kandev/docs/plans/workflow-sync-workspace-authz/plan.md

spec, created, status

spec	created	status
docs/specs/workflow-sync-workspace-authz/spec.md	2026-08-06	building

Implementation Plan: Workflow Sync — Per-User Workspace Authorization

Overview

Close the workspace-scoping gap in internal/workflowsync by reusing the exact pattern already used by every other per-workspace integration service in this codebase (GitHub, Jira, Linear, Slack, Azure DevOps, Automation): a nil-safe workspaceAuthorizer field on workflowsync.Service, set post-construction from backendapp with taskSvc.AuthorizeWorkspaceAccess, checked first in every user-facing service method. Handlers map the resulting ErrWorkspaceNotFound to a sanitized 404. Two tasks, sequential (the second's handler test depends on the first's service change): service-layer authorization + wiring, then handler-layer error mapping + HTTP-level regression tests.

---

Backend

Service layer (internal/workflowsync/service.go)

Add, mirroring internal/github/service.go:137,169-181 exactly:

type Service struct {
    // ...existing fields...
    workspaceAuthorizer func(context.Context, string) error
}

func (s *Service) SetWorkspaceAuthorizer(authorizer func(context.Context, string) error) {
    if s != nil {
        s.workspaceAuthorizer = authorizer
    }
}

func (s *Service) authorizeWorkspaceAccess(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string) error {
    if s == nil || s.workspaceAuthorizer == nil {
        return nil
    }
    return s.workspaceAuthorizer(ctx, workspaceID)
}

Call if err := s.authorizeWorkspaceAccess(ctx, workspaceID); err != nil { return nil, err } (or return err for the delete path) as the first line of the body in:

• GetConfigForWorkspace
• SetConfigForWorkspace (before req.Normalize() — no need to validate an attacker's payload)
• DeleteConfigForWorkspace
• SyncWorkspace (covers httpForceSync, and is a no-op for the internal poller's identity-free calls since authorizeWorkspaceID's callerScope already treats no-identity as unscoped)

Wiring (internal/backendapp/services.go)

In initWorkflowSyncService (already receives taskSvc *taskservice.Service — currently used only for workflowSvc.SetSyncWorkflowOps(taskSvc)), add immediately after workflowsync.Provide succeeds, matching the azuredevops in-function style at services.go:609-612:

svc.SetWorkspaceAuthorizer(taskSvc.AuthorizeWorkspaceAccess)

Handler layer (internal/workflowsync/handlers.go)

Add a workspaceDenied helper (mirrors internal/jira/handlers.go:18-22) and use it in all four handlers to return 404 instead of falling into the generic internalError 500 path:

func workspaceDenied(err error) bool {
    return errors.Is(err, repoerrors.ErrWorkspaceNotFound)
}

httpGetConfig, httpSetConfig, httpDeleteConfig, httpForceSync: check workspaceDenied(err) before the generic error branch and respond ctx.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "workspace not found"}) (no config/repo data in the body). Import github.com/kandev/kandev/internal/task/repository/repoerrors.

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Tests

• What: foreign-workspace denial at the service layer for all four entry points. File: apps/backend/internal/workflowsync/service_authorization_test.go (new). How: unit test constructing Service directly (no HTTP), installing a fake SetWorkspaceAuthorizer that asserts the identity/workspaceID it receives (pattern: internal/github/handlers_authorization_test.go's TestReviewWatchWebSocketDeniesForeignWorkspaceListAndMutations), returning repoerrors.ErrWorkspaceNotFound; assert each of GetConfigForWorkspace, SetConfigForWorkspace, DeleteConfigForWorkspace, SyncWorkspace returns that sentinel and performs no store mutation (re-read the config afterward to confirm it's unchanged).
• What: unscoped callers (nil authorizer, and an authorizer that itself no-ops on missing identity) are unaffected. File: same new file. How: call the same four methods with no authorizer wired and confirm they succeed as before (regression guard against a nil-safety mistake in authorizeWorkspaceAccess).
• What: HTTP-level 404 + no-leak behavior end to end. File: apps/backend/internal/workflowsync/handlers_test.go (new — this package currently has zero handler-level tests). How: gin.New() + RegisterRoutes, httptest.NewRequest + authn.WithIdentity on the request context (pattern: internal/github/controller_auth_identity_test.go), covering:
  • Owner identity succeeds on GET/POST/DELETE/sync against their own workspace.
  • Foreign member identity gets 404 on all four routes against a seeded victim workspace's config, and the response body never contains the victim's repo owner/name/branch/path.
  • Victim's config is unchanged after the denied POST/DELETE attempts.
  • Synthetic identity (auth disabled) still succeeds — no regression for the default (auth-off) path.
• Regression test that must fail before the fix and pass after: the foreign-member GET/POST cases above — today they succeed and leak/accept a foreign workspace's config; after the fix they 404.

Backend-only change; no frontend/E2E surface (no UI, WS, or client-visible contract changes).

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Verification Results

Both tasks done; see each task file's ## Results for exact per-task output, including two Codex-review-driven follow-up fixes (untested production wiring, force-sync's second error path) and expanded test coverage. Whole-package summary:

• go build ./...: clean.
• gofmt -l internal/workflowsync internal/backendapp: no output (already formatted).
• go vet ./internal/workflowsync/... ./internal/backendapp/...: clean.
• go test -race ./internal/workflowsync/... ./internal/backendapp/...: both ok.
• golangci-lint run ./internal/workflowsync/... ./internal/backendapp/... --new-from-rev=main --timeout=5m: 0 issues.
• Full go build ./... && go test -race ./... (whole backend): all packages ok except a pre-existing, unrelated flake in internal/repoclone (TestEnsureWorkspaceClonedWithBasicAuthKeepsCredentialScopedToGitChild/context_cancellation, a subprocess-timing test) — confirmed unrelated by re-running it in isolation (passes) and by this branch touching neither that package nor anything it depends on.

Severity correction: Codex review found that origin/main already has a global integrationWorkspaceScopeMiddleware (internal/backendapp/main.go:1807) that path-matches /api/v1/workflow-sync/ and authorizes before any handler runs — the HTTP-level exploit originally described in this spec's first draft was already blocked. See spec.md's "Correction" note; this fix closes a real but narrower gap (service-layer defense-in-depth, consistency with every sibling integration, protection for any future non-HTTP caller), not a currently-open HTTP vulnerability.

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Implementation Waves And Parallel Candidates

Sequential (2 tasks; task 2's handler tests depend on task 1's service-layer change):

• task-01-service-authorization
• task-02-handler-error-mapping

Open Questions

(none)