* feat(plugins): add auth capability for plugin-provided OIDC/SAML login
Plugins can now authenticate a visitor against an external IdP (OIDC/SAML)
and contribute a login button to the pre-auth screen:
- new `auth` manifest capability + a capability-gated X-Kandev-Auth-Login
webhook-response directive; the host mints the kandev_session (ADR 0050),
the plugin never receives the raw token. Plugin-set Set-Cookie is dropped.
- auth.Service.AuthenticateExternal: existing-identity / link-by-email / JIT
member provisioning; refuses to auto-link to an admin; verified-email is
the plugin's contract.
- auth_providers manifest block + plugins.SSOProviders() populate the
anonymous boot payload (auth.ssoProviders); the login page renders a
"Continue with <provider>" button per provider.
- ADR 0050 + plugin-manifest / plugin-authoring / auth spec docs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: exclude publish_review_findings_kandev from public-docs coverage
The native code-review agent (#1957) added the publish_review_findings_kandev
MCP tool but did not update docs/public/coverage.json; that PR did not touch
docs/public so the path-filtered validator never ran. It's an internal review
reporting tool, not a user-facing feature, so record it as an exclusion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(plugins,auth): address review on SSO directive and JIT provisioning
- takeAuthLoginDirective strips every case variant of X-Kandev-Auth-Login and
rejects (403) when a plugin sends more than one, so no variant leaks to the
browser and login never uses a nondeterministically-picked assertion.
- provisionExternalUser rolls back the just-created user when the identity
insert fails (transient error or a lost UNIQUE(provider,subject) race) and
resolves to the winning identity, so no account is left without a login and
no email is reserved by an unusable row. Adds userstore.DeleteUser.
- auth spec: mark the login-page SSO buttons + provider discovery as landed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: drop redundant coverage exclusion; main now covers publish_review_findings_kandev
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): add auth core — identities, sessions, PATs, invites, mode state machine
Phase 1 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- internal/auth: argon2id password hashing (PHC), opaque session/PAT tokens
(SHA-256 at rest), login rate limiter, auth-mode state machine
(disabled/setup/enabled), setup-wizard promotion of the pre-auth
default-user row into the admin account, invites, admin user management
with last-admin guard.
- internal/auth/store: auth_identities (OIDC-ready), auth_sessions,
auth_api_tokens, auth_invites tables (SQLite+Postgres dialects).
- internal/auth/authn: request-identity plumbing (gin + plain contexts),
RequireAdmin middleware.
- users table: display_name/role/status columns via new MigrateLogger
wiring; AccountRepository surface (consumer-scoped, keeps existing
Repository fakes untouched).
- config: AuthConfig.Required/SessionTTLHours/CookieName
(KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED), FeaturesConfig.Auth; profiles.yaml + runtime
flag registry entry for KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): enforce opt-in auth over HTTP — middleware, auth API, boot payload
Phase 2 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- internal/auth/httpmw: global gin middleware after CORS. Disabled mode
injects the synthetic single-user admin identity (behavior unchanged);
enabled mode resolves session cookie then PAT bearer, with an explicit
allowlist (health, SPA bootstrap reads, credential endpoints,
self-authenticating webhooks), deferral for WS/proxy upgrades and
office agent JWTs, and SPA shell availability for the login page.
- internal/auth/httpapi: full auth surface — setup wizard, login/logout,
me, password change, sessions, PATs, invites (mint/preview/accept),
auth settings (enable/disable), admin user management.
- Boot payload: initialState.auth block always present; unauthenticated
visitors on auth-enabled instances get features+auth only (no data).
- External MCP: PAT required once auth is enabled (open while disabled).
- Admin guards on destructive system routes and runtime-flag overrides.
- Startup warning when bound non-loopback with auth disabled
(ServerConfig.NonLoopbackBinds fail-closed nudge).
- Wiring: auth store in Repositories, auth service in Services,
ClaimUnownedWorkspaces backfill on the task repository.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): per-user workspace scoping across HTTP services
Phase 3 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- Task service: workspaces, workflows, repositories, and tasks are scoped
to the request identity (owner-only visibility; pre-auth unowned rows
stay shared). Denials use *NotFound sentinels - no existence leak.
Internal callers and the disabled-mode synthetic identity remain
unscoped, preserving behavior exactly when auth is off.
- CreateWorkspace stamps the authenticated caller as owner.
- Session chokepoint: lifecycle Manager.GetOrEnsureExecution runs a
settable session-access check covering shell/files/ports/vscode/LSP.
- Secrets: per-user user_id column, scoped CRUD/list, ClaimUnowned wired
into the setup-wizard backfills.
- Boot payload inherits scoping automatically.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): scope WebSocket gateway to authenticated users
Phase 4 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- Connection auth: /ws, /terminal, /lsp, /vscode, /port-proxy routes are
guarded when auth is enabled - session cookie (same-origin upgrade),
resolved identity from the HTTP middleware, or ?token=<PAT> for
headerless programmatic clients; JSON 401 before any upgrade.
- Client identity: every WS client carries its authn.Identity; dispatched
RPC actions (workspace.list, task CRUD, ...) run under a context
carrying it, so WS RPC gets the same per-user scoping as HTTP.
- Subscription checks: task/session subscribe+focus verify workspace
visibility via the task service; user topic subscriptions are pinned to
the client's own user.
- Broadcast routing: new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspace routes workspace-scoped
events (task/workflow/repo/office/session-state) to the owner's clients
only, with safe fallbacks (unowned/unresolvable -> broadcast) so events
never vanish; instance-wide events (executors, environments, agent
profiles, system jobs) stay global by design.
- Replaced the long-standing discarded-token TODO in HandleConnection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(auth): add feature spec and backend architecture notes for opt-in auth
- docs/specs/auth/spec.md: product behavior (opt-in, setup wizard,
per-user workspaces, sessions/PATs, invites, public surface, v1 limits)
- apps/backend/AGENTS.md: internal/auth package layout + scoping rules
for new service entry points and WS broadcast call sites
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(auth): public documentation for opt-in authentication
- New docs/public/authentication.md: enabling, users & invites, PATs,
public endpoints, limitations, disabling
- run-as-a-service.md: network-security note now points at the real
authentication boundary instead of reverse-proxy-only guidance
- meta.json: nav entry under Configure Kandev
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(auth): ADR for opt-in authentication architecture
Records the load-bearing choices: mode state machine + synthetic identity
in disabled mode, opaque DB-backed credentials over JWTs, default-user
promotion at setup, service-layer scoping with no-admin-bypass, and the
explicit public allowlist.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(web): auth UI — login, setup wizard, invites, users & account settings
Adds the frontend half of opt-in authentication: a pre-auth gate in
main.tsx that renders the setup wizard or login/invite pages instead of
the app shell whenever the boot payload's auth block says so, a new
`auth` store slice + feature flag mirroring the backend's StatePayload,
credentialed fetch (`credentials: "include"`) with a 401 handler that
clears the session and redirects to /login, and a full auth-api.ts
client for the /api/v1/auth and /api/v1/users routes.
Settings additions: a System > Users page (list/create/disable/promote
users, invite-link dialog) and System > Authentication page (enable/
disable with confirm + env-locked banner), gated on the `auth` feature
flag and admin role. A new Account sidebar group (Profile & Password,
API Tokens) is shown to signed-in users once auth is enabled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(auth): E2E lifecycle suite + fix workspace event WS leak it caught
New dedicated Playwright auth project (backend restarts with
KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED=true, isolated from the tokenless default suite):
setup-mode boot gating, admin setup wizard, login/logout + bad
credentials, PATs, admin-surface authorization, anonymous WS rejection,
UI login flow, and the acceptance test - two-user segregation across
HTTP, boot payload, and WebSocket.
The segregation spec immediately caught a real leak: workspace.* event
payloads carry their ID as 'id' (the payload IS the workspace DTO), not
'workspace_id', so BroadcastToWorkspace fell back to broadcast-to-all
for workspace create/update/delete. Fixed with action-aware extraction
plus a unit regression test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): close cross-user access gaps found in security audit
Two independent security audits of the auth branch found several
authorization gaps where session/workspace-scoped surfaces were not wired
to the new per-user chokepoint. All fixed:
- IDOR on reverse-proxy/terminal routes (vscode, port-proxy, terminal):
these resolve executions via GetExecutionBySessionID /
GetOrEnsureExecutionForEnvironment / EnsurePassthroughExecution, which
skipped the session-access check that only GetOrEnsureExecution ran. Added
the check inside the env/passthrough resolvers (before the cache
short-circuit) and an explicit CheckSessionAccess gate in the two bare-lookup
proxy handlers. An authenticated non-owner can no longer reach another
user's IDE, forwarded ports, or shell.
- Cross-user agent-conversation read: ListMessages / ListMessagesPaginated /
SearchMessages now authorize the session.
- Cross-user repository-script read/inject: script CRUD now authorizes the
parent repository's workspace.
- Office HTTP surface: a group middleware enforces workspace ownership on
:wsId routes for real users (agent-JWT callers keep their claim scoping).
- Login rate-limit bypass: SetTrustedProxies(nil) so a spoofed
X-Forwarded-For can't rotate the limiter key on a directly-reachable
backend.
- Invite double-provisioning race: MarkInviteUsed is now the atomic
serialization point (consumed before user creation).
- Setup wizard: serialized with a mutex so concurrent first-visitors can't
corrupt the promoted admin profile.
- Log sanitizer: explicit kandev_pat_ redaction rule.
Regression tests added for message/script scoping and the
execution-access-before-cache invariant. Auth E2E (incl. two-user
segregation) still green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): scope repository active-session-count endpoint
GET /api/v1/repositories/:id/active-session-count went through
CountActiveSessionsByRepository, which was not identity-scoped - a
cross-user info leak of another owner's active session counts. Added the
same authorizeRepositoryID gate the script routes use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): add json tags to auth store models — omit digests, fix token UI
The auth store structs (APIToken, Invite, LoginIdentity, Session) had db:
tags but no json: tags, so the handlers that serialize them directly sent
Go-cased keys (CreatedAt, Name) AND leaked the SHA-256/password digests to
clients. Two consequences:
- The API-tokens UI showed 'Invalid Date' and an empty name (frontend reads
created_at/name).
- token_sha256 / password_hash were serialized in list responses.
Added json tags with snake_case keys the frontend reads and json:"-" on
every credential digest. Regression test asserts digests never serialize and
the snake_case timestamp/name keys are present. Also adds the
auth-screenshots capture spec (artifacts gitignored).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(web): move auth enable into feature toggles; show current user in sidebar
Remove the standalone Authentication settings page and its dedicated
settings/get-auth-settings API surface now that enabling auth lives in the
Feature Toggles system, and drop env_required now that /auth/me no longer
returns it. Add a current-user chip with a logout action to the sidebar
footer, shown only in enabled auth mode.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(auth): make features.auth the single on/off control
Per review feedback: authentication configuration now lives entirely in
the existing Feature Toggles system rather than a separate Authentication
settings section.
- The auth mode is derived from the features.auth runtime flag
(KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH): off -> disabled, on+no-admin -> setup,
on+admin -> enabled. Removed the parallel auth.mode system setting,
the SetEnabled service method, GET/PATCH /api/v1/auth/settings, the
AuthConfig.Required field, KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED, and the auth service's
Settings-store dependency and EnvRequired/env_required.
- The features.auth registry entry is re-described as the actual enable
switch (high-risk, restart-required) and defaults off in every profile
(dev was previously true — that only revealed UI before; now it would
enforce, so it must be an explicit opt-in).
- Setup no longer persists a mode; completing the wizard creates the admin
and the mode auto-derives to enabled.
- Startup 'exposed without auth' warning + all docs (public guide,
run-as-a-service, spec, ADR, AGENTS.md) point at the feature toggle.
- E2E: auth specs use KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH; screenshot spec captures the
Feature Toggles page instead of the removed Authentication page; the
member-restriction assertion targets an admin invite route.
- Tests updated across service/httpmw/httpapi/profiles for the derived
mode; full suite green (only pre-existing sandbox-FS failures remain).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): complete cross-user isolation — integrations, automation, plan/walkthrough, session reads
A follow-up isolation audit found that per-user scoping had been wired into
the task service, secrets, office, and the WS gateway — but several
workspace/task/session-scoped surfaces still resolved a caller-supplied ID
with no ownership gate. Closed all of them; cross-user access now returns
404 across the board.
- Integrations (jira/linear/sentry/slack/azure-devops/gitlab/github/
workflow-sync): a global middleware authorizes the workspace_id (query, or
gitlab's /workspaces/:id/ path) on those route groups. Previously a member
who knew another user's workspace ID could read/overwrite their integration
connection config and watches.
- Automation: workspace-authorizer seam gates get/list/create/update/delete/
enable/disable, triggers, run history, and — critically — the webhook
secret. Was fully cross-tenant over WS before.
- Task plans (PlanService) and walkthroughs (WalkthroughService): task-
authorizer seam on every read/write. These bypassed the task service.
- Session reads that hit the repo directly — session turns, task context,
git snapshots, file reviews — now call AuthorizeSession/TaskAccess.
Internal callers (pollers, schedulers, MCP) carry no identity and stay
unscoped; disabled mode is unaffected. Regression tests added
(plan/walkthrough scoping, automation authorizer matrix, integration path
extraction) and the two-user E2E now asserts integration routes are shielded.
Docs (spec, ADR, public guide) updated to state what is isolated and that
filesystem/agent-credential isolation remains an OS-level limitation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(web): current-user chip uses border hover, not accent fill
The sidebar current-user chip used hover:bg-accent (a purpleish fill).
Switch to the border-hover idiom used elsewhere (border border-transparent
-> hover:border-border) with the neutral hover:bg-muted/50 the adjacent
workspace picker uses, so the hover reads as a subtle outline instead of a
colored background. Screenshot spec now captures the chip hover state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(web): right-align current-user chip in the sidebar footer
Push the user chip to the far right of the expanded footer (ml-auto) so it
sits opposite the left-aligned icon buttons; collapsed mode keeps the
centered vertical stack unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): reject synthetic identity on management routes and scope office run broadcasts
Address code-review findings on the opt-in authentication PR:
- P1: while auth is disabled the middleware injects a synthetic admin
(RoleAdmin), and RequireAdmin alone let it through — so anyone hitting a
not-yet-enabled instance could mint a PAT or plant an admin that survives
enablement and hijacks first-run setup. Add authn.RequireRealIdentity and
guard the credential/session/user-management routes with it (public
bootstrap routes stay reachable). Responds 404 while disabled.
- P1: office run events carry task_id but no workspace_id, so they fell back
to a global broadcast and leaked across users. Resolve the workspace from
the task and route via the new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspaceOrDrop, which fails
closed (drops rather than global-broadcasts) when the workspace is unknown
and auth is enforced.
- nit: type createAuthSlice as a single-arg creator and call it with just set.
Also register the authentication docs page and its settings routes in
docs/public/coverage.json so the public-docs validator passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(web): add app status bar
* feat(web): add app status bar visibility toggle
* feat(web): persist status bar item order
* fix(web): refine app status bar behavior
* fix(web): polish app status bar presentation
* test(web): split plugin slot coverage groups
* fix(web): address status surface review feedback
* fix(web): stabilize status bar overlay tests
* feat(plugins): add capability-gated Host reader for conversation content
Plugins can now read historical user/agent message content over the Host
data API, gated by a new `api_read:messages` capability (ADR 0047). This
unblocks "summarize yesterday"-style plugins that the live `message.added`
bus event alone cannot serve.
- proto: `ListMessages` RPC + `Message`/`MessageFilter` on `service Host`.
- SDK: `Host.Messages() MessageReader`, Go-native `Message`/`MessageFilter`.
- host: `api_read:messages` accessor + denied reader; content sanitized via
`sysprompt.StripSystemContent` (no raw system prompts); RFC3339 `since`/
`until` → `InvalidArgument` on bad input.
- data: new `ListMessagesForPlugin` filtered query (session/task ids, type,
created_at range) through the task service, never the DB file.
- tests: in-process + wire capability gating, content stripping, filter/time
passthrough, pagination, and the SQLite query.
- docs: ADR 0047, spec, plugins-manifest, plugins-authoring.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(plugins): add Host.InvokeUtilityAgent for settings-selectable utility agent
Plugins can now delegate a one-shot LLM step to an operator-configured agent,
gated by a new `agent_invoke` capability (ADR 0048), so a plugin needs no
provider API key of its own.
- setting: new `utility_agent_profile_id` user setting (Settings > System >
Utility Agent), a profile dropdown cloned from the existing utility-agent
path; selectable in the UI.
- capability: boolean `agent_invoke`, enforced like `state`/`secrets`.
- proto/SDK: `InvokeUtilityAgent(prompt) -> text` RPC and
`Host.InvokeUtilityAgent(ctx, prompt)`.
- backend: reuses the sessionless host-utility inference tier (ADR 0002) via a
thin adapter — no agent loop, no task/session/workspace; resolves the
configured profile to (agent type, model). Unconfigured / deleted profile ->
gRPC FailedPrecondition.
- tests: capability gating, completion path (asserts the configured profile is
used and text returned), no-utility-agent and stale-profile error paths,
SDK/wire round-trips, and the settings apply/trim behavior.
- docs: ADR 0048, spec, plugins-manifest, plugins-authoring.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(plugins): resolve utility-agent deps live and bound message filter size
Address CI + review feedback on the host plugin capabilities:
- docs: register the new /settings/system/utility-agent route in
docs/public/coverage.json (fixes the "Validate public docs" CI failure).
- utility agent (ADR 0048): hostUtilityMgr is wired late in boot — after
StartActivePlugins has already spawned boot-active plugins — so snapshotting
the utility deps in hostForPlugin stranded those hosts with nil deps and made
InvokeUtilityAgent return Unimplemented for their lifetime. Read the deps live
from the Service (mutex-guarded) at call time instead; add a regression test
for late wiring reaching an already-spawned host.
- messages (ADR 0047): cap the combined session/task/type filter values at 400
so an oversized filter fails fast with InvalidArgument instead of hitting
SQLite's host-parameter limit at query execution; add a test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Carlos Florêncio