--- status: draft created: 2026-07-19 amended: 2026-07-28 owner: Kandev --- # Workspace GitHub Authentication ## Why GitHub credentials must not silently cross workspace boundaries. A local workspace may only need a human PAT or a named `gh` CLI account, while unattended company automation benefits from a GitHub App's short-lived, repository-scoped installation tokens. Users also need to keep work and personal automation under different GitHub Apps without operating separate Kandev deployments. ## What - Every workspace chooses exactly one automation source: PAT, a named `gh` CLI account, a verified GitHub App installation, or the migration-only `legacy_shared` source. - GitHub App registration is configured from the workspace GitHub settings flow. There is no singleton GitHub App settings page and no automatically active deployment App. - A workspace may select a GitHub App registration already known to the Kandev deployment, import an existing GitHub App that the user owns, or create a new GitHub App through GitHub's App Manifest flow. Import and creation guide the user through ownership, callback, webhook, permission, visibility, and installation requirements. - The deployment stores a catalog of GitHub App registrations because a user may intentionally reuse one App across workspaces. Each workspace still selects and installs an App independently. Selecting an existing registration never binds another workspace automatically. - Users who require independent root credentials, bot identity, revocation, or ownership create a separate registration for each trust boundary. Work and personal workspaces can therefore use different Apps. - Reusing one registration shares its App private key, client secret, webhook secret, permission policy, and bot identity. Installation tokens, workspace repository scope, connection generation, broker leases, health, and personal OAuth tokens remain workspace isolated. - A newly created App defaults to private, meaning GitHub permits installation only on the account that owns it. The user may explicitly choose public when the same App must be installable on other GitHub accounts or organizations. Public does not list the App in Marketplace, reveal secrets, or grant repository access without installation approval. - PAT and named CLI automation act as the verified human account. A separate `My GitHub` connection is only offered when workspace automation uses a GitHub App, because App installations are not people and cannot provide authenticated-viewer semantics. - User-triggered mutations prefer the workspace's verified personal connection, then a human PAT/CLI automation connection, then the App installation. The UI always identifies the effective actor and never labels an App mutation as human-attributed. - Background watches, cleanup, repository discovery, and workflow sync always use the workspace automation connection. Personal credentials are never exposed to agents or executors. - Task Git credential routing is a separate workspace policy. **Managed workspace credentials** gives attached GitHub repositories task/repository/generation-bound broker leases from the workspace automation connection. **Inherit executor Git credentials** injects no GitHub broker helper or `gh` shim: Local and Worktree tasks use host-visible Git/SSH credentials, while remote tasks use credentials configured in that executor. - For Kandev-managed GitHub checkouts used by Local and Worktree tasks, the selected task policy also controls the persisted `origin` transport. Managed routing uses canonical GitHub HTTPS. Executor inheritance uses the host's detected `gh` clone protocol, including SSH, and reconciles an existing managed checkout when the policy changes. This makes Git conditional includes based on `remote.*.url` observe the same transport the task uses. Kandev never rewrites the remote of a repository registered as a user-managed local checkout. - Under managed routing, App installation tokens are minted for the requested repository and cached only in memory. PAT/CLI tokens retain their provider-granted scope once delivered to a trusted agent subprocess. GitHub HTTPS and the broker-aware `gh` shim fail closed rather than consulting another ambient helper after a managed-helper failure. - Under managed routing, every authorized task execution surface receives the same current task-scoped Git environment: the agent subprocess, terminal shells, passthrough-agent PTYs, and task-scoped command processes. This includes the broker contract, managed indexed Git configuration, and the `agentctl`/`gh` shim-first `PATH`; it does not grant access to a browser client, an unrelated host shell, or another workspace's task environment. - Kandev composes the indexed `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT` / `GIT_CONFIG_KEY_` / `GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_` protocol across host, executor, profile, task, and agentctl boundaries. Unrelated entries such as hooks, notes, safe-directory, and URL-rewrite settings survive in their original order; later Kandev credential entries affect only their intended GitHub credential keys. An already-forwarded suffix is not duplicated. - Explicit executor-profile `GITHUB_TOKEN` or `GH_TOKEN` values remain unmanaged operator overrides and take precedence over the workspace broker when managed routing is selected. - Every successful task launch or resume records a non-secret session snapshot of the selected policy, effective credential source, known method and actor, transport, executor, and capture time. Inherited and profile-token actors are labeled runtime-selected instead of being probed. - The unpublished `KANDEV_GITHUB_APP_*` configuration introduced on this branch is removed. Setting those variables does not create or configure a registration; operators use the guided import flow for an App they already own. - Existing released workspaces migrate to `legacy_shared`; new workspaces start disconnected. Once a workspace leaves legacy mode it cannot return. The unpublished singleton registration schema on this branch is rewritten directly and receives no compatibility migration. A valid legacy connection supplies both the existing API client abstraction and an in-memory Git transport credential so provider-backed repositories can be rematerialized from legacy shared managed paths into workspace-isolated clone roots. - Copying a workspace copies repository preferences but never copies a PAT, CLI account selection, App installation binding, registration secret, or personal identity. ## Choosing A Method | Method | Use when | Benefits | Costs and limits | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | PAT | A local or simple workspace should act as one person | Fast setup; human attribution | Long-lived bearer secret; agents receive its full provider scope | | Named `gh` CLI | The desired human account already exists in local `gh` auth | No token copied into Kandev; deterministic account selection | Depends on host CLI credentials; remote agents still use the brokered bearer token | | GitHub App | An organization or unattended workspace needs managed automation | Short-lived repository-scoped tokens; independent revocation; App attribution | Requires App ownership, callback/webhook configuration, installation, and a public HTTPS URL for full lifecycle health | The workspace UI explains that an App is recommended for background jobs and managed agents, but it does not claim agents can only use the selected method. Explicit executor credentials and other unmanaged tools remain outside Kandev's workspace credential contract. The automation method and task Git credential policy are independent. Selecting a named `gh` account does not inherit the host's Git configuration: in managed mode Kandev resolves that exact host/login and brokers its token to the task. Users who want traditional host or executor behavior select **Inherit executor Git credentials** explicitly. ## Identity And Routing | Purpose | First choice | Fallback | Attribution | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Background reads and writes | Workspace automation | None | Automation principal | | Managed task git and `gh` access | Workspace automation | Explicit profile token | Automation principal, or runtime-selected override | | Inherited task Git access | Executor-visible Git/SSH credentials | None | Runtime-selected | | `My GitHub` reads | Personal connection | Human PAT/CLI automation | Human principal | | User-triggered mutation | Personal connection | Human PAT/CLI, then App installation | Effective principal shown in UI | An App-only workspace without personal OAuth remains usable for automation and App-attributed mutations. `My GitHub` instead offers a personal connection created with the same App registration as the workspace installation. ## GitHub App Policy Kandev-created Apps request repository metadata read; contents read/write; pull requests read/write; issues read/write; checks, statuses, and Actions read; administration read; organization members read; and workflows write. The UI exposes this policy through a permissions button and dialog, not a row of chips. The App subscribes to `installation`, `installation_repositories`, and `github_app_authorization`. An imported App must meet the same callback, setup URL, webhook, event, and permission requirements. Kandev validates the App identity and reports missing capabilities after installation. It does not silently change an imported App's GitHub settings. The guide provides exact values and GitHub links for the user to apply. ## Data Model ### `github_app_registrations` One row per GitHub App known to this Kandev deployment. Registration metadata is catalog state; workspace use is represented only by an explicit workspace connection. | Field | Type | Constraint | | --- | --- | --- | | `id` | UUID text | Primary key; allocated before manifest creation | | `source` | enum text | `managed` (manifest-created) or `imported` | | `display_name` | text | Non-empty user-facing disambiguator | | `github_host` | text | `github.com` in this feature | | `app_id` | int64 | Positive; unique with `github_host` | | `client_id` | text | Non-secret App OAuth client identifier | | `slug` | text | Verified App slug | | `owner_login` | text | Verified App owner | | `owner_type` | enum text | `User` or `Organization` | | `visibility` | enum text | `private` or `public` | | `public_base_url` | text | Canonical public HTTPS origin | | `created_for_workspace_id` | text nullable | Provenance only; not an automatic binding | | `credential_generation` | int64 | Positive; cache and lease invalidation key | | `credential_secret_id` | text | Non-empty encrypted bundle pointer | | `status` | enum text | `active` or `invalid` | | `webhook_status` | enum text | `unverified`, `verified`, or `failing` | | `last_webhook_at` | timestamp nullable | Last correctly signed delivery for this registration | | `last_error` | text nullable | Sanitized validation or runtime failure | | `created_at`, `updated_at` | timestamp | Required | Managed and imported credentials are immutable encrypted bundles under `github:app-registration::g:`. A versioned bundle contains the private key, client secret, and webhook secret. Metadata points to the active bundle only after the bundle is durable. Every registration is represented by one verified catalog row and encrypted bundle; there is no synthetic, configuration-backed, or globally active registration. ### `github_app_registration_flows` Manifest flows store `state_hash`, preallocated `registration_id`, initiating `workspace_id` and `user_id`, owner type/login, display name, visibility, canonical public base URL, manifest revision, expiry, consumption time, and creation time. A new flow for the same workspace supersedes its older unconsumed flow. State is random, hashed at rest, single-use, and expires after one hour. ### `github_workspace_connections` One row per configured workspace automation identity. Existing fields remain, with: | Field | Type | Constraint | | --- | --- | --- | | `app_registration_id` | UUID text nullable | Required only for `github_app_installation`; FK to `github_app_registrations.id` with delete restricted | For an App connection, `installation_id`, verified account login/type, and `app_registration_id` must all be present. PAT/CLI/legacy rows must have no registration ID. ### `github_workspace_settings` The non-secret operational settings row adds `task_git_credentials_mode`, with allowed values: | Value | Behavior | | --- | --- | | `managed` | Default. Inject the workspace broker contract for attached GitHub repositories unless an explicit executor-profile token overrides it. | | `executor` | Inject no Kandev GitHub helper or `gh` shim; use credentials available where the selected executor runs. | Missing or invalid persisted values normalize to `managed`. Workspace-settings copy includes this policy because it is operational configuration, not authentication material. ### Task-session credential snapshot After a successful launch or resume, task-session metadata contains a versioned `git_credential_snapshot` with: - selected policy (`managed` or `executor`); - effective source (`workspace`, `executor_profile`, or `executor`); - workspace method when known (`pat`, `gh_cli`, `github_app_installation`, or `legacy_shared`); - a known human/App actor label, or `runtime_selected` when Kandev does not inspect the credential; - transport (`managed_https`, `profile_token`, or `executor_selected`), executor type, and capture timestamp. The snapshot contains no token, lease, helper path, credential-file path, or SSH key detail. A failed launch/resume does not replace the last successful snapshot. ### `github_user_connections` One optional personal identity per `(workspace_id, user_id)`. Add required `app_registration_id`, which must equal the current workspace App connection's registration. Access and refresh tokens remain encrypted under workspace/user-derived keys. Switching away from that App deletes the old personal secrets and increments its generation before the new automation connection becomes visible. ### `github_auth_flows` Installation and personal OAuth flows include `app_registration_id` in addition to workspace, user, expected connection generation, PKCE material, expiry, and consumption state. A callback is valid only when both its route registration ID and stored registration ID match. ### `github_webhook_deliveries` The primary key is `(app_registration_id, delivery_id)`. A delivery is claimed only after the registration-specific HMAC signature is verified. The row records event, terminal result, received time, and processed time without payload secrets or tokens. Background PR, task, and review-watch records retain `workspace_id`; review watches also retain the verified target human login. Missing or contradictory ownership fails closed. ## API Surface All non-public endpoints require workspace authorization. The current trusted-single-user runtime maps this to `default-user`; mutually untrusted deployments require real workspace/admin roles before exposing registration management. ### Registration catalog - `GET /api/v1/github/app/registrations?workspace_id=` returns accessible non-secret registrations, source, identity, visibility, callback URLs, health, whether each is selected by this workspace, and sharing implications. It never returns credentials. - `POST /api/v1/github/app/registrations/manifest/start` accepts `workspace_id`, `display_name`, owner type/login, visibility, and public base URL. It returns the GitHub owner-specific manifest submission URL, generated manifest, state, registration ID, revision, and expiry. - `GET /api/v1/github/app/registrations/:registrationId/manifest/callback` consumes state, converts the one-hour code, verifies identity and policy, commits an encrypted bundle plus metadata, and returns to that workspace's GitHub settings. It does not select or install the App automatically. - `POST /api/v1/github/app/registrations/import/prepare` creates a short-lived, single-use import preparation for the initiating workspace. It returns `registration_id`, `public_base_url`, `manifest_callback_url`, `install_callback_url`, `personal_callback_url`, `webhook_url`, `setup_url`, `permissions`, `events`, and `expires_at` so the user can configure the existing App before submitting any root credentials. - `POST /api/v1/github/app/registrations/import` consumes the prepared `registration_id` and accepts the workspace context, label, App ID, client ID/secret, slug, private key, webhook secret, owner, and visibility. It verifies the App via GitHub before atomically persisting it. Duplicate `(host, app_id)` returns `github_app_already_registered` and the non-secret existing registration ID. - `PATCH /api/v1/github/app/registrations/:registrationId` changes only `display_name`. - `DELETE /api/v1/github/app/registrations/:registrationId` deletes a registration only when no workspace or personal connection references it. ### Workspace automation - `GET /api/v1/github/status?workspace_id=` returns automation, personal identity, effective actors, App registration metadata, capabilities, missing permissions, and migration state. - `GET /api/v1/github/workspace-settings?workspace_id=` returns repository scope, saved preferences, and `task_git_credentials_mode`. - `PUT /api/v1/github/workspace-settings` accepts a partial `task_git_credentials_mode` update and rejects unknown values without changing the prior policy. - `GET /api/v1/github/auth/gh-cli/accounts?workspace_id=` lists exact local host/login choices. - `PUT /api/v1/github/workspace-connection?workspace_id=` configures validated PAT or named CLI auth. App connections can only be committed by the verified installation callback. - `POST /api/v1/github/app/install/start` accepts `workspace_id` and `app_registration_id`, stores a single-use flow, and returns the registration-specific GitHub installation URL. - `GET /api/v1/github/app/registrations/:registrationId/install/callback` verifies state, App, installation, authorizing user, and owner association before atomically replacing workspace automation. Failure leaves the previous automation connection unchanged. - `DELETE /api/v1/github/workspace-connection?workspace_id=` removes workspace secret material and the App installation binding but never deletes or uninstalls the registration. - `POST /api/v1/github/app/registrations/:registrationId/webhook` is public. It chooses exactly that registration's webhook secret, validates HMAC before parsing or claiming the delivery, and only mutates connections whose registration and installation both match. ### Personal identity - `POST /api/v1/github/personal-connection/start` uses the workspace's active App registration and returns its PKCE/state authorization URL. - `GET /api/v1/github/app/registrations/:registrationId/personal/callback` validates route, state, PKCE, current workspace registration, and GitHub user before storing tokens. - `DELETE /api/v1/github/personal-connection?workspace_id=` deletes only the current user's workspace personal connection and secrets. Existing `/api/v1/github/token` remains a one-release compatibility alias with mandatory `workspace_id` and a deprecation header. ## State Machines ### Registration - `absent -> registering`: start a manifest flow or prepare an import with a preallocated ID. - `registering -> active`: verify GitHub identity and durable credential bundle, then publish catalog metadata and hot-load the registration generation. - `registering -> absent`: cancellation, expiry, replay, conversion, validation, or persistence failure leaves no selectable registration. An orphan App created on GitHub is reported with recovery instructions. - `active -> invalid`: credential load, signing, or identity validation fails; workspaces selecting it fail closed while PAT/CLI workspaces continue. - `active -> absent`: delete an unreferenced managed/imported registration. Webhook health is independent: `unverified -> verified` after the first correctly signed delivery; post-signature processing failures produce `failing`; a later valid successful delivery restores `verified`. ### Workspace automation - The current connection remains active while PAT/CLI validation, App creation/import, and App installation are pending. - A successful replacement increments the workspace credential generation, revokes old broker leases, clears incompatible personal auth, and then exposes the new connection atomically. - Installation suspension, deletion, permission loss, or registration invalidity updates only connections matching both registration ID and installation ID. - Disconnect removes workspace-owned secrets and leaves the reusable registration untouched. ### Task Git credential resolution - Missing settings start at `managed`. - `managed + explicit profile GITHUB_TOKEN/GH_TOKEN -> executor_profile`. - `managed + attached GitHub repository + active workspace connection -> workspace broker`. - `executor -> executor-visible credentials`, regardless of PAT/CLI/App automation method. - Initial launch and resume run the same resolution. A successful operation replaces the session snapshot; a failed operation leaves the previous snapshot unchanged. - Changing the workspace policy affects new launches and the next resume, not an already-running process. ## Permissions And Security - Registration list/create/import/delete requires registration-manager authority plus access to the initiating workspace. Under the current single-user trust model `default-user` has both; future multi-user deployments must replace this provisional rule. - Workspace connection and personal identity actions require access to that workspace. - Registration IDs are not secrets. They select a candidate key; HMAC verification is still mandatory before any webhook payload is trusted. - Secret request fields have bounded bodies, are excluded from structured logs and errors, are stored only in the encrypted secret store, and are never returned by status/catalog APIs. - Runtime and token-cache keys include registration ID, registration generation, installation ID, workspace ID, and repository scope as applicable. No lookup may fall back to another registration or workspace. - Named GitHub CLI bearer tokens remain memory-only and are re-resolved from the exact selected host/login after at most five minutes. Connection-generation invalidation remains immediate. - Public base URL validation requires a canonical HTTPS origin with no credentials, query, or fragment and rejects loopback, private, link-local, or non-globally-routable DNS results. Kandev does not fetch the supplied URL as validation. - App private keys, client secrets, webhook secrets, personal tokens, and live installation tokens never enter executor environments. Only brokered PAT/CLI tokens or repository-restricted installation tokens reach a managed trusted child operation; explicit executor-profile `GITHUB_TOKEN`/`GH_TOKEN` values are an unmanaged exception and can reach that child instead. - Managed helper configuration resets the inherited GitHub HTTPS helper chain, disables terminal prompts, and activates Kandev's `agentctl`/`gh` tool directory only for broker-enabled task instances. It does not claim to prevent a host-authority agent from manually switching a remote to SSH or invoking another credential-bearing tool. - The effective task Git environment is runtime-only. It is copied only after the existing task/session or task-environment ownership check, is never persisted in task metadata or terminal records, and is never written to logs, errors, browser payloads, or process arguments. - Indexed Git configuration is validated and composed as a single ordered block at environment merge boundaries. Kandev never replaces a complete inherited block merely by assigning its own `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT`; managed helper reset semantics are expressed as later Git config entries. ## Failure Modes - A registration create/import failure never replaces workspace auth or exposes submitted secrets. - A duplicate import directs the user to select the known registration instead of storing another copy of its root credentials. - Callback route/state/registration/workspace mismatches fail closed and consume no unrelated flow. - An invalid webhook signature performs no delivery claim, health update, or connection mutation. - Missing App permissions produce capability-specific diagnostics; unrelated capabilities continue to work. - GitHub CLI account discovery and token resolution tolerate host CLI releases both before and after structured status and multi-account flags. Genuine discovery failures are shown as errors, not as an empty account list. A CLI without named-token support may resolve only the active account; selecting another stored login fails with guidance to activate it or upgrade the CLI. - If the managed `agentctl` helper, broker, or `gh` shim is unavailable, the command fails with a managed-credential error and does not fall through to another HTTPS helper or interactive prompt. - If an authorized task terminal, passthrough PTY, or task-scoped command cannot receive its effective managed Git environment, Kandev fails that process start before it runs the requested command. It does not silently fall back to an ambient credential helper or host `gh` login. - If any environment source supplies a malformed or unreasonably large indexed Git configuration, task environment preparation fails with a sanitized configuration error rather than silently truncating, partially merging, or executing a different block. - If executor inheritance is selected but no usable credential exists in that executor, Git/SSH reports its normal authentication failure. Kandev does not probe or guess the actor. - If Kandev cannot reconcile a managed checkout's `origin` with the selected task policy, Local and Worktree preparation fails before the agent starts instead of silently using the other policy's transport. - Deleting a registration with any workspace or personal reference returns `github_app_registration_in_use` with a non-secret binding count. - Changing workspace auth while a flow is open makes the stale callback fail without reverting the newer connection. ## Persistence Guarantees Registrations, workspace/personal bindings, task Git credential policy, credential generations, health, auth flows, webhook dedupe, and successful task-session credential snapshots survive restart. Installation tokens, App JWTs, CLI-derived tokens, and broker lease plaintext remain memory-only. Active encrypted-bundle pointers are crash consistent; orphan inactive bundles are reconciled after restart. Restart rebuilds runtime clients independently for every valid stored registration and never creates a global default. ## UX And Mobile Contract - Workspace GitHub settings lead with the active automation identity and a **Change connection** command. The method chooser uses a menu/list with PAT, GitHub CLI, and GitHub App descriptions, not a segmented tab control. - Method descriptions state where the credential is stored/resolved and how managed tasks receive it. A separate **Task Git credentials** setting visibly explains **Managed workspace credentials** and **Inherit executor Git credentials**, including local/Worktree versus remote behavior and explicit profile-token precedence. An information icon provides the complete per-method delivery explanation as supplementary help. - GitHub App selection first explains when to use it and the sharing/isolation trade-off, then lists known registrations and actions to **Add existing App** or **Create new App**. - The import guide provides copyable callback, setup, and webhook URLs; required permissions/events; exact GitHub settings navigation; bounded secret inputs; validation; and an install handoff. - The manifest guide asks owner, visibility, display name, and public URL. Visibility help explicitly distinguishes installability from Marketplace publication and repository access. - Permission details use a button and dialog. Current actor, installation account, App label, source, visibility, webhook health, and sharing warning are scannable without exposing secrets. - `My GitHub identity` appears as a connectable section only for App automation. For PAT/CLI it shows that personal actions use the same verified human identity and offers no fake selector. - Desktop and mobile support the same create/import/select/install/switch/disconnect flows. Mobile uses a single-column sheet/page, one scroll owner, safe-area padding, 44px targets, no fixed footer, and no horizontal overflow. External GitHub navigation is deliberate and returns to the same workspace settings route. - The Changes panel branch disclosure includes the active session's launch-time Git credential snapshot. Desktop supports hover and keyboard focus; coarse-pointer/mobile users open the same information in a 44px-target drawer. Unknown inherited/profile actors are explicitly labeled runtime-selected. ## Scenarios - **GIVEN** two workspaces, **WHEN** each selects a different App registration and installation, **THEN** status, tokens, webhooks, repositories, actors, and revocation remain isolated. - **GIVEN** two workspaces intentionally reuse one registration, **WHEN** each installs it into a different account, **THEN** each workspace receives only its own installation and repository scope while the UI identifies the shared root App identity. - **GIVEN** a private managed App, **WHEN** creation completes, **THEN** the UI says it is installable only on its owner and does not imply Marketplace publication. - **GIVEN** a user chooses public, **WHEN** the manifest is submitted, **THEN** `public: true` is sent and the confirmation explains that installation approval still controls repository access. - **GIVEN** a correctly configured existing App, **WHEN** the import is verified, **THEN** it appears in the workspace chooser without becoming the active connection until installation succeeds. - **GIVEN** an imported App misses a required GitHub setting, **WHEN** validation or installation runs, **THEN** the guide identifies the exact setting without returning submitted secrets. - **GIVEN** App creation, import, or installation is canceled, **WHEN** the user returns, **THEN** the previous workspace automation connection remains active. - **GIVEN** an App workspace with personal OAuth, **WHEN** it switches registration or to PAT/CLI, **THEN** the incompatible personal connection is removed and its old tokens cannot be resolved. - **GIVEN** a webhook for registration A, **WHEN** it is sent to registration B's route or signature, **THEN** no delivery or workspace state is mutated. - **GIVEN** a PAT or named CLI workspace, **WHEN** an agent uses the managed credential helper, **THEN** it receives that workspace's automation token and the UI does not promise provider-side repository narrowing. - **GIVEN** a named CLI workspace in managed mode, **WHEN** a task launches, **THEN** Kandev resolves the selected host/login, makes both managed `git` and `gh` available in standalone and remote runtimes, and does not depend on the host's currently active CLI account. - **GIVEN** an authorized user opens a terminal, uses a passthrough-agent PTY, or starts a task-scoped command in a managed task, **WHEN** it accesses an attached GitHub repository, **THEN** it receives the same task-scoped broker helper and `gh` shim environment as the agent subprocess. - **GIVEN** an unauthorised user or a terminal for another task environment, **WHEN** it attempts to open a terminal or start a process, **THEN** it cannot receive the managed task Git environment. - **GIVEN** a workspace selects executor inheritance, **WHEN** a Local/Worktree or remote task launches, **THEN** Kandev injects no broker helper/shim and the task uses host-visible or executor-configured credentials respectively. - **GIVEN** the host `gh` clone protocol is SSH and a Kandev-managed GitHub checkout currently has an HTTPS `origin`, **WHEN** the workspace selects executor inheritance and launches a Local or Worktree task, **THEN** Kandev changes that managed checkout's `origin` to the canonical SSH URL before task preparation so matching Git conditional includes apply. - **GIVEN** a Kandev-managed GitHub checkout currently has an SSH `origin`, **WHEN** the workspace selects managed credentials and launches a Local or Worktree task, **THEN** Kandev changes that managed checkout's `origin` to canonical HTTPS before task preparation. - **GIVEN** a repository is registered from a user-managed local checkout, **WHEN** either task Git credential policy is selected, **THEN** Kandev leaves its configured `origin` unchanged. - **GIVEN** managed mode and an explicit executor-profile GitHub token, **WHEN** a task launches, **THEN** the profile token wins and the session disclosure labels its actor runtime-selected. - **GIVEN** a managed helper cannot execute or redeem its lease, **WHEN** Git requests GitHub HTTPS credentials, **THEN** the command fails without falling through to a personal helper or prompt. - **GIVEN** the host or executor exports indexed Git config for `core.hooksPath` and `notes.augment.mergeStrategy`, **WHEN** Kandev appends its managed GitHub helper configuration, **THEN** the agent receives one contiguous block containing the original entries first and the Kandev entries afterward, and a real Git commit still runs the configured hook. - **GIVEN** Docker or a remote control process already contains the same task Git config suffix, **WHEN** that suffix is forwarded again while creating or configuring an agent instance, **THEN** Kandev emits it once while retaining executor-added `safe.directory` and URL rewrites. - **GIVEN** a workspace policy or automation connection changes after launch, **WHEN** the user views the running session, **THEN** the Changes disclosure still shows its launch snapshot; a successful resume records and shows the newly resolved contract. - **GIVEN** an authenticated host GitHub CLI without structured status or named-token flags, **WHEN** an operator selects its sole account, **THEN** Kandev discovers and validates that account without requiring a CLI upgrade. - **GIVEN** a valid migrated `legacy_shared` connection and a legacy shared managed checkout, **WHEN** a task needs a workspace-isolated checkout, **THEN** Kandev resolves the same automation identity's Git credential and clones into that workspace's managed root without persisting or exposing the token. - **GIVEN** desktop and mobile viewports, **WHEN** users complete every App flow, **THEN** actions and disclosures remain usable without clipping, overlap, or desktop-only capability. - **GIVEN** desktop fine-pointer and mobile coarse-pointer task views, **WHEN** the branch disclosure is opened, **THEN** both show the same credential policy, method, actor truth, and transport without horizontal overflow. ## Success Criteria - No runtime, callback, webhook, cache, broker, or status path resolves a GitHub App without both workspace and registration identity where workspace ownership is required. - A seeded E2E run proves different Apps for work/personal workspaces and intentional App reuse. - Secret scans find no PAT, private key, client secret, webhook secret, personal token, refresh token, or live installation token in logs, API snapshots, redirects, process arguments, or executor environments. - Standalone, container, and remote task tests prove the managed helper is discoverable only for broker-enabled instances and their authorized task terminals/processes, while executor inheritance receives no Kandev GitHub helper/shim. - A real Git subprocess test proves that host/executor indexed hooks and notes config survive managed credential injection, and focused tests prove ordered composition and overlap handling across standalone, container, and remote launch shapes. ## Out Of Scope - Multiple automation connections or per-repository credential routing inside one workspace. - Automatically editing an imported App's GitHub settings or uninstalling an App on disconnect. - Automatic private-key/client-secret rotation; users replace an unbound stored registration or import the replacement App credentials through the guided flow. - GitHub Enterprise Server, enterprise-owned Apps, or hosts other than `github.com`. - Kandev multi-user login, workspace membership, or RBAC implementation. - Publishing Apps to GitHub Marketplace. - Discovering or verifying the actor behind inherited credential managers, SSH agents, or explicit profile tokens. - Preventing a host-authority agent from manually selecting another Git transport outside Kandev-injected managed HTTPS and `gh` commands. ## Implementation Plan See [the original authentication implementation plan](../../plans/github-authentication/plan.md) and the [task Git credential policy follow-up plan](../../plans/task-git-credential-policy/plan.md), plus the [executor clone transport repair plan](../../plans/github-executor-clone-transport/plan.md), and the [managed task terminal environment plan](../../plans/task-terminal-git-environment/plan.md). ## Decision See [ADR-2026-07-21-workspace-selectable-github-app-registrations](../../decisions/2026-07-21-workspace-selectable-github-app-registrations.md) and [ADR-2026-07-27-task-git-credential-policy](../../decisions/2026-07-27-task-git-credential-policy.md).