docs: migrate legacy specs and add product context (#2964)
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---
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status: draft
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system: integrations
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requirements:
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- REQ-INTEGRATIONS-GITHUB-AUTHENTICATION-001
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created: 2026-07-19
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owners:
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- Kandev
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---
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# Workspace GitHub Authentication System Design Part 1
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## Purpose and boundaries
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This design preserves the technical source detail for `REQ-INTEGRATIONS-GITHUB-AUTHENTICATION-001` during migration.
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## Requirement mapping
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| Requirement | Design section |
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| --- | --- |
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| `REQ-INTEGRATIONS-GITHUB-AUTHENTICATION-001` | [Migrated source detail](#migrated-source-detail) |
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## Migrated source detail
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## Why
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GitHub credentials must not silently cross workspace boundaries. A local workspace may only need a
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human PAT or a named `gh` CLI account, while unattended company automation benefits from a GitHub
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App's short-lived, repository-scoped installation tokens. Users also need to keep work and personal
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automation under different GitHub Apps without operating separate Kandev deployments.
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## What
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- Every workspace chooses exactly one automation source: PAT, a named `gh` CLI account, a verified
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GitHub App installation, or the migration-only `legacy_shared` source.
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- GitHub App registration is configured from the workspace GitHub settings flow. There is no
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singleton GitHub App settings page and no automatically active deployment App.
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- A workspace may select a GitHub App registration already known to the Kandev deployment, import
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an existing GitHub App that the user owns, or create a new GitHub App through GitHub's App
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Manifest flow. Import and creation guide the user through ownership, callback, webhook,
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permission, visibility, and installation requirements.
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- The deployment stores a catalog of GitHub App registrations because a user may intentionally
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reuse one App across workspaces. Each workspace still selects and installs an App independently.
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Selecting an existing registration never binds another workspace automatically.
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- Users who require independent root credentials, bot identity, revocation, or ownership create a
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separate registration for each trust boundary. Work and personal workspaces can therefore use
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different Apps.
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- Reusing one registration shares its App private key, client secret, webhook secret, permission
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policy, and bot identity. Installation tokens, workspace repository scope, connection generation,
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broker leases, health, and personal OAuth tokens remain workspace isolated.
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- A newly created App defaults to private, meaning GitHub permits installation only on the account
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that owns it. The user may explicitly choose public when the same App must be installable on other
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GitHub accounts or organizations. Public does not list the App in Marketplace, reveal secrets, or
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grant repository access without installation approval.
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- PAT and named CLI automation act as the verified human account. A separate `My GitHub` connection
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is only offered when workspace automation uses a GitHub App, because App installations are not
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people and cannot provide authenticated-viewer semantics.
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- Named CLI account discovery accepts a successful `gh auth status` report from either stdout or
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stderr, while preserving non-empty stdout as the authoritative command result.
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- User-triggered mutations prefer the workspace's verified personal connection, then a human
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PAT/CLI automation connection, then the App installation. The UI always identifies the effective
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actor and never labels an App mutation as human-attributed.
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- Background watches, cleanup, repository discovery, and workflow sync always use the workspace
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automation connection. Personal credentials are never exposed to agents or executors.
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- Task Git credential routing is a separate workspace policy. **Managed workspace credentials**
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gives attached GitHub repositories task/repository/generation-bound broker leases from the
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workspace automation connection. **Inherit executor Git credentials** injects no GitHub broker
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helper or `gh` shim: Local and Worktree tasks use host-visible Git/SSH credentials, while remote
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tasks use credentials configured in that executor.
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- A task that is explicitly created for a pre-PR fork contribution under managed task credentials
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may carry one server-authored, versioned `contribution_destination` on its canonical repository
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attachment. Managed routing may issue one additional lease for that exact fork. The fork is a
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push destination only: canonical repository identity, `origin`, issue lookup, and pull-request
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targeting remain unchanged. Executor-owned identities are opaque and do not receive a
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workspace-authored destination binding.
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- Every newly created workspace attempts to persist **Inherit executor Git credentials** as its
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initial task policy. After a successful settings write, if creation is performed by an internal
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trusted caller, an auth-disabled synthetic administrator, or a real administrator while host
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`gh` has an authenticated active account, Kandev also stores that exact host/login as the new
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workspace's named CLI automation connection. Non-admin member-created workspaces never receive
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the server operator's CLI identity automatically.
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- If host `gh` is absent, unauthenticated, or cannot validate its active account, workspace creation
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still succeeds with executor task access and disconnected GitHub automation. If the executor
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settings write fails, creation still succeeds but the existing managed compatibility fallback
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remains until the workspace is configured or retried. Existing workspaces are never migrated to
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these defaults; their connection, persisted policy, and legacy missing/invalid policy fallback
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remain unchanged.
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- Workspace settings present the automation identity and task Git credential routing as one
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**Workspace GitHub access** group. The page shows a compact read-only summary of both effective
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choices; the existing **Change GitHub connection** dialog contains the full controls for the
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automation method and task routing policy. The task policy remains independent in behavior and
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persistence even though the related choices share one configuration surface.
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- The connection dialog has one **Save changes** action for local PAT or named CLI connection
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drafts and task Git access. Method-specific **Connect token**, **Use account**, and **Save task
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access** actions are not shown. GitHub App create, import, and install remain explicit workflow
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actions because they leave Kandev for GitHub rather than saving a local connection draft.
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- For Kandev-managed GitHub checkouts used by Local and Worktree tasks, the selected task policy
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also controls the persisted `origin` transport. Managed routing uses canonical GitHub HTTPS.
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Executor inheritance uses the host's detected `gh` clone protocol, including SSH, and reconciles
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an existing managed checkout when the policy changes. This makes Git conditional includes based
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on `remote.*.url` observe the same transport the task uses. Kandev never rewrites the remote of a
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repository registered as a user-managed local checkout.
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- Repository preparation resolves each attached repository once per launch or resume and reuses
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that result for primary-repository configuration, multi-repository configuration, and credential
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routing. Origin reconciliation is serialized per managed checkout, compares the current and
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desired canonical URLs, and performs no write when they already match.
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- Repository preparation validates any contribution destination before issuing credentials, adds a
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collision-resistant dedicated fork remote, and reconstructs it on launch and resume. It never
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accepts a fork inferred from the checkout's current remotes or a caller-provided repository name.
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- Git failures while inspecting or reconciling a managed checkout preserve a bounded,
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credential-redacted diagnostic. Git's dubious-ownership failure is classified as a service/data
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ownership mismatch with guidance to restore the intended Kandev service account or reconcile the
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managed data owner. Kandev does not bypass Git's ownership protection with a broad
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`safe.directory` entry.
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- Under managed routing, App installation tokens are minted for the requested repository and cached
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only in memory. PAT/CLI tokens retain their provider-granted scope once delivered to a trusted
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agent subprocess. GitHub HTTPS and the broker-aware `gh` shim fail closed rather than consulting
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another ambient helper after a managed-helper failure.
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- A managed pre-PR fork destination must be writable by the same workspace automation source that
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supplies the task leases. Human PAT and named CLI automation actors may own or create their fork.
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An App installation without direct target write access is not silently paired with a user's
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personal fork or personal token.
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- Managed Git helper execution does not depend on the post-startup `PATH`: Git resolves an
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absolute Kandev-owned `agentctl` executable published before the first managed Git operation.
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Local and Worktree preparation binds the helper to the standalone launcher's absolute executable
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before checkout or setup scripts run. Remote preparation binds it to the installed executor
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binary before cloning, and a running `agentctl` publishes its own executable for child processes.
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Non-interactive Unix login shells that replace their inherited `PATH` restore the managed
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CLI-shim directory after profile initialization for broker-enabled tasks, while preserving
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pre-existing Bash environment hooks, including hook paths containing `$VAR` or `${VAR}`
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references from the effective child environment. Broker-disabled and executor-inheritance
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processes receive no shell hook or managed-tool path.
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- Under managed routing, every authorized task execution surface receives the same current
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task-scoped Git environment: the agent subprocess, terminal shells, passthrough-agent PTYs, and
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task-scoped command processes. This includes the broker contract, managed indexed Git
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configuration, and the `agentctl`/`gh` shim-first `PATH`; it does not grant access to a browser
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client, an unrelated host shell, or another workspace's task environment.
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- Kandev composes the indexed `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT` / `GIT_CONFIG_KEY_<n>` /
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`GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_<n>` protocol across host, executor, profile, task, and agentctl boundaries.
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Unrelated entries such as hooks, notes, safe-directory, and URL-rewrite settings survive in their
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original order; later Kandev credential entries affect only their intended GitHub credential
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keys. An already-forwarded suffix is not duplicated.
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- Explicit executor-profile `GITHUB_TOKEN` or `GH_TOKEN` values remain unmanaged operator overrides
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and take precedence over the workspace broker when managed routing is selected.
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- Every successful task launch or resume records a non-secret session snapshot of the selected
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policy, effective credential source, known method and actor, transport, executor, and capture
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time. Inherited and profile-token actors are labeled runtime-selected instead of being probed.
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- The unpublished `KANDEV_GITHUB_APP_*` configuration introduced on this branch is removed. Setting
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those variables does not create or configure a registration; operators use the guided import
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flow for an App they already own.
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- Existing released workspaces migrate to `legacy_shared`; upgrades do not rewrite their
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connection or task policy. New operator-authorized workspaces use the active authenticated host
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`gh` account when one can be validated, while member-created workspaces and workspaces created
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without usable host `gh` remain disconnected. Once a workspace leaves legacy mode it cannot
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return. The unpublished singleton registration
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schema on this branch is rewritten directly and receives no compatibility migration. A valid
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legacy connection supplies both the existing API client abstraction and an in-memory Git
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transport credential so provider-backed repositories can be rematerialized from legacy shared
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managed paths into workspace-isolated clone roots.
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- Copying a workspace copies repository preferences but never copies a PAT, CLI account selection,
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App installation binding, registration secret, or personal identity.
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## Choosing A Method
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| Method | Use when | Benefits | Costs and limits |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| PAT | A local or simple workspace should act as one person | Fast setup; human attribution | Long-lived bearer secret; agents receive its full provider scope |
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| Named `gh` CLI | The desired human account already exists in local `gh` auth | No token copied into Kandev; deterministic account selection | Depends on host CLI credentials; remote agents still use the brokered bearer token |
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| GitHub App | An organization or unattended workspace needs managed automation | Short-lived repository-scoped tokens; independent revocation; App attribution | Requires App ownership, callback/webhook configuration, installation, and a public HTTPS URL for full lifecycle health |
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The workspace UI explains that an App is recommended for background jobs and managed agents, but
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it does not claim agents can only use the selected method. Explicit executor credentials and other
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unmanaged tools remain outside Kandev's workspace credential contract.
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The automation method and task Git credential policy are independent. Selecting a named `gh`
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account does not inherit the host's Git configuration: in managed mode Kandev resolves that exact
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host/login and brokers its token to the task. Users who want traditional host or executor behavior
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select **Inherit executor Git credentials** explicitly.
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## Identity And Routing
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| Purpose | First choice | Fallback | Attribution |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| Background reads and writes | Workspace automation | None | Automation principal |
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| Managed task git and `gh` access | Workspace automation | Explicit profile token | Automation principal, or runtime-selected override |
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| Inherited task Git access | Executor-visible Git/SSH credentials | None | Runtime-selected |
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| `My GitHub` reads | Personal connection | Human PAT/CLI automation | Human principal |
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| User-triggered mutation | Personal connection | Human PAT/CLI, then App installation | Effective principal shown in UI |
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An App-only workspace without personal OAuth remains usable for automation and App-attributed
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mutations. `My GitHub` instead offers a personal connection created with the same App registration
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as the workspace installation.
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## GitHub App Policy
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Kandev-created Apps request repository metadata read; contents read/write; pull requests read/write;
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issues read/write; checks, statuses, and Actions read; administration read; organization members
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read; and workflows write. The UI exposes this policy through a permissions button and dialog, not
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a row of chips. The App subscribes to the configurable `push` and `check_run` events. GitHub sends
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`installation`, `installation_repositories`, and `github_app_authorization` lifecycle events
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automatically, so they are handled but are not part of the requested event policy.
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An imported App must meet the same callback, OAuth-on-install, webhook, event, and permission
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requirements. Kandev validates the App identity and reports missing capabilities after installation.
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It does not silently change an imported App's GitHub settings. The guide provides exact values and
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GitHub links for the user to apply.
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## Data Model
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### `github_app_registrations`
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One row per GitHub App known to this Kandev deployment. Registration metadata is catalog state;
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workspace use is represented only by an explicit workspace connection.
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| Field | Type | Constraint |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `id` | UUID text | Primary key; allocated before manifest creation |
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| `source` | enum text | `managed` (manifest-created) or `imported` |
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| `display_name` | text | Non-empty user-facing disambiguator |
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| `github_host` | text | `github.com` in this feature |
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| `app_id` | int64 | Positive; unique with `github_host` |
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| `client_id` | text | Non-secret App OAuth client identifier |
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| `slug` | text | Verified App slug |
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| `owner_login` | text | Verified App owner |
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| `owner_type` | enum text | `User` or `Organization` |
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| `visibility` | enum text | `private` or `public` |
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| `public_base_url` | text | Canonical public HTTPS origin |
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| `created_for_workspace_id` | text nullable | Provenance only; not an automatic binding |
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| `credential_generation` | int64 | Positive; cache and lease invalidation key |
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| `credential_secret_id` | text | Non-empty encrypted bundle pointer |
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| `status` | enum text | `active` or `invalid` |
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| `webhook_status` | enum text | `unverified`, `verified`, or `failing` |
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| `last_webhook_at` | timestamp nullable | Last correctly signed delivery for this registration |
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| `last_error` | text nullable | Sanitized validation or runtime failure |
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| `created_at`, `updated_at` | timestamp | Required |
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Managed and imported credentials are immutable encrypted bundles under
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`github:app-registration:<registration-id>:g<generation>:<nonce>`. A versioned bundle contains the
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private key, client secret, and webhook secret. Metadata points to the active bundle only after the
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bundle is durable. Every registration is represented by one verified catalog row and encrypted
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bundle; there is no synthetic, configuration-backed, or globally active registration.
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### `github_app_registration_flows`
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Manifest flows store `state_hash`, preallocated `registration_id`, initiating `workspace_id` and
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`user_id`, owner type/login, display name, visibility, canonical public base URL, manifest revision,
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expiry, consumption time, and creation time. A new flow for the same workspace supersedes its older
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unconsumed flow. State is random, hashed at rest, single-use, and expires after one hour.
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### `github_workspace_connections`
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One row per configured workspace automation identity. Existing fields remain, with:
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| Field | Type | Constraint |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `app_registration_id` | UUID text nullable | Required only for `github_app_installation`; FK to `github_app_registrations.id` with delete restricted |
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For an App connection, `installation_id`, verified account login/type, and
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`app_registration_id` must all be present. PAT/CLI/legacy rows must have no registration ID.
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### `github_workspace_settings`
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The non-secret operational settings row adds `task_git_credentials_mode`, with allowed values:
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| Value | Behavior |
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| --- | --- |
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| `managed` | Inject the workspace broker contract for attached GitHub repositories unless an explicit executor-profile token overrides it. Existing missing/invalid values continue to normalize here for upgrade compatibility. |
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| `executor` | Default persisted for newly created workspaces. Inject no Kandev GitHub helper or `gh` shim; use credentials available where the selected executor runs. |
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Missing or invalid persisted values normalize to `managed`. Workspace-settings copy includes this
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policy because it is operational configuration, not authentication material.
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### Task-session credential snapshot
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After a successful launch or resume, task-session metadata contains a versioned
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`git_credential_snapshot` with:
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- selected policy (`managed` or `executor`);
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- effective source (`workspace`, `executor_profile`, or `executor`);
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- workspace method when known (`pat`, `gh_cli`, `github_app_installation`, or
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`legacy_shared`);
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- a known human/App actor label, or `runtime_selected` when Kandev does not inspect the credential;
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- transport (`managed_https`, `profile_token`, or `executor_selected`), executor type, and capture
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timestamp.
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The snapshot contains no token, lease, helper path, credential-file path, or SSH key detail. A
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failed launch/resume does not replace the last successful snapshot.
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### `github_user_connections`
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One optional personal identity per `(workspace_id, user_id)`. Add required
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`app_registration_id`, which must equal the current workspace App connection's registration. Access
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and refresh tokens remain encrypted under workspace/user-derived keys. Switching away from that
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App deletes the old personal secrets and increments its generation before the new automation
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connection becomes visible.
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### `github_auth_flows`
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Installation and personal OAuth flows include `app_registration_id` in addition to workspace,
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user, expected connection generation, PKCE material, expiry, and consumption state. A callback is
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valid only when both its route registration ID and stored registration ID match.
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### `github_webhook_deliveries`
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The primary key is `(app_registration_id, delivery_id)`. A delivery is claimed only after the
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registration-specific HMAC signature is verified. The row records event, terminal result, received
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time, and processed time without payload secrets or tokens.
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Background PR, task, and review-watch records retain `workspace_id`; review watches also retain the
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verified target human login. Missing or contradictory ownership fails closed.
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## API Surface
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All non-public endpoints require workspace authorization. The current trusted-single-user runtime
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maps this to `default-user`; mutually untrusted deployments require real workspace/admin roles
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before exposing registration management.
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### Registration catalog
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- `GET /api/v1/github/app/registrations?workspace_id=<id>` returns accessible non-secret
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registrations, source, identity, visibility, callback URLs, health, whether each is selected by
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this workspace, and sharing implications. It never returns credentials.
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- `POST /api/v1/github/app/registrations/manifest/start` accepts `workspace_id`, `display_name`,
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owner type/login, visibility, and public base URL. It returns the GitHub owner-specific manifest
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submission URL, generated manifest, state, registration ID, revision, and expiry.
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- `GET /api/v1/github/app/registrations/:registrationId/manifest/callback` consumes state, converts
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the one-hour code, verifies identity and policy, commits an encrypted bundle plus metadata, and
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returns to that workspace's GitHub settings. It does not select or install the App automatically.
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- `POST /api/v1/github/app/registrations/import/prepare` creates a short-lived, single-use import
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preparation for the initiating workspace. It returns `registration_id`, `public_base_url`,
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`manifest_callback_url`, `install_callback_url`, `personal_callback_url`, `webhook_url`,
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`permissions`, `events`, and `expires_at` so the user can configure the existing App before
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submitting any root credentials. The legacy `setup_url` response field is retained for client
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compatibility and is always empty because OAuth-on-install disables GitHub's Setup URL.
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- `POST /api/v1/github/app/registrations/import` consumes the prepared `registration_id` and accepts
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the workspace context, label, App ID, client ID/secret, slug, private key, webhook secret, owner,
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and visibility. It verifies the App via GitHub before atomically persisting it. Duplicate
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`(host, app_id)` returns `github_app_already_registered` and the non-secret existing registration
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ID.
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- `PATCH /api/v1/github/app/registrations/:registrationId` changes only `display_name`.
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- `DELETE /api/v1/github/app/registrations/:registrationId` deletes a registration only when no
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workspace or personal connection references it.
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### Workspace automation
|
||||
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||||
- `GET /api/v1/github/status?workspace_id=<id>` returns automation, personal identity, effective
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actors, App registration metadata, capabilities, missing permissions, and migration state.
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||||
- `GET /api/v1/github/workspace-settings?workspace_id=<id>` returns repository scope, saved
|
||||
preferences, and `task_git_credentials_mode`.
|
||||
- `PUT /api/v1/github/workspace-settings` accepts a partial
|
||||
`task_git_credentials_mode` update and rejects unknown values without changing the prior policy.
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||||
- `GET /api/v1/github/auth/gh-cli/accounts?workspace_id=<id>` lists exact local host/login choices.
|
||||
- `PUT /api/v1/github/workspace-connection?workspace_id=<id>` configures validated PAT or named CLI
|
||||
auth. App connections can only be committed by the verified installation callback.
|
||||
- `POST /api/v1/github/app/install/start` accepts `workspace_id` and `app_registration_id`, stores a
|
||||
single-use flow, and returns the registration-specific GitHub installation URL.
|
||||
- `GET /api/v1/github/app/registrations/:registrationId/install/callback` verifies state, App,
|
||||
installation, authorizing user, and owner association before atomically replacing workspace
|
||||
automation. Failure leaves the previous automation connection unchanged.
|
||||
- `DELETE /api/v1/github/workspace-connection?workspace_id=<id>` removes workspace secret material
|
||||
and the App installation binding but never deletes or uninstalls the registration.
|
||||
- `POST /api/v1/github/app/registrations/:registrationId/webhook` is public. It chooses exactly that
|
||||
registration's webhook secret, validates HMAC before parsing or claiming the delivery, and only
|
||||
mutates connections whose registration and installation both match.
|
||||
|
||||
### Personal identity
|
||||
|
||||
- `POST /api/v1/github/personal-connection/start` uses the workspace's active App registration and
|
||||
returns its PKCE/state authorization URL.
|
||||
- `GET /api/v1/github/app/registrations/:registrationId/personal/callback` validates route, state,
|
||||
PKCE, current workspace registration, and GitHub user before storing tokens.
|
||||
- `DELETE /api/v1/github/personal-connection?workspace_id=<id>` deletes only the current user's
|
||||
workspace personal connection and secrets.
|
||||
|
||||
Existing `/api/v1/github/token` remains a one-release compatibility alias with mandatory
|
||||
`workspace_id` and a deprecation header.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user