain).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): complete cross-user isolation — integrations, automation, plan/walkthrough, session reads

A follow-up isolation audit found that per-user scoping had been wired into
the task service, secrets, office, and the WS gateway — but several
workspace/task/session-scoped surfaces still resolved a caller-supplied ID
with no ownership gate. Closed all of them; cross-user access now returns
404 across the board.

- Integrations (jira/linear/sentry/slack/azure-devops/gitlab/github/
  workflow-sync): a global middleware authorizes the workspace_id (query, or
  gitlab's /workspaces/:id/ path) on those route groups. Previously a member
  who knew another user's workspace ID could read/overwrite their integration
  connection config and watches.
- Automation: workspace-authorizer seam gates get/list/create/update/delete/
  enable/disable, triggers, run history, and — critically — the webhook
  secret. Was fully cross-tenant over WS before.
- Task plans (PlanService) and walkthroughs (WalkthroughService): task-
  authorizer seam on every read/write. These bypassed the task service.
- Session reads that hit the repo directly — session turns, task context,
  git snapshots, file reviews — now call AuthorizeSession/TaskAccess.

Internal callers (pollers, schedulers, MCP) carry no identity and stay
unscoped; disabled mode is unaffected. Regression tests added
(plan/walkthrough scoping, automation authorizer matrix, integration path
extraction) and the two-user E2E now asserts integration routes are shielded.
Docs (spec, ADR, public guide) updated to state what is isolated and that
filesystem/agent-credential isolation remains an OS-level limitation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(web): current-user chip uses border hover, not accent fill

The sidebar current-user chip used hover:bg-accent (a purpleish fill).
Switch to the border-hover idiom used elsewhere (border border-transparent
-> hover:border-border) with the neutral hover:bg-muted/50 the adjacent
workspace picker uses, so the hover reads as a subtle outline instead of a
colored background. Screenshot spec now captures the chip hover state.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(web): right-align current-user chip in the sidebar footer

Push the user chip to the far right of the expanded footer (ml-auto) so it
sits opposite the left-aligned icon buttons; collapsed mode keeps the
centered vertical stack unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): reject synthetic identity on management routes and scope office run broadcasts

Address code-review findings on the opt-in authentication PR:

- P1: while auth is disabled the middleware injects a synthetic admin
  (RoleAdmin), and RequireAdmin alone let it through — so anyone hitting a
  not-yet-enabled instance could mint a PAT or plant an admin that survives
  enablement and hijacks first-run setup. Add authn.RequireRealIdentity and
  guard the credential/session/user-management routes with it (public
  bootstrap routes stay reachable). Responds 404 while disabled.
- P1: office run events carry task_id but no workspace_id, so they fell back
  to a global broadcast and leaked across users. Resolve the workspace from
  the task and route via the new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspaceOrDrop, which fails
  closed (drops rather than global-broadcasts) when the workspace is unknown
  and auth is enforced.
- nit: type createAuthSlice as a single-arg creator and call it with just set.

Also register the authentication docs page and its settings routes in
docs/public/coverage.json so the public-docs validator passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 00:10:22 +01:00

254 lines
8.1 KiB
Go

package websocket
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/auth/authn"
"github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/common/logger"
ws "github.com/kandev/kandev/pkg/websocket"
"go.uber.org/zap"
)
func newAccessTestHub(t *testing.T) *Hub {
t.Helper()
log, err := logger.NewFromZap(zap.NewNop())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("logger: %v", err)
}
hub := NewHub(ws.NewDispatcher(), log)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
t.Cleanup(cancel)
go hub.Run(ctx)
return hub
}
func registerAccessClient(t *testing.T, hub *Hub, id string, identity authn.Identity) *Client {
t.Helper()
log, err := logger.NewFromZap(zap.NewNop())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("logger: %v", err)
}
client := NewClient(id, identity, nil, hub, log)
hub.Register(client)
waitForClientCount(t, hub, id)
return client
}
// waitForClientCount waits until the hub has processed the register message
// for the given client (Register goes through the Run loop channel).
func waitForClientCount(t *testing.T, hub *Hub, clientID string) {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
hub.mu.RLock()
found := false
for client := range hub.clients {
if client.ID == clientID {
found = true
break
}
}
hub.mu.RUnlock()
if found {
return
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
}
t.Fatalf("client %s never registered", clientID)
}
func receivedActions(client *Client) []string {
actions := []string{}
for {
select {
case raw := <-client.send:
var msg ws.Message
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &msg); err == nil {
actions = append(actions, msg.Action)
}
default:
return actions
}
}
}
func TestBroadcastToWorkspaceRoutesByOwner(t *testing.T) {
hub := newAccessTestHub(t)
hub.setAuthPolicy(AuthPolicy{
WorkspaceOwner: func(_ context.Context, workspaceID string) (string, error) {
switch workspaceID {
case "ws-a":
return "user-a", nil
case "ws-unowned":
return "", nil
}
return "", errors.New("unknown workspace")
},
})
clientA := registerAccessClient(t, hub, "a", authn.Identity{UserID: "user-a", Role: authn.RoleMember})
clientB := registerAccessClient(t, hub, "b", authn.Identity{UserID: "user-b", Role: authn.RoleMember})
clientSynthetic := registerAccessClient(t, hub, "s", authn.Identity{UserID: "default-user", Role: authn.RoleAdmin, Synthetic: true})
notify := func(action string) *ws.Message {
msg, err := ws.NewNotification(action, map[string]interface{}{"workspace_id": "ws-a"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return msg
}
// Owned workspace: owner + synthetic receive, the other user does not.
hub.BroadcastToWorkspace("ws-a", notify("task.created"))
if got := receivedActions(clientA); len(got) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("owner received %v, want 1 message", got)
}
if got := receivedActions(clientB); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("foreign user received %v, want none — WS LEAK", got)
}
if got := receivedActions(clientSynthetic); len(got) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("synthetic client received %v, want 1 message", got)
}
// Unowned workspace falls back to broadcast-to-all (async via Run loop).
hub.BroadcastToWorkspace("ws-unowned", notify("task.updated"))
waitForMessage(t, clientB)
// Resolver errors also fall back to broadcast (never drop events).
hub.BroadcastToWorkspace("ws-mystery", notify("task.updated"))
waitForMessage(t, clientB)
// Empty workspace ID = instance-wide event = everyone.
hub.BroadcastToWorkspace("", notify("executor.created"))
waitForMessage(t, clientA)
}
func waitForMessage(t *testing.T, client *Client) {
t.Helper()
select {
case <-client.send:
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatalf("client %s did not receive expected broadcast", client.ID)
}
}
func TestSubscriptionChecksDenyForeignTopics(t *testing.T) {
hub := newAccessTestHub(t)
denied := errors.New("denied")
hub.setAuthPolicy(AuthPolicy{
Subscriptions: SubscriptionAccessPolicy{
Task: func(ctx context.Context, taskID string) error {
identity, _ := authn.IdentityFromContext(ctx)
if taskID == "task-b" && identity.UserID != "user-b" {
return denied
}
return nil
},
Session: func(ctx context.Context, sessionID string) error {
identity, _ := authn.IdentityFromContext(ctx)
if sessionID == "sess-b" && identity.UserID != "user-b" {
return denied
}
return nil
},
},
})
clientA := registerAccessClient(t, hub, "a", authn.Identity{UserID: "user-a", Role: authn.RoleMember})
subscribe := func(action string, payload map[string]interface{}) *ws.Message {
raw, _ := json.Marshal(payload)
return &ws.Message{ID: "1", Type: ws.MessageTypeRequest, Action: action, Payload: raw}
}
clientA.handleSubscribe(subscribe(ws.ActionTaskSubscribe, map[string]interface{}{"task_id": "task-b"}))
assertErrorResponse(t, clientA, "task subscribe")
if len(hub.getSubscribersLocked(hub.taskSubscribers, "task-b")) != 0 {
t.Fatal("denied task subscription must not register")
}
clientA.handleSessionSubscribe(subscribe(ws.ActionSessionSubscribe, map[string]interface{}{"session_id": "sess-b"}))
assertErrorResponse(t, clientA, "session subscribe")
if len(hub.getSubscribersLocked(hub.sessionSubscribers, "sess-b")) != 0 {
t.Fatal("denied session subscription must not register")
}
// Own topics still work.
clientA.handleSubscribe(subscribe(ws.ActionTaskSubscribe, map[string]interface{}{"task_id": "task-a"}))
assertSuccessResponse(t, clientA, "own task subscribe")
if len(hub.getSubscribersLocked(hub.taskSubscribers, "task-a")) != 1 {
t.Fatal("allowed task subscription must register")
}
}
func TestUserSubscribeScopedToOwnUser(t *testing.T) {
hub := newAccessTestHub(t)
client := registerAccessClient(t, hub, "a", authn.Identity{UserID: "user-a", Role: authn.RoleMember})
raw, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]interface{}{"user_id": "user-b"})
client.handleUserSubscribe(&ws.Message{ID: "1", Type: ws.MessageTypeRequest, Action: ws.ActionUserSubscribe, Payload: raw})
assertErrorResponse(t, client, "foreign user subscribe")
// Empty user_id defaults to the client's own user.
raw, _ = json.Marshal(map[string]interface{}{})
client.handleUserSubscribe(&ws.Message{ID: "2", Type: ws.MessageTypeRequest, Action: ws.ActionUserSubscribe, Payload: raw})
assertSuccessResponse(t, client, "own user subscribe")
if len(hub.getSubscribersLocked(hub.userSubscribers, "user-a")) != 1 {
t.Fatal("own-user subscription must land on the client's user topic")
}
}
func assertErrorResponse(t *testing.T, client *Client, label string) {
t.Helper()
select {
case raw := <-client.send:
var msg ws.Message
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &msg); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: bad frame: %v", label, err)
}
if msg.Type != ws.MessageTypeError {
t.Fatalf("%s: got %s frame, want error", label, msg.Type)
}
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatalf("%s: no response frame", label)
}
}
func assertSuccessResponse(t *testing.T, client *Client, label string) {
t.Helper()
select {
case raw := <-client.send:
var msg ws.Message
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &msg); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: bad frame: %v", label, err)
}
if msg.Type == ws.MessageTypeError {
t.Fatalf("%s: got error frame: %s", label, string(raw))
}
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatalf("%s: no response frame", label)
}
}
// Regression: workspace.* event payloads carry the workspace ID under "id"
// (the payload IS the workspace DTO), not "workspace_id". The first
// implementation missed this and broadcast admin workspace updates to every
// user — caught by the auth E2E segregation spec.
func TestExtractWorkspaceIDFieldShapes(t *testing.T) {
if got := extractWorkspaceID(map[string]interface{}{"workspace_id": "ws-1"}); got != "ws-1" {
t.Fatalf("workspace_id key: %q", got)
}
if got := extractWorkspaceID(map[string]interface{}{"id": "ws-1"}); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("bare id must NOT be treated as workspace context for generic events: %q", got)
}
if got := extractStringField(map[string]interface{}{"id": "ws-1"}, "id"); got != "ws-1" {
t.Fatalf("extractStringField: %q", got)
}
if got := extractWorkspaceID("not-a-map"); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("non-map payload: %q", got)
}
}