Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Carlos Florêncio 0b2085688b feat(office): autonomous agent management layer (#914) 2026-05-16 20:07:57 +01:00
João Salavisa 7e0b46c227 feat(slack): cookie-mode integration that triages threads via a utility agent (#775)
* feat(slack): add cookie-mode integration that triages messages via utility agent

Adds an install-wide Slack integration that polls the connected user's
own messages for `!kandev <instruction>`, hands the thread context to a
configured utility agent with the Kandev MCP server attached, and
creates the resulting task. Auth uses the user's xoxc- token + d cookie
so it works on locked-down Enterprise Slack tenants where bot installs
aren't possible.

Shared infra:
- ACP host-utility executor accepts McpServers on session/new
- New MCP tool list_repositories_kandev so the triage agent can pick the
  right repo
- Template engine exposes Slack-specific variables for prompt injection
- secretadapter + healthpoll reused from jira/linear

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(slack): address PR review feedback round 9

- Drop dead `var _ = time.Second` no-op and its misleading comment in
  trigger_test.go.
- `RecordAuthHealth` now invalidates the cached client when the probe
  fails, so the poller self-recovers from credential rotation without
  requiring a re-save.
- Stable secondary sort key (`workspace_id DESC`) on the legacy →
  singleton migration so promoted-row selection is deterministic on
  `updated_at` ties.
- Extract `categorySlack` constant in `engine.go` and update the
  `VariableInfo.Category` doc-comment to list the full set of values.
- Realign `slack-integration/spec.md` with what shipped: cookie-mode +
  `!kandev` triage as v1, with bot install / User OAuth / reaction &
  slash & shortcut triggers moved under Future scope.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-05 09:03:42 +01:00
Carlos Florêncio 7ce2e24150 feat(backend): add 10 ACP agents, set_config_option, auth_required flow (#807) 2026-05-04 07:46:56 +01:00
João Salavisa dccff23cc0 feat(backend): per-launch authentication for agentctl (#666)
* feat(backend): per-launch authentication for agentctl

Add nonce-based handshake protocol to secure all agentctl HTTP/WS
endpoints. On launch, the parent (backend) passes a one-time bootstrap
nonce via AGENTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_NONCE env var. agentctl generates its own
auth token, enables Bearer auth immediately, and returns the token to
the parent via POST /auth/handshake (validated by nonce).

Standalone, Docker, and Sprites executors all use the same handshake
flow. Removes the old AGENTCTL_AUTH_TOKEN env var approach. For
Docker/Sprites, the retrieved token is persisted encrypted in
SecretStore (AES-256-GCM) for crash recovery.

Security properties:
- Auth enabled from boot (no unprotected window)
- Token never in env vars (only the burned nonce)
- Nonce is one-shot (replay impossible)
- Constant-time token comparison (timing-safe)

* fix: check fmt.Sscanf return value in integration test

* fix: address review feedback - constant-time nonce comparison, safe ID truncation

* fix(backend): exempt MCP routes from agentctl auth middleware

The agent subprocess connects to agentctl's MCP endpoints (/sse, /message,
/mcp) to use kandev tools (create_task, ask_user_question, etc.). These
endpoints run on the same HTTP server as the authenticated API, but the
agent process doesn't possess the auth token — it was only exchanged
between the backend and agentctl during the handshake.

Exempt /sse, /message, and /mcp from the Bearer auth middleware since the
agent process runs in the same trust boundary as agentctl.

* refactor(backend): remove query param token fallback and document SetAuthToken constraint

Remove the ?token= query parameter fallback from extractBearerToken —
tokens in URLs leak via access logs, referer headers, and browser history.
All WS callers already use Authorization headers via wsAuthHeaders().

Document SetAuthToken's concurrency constraint: it must not be called
concurrently with HTTP requests on the same client.

* fix(backend): enforce mutex in ControlClient/Launcher auth, fix Start() lock scope

- Add sync.Mutex to ControlClient; protect SetAuthToken and AuthToken() reads
- Guard Launcher.AuthToken() with l.mu (written under lock in Start, read unprotected)
- Extract buildAndStartProcess and performHandshake from Start() (was 106 lines, over 80-line limit)
- Release l.mu before blocking health/handshake calls so monitorExit() can close
  l.exited — previously the fast-fail path in waitForHealthy was unreachable
- Update stale executor_backend.go comment (standalone no longer uses env var auth)

Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-21 14:00:49 +01:00
Carlos Florêncio 204fac1cca feat: acp-first profiles, models, and modes (#566) 2026-04-15 13:22:32 +01:00