manager_launch: trusted exec-config keys override req.Metadata.
buildLaunchMetadata applied executor config only when the matching
key was missing in req.Metadata. A request that carried metadata.
ssh_host_fingerprint (or ssh_host, ssh_identity_*) could pivot the
launch to a different target and bypass the pinned fingerprint.
Pin a list of connection-routing keys (ssh_host, ssh_port, ssh_user,
ssh_host_fingerprint, ssh_identity_source, ssh_identity_file,
ssh_proxy_jump) and have the executor config always win for those.
Cubic / CodeRabbit P1.
executor_ssh.CreateInstance: reuse the resumed session state.
ResumeRemoteInstance attaches the recovered ssh.Client + forwarder
to r.sessions[InstanceID] and refreshes metadata, then the lifecycle
manager unconditionally called CreateInstance, which dialed a fresh
client and started a second remote agentctl on top of the live one
— leaking the resumed state. CreateInstance now early-returns from
the existing r.sessions entry via buildResumedInstance. Cubic P1.
executor_ssh.Close: actually release tracked sessions.
After dropping the SSHConnPool, Close was a no-op. A hard kandev
exit (no per-session StopInstance) left forwarders and SSH clients
open. Iterate r.sessions and Close the forwarder + client for each.
Cubic P2.
buildAuthMethods: close the ssh-agent unix socket after handshake.
Each agent-authenticated dial opened net.Dial("unix", $SSH_AUTH_SOCK)
and never closed it; only PublicKeysCallback held the agent.Client
reference and that callback is consulted exactly once at handshake.
Return a cleanup func from buildAuthMethods + buildClientConfig and
defer it from dialSSH / dialViaJump so the socket releases as soon
as key exchange completes. Greptile P1 security.
waitAgentctlHealthy: probe HTTP /health, not just the TCP listener.
The local port is owned by the SSH forwarder, which Accepts before
it Dials the remote direct-tcpip channel — a TCP connect can succeed
before the channel actually establishes. Issue a real GET /health
and require a 2xx so a broken tunnel surfaces here rather than at
the first agent operation. Cubic P1.
ssh-connection-card: also gate the trust + save on in-flight tests.
Editing a connection field during a pending test silently kept
resultStale=false because prev.result was still null; when the test
returned, the new fingerprint was bound to the old form values but
the gate let the user trust + save anyway. Treat in-flight tests as
prior tests for staleness purposes, and preserve resultStale across
the test's success setState. Cubic P2.
Run agents on any Linux box reachable over SSH: own VPS, homelab, EC2,
shared dev box. One SSH connection per (host, user, identity) shared
across all sessions on that host; each session gets its own remote
agentctl process, remote port, and SSH-tunneled local port. Mirrors the
local ~/.kandev/tasks/<task-dir>/<repo>/ layout on the remote so
multi-session tasks share a worktree and per-session runtime state lives
under the task dir.
Implements ExecutorBackend + RemoteSessionResumer + RemoteStatusProvider
+ Closeable. Host-key trust is explicit: the test endpoint observes a
fingerprint without pinning; the user trusts it in settings; subsequent
connects reject any mismatch. Auth via ssh-agent or IdentityFile only
(passphrase-protected keys must be loaded into ssh-agent). Parses
~/.ssh/config for HostName/Port/User/IdentityFile/ProxyJump inheritance.
agentctl is content-hash-cached on the remote (~/.kandev/bin/agentctl
plus a .sha256 sidecar) and uploaded only when local and remote differ.
Linux/amd64 only in v1, matching Docker's current state; arm64 is
called out as a cross-cutting follow-up.
See docs/specs/ssh-executor/spec.md.