fix(agents): harden ACP launcher configuration (#1917)
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@@ -51,6 +51,19 @@ Use separate profiles for different trust levels. Do not give a routine document
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An agent profile combines a CLI, model, mode, flags, environment values, secret references, permissions, and optional MCP servers. Treat it as a reusable authority package.
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The configurable ACP command prefix is currently a launch-customization
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feature, not an isolation boundary. Kandev does not yet have a separate
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authenticated operator session for profile mutations, so an agent that can
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reach the main HTTP API may attempt the same profile edits as the UI. Do not
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rely on the prefix to confine a hostile agent until the operator-owned settings
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boundary in
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[ADR-2026-07-24-operator-owned-agent-launcher-settings](../decisions/2026-07-24-operator-owned-agent-launcher-settings.md)
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is enforced. The current per-boot token is a deliberately replayable interim
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CSRF and accidental-mutation interlock, not authentication: an intentional
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agent can fetch and replay it. It does not close this direct-client path, and
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an ambient browser login is insufficient while agent-controlled previews can
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share the operator origin.
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1. Create a profile for one purpose, such as local implementation, read-focused review, or unattended maintenance.
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2. Select the least-privileged Git, provider, and cloud credentials that purpose needs.
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3. Leave approval or sandbox bypasses disabled unless the executor is disposable and the task is trusted.
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