diff --git a/apps/backend/internal/backendapp/middleware.go b/apps/backend/internal/backendapp/middleware.go index 1f8702c7f1..380b1b699e 100644 --- a/apps/backend/internal/backendapp/middleware.go +++ b/apps/backend/internal/backendapp/middleware.go @@ -13,12 +13,20 @@ func corsMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc { return func(c *gin.Context) { if origin := c.Request.Header.Get("Origin"); origin != "" { if !httpmw.AllowedOrigin(origin, c.Request.Host) { - if c.Request.Method == http.MethodOptions { - c.AbortWithStatus(http.StatusForbidden) - return - } - - c.Next() + // Disallowed cross-origin browser request: reject every method + // (including GET/HEAD) with 403. Letting one reach the handler + // yields nothing legitimate — a response the browser could read + // cross-origin needs CORS headers we only emit for allowed + // origins — but it does expose side-effecting endpoints to + // drive-by CSRF: a browser "simple request" (e.g. a + // multipart/form-data POST, CORS-safelisted so it skips + // preflight) or even a plain GET (plugin webhooks are + // registered for GET as well as POST, see plugins/handlers.go) + // would still trigger the side effect even though the page + // can't read the response. Non-browser clients (CLI/curl) and + // resource loads (/