* feat(backend): key user shells by TaskEnvironmentID
Sessions in the same task share a TaskEnvironment. Re-key the user shell
runner so terminals are scoped per env, not per session — switching between
sessions of the same task now sees the same shell list.
- Add TaskEnvironmentID to AgentExecution / LaunchRequest / ExecutorCreateRequest
/ executor.LaunchAgentRequest, propagated through ToAgentExecution and the
orchestrator launch path.
- Add Manager.ResolveScopeKey(sessionID) — returns env when execution carries
it, falls back to sessionID for legacy paths.
- Rename runner param sessionID -> scopeID in interactive_shells.go; map keys
are now scopeID:terminalID.
- Shell handlers + WS terminal handler resolve sid -> scopeID via
ResolveScopeKey before calling the runner.
* feat(web): key dockview layout + portals to TaskEnvironmentID
Switching between sessions of the same task no longer rebuilds the dockview
layout — terminals and panels persist because layouts are env-scoped, not
session-scoped. The bottom terminal also reuses a stable sessionId across
same-env switches so it doesn't reconnect to a different shell.
- Rename layout persistence: setSessionLayout/getSessionLayout/*SessionMaximizeState
-> setEnvLayout/getEnvLayout/*EnvMaximizeState (kandev.dockview.env-layout. prefix).
- Rename dockview-session-switch.ts -> dockview-env-switch.ts; performSessionSwitch
-> performEnvSwitch with oldEnvId/newEnvId/activeSessionId.
- dockview-store.ts: currentLayoutSessionId -> currentLayoutEnvId; switchSessionLayout
-> switchEnvLayout(oldEnvId, newEnvId, activeSessionId). Same-env switches no-op.
Drop _skipLayoutSwitchForSession + consumeSkipFlag — env-keyed action handles it
structurally.
- panel-portal-manager: PortalEntry.envId; releaseBySession -> releaseByEnv.
ENV_SCOPED_COMPONENTS in dockview-desktop-layout (renamed from SESSION_SCOPED).
- useEnvSwitchCleanup replaces useSessionSwitchCleanup; tracks env changes only.
- All performLayoutSwitch callers (sidebar, dropdown, header, dialog) resolve
sid -> envId via environmentIdBySessionId before switching.
- bottom-terminal-panel: drop sessionId prop, use useEnvironmentSessionId().
- cleanupTaskStorage now takes envIds[] alongside sessionIds[] for env-scoped
layout/maximize cleanup.
* test: add coverage for env-keyed terminals + layout
Playwright e2e (terminal-env-keyed.spec.ts) — switching between sessions of
the same task keeps terminal scrollback intact and asserts both sessions
share one task_environment_id. Update the comment in
sessionless-task-switch.spec.ts to reference performEnvSwitch.
* fix: address env layout PR feedback
* test: fix flaky handshake auth check
* fix: address env scope review findings
* feat(backend): per-launch authentication for agentctl
Add nonce-based handshake protocol to secure all agentctl HTTP/WS
endpoints. On launch, the parent (backend) passes a one-time bootstrap
nonce via AGENTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_NONCE env var. agentctl generates its own
auth token, enables Bearer auth immediately, and returns the token to
the parent via POST /auth/handshake (validated by nonce).
Standalone, Docker, and Sprites executors all use the same handshake
flow. Removes the old AGENTCTL_AUTH_TOKEN env var approach. For
Docker/Sprites, the retrieved token is persisted encrypted in
SecretStore (AES-256-GCM) for crash recovery.
Security properties:
- Auth enabled from boot (no unprotected window)
- Token never in env vars (only the burned nonce)
- Nonce is one-shot (replay impossible)
- Constant-time token comparison (timing-safe)
* fix: check fmt.Sscanf return value in integration test
* fix: address review feedback - constant-time nonce comparison, safe ID truncation
* fix(backend): exempt MCP routes from agentctl auth middleware
The agent subprocess connects to agentctl's MCP endpoints (/sse, /message,
/mcp) to use kandev tools (create_task, ask_user_question, etc.). These
endpoints run on the same HTTP server as the authenticated API, but the
agent process doesn't possess the auth token — it was only exchanged
between the backend and agentctl during the handshake.
Exempt /sse, /message, and /mcp from the Bearer auth middleware since the
agent process runs in the same trust boundary as agentctl.
* refactor(backend): remove query param token fallback and document SetAuthToken constraint
Remove the ?token= query parameter fallback from extractBearerToken —
tokens in URLs leak via access logs, referer headers, and browser history.
All WS callers already use Authorization headers via wsAuthHeaders().
Document SetAuthToken's concurrency constraint: it must not be called
concurrently with HTTP requests on the same client.
* fix(backend): enforce mutex in ControlClient/Launcher auth, fix Start() lock scope
- Add sync.Mutex to ControlClient; protect SetAuthToken and AuthToken() reads
- Guard Launcher.AuthToken() with l.mu (written under lock in Start, read unprotected)
- Extract buildAndStartProcess and performHandshake from Start() (was 106 lines, over 80-line limit)
- Release l.mu before blocking health/handshake calls so monitorExit() can close
l.exited — previously the fast-fail path in waitForHealthy was unreachable
- Update stale executor_backend.go comment (standalone no longer uses env var auth)
Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com>
Carlos Florêncio