Address recurring review feedback on the docker reconnect path:
- reconnectToContainer was 98 lines (over the 80-line repo limit). Split
into ensureContainerRunning (inspect + start + re-inspect) and
bringupAgentctl (health-check, find-or-create instance, transparent
re-handshake). The orchestration body now reads top-down at 49 lines.
- resolveDockerEndpoint and waitForAgentctlHealth grew real branches in
this PR (host-port lookup with container-IP fallback; 240×500ms
retry loop) but had no direct tests. Introduce narrow hostPortLookup
/ healthChecker interfaces, satisfied by *docker.Client and
*agentctl.ControlClient, so both functions are now driven by stubs
that exercise happy-path, fallback, retry-until-healthy, exhaustion,
and context-cancellation branches.
- Add direct unit tests for the docker package's pure helpers
(normalizeDockerHostIP, buildDockerPortBindings) and for
dockerAgentctlPortBindings — a regression in the published port
range or host IP would silently break container reconnect.
Tier 1 of the post-review cleanup. Each item is independently safe; bundling
because they're all small, mechanical, and lint-passing.
- fix(clone): unify injectTokenIntoURL across Docker and Sprites — Sprites
used to ignore GH_TOKEN entirely (a user with only GH_TOKEN set got 401
on Sprites clone but worked on Docker). Promote one
`injectGitHubTokenIntoCloneURL` helper, accept both env vars
(GITHUB_TOKEN wins, matching Docker), and use the documented
`https://x-access-token:T@github.com/` form on both surfaces.
- fix(executor-popover): swap the <span tabIndex role="button"> trigger
for <Button variant="ghost"> so Enter/Space activation, focus rings on
Safari, and disabled semantics come for free.
- test(docker): rewrite TestDockerStopInstance_PreservesSessionDirOnPlainStop
to drive the real DockerExecutor.StopInstance path with ContainerID=""
(skips the docker daemon, exercises the kandev-side cleanup branch).
Previous version only iterated shouldRunExecutorCleanup strings — would
pass even if StopInstance always cleaned up. Now table-driven over
preserve+destructive reasons with on-disk asserts.
- refactor(orchestrator): drop dead `_ = arg` parameters from persist*
helpers (persistResumeState, persistModelSwitchState, persistLaunchState).
Brings signatures from 9→6 args, under the funlen lint cap.
- refactor(orchestrator): collapse byte-identical isContainerizedExecutor
≡ isCloneBasedExecutorType predicate into one.
- refactor(lifecycle): drop dead getMetadataBool, FileUploader.RunCommand,
expandMountSource {home} arm (no production agent ships {home} in
Mounts; codex_acp_test asserts it), dockerTaskBranch one-line wrapper.
Profiles created in the UI snapshot the *then-current* DefaultPrepareScript
into their stored prepare_script field. Updates to the default — like
shipping the worktree-branch checkout block — never reach those older
profiles, so users keep landing the agent on the chosen base branch
(main) even though the env row carries a feature branch name.
Append a kandev-managed postlude to whatever prepare_script ran (custom
or default), wrapped in a subshell + `|| true` so it's idempotent and
never blocks agentctl from starting. The postlude prefers the remote tip
when origin already has the branch (resume after a destroyed sandbox),
falls back to checking out the existing local branch, and finally
creates one off the current HEAD.
Sprites needed the WorktreeProvider in resolvePrepareScript so the
postlude's `{{worktree.branch}}` actually expands; Docker already had
it.
The Docker e2e gains a regression case that explicitly stores an older
default-style script (clone, no checkout) and asserts the agent still
ends up on the feature branch — locking the contract in regardless of
which default the user happens to have stored.
Every ACP agent's session dir was bind-mounted from ~/.<agent> on the
host into /root/.<agent> in the container. That exposed host state DBs,
session caches, and lock files to the container — codex's rollout DB
caches absolute /Users/... paths, which don't resolve inside Linux and
the agent silently loses prior thread context on resume.
Replace the host bind mount with a kandev-managed per-container session
dir under <kandev-home>/agent-sessions/<instance_id>/. Before the
container starts, selectively copy the auth-relevant files (the same
files Sprites already copies via RemoteAuth.SourceFiles) into that
dir; everything else — state DBs, sessions/, lock files — stays on the
host and the agent rebuilds them inside the container with
container-local Linux paths.
The change is agent-agnostic: any agent that has SessionDirTemplate
+ SessionDirTarget gets the new behavior automatically. Cleanup runs
on destructive stops only (task/session deleted/archived), mirroring
the Sprites preserve-on-stop rule so plain stops let resume re-attach
to the same agent state.
Two bugs:
1. The Dockerfile editor and Image Tag input on the executor profile page
stored their values in component-local useState inside DockerSections,
not in the form state. Saving the profile never wrote them back, so
"Use defaults" / typing in the editor / changing the tag never
persisted — and the Build button was the only thing that consumed
them. The same gap existed in the new-executor flow's
buildProfileConfig.
Lift `dockerfile` and `image_tag` into useProfileFormState (edit) and
useCreateProfileFormState (new), and emit them in buildSaveConfig /
buildProfileConfig so they round-trip through profile.config.
2. Even when an image_tag is set on the profile, the container builder
ignored it. imageName was always derived from the agent runtime's
hardcoded `kandev/multi-agent`, so a user who built a custom image
like `kandev/agent:latest` would still see Docker fail with
"No such image: kandev/multi-agent:latest".
Propagate `profile.config.image_tag` → metadata
(`image_tag_override`) → ExecutorCreateRequest → ContainerConfig,
and let it override `rt.Image` in buildContainerConfig when set.
Also align the frontend default image tag (kandev/multi-agent:latest)
with the backend's hardcoded runtime default so users who don't override
end up with a working build.
* feat: add GitHub token injection for remote executors and Docker session resume
- Add global GitHub access token configuration (backend + frontend)
- Inject GitHub token into Docker and Sprites executors via env vars and Git credential helper
- Transition Docker executor from host mounting to repository cloning
- Implement Docker session resume (reconnect to existing containers after backend restart)
- Add shell validation using exec.LookPath in agentctl
- Add scriptengine providers for agent install and agentctl placeholders
* fix: format github-status.tsx with prettier
* fix: resolve lint issues (goconst, errcheck, file-length)
* fix: address code review findings
- Fix resolveGHCLIToken to check both GITHUB_TOKEN and GH_TOKEN guards
- Fix credential helper to use \\ fallback
- Change /bin/bash to /bin/sh in credential helper for Alpine compat
- Strip embedded token from .git/config after clone in prepare scripts
- Extract buildLaunchAgentRequest helpers to stay under 80-line limit
- Add tests for GitHubAuthProvider, injectTokenIntoURL, reconnect validation
- Add GH_TOKEN-only test case for resolveGHCLIToken
* refactor(executor): extract GitHub credential resolution to separate file
Move injectGitHubToken, injectGitHubTokenFromCLI, resolveRemoteCredentials,
resolveAuthSecrets, methodIDToEnvVar, resolveGHCLIToken, and detectGHToken
out of executor_execute.go (was 803 logical lines, over the 800-line limit
after merging main) into a new executor_credentials.go file. Also adds the
nil-guard on secretStore in resolveAuthSecrets that was flagged by review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(backend): per-launch authentication for agentctl
Add nonce-based handshake protocol to secure all agentctl HTTP/WS
endpoints. On launch, the parent (backend) passes a one-time bootstrap
nonce via AGENTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_NONCE env var. agentctl generates its own
auth token, enables Bearer auth immediately, and returns the token to
the parent via POST /auth/handshake (validated by nonce).
Standalone, Docker, and Sprites executors all use the same handshake
flow. Removes the old AGENTCTL_AUTH_TOKEN env var approach. For
Docker/Sprites, the retrieved token is persisted encrypted in
SecretStore (AES-256-GCM) for crash recovery.
Security properties:
- Auth enabled from boot (no unprotected window)
- Token never in env vars (only the burned nonce)
- Nonce is one-shot (replay impossible)
- Constant-time token comparison (timing-safe)
* fix: check fmt.Sscanf return value in integration test
* fix: address review feedback - constant-time nonce comparison, safe ID truncation
* fix(backend): exempt MCP routes from agentctl auth middleware
The agent subprocess connects to agentctl's MCP endpoints (/sse, /message,
/mcp) to use kandev tools (create_task, ask_user_question, etc.). These
endpoints run on the same HTTP server as the authenticated API, but the
agent process doesn't possess the auth token — it was only exchanged
between the backend and agentctl during the handshake.
Exempt /sse, /message, and /mcp from the Bearer auth middleware since the
agent process runs in the same trust boundary as agentctl.
* refactor(backend): remove query param token fallback and document SetAuthToken constraint
Remove the ?token= query parameter fallback from extractBearerToken —
tokens in URLs leak via access logs, referer headers, and browser history.
All WS callers already use Authorization headers via wsAuthHeaders().
Document SetAuthToken's concurrency constraint: it must not be called
concurrently with HTTP requests on the same client.
* fix(backend): enforce mutex in ControlClient/Launcher auth, fix Start() lock scope
- Add sync.Mutex to ControlClient; protect SetAuthToken and AuthToken() reads
- Guard Launcher.AuthToken() with l.mu (written under lock in Start, read unprotected)
- Extract buildAndStartProcess and performHandshake from Start() (was 106 lines, over 80-line limit)
- Release l.mu before blocking health/handshake calls so monitorExit() can close
l.exited — previously the fast-fail path in waitForHealthy was unreachable
- Update stale executor_backend.go comment (standalone no longer uses env var auth)
Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Kandev Agent <agent@kandev.dev>
Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: João Salavisa <undefined@users.noreply.github.com>