* feat(auth): add auth core — identities, sessions, PATs, invites, mode state machine
Phase 1 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- internal/auth: argon2id password hashing (PHC), opaque session/PAT tokens
(SHA-256 at rest), login rate limiter, auth-mode state machine
(disabled/setup/enabled), setup-wizard promotion of the pre-auth
default-user row into the admin account, invites, admin user management
with last-admin guard.
- internal/auth/store: auth_identities (OIDC-ready), auth_sessions,
auth_api_tokens, auth_invites tables (SQLite+Postgres dialects).
- internal/auth/authn: request-identity plumbing (gin + plain contexts),
RequireAdmin middleware.
- users table: display_name/role/status columns via new MigrateLogger
wiring; AccountRepository surface (consumer-scoped, keeps existing
Repository fakes untouched).
- config: AuthConfig.Required/SessionTTLHours/CookieName
(KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED), FeaturesConfig.Auth; profiles.yaml + runtime
flag registry entry for KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): enforce opt-in auth over HTTP — middleware, auth API, boot payload
Phase 2 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- internal/auth/httpmw: global gin middleware after CORS. Disabled mode
injects the synthetic single-user admin identity (behavior unchanged);
enabled mode resolves session cookie then PAT bearer, with an explicit
allowlist (health, SPA bootstrap reads, credential endpoints,
self-authenticating webhooks), deferral for WS/proxy upgrades and
office agent JWTs, and SPA shell availability for the login page.
- internal/auth/httpapi: full auth surface — setup wizard, login/logout,
me, password change, sessions, PATs, invites (mint/preview/accept),
auth settings (enable/disable), admin user management.
- Boot payload: initialState.auth block always present; unauthenticated
visitors on auth-enabled instances get features+auth only (no data).
- External MCP: PAT required once auth is enabled (open while disabled).
- Admin guards on destructive system routes and runtime-flag overrides.
- Startup warning when bound non-loopback with auth disabled
(ServerConfig.NonLoopbackBinds fail-closed nudge).
- Wiring: auth store in Repositories, auth service in Services,
ClaimUnownedWorkspaces backfill on the task repository.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): per-user workspace scoping across HTTP services
Phase 3 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- Task service: workspaces, workflows, repositories, and tasks are scoped
to the request identity (owner-only visibility; pre-auth unowned rows
stay shared). Denials use *NotFound sentinels - no existence leak.
Internal callers and the disabled-mode synthetic identity remain
unscoped, preserving behavior exactly when auth is off.
- CreateWorkspace stamps the authenticated caller as owner.
- Session chokepoint: lifecycle Manager.GetOrEnsureExecution runs a
settable session-access check covering shell/files/ports/vscode/LSP.
- Secrets: per-user user_id column, scoped CRUD/list, ClaimUnowned wired
into the setup-wizard backfills.
- Boot payload inherits scoping automatically.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): scope WebSocket gateway to authenticated users
Phase 4 of opt-in authentication + multi-user segregation:
- Connection auth: /ws, /terminal, /lsp, /vscode, /port-proxy routes are
guarded when auth is enabled - session cookie (same-origin upgrade),
resolved identity from the HTTP middleware, or ?token=<PAT> for
headerless programmatic clients; JSON 401 before any upgrade.
- Client identity: every WS client carries its authn.Identity; dispatched
RPC actions (workspace.list, task CRUD, ...) run under a context
carrying it, so WS RPC gets the same per-user scoping as HTTP.
- Subscription checks: task/session subscribe+focus verify workspace
visibility via the task service; user topic subscriptions are pinned to
the client's own user.
- Broadcast routing: new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspace routes workspace-scoped
events (task/workflow/repo/office/session-state) to the owner's clients
only, with safe fallbacks (unowned/unresolvable -> broadcast) so events
never vanish; instance-wide events (executors, environments, agent
profiles, system jobs) stay global by design.
- Replaced the long-standing discarded-token TODO in HandleConnection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(auth): add feature spec and backend architecture notes for opt-in auth
- docs/specs/auth/spec.md: product behavior (opt-in, setup wizard,
per-user workspaces, sessions/PATs, invites, public surface, v1 limits)
- apps/backend/AGENTS.md: internal/auth package layout + scoping rules
for new service entry points and WS broadcast call sites
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(auth): public documentation for opt-in authentication
- New docs/public/authentication.md: enabling, users & invites, PATs,
public endpoints, limitations, disabling
- run-as-a-service.md: network-security note now points at the real
authentication boundary instead of reverse-proxy-only guidance
- meta.json: nav entry under Configure Kandev
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(auth): ADR for opt-in authentication architecture
Records the load-bearing choices: mode state machine + synthetic identity
in disabled mode, opaque DB-backed credentials over JWTs, default-user
promotion at setup, service-layer scoping with no-admin-bypass, and the
explicit public allowlist.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(web): auth UI — login, setup wizard, invites, users & account settings
Adds the frontend half of opt-in authentication: a pre-auth gate in
main.tsx that renders the setup wizard or login/invite pages instead of
the app shell whenever the boot payload's auth block says so, a new
`auth` store slice + feature flag mirroring the backend's StatePayload,
credentialed fetch (`credentials: "include"`) with a 401 handler that
clears the session and redirects to /login, and a full auth-api.ts
client for the /api/v1/auth and /api/v1/users routes.
Settings additions: a System > Users page (list/create/disable/promote
users, invite-link dialog) and System > Authentication page (enable/
disable with confirm + env-locked banner), gated on the `auth` feature
flag and admin role. A new Account sidebar group (Profile & Password,
API Tokens) is shown to signed-in users once auth is enabled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(auth): E2E lifecycle suite + fix workspace event WS leak it caught
New dedicated Playwright auth project (backend restarts with
KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED=true, isolated from the tokenless default suite):
setup-mode boot gating, admin setup wizard, login/logout + bad
credentials, PATs, admin-surface authorization, anonymous WS rejection,
UI login flow, and the acceptance test - two-user segregation across
HTTP, boot payload, and WebSocket.
The segregation spec immediately caught a real leak: workspace.* event
payloads carry their ID as 'id' (the payload IS the workspace DTO), not
'workspace_id', so BroadcastToWorkspace fell back to broadcast-to-all
for workspace create/update/delete. Fixed with action-aware extraction
plus a unit regression test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): close cross-user access gaps found in security audit
Two independent security audits of the auth branch found several
authorization gaps where session/workspace-scoped surfaces were not wired
to the new per-user chokepoint. All fixed:
- IDOR on reverse-proxy/terminal routes (vscode, port-proxy, terminal):
these resolve executions via GetExecutionBySessionID /
GetOrEnsureExecutionForEnvironment / EnsurePassthroughExecution, which
skipped the session-access check that only GetOrEnsureExecution ran. Added
the check inside the env/passthrough resolvers (before the cache
short-circuit) and an explicit CheckSessionAccess gate in the two bare-lookup
proxy handlers. An authenticated non-owner can no longer reach another
user's IDE, forwarded ports, or shell.
- Cross-user agent-conversation read: ListMessages / ListMessagesPaginated /
SearchMessages now authorize the session.
- Cross-user repository-script read/inject: script CRUD now authorizes the
parent repository's workspace.
- Office HTTP surface: a group middleware enforces workspace ownership on
:wsId routes for real users (agent-JWT callers keep their claim scoping).
- Login rate-limit bypass: SetTrustedProxies(nil) so a spoofed
X-Forwarded-For can't rotate the limiter key on a directly-reachable
backend.
- Invite double-provisioning race: MarkInviteUsed is now the atomic
serialization point (consumed before user creation).
- Setup wizard: serialized with a mutex so concurrent first-visitors can't
corrupt the promoted admin profile.
- Log sanitizer: explicit kandev_pat_ redaction rule.
Regression tests added for message/script scoping and the
execution-access-before-cache invariant. Auth E2E (incl. two-user
segregation) still green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): scope repository active-session-count endpoint
GET /api/v1/repositories/:id/active-session-count went through
CountActiveSessionsByRepository, which was not identity-scoped - a
cross-user info leak of another owner's active session counts. Added the
same authorizeRepositoryID gate the script routes use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): add json tags to auth store models — omit digests, fix token UI
The auth store structs (APIToken, Invite, LoginIdentity, Session) had db:
tags but no json: tags, so the handlers that serialize them directly sent
Go-cased keys (CreatedAt, Name) AND leaked the SHA-256/password digests to
clients. Two consequences:
- The API-tokens UI showed 'Invalid Date' and an empty name (frontend reads
created_at/name).
- token_sha256 / password_hash were serialized in list responses.
Added json tags with snake_case keys the frontend reads and json:"-" on
every credential digest. Regression test asserts digests never serialize and
the snake_case timestamp/name keys are present. Also adds the
auth-screenshots capture spec (artifacts gitignored).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(web): move auth enable into feature toggles; show current user in sidebar
Remove the standalone Authentication settings page and its dedicated
settings/get-auth-settings API surface now that enabling auth lives in the
Feature Toggles system, and drop env_required now that /auth/me no longer
returns it. Add a current-user chip with a logout action to the sidebar
footer, shown only in enabled auth mode.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(auth): make features.auth the single on/off control
Per review feedback: authentication configuration now lives entirely in
the existing Feature Toggles system rather than a separate Authentication
settings section.
- The auth mode is derived from the features.auth runtime flag
(KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH): off -> disabled, on+no-admin -> setup,
on+admin -> enabled. Removed the parallel auth.mode system setting,
the SetEnabled service method, GET/PATCH /api/v1/auth/settings, the
AuthConfig.Required field, KANDEV_AUTH_REQUIRED, and the auth service's
Settings-store dependency and EnvRequired/env_required.
- The features.auth registry entry is re-described as the actual enable
switch (high-risk, restart-required) and defaults off in every profile
(dev was previously true — that only revealed UI before; now it would
enforce, so it must be an explicit opt-in).
- Setup no longer persists a mode; completing the wizard creates the admin
and the mode auto-derives to enabled.
- Startup 'exposed without auth' warning + all docs (public guide,
run-as-a-service, spec, ADR, AGENTS.md) point at the feature toggle.
- E2E: auth specs use KANDEV_FEATURES_AUTH; screenshot spec captures the
Feature Toggles page instead of the removed Authentication page; the
member-restriction assertion targets an admin invite route.
- Tests updated across service/httpmw/httpapi/profiles for the derived
mode; full suite green (only pre-existing sandbox-FS failures remain).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): complete cross-user isolation — integrations, automation, plan/walkthrough, session reads
A follow-up isolation audit found that per-user scoping had been wired into
the task service, secrets, office, and the WS gateway — but several
workspace/task/session-scoped surfaces still resolved a caller-supplied ID
with no ownership gate. Closed all of them; cross-user access now returns
404 across the board.
- Integrations (jira/linear/sentry/slack/azure-devops/gitlab/github/
workflow-sync): a global middleware authorizes the workspace_id (query, or
gitlab's /workspaces/:id/ path) on those route groups. Previously a member
who knew another user's workspace ID could read/overwrite their integration
connection config and watches.
- Automation: workspace-authorizer seam gates get/list/create/update/delete/
enable/disable, triggers, run history, and — critically — the webhook
secret. Was fully cross-tenant over WS before.
- Task plans (PlanService) and walkthroughs (WalkthroughService): task-
authorizer seam on every read/write. These bypassed the task service.
- Session reads that hit the repo directly — session turns, task context,
git snapshots, file reviews — now call AuthorizeSession/TaskAccess.
Internal callers (pollers, schedulers, MCP) carry no identity and stay
unscoped; disabled mode is unaffected. Regression tests added
(plan/walkthrough scoping, automation authorizer matrix, integration path
extraction) and the two-user E2E now asserts integration routes are shielded.
Docs (spec, ADR, public guide) updated to state what is isolated and that
filesystem/agent-credential isolation remains an OS-level limitation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(web): current-user chip uses border hover, not accent fill
The sidebar current-user chip used hover:bg-accent (a purpleish fill).
Switch to the border-hover idiom used elsewhere (border border-transparent
-> hover:border-border) with the neutral hover:bg-muted/50 the adjacent
workspace picker uses, so the hover reads as a subtle outline instead of a
colored background. Screenshot spec now captures the chip hover state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(web): right-align current-user chip in the sidebar footer
Push the user chip to the far right of the expanded footer (ml-auto) so it
sits opposite the left-aligned icon buttons; collapsed mode keeps the
centered vertical stack unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): reject synthetic identity on management routes and scope office run broadcasts
Address code-review findings on the opt-in authentication PR:
- P1: while auth is disabled the middleware injects a synthetic admin
(RoleAdmin), and RequireAdmin alone let it through — so anyone hitting a
not-yet-enabled instance could mint a PAT or plant an admin that survives
enablement and hijacks first-run setup. Add authn.RequireRealIdentity and
guard the credential/session/user-management routes with it (public
bootstrap routes stay reachable). Responds 404 while disabled.
- P1: office run events carry task_id but no workspace_id, so they fell back
to a global broadcast and leaked across users. Resolve the workspace from
the task and route via the new Hub.BroadcastToWorkspaceOrDrop, which fails
closed (drops rather than global-broadcasts) when the workspace is unknown
and auth is enforced.
- nit: type createAuthSlice as a single-arg creator and call it with just set.
Also register the authentication docs page and its settings routes in
docs/public/coverage.json so the public-docs validator passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(web): add app status bar
* feat(web): add app status bar visibility toggle
* feat(web): persist status bar item order
* fix(web): refine app status bar behavior
* fix(web): polish app status bar presentation
* test(web): split plugin slot coverage groups
* fix(web): address status surface review feedback
* fix(web): stabilize status bar overlay tests
* feat: bind HTTP server to multiple addresses
Support a list of bind addresses so the backend can serve on loopback and
a tailnet IP at once, without exposing every interface via 0.0.0.0.
- Config: server.host now parses a comma-separated list; a new server.hosts
YAML array takes precedence when set. Entries are trimmed, deduped, and
validated (IP or hostname); a wildcard entry collapses the set.
- Startup: one net.Listener per resolved address serving one shared
http.Server; the single-listener path is the one-element case.
- Bind-failure policy: all-fail is fatal; partial-fail warns, serves the
good addresses, and runs a cancellable background retry loop that binds
late-arriving addresses (e.g. a tailnet IP after tailscaled starts).
- Graceful shutdown stops the retry loop before closing all listeners;
covered by goleak.
- Readiness probe picks a reachable bound address, preferring loopback.
- Add ServerConfig.NonLoopbackBinds and config.IsLoopbackHost so the
sibling app-auth task can gate fail-closed auth on off-box binds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: preserve KANDEV_SERVER_HOST over config server.hosts
server.host now wins over the server.hosts array when set, because Host
carries the KANDEV_SERVER_HOST env override and env must beat a config-file
server.hosts (env-over-file precedence and the desktop loopback contract).
The viper default for server.host is empty so an unset host is
distinguishable from an explicit one; server.hosts is used only when host is
unset. Adds regression tests covering the env-override and hosts-when-unset
paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: harden multi-bind host parsing and listener lifecycle
Address review feedback:
- Validate every host before wildcard collapse so an invalid entry is
rejected regardless of order; canonicalize IPs so equivalent forms
(::1 and 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1) dedupe and unspecified longhand IPs count as
the wildcard.
- Probe the IPv6 loopback (::1) for an IPv6 wildcard listener instead of
127.0.0.1, so readiness doesn't stall on an IPv6-only socket.
- Make serverListeners.Stop race-free via sync.Once.
- Register t.Cleanup for the blocker listener before the fatal-assertion
path in the partial-failure test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add plugin system with grpc runtime and native ui plugins
- go plugin backends ship as release tarballs (per-platform binaries, checksums) that
kandev installs from url/upload or filesystem sideload+sync, then spawns and
supervises via hashicorp/go-plugin (unix socket / loopback tcp+automtls)
- strict typed grpc contract (kandev.plugin.v1): DeliverEvent/InvokeTool/HandleWebhook
plus a capability-gated host service (state, secrets, emit); author sdk in
pkg/pluginsdk; packaging cli in cmd/plugin-pack
- native frontend bundles: window.registerKandevPlugin + registry/host loader with
dynamic routes, nav items, slots and ws handlers; plugins settings page with
install dialog, sync button and enable/disable/uninstall
- gated behind the plugins feature flag (prod off, dev/e2e on); covered by unit and
integration tests plus playwright e2e against a real packaged fixture plugin
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(plugins): hydrate base app context on plugin routes
Plugin-owned SPA routes classify as RouteUnknown, so the boot payload shipped
only feature flags — no workspaces, workflows, or kanban context. Native plugin
UI (e.g. host.ui.TaskCreateDialog) then had an empty store. Hydrate the same
base context as the Home route for unknown SPA routes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(plugins): expose TaskCreateDialog on host.ui
Lets a native plugin open kandev's real create-task modal (prefilled via
initialValues) instead of POSTing directly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(plugins): harden filesystem/URL sinks against CodeQL findings
Add sink-level guards on the plugin trust boundary: securejoin containment on
archive extraction (zip-slip), plugin-id validation before every fs_store path,
http/https scheme validation on install-from-URL, and non-interpolated ws-handler
error logging.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(plugins): address review findings (races, resource caps, lifecycle)
- serialize per-plugin startup to close a TOCTOU double-spawn race, and let a
plugin restart after exhausting attempts
- bound plugin startup with an explicit 30s timeout
- reject backslash paths and cap decompressed bytes by actual size in pkgtar;
only mark a package Signed when a verifier actually ran and passed
- delete plugin_state on uninstall; validate webhook keys against the manifest
and cap webhook body size; restart an active plugin when a new version installs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(plugins): sanitize plugin-id path sinks for CodeQL
Pin the plugin id to a single path segment with filepath.Base at recordPath/
configPath and pkgtar.Remove — a barrier the taint analysis recognizes.
Behaviour-identical for valid ids (already validated by safePluginID); clears
the go/path-injection alerts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(plugins): inline plugin-id validation at path sinks for CodeQL
filepath.Base does not strip '..', so it is not a path-injection barrier. Call
the recognized safePluginID / id-pattern guard inline in Delete/GetConfig/
SetConfig and pkgtar.Remove — the same barrier that already cleared the Get sink.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(plugins): address code-review findings (backend)
- add capability-gating tests for the Host RPC service (was untested)
- close a stop-during-start orphan race so Disable/Uninstall can't leave a
supervised subprocess behind
- on failed upgrade, remove only the new version dir (not all versions + data);
restart the prior version
- validate manifest version and reject ids ending in .config (record-file alias)
- make Deliverer.Refresh non-blocking and cancel in-flight delivery on worker stop
- clamp out-of-range webhook status, skip-and-warn corrupt records in List,
write records atomically, semver-aware sideload version pick
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(plugins): address code-review findings (frontend)
- wrap plugin routes + settings routes in a shared PluginErrorBoundary so a
throwing plugin page shows a fallback instead of white-screening the SPA
- fix disable/re-enable in one session: keep the cached registration and
re-run initialize instead of relying on a cached ES-module re-import
- prefix root-relative bundle/style URLs with apiBaseUrl (split-origin/Tauri)
- surface partial-install warnings via toast.warning instead of a bare success
- dedupe/remove injected style links on unload; gate PluginNavItems on the flag
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(plugins): serialize per-plugin lifecycle + guard config writes
- add a per-plugin keyed lock in Service so concurrent Enable/Disable/Install/
Uninstall/UpdateConfig for one id are serialized (no status-machine race)
- take s.mu in SetConfig/GetConfig and write config atomically
- bound each plugin initialize() with a timeout so one hung bundle can't stall
the rest of the boot load
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(plugins): split service_test.go to satisfy file-length lint
Move the install/URL test group into service_install_test.go; no logic change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* ci: build and ship the e2e fixture plugin package to E2E shards
The plugin E2E specs' global-setup requires apps/backend/.build/kandev-plugin-e2e-1.0.0.tar.gz.
Build it in the E2E build job, upload it as an artifact, and download it in both
the regular and container shard jobs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add voice mode for chat input
Adds a voice input button to the chat composer with three transcription engines:
in-browser Web Speech API, in-browser Whisper via @huggingface/transformers, and
a server-side OpenAI Whisper fallback gated on KANDEV_VOICE_OPENAI_API_KEY.
User-configurable from a new /settings/voice-mode page:
- Master on/off toggle (defaults to on; opt-out, not opt-in)
- Engine preference (auto / Web Speech / Whisper Web / Whisper Server)
- Language hint (auto-detect or BCP-47 pinned)
- Activation mode (click-to-toggle or hold-to-talk)
- Auto-send after transcription
- Whisper Web model size (tiny / base / small)
- Editable Cmd+Shift+M keyboard shortcut
Voice settings live under user_settings.voice_mode as a nested JSON object —
no schema migration. Setting changes broadcast via the existing
user.settings.updated WS event so any open chat tab updates live.
The mic button is rendered on the right of the composer alongside the send
button (round primary fill; destructive fill with pulse ring while recording).
On browsers without a usable engine (e.g. iOS Chrome over HTTP) the button
stays visible as a muted greyed icon — tapping it surfaces a toast with the
reason (typically a missing secure context).
Whisper Web runs in a Web Worker with fp16 decoder weights (avoids the
MatMulNBits scale-missing crash that q4/q8 hit on WASM). Models are pulled
from the onnx-community/* mirror and cached by transformers.js in the Cache
Storage on first use.
* fix: address voice mode PR review feedback and E2E selector clash
Bot-review fixes from #1159:
- Map http.MaxBytesError from c.FormFile to 413 instead of bare 400.
- Strip BCP-47 region suffix before passing language hint to Whisper Web.
- Recover from worker crash: terminate + null worker + reset ready flag so
next init/transcribe creates a fresh worker instead of hanging.
- Read live store state via storeApi.getState() in voice-mode settings
savers to avoid stale-closure clobbering concurrent settings updates.
- Detach Web Speech callbacks before abort() so trailing onend/onerror
events don't mutate hook state after cancel().
- Spread caller init before method/body in voice-api fetch so a caller-
supplied init can't override the multipart POST.
- Replace t.Fatalf with t.Errorf+return inside test HTTP handler goroutine
(FailNow from non-test goroutine is unsafe).
- Add Enabled/AutoSend zeroing assertions in partial-update test so the
bool-overwrite-on-PATCH behavior is locked in explicitly.
E2E fix:
- toolbar-overflow spec used button.rounded-full which now matches both
the send and voice buttons (strict-mode violation). Switched to the
submit-message-button testid for an unambiguous locator.
* fix: scope voice settings rollback + whisper worker error to changed keys
Round 2 of PR review feedback on #1159:
- voice-mode settings rollback now restores only the keys patched by the
failing request (not the whole snapshot), preserving concurrent edits
to unrelated voiceMode fields.
- Shortcut rollback diffs previous vs next and reverts only the changed
keys (restore prior value or delete if absent), preserving other
concurrent shortcut edits.
- Whisper worker error handler captures the worker reference at attach
time and only clears refs when this.worker still matches it — a stale
error from a previously replaced worker no longer nukes the active one.
- Update stale whisper-web-models JSDoc that still pointed at Xenova
mirrors.
* fix: voice mode progress scale, hold-mode race, race-aware rollback
Round 3 of PR review feedback on #1159:
- Normalise Whisper progress to 0–1 in ensureWhisperClient (transformers.js
emits 0–100, the button's display + the `ready: 1` convention expect
0–1 — fixes the 5000% mid-download display).
- Claim driverRef synchronously at the top of finishCapture so concurrent
pointerup + pointerleave invocations early-return instead of racing and
clobbering a freshly-started recording's ref.
- Race-aware rollback: voice-mode and shortcut catch branches now skip
reverting a key when latest[key] !== next[key]. A failed earlier request
no longer overwrites a later successful save to the same key.
- Update the Worker wire-protocol comment to show onnx-community/whisper-base
instead of the stale Xenova/* example.
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
* refactor(worktree): drop unused flat-layout worktrees/ path
Every worktree creation now routes through the task-dir layout
(~/.kandev/tasks/{title}_{suffix}/{repo}/); the legacy flat layout
under ~/.kandev/worktrees/ has been unreachable since the subtasks
PR populated TaskDirName/RepoName unconditionally. Removes the dead
Config.BasePath, Manager.createWorktree, and the flat reconciler.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(worktree): remove unused Reconcile, add guard regression test
Address PR review feedback:
- Reconcile (and reconcileTasksDir / isOrphanedTaskDir) had no callers
anywhere in the tree after the flat-layout removal. Deleted rather than
left dangling; if startup orphan cleanup is wired up later it can return
alongside its actual call site. Also moots the stale doc comment that
CodeRabbit flagged.
- Add TestCreate_MissingTaskDirFields_ReturnsErrTaskDirRequired covering
the three permutations (missing RepoName, missing TaskDirName, both
missing) so a regression in the ErrTaskDirRequired guard surfaces in
CI rather than silently.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(backend): per-launch authentication for agentctl
Add nonce-based handshake protocol to secure all agentctl HTTP/WS
endpoints. On launch, the parent (backend) passes a one-time bootstrap
nonce via AGENTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_NONCE env var. agentctl generates its own
auth token, enables Bearer auth immediately, and returns the token to
the parent via POST /auth/handshake (validated by nonce).
Standalone, Docker, and Sprites executors all use the same handshake
flow. Removes the old AGENTCTL_AUTH_TOKEN env var approach. For
Docker/Sprites, the retrieved token is persisted encrypted in
SecretStore (AES-256-GCM) for crash recovery.
Security properties:
- Auth enabled from boot (no unprotected window)
- Token never in env vars (only the burned nonce)
- Nonce is one-shot (replay impossible)
- Constant-time token comparison (timing-safe)
* fix: check fmt.Sscanf return value in integration test
* fix: address review feedback - constant-time nonce comparison, safe ID truncation
* fix(backend): exempt MCP routes from agentctl auth middleware
The agent subprocess connects to agentctl's MCP endpoints (/sse, /message,
/mcp) to use kandev tools (create_task, ask_user_question, etc.). These
endpoints run on the same HTTP server as the authenticated API, but the
agent process doesn't possess the auth token — it was only exchanged
between the backend and agentctl during the handshake.
Exempt /sse, /message, and /mcp from the Bearer auth middleware since the
agent process runs in the same trust boundary as agentctl.
* refactor(backend): remove query param token fallback and document SetAuthToken constraint
Remove the ?token= query parameter fallback from extractBearerToken —
tokens in URLs leak via access logs, referer headers, and browser history.
All WS callers already use Authorization headers via wsAuthHeaders().
Document SetAuthToken's concurrency constraint: it must not be called
concurrently with HTTP requests on the same client.
* fix(backend): enforce mutex in ControlClient/Launcher auth, fix Start() lock scope
- Add sync.Mutex to ControlClient; protect SetAuthToken and AuthToken() reads
- Guard Launcher.AuthToken() with l.mu (written under lock in Start, read unprotected)
- Extract buildAndStartProcess and performHandshake from Start() (was 106 lines, over 80-line limit)
- Release l.mu before blocking health/handshake calls so monitorExit() can close
l.exited — previously the fast-fail path in waitForHealthy was unreachable
- Update stale executor_backend.go comment (standalone no longer uses env var auth)
Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com>
The default Docker API version was hardcoded to 1.41, which fails on
newer Docker daemons that require at least API version 1.44.
Change the default to empty string so the Docker client uses the
existing WithAPIVersionNegotiation() option to auto-negotiate a
compatible version with the daemon.
Carlos Florêncio