Tier 1 of the post-review cleanup. Each item is independently safe; bundling
because they're all small, mechanical, and lint-passing.
- fix(clone): unify injectTokenIntoURL across Docker and Sprites — Sprites
used to ignore GH_TOKEN entirely (a user with only GH_TOKEN set got 401
on Sprites clone but worked on Docker). Promote one
`injectGitHubTokenIntoCloneURL` helper, accept both env vars
(GITHUB_TOKEN wins, matching Docker), and use the documented
`https://x-access-token:T@github.com/` form on both surfaces.
- fix(executor-popover): swap the <span tabIndex role="button"> trigger
for <Button variant="ghost"> so Enter/Space activation, focus rings on
Safari, and disabled semantics come for free.
- test(docker): rewrite TestDockerStopInstance_PreservesSessionDirOnPlainStop
to drive the real DockerExecutor.StopInstance path with ContainerID=""
(skips the docker daemon, exercises the kandev-side cleanup branch).
Previous version only iterated shouldRunExecutorCleanup strings — would
pass even if StopInstance always cleaned up. Now table-driven over
preserve+destructive reasons with on-disk asserts.
- refactor(orchestrator): drop dead `_ = arg` parameters from persist*
helpers (persistResumeState, persistModelSwitchState, persistLaunchState).
Brings signatures from 9→6 args, under the funlen lint cap.
- refactor(orchestrator): collapse byte-identical isContainerizedExecutor
≡ isCloneBasedExecutorType predicate into one.
- refactor(lifecycle): drop dead getMetadataBool, FileUploader.RunCommand,
expandMountSource {home} arm (no production agent ships {home} in
Mounts; codex_acp_test asserts it), dockerTaskBranch one-line wrapper.
Resuming a Sprites task whose sandbox was destroyed upstream returned
"sprite not found" and dead-ended the user. Detect the upstream 404 via
a typed ErrSpriteNotFound sentinel, mark the reconnect step skipped with
a user-facing warning explaining what happened, swap the prepare plan
in place to the fresh-provision shape, and continue the launch under a
new sandbox name on the same branch.
The progress plan is now mutable so the reporter can stream the fresh
steps live after the reconnect-then-fresh transition. Only the explicit
not-found case triggers fallback; other reconnect failures still
surface as before, and the fallback fires at most once per launch.
* feat(backend): per-launch authentication for agentctl
Add nonce-based handshake protocol to secure all agentctl HTTP/WS
endpoints. On launch, the parent (backend) passes a one-time bootstrap
nonce via AGENTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_NONCE env var. agentctl generates its own
auth token, enables Bearer auth immediately, and returns the token to
the parent via POST /auth/handshake (validated by nonce).
Standalone, Docker, and Sprites executors all use the same handshake
flow. Removes the old AGENTCTL_AUTH_TOKEN env var approach. For
Docker/Sprites, the retrieved token is persisted encrypted in
SecretStore (AES-256-GCM) for crash recovery.
Security properties:
- Auth enabled from boot (no unprotected window)
- Token never in env vars (only the burned nonce)
- Nonce is one-shot (replay impossible)
- Constant-time token comparison (timing-safe)
* fix: check fmt.Sscanf return value in integration test
* fix: address review feedback - constant-time nonce comparison, safe ID truncation
* fix(backend): exempt MCP routes from agentctl auth middleware
The agent subprocess connects to agentctl's MCP endpoints (/sse, /message,
/mcp) to use kandev tools (create_task, ask_user_question, etc.). These
endpoints run on the same HTTP server as the authenticated API, but the
agent process doesn't possess the auth token — it was only exchanged
between the backend and agentctl during the handshake.
Exempt /sse, /message, and /mcp from the Bearer auth middleware since the
agent process runs in the same trust boundary as agentctl.
* refactor(backend): remove query param token fallback and document SetAuthToken constraint
Remove the ?token= query parameter fallback from extractBearerToken —
tokens in URLs leak via access logs, referer headers, and browser history.
All WS callers already use Authorization headers via wsAuthHeaders().
Document SetAuthToken's concurrency constraint: it must not be called
concurrently with HTTP requests on the same client.
* fix(backend): enforce mutex in ControlClient/Launcher auth, fix Start() lock scope
- Add sync.Mutex to ControlClient; protect SetAuthToken and AuthToken() reads
- Guard Launcher.AuthToken() with l.mu (written under lock in Start, read unprotected)
- Extract buildAndStartProcess and performHandshake from Start() (was 106 lines, over 80-line limit)
- Release l.mu before blocking health/handshake calls so monitorExit() can close
l.exited — previously the fast-fail path in waitForHealthy was unreachable
- Update stale executor_backend.go comment (standalone no longer uses env var auth)
Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com>
José Almeida