diff --git a/apps/backend/internal/backendapp/middleware.go b/apps/backend/internal/backendapp/middleware.go
index 1f8702c7f1..380b1b699e 100644
--- a/apps/backend/internal/backendapp/middleware.go
+++ b/apps/backend/internal/backendapp/middleware.go
@@ -13,12 +13,20 @@ func corsMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
if origin := c.Request.Header.Get("Origin"); origin != "" {
if !httpmw.AllowedOrigin(origin, c.Request.Host) {
- if c.Request.Method == http.MethodOptions {
- c.AbortWithStatus(http.StatusForbidden)
- return
- }
-
- c.Next()
+ // Disallowed cross-origin browser request: reject every method
+ // (including GET/HEAD) with 403. Letting one reach the handler
+ // yields nothing legitimate — a response the browser could read
+ // cross-origin needs CORS headers we only emit for allowed
+ // origins — but it does expose side-effecting endpoints to
+ // drive-by CSRF: a browser "simple request" (e.g. a
+ // multipart/form-data POST, CORS-safelisted so it skips
+ // preflight) or even a plain GET (plugin webhooks are
+ // registered for GET as well as POST, see plugins/handlers.go)
+ // would still trigger the side effect even though the page
+ // can't read the response. Non-browser clients (CLI/curl) and
+ // resource loads (
/