32c6cd5bc9f1ae2dcc28fa05ac1702e2ca291dfc
2 Commits
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45ee2ff48f |
feat: key terminals + dockview layout to TaskEnvironment (#755)
* feat(backend): key user shells by TaskEnvironmentID Sessions in the same task share a TaskEnvironment. Re-key the user shell runner so terminals are scoped per env, not per session — switching between sessions of the same task now sees the same shell list. - Add TaskEnvironmentID to AgentExecution / LaunchRequest / ExecutorCreateRequest / executor.LaunchAgentRequest, propagated through ToAgentExecution and the orchestrator launch path. - Add Manager.ResolveScopeKey(sessionID) — returns env when execution carries it, falls back to sessionID for legacy paths. - Rename runner param sessionID -> scopeID in interactive_shells.go; map keys are now scopeID:terminalID. - Shell handlers + WS terminal handler resolve sid -> scopeID via ResolveScopeKey before calling the runner. * feat(web): key dockview layout + portals to TaskEnvironmentID Switching between sessions of the same task no longer rebuilds the dockview layout — terminals and panels persist because layouts are env-scoped, not session-scoped. The bottom terminal also reuses a stable sessionId across same-env switches so it doesn't reconnect to a different shell. - Rename layout persistence: setSessionLayout/getSessionLayout/*SessionMaximizeState -> setEnvLayout/getEnvLayout/*EnvMaximizeState (kandev.dockview.env-layout. prefix). - Rename dockview-session-switch.ts -> dockview-env-switch.ts; performSessionSwitch -> performEnvSwitch with oldEnvId/newEnvId/activeSessionId. - dockview-store.ts: currentLayoutSessionId -> currentLayoutEnvId; switchSessionLayout -> switchEnvLayout(oldEnvId, newEnvId, activeSessionId). Same-env switches no-op. Drop _skipLayoutSwitchForSession + consumeSkipFlag — env-keyed action handles it structurally. - panel-portal-manager: PortalEntry.envId; releaseBySession -> releaseByEnv. ENV_SCOPED_COMPONENTS in dockview-desktop-layout (renamed from SESSION_SCOPED). - useEnvSwitchCleanup replaces useSessionSwitchCleanup; tracks env changes only. - All performLayoutSwitch callers (sidebar, dropdown, header, dialog) resolve sid -> envId via environmentIdBySessionId before switching. - bottom-terminal-panel: drop sessionId prop, use useEnvironmentSessionId(). - cleanupTaskStorage now takes envIds[] alongside sessionIds[] for env-scoped layout/maximize cleanup. * test: add coverage for env-keyed terminals + layout Playwright e2e (terminal-env-keyed.spec.ts) — switching between sessions of the same task keeps terminal scrollback intact and asserts both sessions share one task_environment_id. Update the comment in sessionless-task-switch.spec.ts to reference performEnvSwitch. * fix: address env layout PR feedback * test: fix flaky handshake auth check * fix: address env scope review findings |
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dccff23cc0 |
feat(backend): per-launch authentication for agentctl (#666)
* feat(backend): per-launch authentication for agentctl Add nonce-based handshake protocol to secure all agentctl HTTP/WS endpoints. On launch, the parent (backend) passes a one-time bootstrap nonce via AGENTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_NONCE env var. agentctl generates its own auth token, enables Bearer auth immediately, and returns the token to the parent via POST /auth/handshake (validated by nonce). Standalone, Docker, and Sprites executors all use the same handshake flow. Removes the old AGENTCTL_AUTH_TOKEN env var approach. For Docker/Sprites, the retrieved token is persisted encrypted in SecretStore (AES-256-GCM) for crash recovery. Security properties: - Auth enabled from boot (no unprotected window) - Token never in env vars (only the burned nonce) - Nonce is one-shot (replay impossible) - Constant-time token comparison (timing-safe) * fix: check fmt.Sscanf return value in integration test * fix: address review feedback - constant-time nonce comparison, safe ID truncation * fix(backend): exempt MCP routes from agentctl auth middleware The agent subprocess connects to agentctl's MCP endpoints (/sse, /message, /mcp) to use kandev tools (create_task, ask_user_question, etc.). These endpoints run on the same HTTP server as the authenticated API, but the agent process doesn't possess the auth token — it was only exchanged between the backend and agentctl during the handshake. Exempt /sse, /message, and /mcp from the Bearer auth middleware since the agent process runs in the same trust boundary as agentctl. * refactor(backend): remove query param token fallback and document SetAuthToken constraint Remove the ?token= query parameter fallback from extractBearerToken — tokens in URLs leak via access logs, referer headers, and browser history. All WS callers already use Authorization headers via wsAuthHeaders(). Document SetAuthToken's concurrency constraint: it must not be called concurrently with HTTP requests on the same client. * fix(backend): enforce mutex in ControlClient/Launcher auth, fix Start() lock scope - Add sync.Mutex to ControlClient; protect SetAuthToken and AuthToken() reads - Guard Launcher.AuthToken() with l.mu (written under lock in Start, read unprotected) - Extract buildAndStartProcess and performHandshake from Start() (was 106 lines, over 80-line limit) - Release l.mu before blocking health/handshake calls so monitorExit() can close l.exited — previously the fast-fail path in waitForHealthy was unreachable - Update stale executor_backend.go comment (standalone no longer uses env var auth) Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev> Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com> |