* fix(auth): scope integration config/watch routes to workspace owner
The third-party integration route group is guarded by its own
query-only middleware (integrationWorkspaceScopeMiddleware), which
authorizes only the workspace_id query param and falls through when it
is absent. Two shapes bypassed it entirely under enforced auth:
- POST /{jira,linear,slack}/config/copy takes the copy TARGET from the
request body (targetWorkspaceId), which no layer checked. A caller
could copy their own connection settings + credential into another
user's workspace by naming its ID, after which that workspace's
identity-less poller would run against attacker-controlled config
(Jira/Linear issue watchers auto-creating tasks from attacker issues;
Slack bot token/webhook). CopyConfigToWorkspace now authorizes BOTH
source and target up front, before the pre-write UpdateAuthHealth
side effect. Mirrors github/copy.go.
- GET /{jira,linear}/watches/issue with workspace_id omitted returned
ListAllIssueWatches across every workspace (JQL/filters, repo, agent
and executor profile IDs, spawn prompt). It now filters to the
caller's workspaces; an identity-less internal caller still sees all,
preserving poller use.
- The config Get/Set/Delete entry points resolved an unowned global
"default" workspace when workspace_id was omitted; they now
resolve+authorize via resolveWorkspaceID.
Each service gains SetWorkspaceAuthorizer(taskSvc.AuthorizeWorkspaceAccess),
wired in backendapp; nil (unit tests, auth disabled) stays unscoped.
Denials surface repoerrors.ErrWorkspaceNotFound, mapped to 404 by the
handlers (no existence leak). Recorded the query-only-middleware rule in
integrations/AGENTS.md, including that Sentry and GitLab's
ListAllIssueWatches still need the same filter.
Regression tests added per package and mutation-verified: dropping only
the copy up-front guard fails on the victim health-flip witness;
dropping both guards fails on the config/secret witness.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): scope integration watch-write and data-plane paths too
Review of the prior commit (Codex + Claude, converging) found the same
body/query workspace-bypass class in surfaces the first pass missed:
- CreateIssueWatch / UpdateIssueWatch (Jira, Linear) never authorized the
workspace. CreateIssueWatch takes WorkspaceID from the request body, so
a caller could plant a persistent watch in another user's workspace that
repeatedly spawns tasks with that user's credentials and an
attacker-supplied filter/prompt. Now authorize req.WorkspaceID (create)
and the loaded row's workspace (update). The by-ID mutation/trigger/reset
handlers were already guarded by assertWatchInWorkspace + the
query-authorizing middleware; the service-layer guard adds defense in
depth and covers non-HTTP callers.
- TestConnectionForWorkspace (Jira, Linear, Slack) resolved the default
workspace with no auth, so an omitted workspace_id + attacker-supplied
siteUrl could exfiltrate that workspace's stored token. Now authorizes
after normalize and returns a hard error (404), not a swallowed
{OK:false}.
- Data-plane reads funnel through clientFor, which now resolves+authorizes
the workspace — scoping search/projects/statuses in one chokepoint.
- filterIssueWatchesByAccess treated ANY authorizer error as a denial,
silently dropping watches on a transient failure and returning a
truncated 200. It now drops only on ErrWorkspaceNotFound and propagates
everything else.
Denials map to 404 via the shared writeClientError / writeIssueWatchError
sinks and the two list/test handlers. Renamed the test helper
denyExcept -> denyOnly (it denies exactly the named workspaces). Added
per-package regression tests for create/update/list denial, authorizer
error propagation, connection-test denial, and data-plane denial;
mutation-verified the CreateIssueWatch guard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: remove orphan executor tracing file and deprecated ResolveScript wrappers
- Delete internal/agentctl/tracing/executor.go (7 TraceExecutor* funcs)
- Delete internal/orchestrator/executor/script_template.go (deprecated wrapper)
- Delete scriptengine.ResolveScript convenience function
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: remove orphan setter methods across healthpoll, jira, linear, slack, updates
- Delete Poller.SetInterval from integrations/healthpoll (no callers)
- Delete Poller.SetIssueTickHook from jira and linear (no callers)
- Delete Trigger.SetInterval and Trigger.SetMatchHook from slack (no callers)
- Delete Service.SetPollInterval from system/updates (no callers)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: remove orphan wrapper functions and accessor method
- Delete updates.FetchLatestRelease shim (wraps FetchLatestReleaseFrom, no callers)
- Delete usage.NewClaudeUsageClient and NewCodexUsageClient shims (no callers)
- Delete database.Service.Path() accessor (no callers)
- Update ErrGitHubRateLimited godoc to reference FetchLatestReleaseFrom
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: remove unwired handleListExecutors MCP handler
The sibling profile handlers (list/create/update/delete) are registered
via RegisterFunc in handlers.go. handleListExecutors never was — dead flow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: remove stale hook-field comments after setter deletion
SetIssueTickHook (jira, linear) and SetMatchHook (slack) were removed
in the deadcode cleanup. Their struct fields still claimed "tests use
this" — no test or caller can set these fields now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: remove orphan hook fields and fire methods after setter deletion
issueTickHook (jira/linear) and matchHook (slack) are unexported and
never set after their public setters were removed; fireIssueTickHook /
fireHook were permanent no-ops.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(slack): add cookie-mode integration that triages messages via utility agent
Adds an install-wide Slack integration that polls the connected user's
own messages for `!kandev <instruction>`, hands the thread context to a
configured utility agent with the Kandev MCP server attached, and
creates the resulting task. Auth uses the user's xoxc- token + d cookie
so it works on locked-down Enterprise Slack tenants where bot installs
aren't possible.
Shared infra:
- ACP host-utility executor accepts McpServers on session/new
- New MCP tool list_repositories_kandev so the triage agent can pick the
right repo
- Template engine exposes Slack-specific variables for prompt injection
- secretadapter + healthpoll reused from jira/linear
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(slack): address PR review feedback round 9
- Drop dead `var _ = time.Second` no-op and its misleading comment in
trigger_test.go.
- `RecordAuthHealth` now invalidates the cached client when the probe
fails, so the poller self-recovers from credential rotation without
requiring a re-save.
- Stable secondary sort key (`workspace_id DESC`) on the legacy →
singleton migration so promoted-row selection is deterministic on
`updated_at` ties.
- Extract `categorySlack` constant in `engine.go` and update the
`VariableInfo.Category` doc-comment to list the full set of values.
- Realign `slack-integration/spec.md` with what shipped: cookie-mode +
`!kandev` triage as v1, with bot install / User OAuth / reaction &
slash & shortcut triggers moved under Future scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>